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Hungarian Civil Law since 1990 
Abstract. The paper outlines some trends in the development of Hungarian civil law 
since the political changes. The role of certain social factors having an effect on civil 
law and trends in court practice are focused upon. In the law of torts the decline of the 
respect of the State seems to have an importance in recent chases. In the field of contract 
law problems connected with different kinds of risks are reflected. Both property law 
and contact law have been concerned in cases where principles of the protection of the 
owner and those of the protection of bona fide purchaser has been in contradiction. As a 
result of the growing importance of credit the role of secured transactions has increased. 
Keywords: social changes and civil law, torts, contracts, property law, secured 
transactions 
1. The topic of the essay wishes to establish a link with that of one of Gyula 
Eörsi's works ("On the law of the change-over to a new system of economic 
management" A gazdaságirányítás új rendszerére áttérés jogáról). This has 
not really been the only one of his works dealing with the legal solutions 
of a new era. Ever since the 1930's, Hungarian lawyers faced the question 
of legal transition appropriate for a new stage of history in short periods 
of time. It is thus understandable that in several works by Gyula Eörsi 
the analysis of the legal consequences of changes takes center stage. This 
essay to be published in the volume in honour of Gyula Eörsi corresponds 
also with its choice of topic to the goals of preparing such a col lect ion. 
I consider the analysis of the topic for other reasons as well. The t ime 
that has elapsed since the collapse of the Communist system is not long, 
the first period of transition had nevertheless passed, a new phase has 
begun. The tendencies of the new paths of legal development should be 
analysed to prepare the ground for fu ture steps. A short essay is naturally 
nothing else but one of the contributions necessary for completing the 
great work. 
* 
Attila Harmathy, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, judge of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, Budapest, H-1015 Budapest, Donáti u. 35-45., Hungary. 
Fax: 36 1 488 3170; E-mail: harmathy@mkab.hu 
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2. As an introduction, may I first of all make a remark of a personal 
nature. I had been in contact with Gyula Eörsi since 1957. I listened to his 
lectures at the university, took part in his seminars and I considered it a 
great honour that without regard to the difference of the level of knowledge 
between the two of us, he seriously considered my attempts at presenting 
views differ ing from his own. Our contact did not come to an end when I 
was not allowed to get a job in a legal field after the university. Later, it was 
by his intervention that I found a position at the Institute for Legal Studies 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and I had been working for two 
decades under his guidance. He created possibilities fo r me to work, to 
learn, to appear in international scholarly circles. I was, however, maybe 
most grateful because he did not wish to influence me, but allowed me to 
follow my own path. He provided me with complete independence in 
research, organisation of research and library-building (the foundations of 
later work). I wished to learn a lot f rom him, but maybe first of all his 
style of leadership allowing for freedom of scientific research. During our 
long-lasting relationship the opportunity sometimes arose to express my 
thanks in public. The same is now expressed by this writing to be included 
in the volume to be published in his honour. 
3. Political factors played a decisive role in the transformation of civil law 
during and following the time of the change of political system; the essay does 
not, however, deal with these, as their effect may be regarded as well-
known. The basic topic of the present work is the effect on law of changes 
in society and the economy. 
In the recent years there has been a growing interest towards developments 
taking place in the countries of the previous Communist Bloc. From all the 
conclusions of the many studies concluded in this area, here and now I 
only wish to point out that the role of sociological and political factors is 
more and more recognised, what is more, there is even a view which 
regards these as more important regarding the process of transformation than 
economic ones.1 A considerably influential school of economics highlights 
that, also from the viewpoint of the transformation process, basic institutions 
defining the framework, the rules of the process (e.g. property law, contract 
law) play a decisive role. These institutions change only slowly, as they 
1
 Furubotn , E. G.: Legal r e fo rms in Russ ia : visible steps, obv ious gaps and the 
invisible h a n d ? Comment . Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2 0 0 0 . 
120. 
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are tied to human consciousness, and consciousness changes only over a 
longer period of time.2 
In the following I shall not deal with those areas of civil law, the basic 
rules of which are in direct connection with the changes of the political 
system, as these may be regarded as well-known. Thus, basic rules of privati-
sation, the freedom of enterprise, rules on entrepreneurship and company 
law, moreover the rules of competition law which are unavoidable in today's 
market economy form a basic ingredient in the transformation of civil law. 
The creation of the rules pertaining to these areas brought about a spectacular 
change, the formation of new f ie lds of law. Their spreading indirect effect, 
the role they play in the transformation of civil law thinking is only fulf i l led 
in correlation with other factors, in connection with the changes of society 
and the economy. 
The present essay also does not include analysis of rules of law 
included in Acts of Parliament or other statutes. I have been driven by the 
endeavour to try to present phenomena observed in court practice, as 
opposed to the general approach which tends to concentrate too much on 
statutory law. 
4. The scientific approach stressing the importance of institutions and social 
development stands in opposition to the neo-classical economic theories, 
almost dominant in the 1980's, which regarded the market mechanism as 
playing the definitive role, wished to minimise the role of the state and 
disregarded social and cultural factors. The other school (the role of which 
may also be observed in the activity of the World Bank), gaining more and 
more ground since the end of the 1980's against neo-classical economic 
theory concentrates on social transformation and analyses also the factors 
of policy and state institutions significantly influencing social trans-
formation.2 
The above-mentioned factors seem distant as regards the institutions of 
civil law and their analysis is often disregarded in discussing changes of civil 
law. Studies of the transition process analysing the issue f rom several, non-
legal points of view do, however, regard the transformation of the system 
of institutions including those governed by civil law as well as their social 
North, D. C.: Big-Bang Trans fo rmat ion of E c o n o m i c Sys tems: An Introductory 
Note . Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2000. 5 - 7 . 
3
 Castles, S.: Studying Social Transformation. International Political Science Review, 
2001. 17-19. 
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effect as having fundamental importance.4 Thus, the endeavour at the basis 
of the present essay to analyse the changes of certain fundamental social 
institutions in connection with social and economic factors is in line with 
the view of several authors. Here, the stress is placed on changes occurring 
in a relatively shorter span of time, and a mention of processes lasting several 
decades is only made insofar as this is necessary for understanding the 
developments of the past ten years.5 
5. In Hungary the consequences of the demographic situation must be taken 
into account in bringing about decisions of legal policy, also in the area of 
civil law. Highlighting two phenomena seems to be necessary in this context. 
One of the factors to be considered is the decrease of the population of 
the country, which had to be counted upon since the beginning of the 
1950's. Policy decisions born in 1953, 1968, 1973 and 1984 to counter the 
danger brought, however, only short-lasting, temporary results. The economic 
problems appearing and later strengthening already before the political 
transition period nullified even the temporary effects of these population 
policy measures. The situation turned critical in the 1990's. What we are 
really dealing with here are the consequences of a negative trend in effect— 
with short lapses—for a longer period of time. The current situation is 
represented by the fol lowing data: 
The rate of live births per 1000 population in 1930-1931 numbered 34.6 a 
year, in 1959-1960 14.9 a year, in 1989-1990 12.0 a year and in 1999 only 
9.4 a year.7 This is coupled with the increase in the death rate which may be 
observed since the end of the 1960's. The rate had been per 1000 population 
4
 Tian, G. : A Theory of Ownership Arrangements and Smooth Trans i t ion to a 
Free Market Economy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2001. 
381, 383. ; Blommeste in , H.—Marrese , M.—Zecchin i , S.: Centrally Planned 
Economies in Transit ion, in: Transformation of Planned Economies (ed. : H. 
B l o m m e s t e i n — M . Marrese), Par is , 1991. 1 2 - 1 3 . 
5
 Changes within a longe r span of t ime were analysed in: Harmathy, A. : A pol-
g á r i j o g a századfordulón . Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2000/4, 1 1 7 - 1 2 5 . 
6
 Miltényi, К.: Népesedéspoli t ika (Policy of demographic). In: Demográfia. (Ed.: 
Kovacsicsné Nagy Katalin), Budapes t 1996, 477 -479 . , V u k o v i c h , Gy.: A m a g y a r né-
pesedéspol i t ika néhány vonatkozása ( S o m e relations of Hungarian Po l i cy of 
democraphic) . In: Magyarország történeti demográfiája (1896-1995) [The historical 
demography of Hungary (1896-1995)]. (Ed. : Kovacsics, J.) , Budapes t , 1997. 395 . 
7
 Központ i Statisztikai Hivata l , Demográfiai évkönyv 1999. (Hungarian Demog-
raphic Yearbook 1999), 84. 
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in 1930-1931 16.1 a year, decreasing to 10.3 a year by 1959-1960, then 
rising to a level of 14.0 by 1989-1990, the rate for 1999 having been 14.2.8 
The decrease in the number of births, the growing number of deaths 
resulted—as opposed to previous slow growth—in a decrease of 300,000 in 
the country's population between 1980-1989; the decrease in population in 
one year had been 19,981 in 1990 and already 48,565 in 1999. Available 
data show a decrease in the rate of population loss for 2000 and 2001. 10 
The second factor to be considered is the negative change in the 
proportion of age groups within the population. In comparison with the 
whole of the population, the proportion of people between ages of 40-60 
was 20.1% in 1930, 25.3% in 1980 and 27.9% in 2000; the proportion of 
those above 60 was 9.8% in 1930, 17.1% in 1980 and 19.7% in 2000." 
Before the transition the majority of men above 60 and women above 55 
were employed, however, already by 1989 a significant change has taken 
place. Comparative data of 151 countries show Hungary to be in one of the 
most unfavourable positions. The proportion of economically active persons 
to the whole of the population had been 44.4% in 1949, dropping to 36% by 
1994.'" Inactive persons per 100 economically active persons in gainful 
employment numbered 107 in 1975, 119 in 1988 and 174 in 1994.13 
6. The decrease in population shall have a considerable long-term effect 
even if population policy and family protection measures will be able to 
reverse this unfavourable development, even if a favourable change occurs. 
The death rate deserves a special attention in this regard. 
The growing rate of accidents among the causes of death is once again 
not in connection with the changes of the past ten years, although the 
economic-social system does have a secondary effect alongside technological 
development. Between 1930 and 1949 no significant change occurred in 
the rate of those dying as a result of accidents, the rate being 2-2.5% of 
all deaths. In the following period, however, the number of accidents grew 
fast and continuously. In 1989-1990 accidents represented 5.9% of all 
8
 Hungarian Demograph ic Y e a r b o o k 1999. op. ci t . 156. 
g 
Hungarian Demographic Yearbook 1999. op. cit. 2. 
10
 A KSH je lent i (Reports of the Central Statistics Bureau) 2001/9 . 4 3 - 4 4 , 88. 
" Hungarian Demographic Yearbook 1999. op. cit. 8 - 9 . 
Miltényi, К.: A demográfia e g y e s gazdasági és társadalmi összefüggése i . In: 
Demográfia, op. cit. 533 . 
13
 Katona, T.: Magyarország t á r sada lmi és gazdaság i fej lődése. In: Magyarország 
történeti demográfiája, op. cit. 276. 
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causes of death. Later the number of accidents has dropped and in 1998 
and 1999 the rate of fatal accidents to all causes of death represented 
4.7% and 4.6%, respectively. Of all accidents resulting in death, traffic 
accidents represented around 25% according to relevant data for 1999.14  
Thus, although the significance of accidents is not to be neglected, more 
than 95% of all deaths occur from other reasons. Thus, in the majori ty of 
cases, living conditions and the health-care situation have a prevailing 
significance. In this area we are once again confronted with a phenomenon 
developing and having effect for decades. Economic historians have 
stressed as far back as the 1970's that—partly in connection with the back-
wardness of social policy—the state has volunteered to provide such 
benefits in the form of full health care free and accessible for all which 
were well above all financial means. This step had a damaging effect on 
the quality of these services and resulted in other areas of tension. '5 
7. The Hungarian situation described above causes grave problems in general, 
but its effect may also be felt in the area of civil law as well. This is 
shown by a recent discussion of the topic by Atiyah, which argues that in 
several European states, an explosion of the demographic bomb may be 
expected within the relatively near future, as the expenses of the welfare 
state, including those to be covered within the framework of compensation 
for damages, will not be able to be covered by the decreasing number of 
persons in gainful employment. According to the highly regarded author, 
who has dealt with questions of liability for damages for decades, the state 
effort for the protection of individuals resulted in a great extension of the 
sphere of application of compensation for damages, in particular with the 
spread of insurance for traffic accidents—especially as regards personal 
injuries. Presently, however, welfare expenditures should be decreased as 
a result of the decrease of population, and liability for damages should 
also, as a consequence, be relieved.16 
14
 Demográf ia i évkönyv 1999. (Hungar ian Demographic Yearbook 1999) , op. cit. 
242. 
15
 Berend, T .—Ránki , Gy.: A magyar gazdaság száz éve (100 years of Hungarian 
economy) . Budapest , 1972. 315. 
" 'A t iyah , P. S.: Personal Injuries in the Twenty-Firs t Century: T h i n k i n g the 
Unthinkable. In: Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century (ed.: Peter Birks). 
Clarendon Press , Oxford , 1996. 7 - 8 . 
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Hungarian analyses of legal policy should also take into account the 
financial capacities of society and the connections with the social security 
system in the formation of civil law institutions. In this context especially 
the trend of the continuous expansion of liability for damages requires 
analysis. Liability for damages is connected with a lot of factors and in this 
complicated system in which, among other things, social consciousness and 
public opinion play a great role, a place for the risk distributed to individual 
actors of economic life and the financial capacity of the society should also 
be found. (The requirement, generally accepted by now, that the regulation 
of liability for damages should be examined in connection with the system 
of insurance is well highlighted by the recently published study describing 
and analysing the Scandinavian system, by Jan Hellner, the highly respected 
expert of the field.17) 
8. The effect of different factors arising in the sphere of liability for 
damages are also shown by the officially published court decisions of the last 
ten years. The fact that such decisions were published does not automatically 
mean that similar cases arise in great numbers in court practice. However, 
the fact that the Supreme Court considered it justified to publish a given 
decision does signal the significance of the issue. Conclusions regarding new 
phenomena may thus be drawn f rom these decisions. 
It may be pointed out as one of the new trends in tort cases that the 
practice of an expansion of liability for damages, which may be regarded 
as prevailing in the 20th century in general, has been continued in Hungary, 
arriving to ever newer fields. In referr ing to the existence of certain pheno-
mena, I regard efforts at their introduction as decisive, and not whether or not 
the court has in fact extended the application of liability for damages (this 
should be ascertained in further analyses). 
Of claims for damages appearing previously only in rare instances or 
not at all, the following are especially spectacular: 
— Claims for damages caused in relation to medical activity arise more 
frequently. In these cases doctors—in consequence of their role played in 
the given relationship—command respect and are, in reality, not on an 
17
 Hel lner , J.: Compensa t ion for P e r s o n a l Injuries in Sweden—A Reconsidered 
View. Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 41, 2001. 249-277 . ; on the system of liability 
regulation alongside a partial insurance of liability for damages in general see Honoré, T.: 
The Morali ty of Tort L a w . In: Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (ed.: D. Owen) , 
Oxfo rd , 1995. 73 -95 . 
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equal footing with the patient, the damaged party. Here, making claims in 
court signals a change in the social perception of the doctor—patient 
relationship as well as the previously mentioned unfavourable development 
in the situation of health-care services, besides raising specific issues of 
liability insurance. Decisions brought in such cases appear in much larger 
numbers than in the previous era.18 
— Claims for damages caused by courts had previously been rare 
exceptions, but may be found surprisingly often since 1990. This fact 
requires examination from several points of view (which is not, however, 
the purpose of this essay). 
— Previously no claims for damages caused by legislation appeared, 
following 1990, however, decisions on such claims have repeatedly been 
published."0 
9. When discussing in the present paper selected trends one may often 
draw conclusions as to the joint effect of several factors and it is not clear 
which of these is of grater importance. The above grouping is thus only of 
a relative value, it only serves to highlight different factors. Thus in the 
previous trend, as regards claims for damages caused by courts and legislation, 
an element of a political nature may well be presumed to exist. The process of 
political transformation went hand in hand with the downgrading of the 
role of the state and besides that, the previously also existing but less 
expressed emotional basis of opposition to the state has surfaced. The more 
frequent appearance of claims for damages caused by administrative actions 
may also be a sign of this trend. 
Several types of damages caused by administrative actions may be 
found among the officially published cases. Actions against the police, the 
organs of law enforcement, the tax authority and the customs off ice are to 
21 
be mentioned on the first place." Questions of liability caused by official 
18
 Bírósági Határozatok (Supreme Court Decisions) (hereinafter referred to as B. H.) 
cases no. 1992/5. 317., 1995/6. 344., 1998/2. 78., 1998/ 380., 1998/12. 585., 1999/11. 
501 . , 2000/8. 347. , 2000/12 . 536. 
14
 B. H. cases no. 1992/1. 60., 1992/2. 103., 1995/7. 403., 1996/2. 91., 2000/2. 55. 
2 0 B. H. cases no. 1994/1. 31., 1994/6. 312., 1998/7. 334. 
21
 B. H. cases no. 1996/6. 312., 1998/5. 224. 1998/10. 484., 1999/5. 207., 1999/8. 
359 . , 1999/9. 403. , 2001/7 , 319. 
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actions also appear in housing, registration and social security affairs and 
22 
in connection with public road maintenance." 
10. Following the transition process, the tendency of placing questions of 
personal rights in the focus of attention has strengthened. In actions started 
for an infringement of personal r ights rulings on awarding damages for 
non-pecuniary losses o f t en appeared. A lot of problems await analysis and 
solution in these two topics. Here we just point out the existence of the 
phenomenon together with stating that an extension of liability for 
damages may be observed also in this respect. 
11. A different group of cases involving claims for damages may be 
brought into connection with the bui ld-up of the market economy. I wish 
to emphasize the fol lowing cases of such character (not bearing their 
relative frequency in mind): 
— The borders of the freedom of economic activity are defined, among 
other things, by the law of torts. In this field the sanctioning of illegal 
conduct towards market competitors with an obligation to pay damages is 
especially significant. The first appearance of the question may be found 
in cases published within the last ten years. Similarly, damages awarded 
for the infringement of tender rules for privatisation sales are also meant 
to ensure an adequate functioning of the market."3 
— The fact that claims for damages have been asserted against 
receivers in liquidation stands in connection with the effect of the market 
economy."4 
— Cases similar to those involving receivers include claims asserted in 
connection with the negligence of bailiffs, the land registry and the 
activity of public notaries."5 
12. In a large part of the listed tort cases of varying subject matter, the 
previously not mentioned feature that the decision on liability has to be 
brought in connection with some prefessional activity may also be observed. 
22
 B. H. cases no. 1991/5. 209., 1992/1. 57., 1993/11. 677. , 1993/11. 679., 1996/12. 
638. 
23
 B. H. case no. 1998/9 . 442 and case no . 1997/5. 246. 
24
 B. H. cases no. 1995/11. 663., 1996/12., 654., 2000/1. 25., 2000/9. 417., 2001/10 . 
488. 
25
 B. H. case no. 1998 /6 . 285., cases no. 1996/11. 587 . , 1997/5. 224. 1998/3. 
131., 1999/1 . 25., and c a s e no. 2001/9. 4 2 3 . 
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This is understandable, as economic data show an increase in the importance 
of services."6 A significant circumstance regarding a decision on liability is 
the fact that the conduct causing the damage is a professional activity, in 
which case the ruling depends on an evaluation (of a hidden or open legal 
policy nature) of the requirements of the given profession and the distribution 
of risk on a case-by-case basis. This element should also be taken into 
account when re-evaluating the basis of liability for damages. 
13. A social change influencing the whole of civil law to a significant 
extent has taken place after 1948. In order to picture this well-known process 
it is enough to refer to certain data published already in 1972 by analysts 
of economic history: as a consequence of agricultural policy, more than 
600,000 people left the agricultural sector, the number of townspeople and 
city-dwellers has grown by about 1 million, to which around 350,000 
commuters should be added; as a result of measures against middle-class 
citizens, around 400,000 people have lost their previous positions.27 One 
of the consequences has been a great social mobility,"8 another one being 
an acute shortage of housing, described at the end of the I 9 6 0 ' s as one of 
the "most neuralgic areas of tension" of social life."9 
Great social movement has again occured following the transition process. 
State-owned companies have practically ceased to exist, cooperative member-
ship numbers have gone into a steep decline, the number of private companies 
has multiplied in a quantum leap. " Of all enterprises, individual enterprises 
accounted for 58%, limited partnerships for 20% and limited liability 
31 
companies for 17% according to data for the year 2000. 
" 'Whi le the ra te of those employed in the serv ices sector was 4 4 . 9 % in 1989, this 
number had g r o w n to 59.7% by 1997. see INFO-Társadalomtudomány 43. Budapest , 
1998. 85. 
27
 Be rend—Ránk i : op. cit. 290, 308, 312 -313 . 
28 r 
Ferge, Zs . : Társadalmunk rétegződése (About our social strata). Budapest , 
1973. 298. 
29 , 
Szelényi, I .—Konrád, Gy.: Az új lakótelepek szociológiai problémái (The 
sociological problems of the new housing estates). Budapest , 1969. 140. 
30Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian Statistics) 1990. 
Budapest, 1991. 192., Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian 
Statistics) 1997. Budapest, 1998. 30, 120., Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of 
Hungarian Statistics) 2000. Budapest , 2001. 162. 
31 
Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian Statistics) 2000. op. 
cit. 162 . 
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Following 1990 the situation wherein the numbers of inhabitants in 
Budapest and certain industrially developed cities had grown year by year 
has changed, and population has slowly started to decrease in these areas, 
while starting to grow in villages.'2 The distribution of agricultural production 
according to types of business entities has significantly changed: while in 
1990 individual farmers cultivated 14% of the land, by 2000 this number 
has reached 42.8%, with companies taking up another 27.5%; as opposed 
to this, cooperatives cultivated 59.9% of arable land in 1990, while only 
13.2% in 2000." All this has a significant effect on legal issues of real estate 
ownership and the lease of the land. 
Turning from owners and individual businessmen into employees in 
the years after 1948 and then f rom employees into entrepreneurs after 
1990 went together with changes that resulted in, among other things, the loss 
of traditional social values. After the loss of the previous attitude of 
awareness of risk, the sudden confrontation with risks in a business 
environment characterised by high inflation'4 and a high unemployment 
ra te" meant a great shock. 
The above-mentioned factors had several social, economic and political 
consequences. In the following, I shall emphasise certain civil law conse-
quences. 
14. A large-scale housing scheme had been implemented as early as 1957 
to counter the housing problems. In 1960 a house-building programme 
spanning 15 years was prepared, the objectives of which were not successfully 
achieved and by 1980 the rate of state-owned flats has dropped (from 27% 
3
~ Demográfiai évkönyv 1999. (Hungarian Demographic Yearbook) 1999. op. cit. 
308. 
33Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian Statistics) 1990. op. 
cit. 130., Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian Statistics) 2000. 
op. cit. 230. 
34
 T h e rate of increase in the price of consumer goods is shown by the fact that by 
the end of 1996 the level of prices was f o u r times as high as in 1990, and within this 
period pr ices have near ly doubled b e t w e e n the beginning of 1994 and the end of 
1996, see Magyar Nemze t i Bank: Havi Jelentés (Monthly Report of the Hungarian 
National Bank), 2000. no . 12., 55. 
35
 T h e number of reg is te red unemployed in 1993 was more than 632 ,000 , slowly 
d ropping af terwards, bu t remaining as high as 4 6 4 , 0 0 0 in 1997, see Magyar 
Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian Statistics) 1997. op. cit. 37. 
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in 1970 to 25.6% in 1980).36 A part of the housing problems was also repre-
sented by the facts that, first, satisfactory funds could not be attributed to 
maintenance, which had become a state activity due to the nationalisation 
of apartment buildings in cities, the task was not adequately dealt with 
(around 56,000 flats in Budapest were registered as being in a perilous 
condition already by the early 1980's), second, that the question of rent 
was regarded as a political issue.37 
The housing situation remained unsolved by the time of political changes. 
In the course of privatisation, housing estates previously owned by the state 
and administered by housing management companies founded by local 
councils were handed over to the municipalities with Act XXXIII of 1991. 
Act LXXVIII of 1993 later regulated the appropriate legal framework for 
housing management in a market environment and the sale of flats owned 
by municipalities. These measures naturally did not relieve the housing 
shortage which has been causing serious problems for decades. Home-
building has steeply declined in general, while the sale of flats owned by 
38 
municipalities has taken a quantum leap in 1994-1995. A fitting picture of 
the quality of flats remaining the property of municipalities may be given 
by the following selected data: 
In 1997, 43.6% of all flats owned by municipalities belonged to the 
category of single room flats, temporary accomodation or similar living 
space; 25.2% of all housing estates (33.9% in Budapest) had been built 
before 1900, the rate of those built between 1970-1989 being 18.3%, of those 
built after 1989 being 1.2%; of all housing estates, only 34.2% required 
no intervention, the rest required renewal or were not even economically 
renewable (the rate of unrenewable flats is 8.6%).39 
When evaluating the housing situation, the fact that the differences in 
wealth of different classes of society have significantly grown should also 
7 6Barta, B .—Vukov ics , Gy. : A lakáshelyzet alakulása és je l lemzői (The 
development and character is t ics of the housing si tuat ion). In: Lakáspolitikánkról 
{About our housing policy). (Ed.: Böröczfy , F.). Budapes t , 1983. 205, 214, 216. 
17
 Sándor, P.: A lakásvagyon védelmében, and Dávid , G. J.: Lakáskérdés : piac és 
no rmák (Housing problem: marke t and norms). In: Lakáspolitikánkról, op. cit. 223 
and 304. 
38 
Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv (Pocket-Book of Hungarian Statistics) 1997, op. 
cit. 50-51 . 
"Központ i Statisztikai Hivatal: Az önkormányzatok ingatlanvagyona, 1997. (Central 
Stat ist ics Bureau: The real estate property of municipalities, 1997). Budapest , 1997. 
14, 30-31. 
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be taken into account. In the 1980's the rate of those living below poverty 
level was around 10%, in 1995 this rate was already estimated at 30 -35%. 
The difference between the lowest and highest income brackets has also 
grown: f rom 5.8 a year in 1987 to 7.0 in 1994. To this it should be added 
that fees for public utilities, kept on an artificially low level until the end 
of the 1980's, have also significantly risen. In the 1980's expenditures 
related to housing took up 10-12% of average income, in 1997 this rate 
was already estimated at 25-30% (this could mean as much as 45% for 
those with low income). Thus only a relatively small portion of society has 
been in the position to build new homes, as support fo r housing in the form 
of credit has also dropped, the real value of housing loans in 1995 having 
been only 15% of the value in 1990.40 
The above-mentioned phenomena did not only result in significant 
changes in the law of lease of flat contracts. They have had a direct effect 
on the legal rules pertaining to owner-occupied blocks and the problems 
arising in their application. A further, indirect effect—through the medium of 
hardships of execution—may also be felt in the law of contracts and the 
fulfillment of contractual obligations. 
15. The crisis of values generally accepted in society is shown by the 
rising crime rate. Statistical data show a continuous rise in the number of 
highest registered criminal offences starting with the 1980's. At the end of 
the 1980's the number of criminal offences has taken a quantum leap. The 
numbers are found in data for 1998. Crimes against property represent the 
largest portion (their rate of all crimes committed was around 60% until 
1987, ranging between 70% and 80% in the following years, the rate being 
69% according to data for the year 2001).41 Among crimes against property, 
theft (larceny) appears at a rate several times that of any other offence 
(72.4%).42 
411
 Hegedűs , J.: A magyar lakásszektor piaci á talakulásának el lentmondásos fo-
lyamata (The cont radic tory process of the market t r ans fo rmat ion of the Hungar ian 
housing sector) . INFO-Társcidalomtudomány 43. op, cit. 5 2 - 5 4 . 
41
 A KSH jelenti (Reports of the Central Statistics Bureau) 2001/10. 2 3 - 2 5 . ; Igaz-
ságügyi Minisz tér ium: A bűnözés és jogköve tkezménye i (Minis t ry of Jus t ice : Crime 
and legal consequences) , 10. A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények miatt elítélt fiatal-
korúak 1991-2000. Budapes t , 2001. 1 - 2 . 
4
" Igazságügyi Minisztérium: A bűnözés és jogkövetkezményei (Ministry of Just ice: 
Crime and legal consequences ) , 12. A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények elkövetése miatt 
elítélt felnőttek 1991-2000. Budapest, 2 0 0 1 . 4. 
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The fact that in court practice the interpretation of the rule governing 
aquisition of property from non-owners has caused problems may be 
evaluated as one of the civil law consequences of crimes against property 
becoming more frequent. The Supreme Court has committed itself in several 
consecutive published decisions for a restrictive interpretation of the rule 
allowing for aquisition of property from non-owners in transactions with 
merchants.43 Beside a restrictive interpretation, the question arises whether 
the court practice will be able to find a solution for making claims against 
merchants, who do not themselves formally sell cars later proved to be 
stolen, merely allow somebody to sell the car on their premises, but do not 
appear as sellers in the contract of sale. The good-faith buyer does not 
aquire property in this case (therefore the vict im of the crime, the owner is 
protected as opposed to the buyer), but problems arise in the context of 
security of transactions if no sanctions may be applied against the 
merchant at all.44 
Rules governing aquisition of property f rom non-owners need to be 
revised in any case, as a considerable change has occured f rom the business 
environment existing at the t ime of the creation of the Civil Code. In this 
area the Civil Code differs f rom both Art. 563 of the Civil Code Draft of 
1928 and Art. 299 of the previous Commercial Code. In 1959 the official 
ministrial grounding to Arts. 1 17 and 118 of the Civil Code emphasized 
the sale of second-hand goods, the role of marketplaces and the Commission 
Shop in this respect. It is questionable, what solution is the most adequate 
in the present as regards the conflict of the protection of security of 
transactions and the protection of property. From an overview of regulation 
existing in different countries the conclusion may be drawn that the German 
legal solution of the issue which concentrates on the protection of security 
of transactions (supporting aquisition of property from non-owners) is to 
some extent not followed even in the Austrian and Swiss regulation which 
start out f rom a similar basis, while a very different attitude is taken by 
French and English law.48 I believe this issue to be a significant area of 
43
 B. H. cases no . 1996/1. 48. , 1996/8. 418. and 419 . , 1997/3. 119. 
44
 The ar is ing quest ions and p rob l ems are h igh l igh ted by the dec i s ions published 
in the Bírósági Döntések Tárának (Collection of Court Decisions) 2001/11 nos. 169 
and 170. 
43
 An in te res t ing comparative law overview of the attitudes a c c e p t e d in d i f ferent 
countr ies is g iven by Schwenzer , I .—Mti l l e r -Chen , M.: Rechtsvergleichung, Fälle 
und Materialien, Tübingen , 1996. 3 0 5 - 3 3 7 . ; for Eng l i sh law see Chitty on Contracts, 
28th ed. H. Bea l e , London, 1999. Vol. 2, 1176. f f . ; see moreover Harmathy, A.: 
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the law of property, having an effect on several questions (including the 
role of the land register, the legal effect of registration as well). I regard it 
possible to form the main lines of a new regulation, following an analysis 
encompassing thorough comparative studies and stretching to several 
questions of the law of property. 
16. Society has not easily dealt with the insecurity resulting from growing 
crime. This lack of personal security has arisen parallel with the other 
type of insecurity which many felt to be burdensome because—as it has been 
briefly mentioned above—the possibility of loss of employment became 
an everyday problem and development into individual entrepreneurship 
has occurred beside a high inflation and considerable risk. The factors of 
insecurity have really been in existence already before 1990 (thus the 
crime rate has already risen and inflation had been causing problems already 
earlier46), with the transformation process their effect has, however, become 
manifest and has strengthened considerably. 
The functioning of the economy was hampered by the fact that already 
about ten years before the transition process companies and cooperatives 
had run into considerable debt which caused serious problems following 
1986.47 During the 1987 reform of the banking system, a significant portion of 
the credit owed to banks was classified as bad loan. Changes in the local 
and international economy only increased red tape, as, due to the loss of a 
large part of the markets in the East, the decline of local demand, the 
hardships of transformation vast numbers of businesses showed a deficit 
or went bankrupt. Small enterprises, on the other hand, battled with a lack 
of capital and lacked sufficient experience. The state was forced—not the 
least in order to help certain large companies—to execute several instances of 
bank consolidation, using large sums of money.48 
The insecure situation of the participants of economic life, inflation, 
increased market risk appear in a variety of forms in civil law. In the 
Dologi j o g — kötelmi j o g (Law of p roper ty—Law of contract) . In: Liber Amicorum, 
Studio L. Vékás dedicata. Budapest , 1999. 130 -131 , 134-135 . 
46 
For questions arising in relation to inflation already in 1982, see Harmathy, A.: Az 
árak változása és a polgári jog (Price amendment and civil law). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
1982/2. 7 3 - 8 3 . 47 / • • » 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank: Eves Jelentés (Yearly Report of the Hungarian National 
Bank) 1989. Budapes t , 1990. 4 4 - 4 5 . 48 
A magyar bankrendszer konszolidációja (The consolidation of the Hungarian 
bank system). 1994/10. 145-150 . 
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following those phenomena shall be discussed which may have a serious 
impact on the civil law approach. 
17. One of the phenomena that deserve attention is the new role of 
security instruments. Security instruments did not have a great importance 
under the conditions of the planned economy, the legal issues of security 
instruments gained emphasis in the countries of the previous Communist 
Bloc following the transformation of the economic system.4" It is to be 
noted that the significance of security instruments has grown all around 
the world since the end of the 19th century. On the basis of an analysis of 
the development of law in several countries, Ulrich Drobnig—a well-
known expert in the field—has found that the traditional rules of pledges 
and mortgages have lost much of their significance, the needs of practice 
required new solutions. As the chairman of the working group on European 
harmonisation of law in this field, he thus tries to create a future common 
European regulation along new lines, with a settlement that, among other 
things, regulates pledges alongside the transfer of receivables as security.50 
This represents a contract law solution of the regulation of property law 
security instruments—without leaving property law aspects out of account. 
In the field of personal securities a development similar to that of 
securities in property may be observed, insofar as the use of a form of 
security usually not regulated in codes of civil law has become widespread 
in commercial practice: the independent guarantee. Differences appear, 
however, in the field of consumer protection, where the legislative activity 
in European countries has been intensive in recent years and the statutes 
protect persons not qualifying as merchants f rom an ill-advised acceptance 
of risk. 
The growing number of published court decisions relating to security 
rights in property or in connection with that area since 1990—to a certain 
degree independently of changes in the regulatory regime—is also remarkable 
in Hungarian civil law (this deserves attention also because few decisions 
49 
In relation to this see essays in the volume Systemtransformation in Mittel- und 
Osteuropa und ihre Folgen für Banken, Börsen und Kreditsicherheiten (hrsg.: U. 
Drobnig , K. J. H o p t , H. Kötz, E. J. Metsmäcker) . Tüb ingen , 1998. 2 9 7 - 4 0 5 . 
50
 Drobnig, U.: Security Rights in Movables. In: Towards an European Civil Code 
(ed . : A. Har tkamp, M. Hesselink, E. Hondius, C. Jous t ra , E. Du Perron) , 2nd ed. The 
H a g u e — L o n d o n — B o s t o n , 1998. 51 1, 522 -524 . 
51
 Drobnig, U . : Recent Legis la t ive Trends in the Field of Personal Securi ty. 
European Business Organization Law Review, 2001 . 5 1 2 - 5 1 3 . and 5 1 5 - 5 2 4 . 
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have previously been published in this f ield). Decisions as to a large 
number of questions in the law of pledges and mortgages have been published 
by the Supreme Court.5" By the way, a lot of articles have been published 
about the law of pledges and mortgages (primarily in the bulletin of public 
notaries), which shows a strong interest in the field. The transfer of 
receivables as a security instrument has also appeared in Hungarian court 
practice,53 which serves the same purpose as a fiduciary transfer of property 
of goods (a substitute for mortgages accepted in the law of certain countries). 
Contractual solutions whereby the creditor does not demand mortgages as 
security, but attempts to achieve making certain of being reimbursed by 
other means may also be found. Thus, an aim to provide security may be 
found in contracts wherein the parties provide for an option to purchase 
property beside a loan (practically replacing pledges or mortgages),54 or 
apply the combination of a temporary lease and a sales contract leasing 
instead of retention of title.55 
Personal securities appear relatively rarely among the published cases 
in comparison with securities in property. In spite of that, cases of typical 
and atypical suretyship arose more frequently than in the previous era.51 More 
remarkable is the relatively frequent appearance of guarantees serving as 
security (especially taking into account that this type of security—with 
the exception of export trade prectice—was almost unknown). Most cases 
dealt with bank guarantees, but "guarantees" taken on by persons other 
than financial institutions are also to be found.5 7 
18. The element of insecurity in contractual relationships may also be found 
in the form that the party crediting his contractual counterpart is unable to 
know whether the debtor will fulfill his obligations in accordance with the 
5 2 B. H. cases no. 1992/11. 719 . , 1993/1. 46. , 1993/4. 245., 1995/10. 584., 1995/1 1. 
649. , 1996/5. 267. , 1996/6. 308., 1996/11,601., 1997/1 . 20., 1997/5. 243., 1998/1.38. , 
1998/3., 147., 1998/6. 290. and 292 . , 1999/2. 83. , 1993/3. 127., 1999/4., 180., 1999/11. 
533., 2000/2. 67., 2001/3. 133., 2001 /8 . 393. 
53
 B. H. case no. 2001/10. 489 , a similar background may be p resumed to exist in 
B. H. case no. 1996/7. 380. 
5 4 B. H. cases no. 1996/11. 603 . , 1998/7. 350. 
55
 B. H. cases no. 1992/12. 758 . , 1994/1. 40. , 1994/2. 97. 
56
 B. H. cases no. 1992/4. 239. , 1993/6. 375., 1993/10. 631., 1994/12. 681., 1995/2 . 
108., 1994/12. 681. , 2000/3. 117. 
57
 B. H. cases no. 1992/2. 120., 1993/7. 448 . , 1993/11. 6 9 0 . , 1997/3. 134. , 
1998/6. 293., 1999/6. 267., 2 0 0 0 / 5 . 214. 
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contract. Under the circumstances of the market economy, several other 
factors of insecurity and risk have to be taken into account, starting with 
the change of prices. The planned economy made an attempt to eliminate 
commercial risk in several ways, or, if this was not possible, to counter its 
consequences through the economic control activity of the state. The reform 
of the economic control mechanism did not change a lot in this practice, in 
spite of that, however, the subjects of economic life were more burdened with 
business risk after the transformation period, then before that. Accordingly, in 
contractual relationships the question of business risk has been raised, 
whether in the context of the application of the rule on obligation to pay 
damages for allusive conduct , or the voidability of the contract on account 
of mistake, or the modification of the contract by court, or impossibility 
58 
arising out of a change of prices. In evaluation of the risk in the past era, the 
great changes brought about by the transition process, the extraordinary risk 
has played a great part. Following the completion of the transformation of 
the economy, however, the effect of the extraordinary circumstances need 
no longer be taken into account. An important consideration under usual 
market conditions is how big a role elements of risk should play in the 
regulation of contracts and in the application of rules on contracts by 
judicial practice. 
The change in rates of interest and prices requires a special analysis 
among economic risks. Changing prices affect not only contractual relation-
ships but also other areas of civil law (a change in interest rates has less of a 
direct e f fec t in other issues). The fact that prices are not the same at the 
time of the damaging conduct and the order by the court to pay damages, 
and at the time of actual payment is especially important in establishing 
the amount of damages. A different solution is needed in contractual 
relationships, where the parties conclude the contract based on an 
evaluation of eventual risk, from the one in tort cases. In cases of breach 
of contract, however, considerations similar to those found in tort may 
have effect . It seems that in the case of both torts and breach of contract 
the protection of the interests of the damaged party are in the forefront in 
court practice.59 
58
 B. H. cases no. 1992/2 . 123., 1992/12. 775., 1993/9. 562., 1994/4. 179., 
1996/6. 3 2 6 . , 1998/6. 291., 1998/6. 296. 
59
 B. H. cases no. 1990/4 . 153., 1991/12. 491., 1994/12. 664., 1995/3. 154., 
1995/10. 5 7 3 . , 1996/9. 472. , 1997/4. 185. 
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During the transition period high interest rates had been charged in 
connection with the high inflation. The interest on short-term loans in 1991 
was around 33-36% a year, and the interest on deposits was also high.60 Af ter 
a temporary drop, rates in 1995 were about as high as in 1991, a decrease 
having occurred in 1997. In April 2000, the National Bank interest rate was 
11%.6~ The high risk involving interest rates was a temporary phenomenon. A 
significant change from the times of the planned economy in the material of 
civil law, however, is that the use of money and its price is an important 
factor regardless of temporary disturbances. Several decisions with regard to 
interest have been published by the Supreme Court.63 
In cases of invalidity of contracts, taking into account the risks arising 
in a market economy, establishing the legal consequences of invalidity 
needs to be examined when the contract may not be reformed to become 
valid. Under market circumstances, an uncoordinated change in the value 
of performance and counter performance (e.g. real estate, seasonal goods, 
products strongly affected by technological development etc.) and the rate 
of interest may lead to consequences incapable of being pre-calculated by 
the parties. This may not always be neutralised by applying the legal 
consequences of invalidity. 
19. In the market economy the actual possibility of the enforcement of 
rights in contractual relationships, in the lack of a specifically stipulated 
(or statutorily prescribed) security instrument is another factor of insecurity. 
In the social conscience of the era following 1948 the precise fulfi l lment 
of contractual obligations did not receive great respect. Under circum-
stances, when connections with state economic management organs was 
more important than the relationship with contractual partners, when 
factors outside the realm of law did not require a long-term, reliable partnerly 
conduct, this approach is understandable. The long time that passed since 
transition did not prove to be long enough to change this approach, what 
is more, the period of changes may have even strengthened previous 
60 ' Magyar Nemzeti Bank: Eves Jelentés 1991. ( Yearly Report of The Hungarian 
National Bank 1991). Budapes t , 1992. 102. 
61
 Közponi Statisztikai Hiva ta l : Magyarország 1997. (Cent ra l Statistics Bureau : 
Hungary 1997), Budapest , 1998. 84 -85 . 
" Magyar Nemzeti Bank: Havi Jelentés (Monthly Report of the Hungarian National 
Bank) 2000/12 . 141. 
63
 B. H. cases no. 1993/5. 311., 1994/10. 551. , 1995/3. 154., 1995/6. 342 . , 
1997/5. 223. . 1997/12. 594. . 1998/8. 391.. 1998/10. 495.. 2001/2 . 78. . 2001/4. 181. 
20 ATTILA HARMATHY 
trends, or, if it has not strengthened them, it made them conspicuous. The 
more frequent appearance of contracts concluded in order to deprive creditors 
from funds may be attributed to this development.64 
The frequent use of transfer of receivables as security is partly in 
connection with the hardships of execution. The transfer against money of 
receivables the execution of which is uncertain appears as a business 
activity also known in other countries (from the point of view of the economic 
goal, a similar tool is agency for the purpose of executing receivables, but 
in that case no transfer occurs). The transfer may, however, also be used 
for other purposes: different business goals may lie behind the transfer of 
receivables. In the law of European countries in general, thus also in 
Hungarian law, the transfer as a whole of all the rights and obligations 
arising out of a contract of one of the parties to that contract poses a 
problem. In these cases a transfer of receivables occurs only as regards rights. 
As regards obligations, one may only talk of an overtaking of obligations 
which requires the agreement of the other party to the original contract. 
Taking into account the need arising in practice for the transfer of 
businesses as a whole, the question needs to be examined, whether one may 
treat rights and obligations in a given contract as a thing, as a financial unit. 
This requires a revision of the definition of thing and related categories of 
property law in addition to the problems of contract law. In the Hungarian 
court practice of the last few years, alongside the use of transfer of 
receivables as security, other uses of the transfer of receivables have also 
appeared, such as transfer used in order to execute receivables, as payment of 
debt and in order to achieve a change of partners to a contract.65 This 
means that today Hungarian law has to treat the transfer as one of those 
legal methods of forming economic ties which may be used in more ways 
than one and consequently requires an adequate legal approach and set of 
rules. 
In connection with the hardships of execution and the growing importance 
of money circulation, the use of bills of exchange has become more frequent. 
Questions related to bills of exchange often arise in court practice. All this 
creates a need to analyse abstract obligations, the requirement of making use 
of such experiences in civil law theory and practice. 
64
 B. H. cases no. 1995/8. 458., 1996/5. 252., 1997/11. 549. , 1999/5. 220. , 
1999/11. 5 0 8 . , 2000/8. 365., 2001 /2 . 62. 
65
 B. H. cases no. 1990/7. 268. , 1993/2. 114., 1993/7. 446., 1995/5. 294., 1996/7. 379. 
and 380., 1996 /8 . 422., 1997/5. 244. , 1997/9. 449 . , 1998/8. 379 . , 1999/2. 77. 
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20. During the transition process efforts at taking advantage of the faults 
and gaps of legal regulation could be pointed out. These phenomena are 
only mentioned because when evaluating these efforts, court practice has 
repeatedly ruled that these are "contra bonos mores". An especially interesting 
feature of the relevant judgements is that in certain cases they reflect a 
change in social consciousness, whereas in others they show an unchanged 
attitude. It seems, by the way, that the rulings at issue do not search to find a 
connection with either the requirement of good fai th and fair dealing 
formulated in Art. 4 (1) of the Civil Code, or the obligation to cooperate, 
declared in several parts of the Code and often appearing as a command of 
morality. They are more prone to apply the principles of good morals 
similarly to requirements of public order.66 The invalidity of immoral 
contracts is generally recognised, but its current interpretation is somewhat 
vague, therefore the creators of common principles of European law did 
not even attempt to formulate a common rule for this issue.67 Moral 
reqirements, the obligations of good faith and fair dealing and of cooperation 
are adequate methods for the control of the terms of the contract, to 
regulate the distribution of risk in a way not provided for by the contract. 
Also with this in mind, it is to be examined, what direction the practice 
will take in this field.68 
21. In examination of civil law questions often not enough attention is 
being paid among the changes occurring in the economy to the growing 
importance of services. This development has referred to previously in 
connection with torts (part 12), another one of its significant consequences 
needs, however, to be separately mentioned. This consequence is the 
growing significance of public services. Previously, public services had 
66
 B. H. cases no. 1993/9 . 578., 1993/10. 604., 1997/5. 241., 1997/6. 306. , 
1998/3. 138., 2000/5. 215. , 2000/6 . 260. 
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 Principles of European Contract Law (ed.: О. Lando, H. Beale), Parts I and II, 
The Hague , London, Bos ton , 2000. 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 . , Zweigert , К . — K ö t z , H.: Einführung in 
die Rechtsvergleichung, 3. A u f l . Tübingen, 1996. 375. 
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 Mayer-Maly , T.: Die guten Sitten des Bundesger ich t shofs . In: 50 Jahre des 
Bundesgerichtshof (hrsg.: C . -W. Canaris, A. Heldrich. К. J. Hopt , С. Roxin, К. Schmid t , 
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only been in a marginal connection with civil law. The transition process, 
the creation of the market economy has, however, strengthened the civil 
law aspects of the field. In court practice, this appears first , as a property 
law aspect, in use of property in the public interest,69 and second, in 
public utility contracts. " This development of transition should be taken 
into account when elaborating the theoretical foundations of the rules of 
civil law. 
6 9B. H. ca se s no. 1995/12. 7 0 0 . , 1998/5. 240. , 1998/6. 289., 1998/8 . 376. 
70
 B. H. c a s e s no. 1992/6. 4 0 8 . , 1993/8. 497. , 1999/1. 30., 1999/5 . 208., 1999/7. 
302. 1999/9. 4 1 9 . , 2000/2. 68. , 2000 /9 . 409., 2001 /2 . 64. 
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raised the issue whether economic law could be the adequate branch of law in socialist 
law. However, as the concept of economic law was defeated in the Soviet Union at the 
late 1930s, economic law could not be carried on even in Hungary. The essay provides a 
survey of the fights concerning Hungarian economic law, with special regard to the 
works of Gyula Eörsi. 
Keywords: economic law, socialist legal science 
It is not my purpose here to expound, neither in an international nor in a 
Hungarian perspective, the history of the ideological debate about 'economic 
law', undoubtedly the keenest debate in the history of socialist law which 
had even tragic consequences. 
I seek to expose how Gyula Eörsi, unquestionably the greatest Hungarian 
civilist of his age, arrived from the initial strong opposition—through the 
ingenious idea of the 'internal and external complexity of law', to mention 
it in advance—to the de facto recognition of economic law without having 
to give up his former theoretical posit ion in any respect. 
As human views and scientific propositions cannot be understood without 
knowing the context: the given age, its atmosphere and the consequential 
concrete events, at the beginning I shall briefly deal with the character of 
Hungarian legislation and legal literature in the years after liberation in 
1945, the fall of the theory of economic law (which in my view didn't 
even exist), the cause and origin of this fall, and the history of this subject 
at the end of the thirties in the Soviet Union. 
I. 
György Kálmán, H - l 132 Budapest, Visegrádi u. 9. Hungary. 
Fax: (36 1) 474 5185 
24 GYÖRGY KÁLMÁN 
The history of the formation and fall of Soviet 'economic law' is presented 
in detail in Contribution to the Theory of Enterprise Law by Tamás Sárközy, 
so I don't need to touch upon the topic even in a general perspective. 
On the basis of contemporary legal literature and my personal remem-
brance I would remark that 'economic law', as formed in the Weimar era and 
continued under Hitler in Germany or as established in the Soviet Union 
in the 1920's was in this sense non-existent in Hungary. 
There hasn ' t been any Hungarian theory of economic law (the only 
exception will be treated below) in spite of the use of the term. The term 
referred to economically relevant positive law on the one hand and the 
literature interpreting this legal material for legal professionals and the non-
lawyer economic specialists on the other. 
It is well known and a commonplace that in 1945 Hungary inherited 
a destroyed economy and a severe inflation. Using the phrase of the time, 
economic reconstruction was then the crucial link in the chain. This 
reconstruction, as well as the execution of agrarian reform needed a great-
scale legislation. The problems of the 'abandoned goods' waited for solution 
too, to cite only one example from the long list. The work of reconstruction 
was linked to the introduction of socialism, initiated already in 1946 with 
the nationalisation of big banks. It is clear that the focus of legal literature 
was directed on this topic. Not only the articles of legal journals but also 
books concentrated on the subject, and after 1947 monographs appeared one 
after the other dealing with the regulation of the economy, with the term 
'economic law' in their title in some form. From 1947-48 on these books 
and articles referred to the socialist character of the legal material. 
However, these books were handbooks without any dogmatics. In any 
case, there couldn ' t have been any dogmatics in them, because it simply 
didn' t exist. 
The need for these works has been later (af ter 1951 when the witch-
hunt abated) recognised even by the opponents of economic law, moreover 
their re-edition has been urged (they didn't appear for a long time after the 
end of forties). 
In 1948 the Hungarian Lawyers' Association was formed through the uni-
fication of several organisation of lawyers. On this occasion a great inter-
national conference was held in Hévíz with the participation of foreign 
delegations. As usual, the conference worked in sections and of course there 
was also a section for economic law. A Soviet delegation participated at the 
conference too. The leader of this delegation, Professor Manjkovsky took 
notice from the programme with surprise that there was a section for 
economic law and pointed out to the organisers of the conference and to the 
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participating leaders of legal life that economic law was rejected in the 
Soviet Union at the end of thirties as a Trotskyte and anti-socialist tendency. 
It needed a piece of time for his warning to begin to take effect . In 
1949 and 1950 the term 'economic law' was still used in Hungarian legal 
literature. Moreover, in 1950 Miklós Világhy held a lecture in the Lawyers' 
Association with the title Our Constitution and Economic Law.1 In his 
1
 The principal s t a t ements of his lecture were the fo l lowing : 
"Our Constitution certainly expresses and fixes the achievements of the development 
of e c o n o m i c law, de te rmines the founda t ions of economic law and marks the main 
trends of fu tu re deve lopment as well. Which are these f o u n d a t i o n s and trends? 
a) According to section 4 paragraph 1 of our Constitution, in the People's Republic of 
Hungary the bulk of the product ive assets is in public ownersh ip . Though p roduc t ive 
assets may be hold by pr iva te persons, the work ing peop le—cont inues paragraph 2 of 
the aforementioned section—gradually displaces capitalistic elements and steadily builds 
the social is t economic order . 
From these stipulations of our Constitution we have to draw two conclusions 
regarding the material of economic law. The first conclusion is that in the structure of our 
national economy, those enterprises and other organisational forms that hold each a group 
of the publicly owned productive assets came to have a determinative weight. 
The second conclusion is that among the rules governing the operation of people ' s 
economy, the process of social economic administration, those which regulate public 
enterprises, or in general the operation, production and trade performed by the units of 
public economy, predominate and gain more and more ground. 
A f t e r the detailed examinat ion of the relation be tween the const i tut ion and 
economic law, finally we have to ask the question again: what gives the importance of the 
constitution for economic law. In the introduction we have answered that the cons t i tu t ion , 
among others , summar i ses the main d i rec t ions for the deve lopmen t of economic law 
in the p e o p l e ' s democracy . It is evident that now, after the detai led analysis we have 
a more precise answer. A long the detai led analysis we have seen that in the f i e ld of 
organisa t ional law the development of economic law of the people ' s democracy brought 
about the establishment of the basic principles of socialist enterprise organisation, and the 
development is expected to cont inue in the same direct ion. In the law of exchange , the 
result of development is the emergence of the main legal guaran tees of socialist plan 
disc ipl ine and the legal regulat ion of the contract of del ivery . We have seen in the 
law of co-operat ives that our legal system is on the way toward the realisation of the 
d i f ferent fo rms of socia l i s t - type co-operat ives . Finally, in l abour law, we have s tated 
that the constitution declares the basic principles of socialist labour law and determines its 
main sa feguards as wel l . The economic law of our p e o p l e ' s democracy is t oday of 
socialist type not only th rough its character but, for the most part, on the crucial 
points it has developed to socialist economic law regarding its content and the origin 
of its ru les too. The Cons t i tu t ion of the P e o p l e ' s Republ ic of Hungary re f lec ts this 
economic law of social is t content , summar i ses the ach ievements of its deve lopment , 
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monograph of 1951 entitled The Problem of Economic Law, written in the 
spirit of the era but with a very high professional legal culture, he rejected 
economic law and went as far as to call out for the banishment of economic 
law from the education of non-lawyer economic specialists. 
At the end of 1950 was published the Hungarian translation of Visinsky's 
The Problems of Soviet Legal and Political Science, which rejected economic 
law declaring it Trotskyte and anti-socialist. 
The Committee for Legal and Political Science of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences put the question of economic law on the agenda. 
During the debate on economic law, not limited to the Committee for 
Legal and Political Science of HAS, there were only some persons to hold 
aloft the banner of socialist economic law, already with knowledge of the 
antecedents in the Soviet Union. Among them was György Vadas, the first 
deputy-director of the Institute of Legal and Political Science of HAS, who 
paid for his deed not only with his position at the Institute but also with his 
scientific carrier. During the debate, Vadas explained: it is possible that 
they have chosen a bad name for the subject analysed in their books but it is 
not identical neither to German imperialist nor to so-called "Trotskyte" 
Soviet economic law. 
Following the resolution of the Committee for Legal and Political Science 
of HAS which rejected economic law, was published Miklós Világhy's 
monograph The Problem of Economic Law. This work, using the phraseology 
of the day but reflecting the f ine legal culture of the author, analysed the 
problematics of economic law in six chapters, from the beginnings of 
commercial law in Europe to the critique of the Hungarian theory of economic 
law (which theory, in my view, did not exist). The author stressed with 
and marks the main trends of the further development. This is the essence and 
importance of the relation of the cons t i tu t ion and economic law. 
b) Accord ing to Section 5 of our Const i tu t ion, the economic l i fe of the Hungar ian 
Peop le ' s Repub l i c is determined by the national economic plan. 
From this s t ipulat ion of o u r Const i tu t ion, we can draw again two conclus ions 
regarding the mater ia l of e c o n o m i c law. The f i r s t states that due to the deve lopment 
in the last f e w years , the mater ia l of our e c o n o m i c law has been broadened by the 
ru les regulat ing the determinat ion of the na t iona l economic plan and the p lanned 
operat ion of the economy. This broadening is not only a simple increase in quant i ty 
but—and this is our second conclusion—a qualitative change too. The centre of gravity of 
exchange law, l aw of product ion and trade of g o o d s is no more the material of trade 
transact ions, commerc i a l sale, cons ignment , sh ipment and other so-cal led commerc ia l 
t ransact ions ." Vi lághy , M.: Alkotmányunk és a gazdasági jog (Our Const i tu t ion and 
Economic Law) . Budapest , 1950. 
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emphasis that the scholars of Hungarian economic law (among them the 
author himself with his co-authored secondary school textbook in 1949, his 
articles and lectures) can be identified subjectively neither with the scholars 
of German imperialist economic law nor with mischievous Soviet economic 
lawyers, the subject of their scholarly work, however, objectively leads to 
the destruction of the socialist legal system." 
In his monograph, representing the culmination of the campaign against 
economic law, Miklós Világhy divides the (not too voluminous) literature 
on economic law in groups according to the year of publication (1948, 1949, 
1950) and a bit forcibly refers to some qualitative differences among them. 
Namely 
1948: the beginning of the theory of economic law, 
1949: the accomplishment of the theory of economic law, 
1950: the appearance of fully-fledged socialist theory of economic law. 
2 
Világhy summar i ses his c h a r g e s against the Hungar ian " theo ry" of economic 
l aw as fol lows: 
a) The ques t ion of economic law is primari ly not a problem about the legal 
sys tem but for the most part, a ques t i on about the charac ter of the popu la r democratic 
law and state, about the soundness of the general views on the popular democratic law and 
s tate . The Hungar ian theory of e c o n o m i c law made ser ious mis takes in this respect, 
s ince 
aa) it supposed that there are parts of d i f fe ren t character, of d i f ferent class 
con ten t within our popular democra t i c system of law, 
bb) did not recognise the pos i t ion of the individual in the socialist state, 
especia l ly the inseparable l inkage of socialist f o r m s of ownership and it set socialist 
s ta te and its e c o n o m y against the individual ci t izen. 
b) Economic law is secondarily also a question of the socialist legal system. The 
Hungar ian economic law theory made a serious mistake when it endeavoured to unite the 
legal rules on e c o n o m y in a separa te branch of law, because 
aa) in this way it separated cer ta in groups of pecuniary re la t ions of the socialist 
socie ty from o ther groups of pecun ia ry relations, 
bb) muti lated these pecuniary relations through the exclusion of property and 
consumpt ion , 
cc) the en la rgement of the mate r ia l of economic law is inef fec tua l since it would 
resul t in a he te rogeneous legal mater ia l without any uni fy ing pr inciple , 
dd) the theory of economic law proceeded also wrongly by trying to set the material of 
economic law on the basis of political economy since in this way, it misrepresented the 
p roper relation of basis to supers t ruc ture , especial ly legal supers t ruc ture , and gave a 
false account of the nature and the character is t ics of the legal supers t ruc ture . Világhy, 
M.: A gazdasági jog problémája (The Problem of Economic Law). Magyar Jogász Szö-
vetség, Budapest , 1951. 
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He states the following: the theory of economic law of 1950 declares itself 
self-consciously and decidedly a complete socialist theory, a representative 
of socialist legal science which endeavours consistently to apply the 
Marxist-Leninist scientific method.3 
There is only one theoretical statement in the history of Hungarian economic 
law af ter the liberation in 1945. György Vadas namely wrote in his work 
The Outlines of Economic Law, published in autumn 1950 the following: 
"The material of our economic law is held together by the solid steelworks 
of socialist political economics. We cannot make serious mistakes, cannot 
loose touch with reality if we endeavour to cast light on the material of 
our economic law by the laws of political economics. [...] We strive to sum 
up our legal institutions according to the basic features of the political 
economics of socialism."4 
Gyula Eörsi jo ined the debate at this question of systématisation. In 
his article "Economic Law and Political Economy", published in the November 
1951 issue of Jogtudományi Közlöny [Journal for Legal Science] and 
based on his contribution of 5 July, 1951 at the discussion on economic law 
in the Committee for Legal and Political Science of HAS, Eörsi refuted 
Vadas' views. His main argument was that to treat the material of economic 
3
 B y 1950, the mos t important charac ter i s t ics of this theory got fu l ly mature. 
These character is t ics are 
— the conception tha t legal rules re la t ing to social economy mount up to a 
separate self-contained b r a n c h of law, 
— the view that e c o n o m i c law prac t ica l ly cuts through the material of a host of 
other b r anches of law, separa t ing and embrac ing in itself every rule that has some 
linkage to economic life (e.g. the law of economic administration, the part of criminal law 
deal ing wi th economic c r imes , parts of procedural law that are closely related to 
economic life, the ent i re f inancial law, the entire labour law); so e c o n o m i c law 
appears indeed as an expans ive branch of law which depr ives other b ranches of their 
mater ial , takes the air a w a y f rom them. 
— the view that the whole economic law, or at least its basic part reflects the main 
idea, the "regulat ing p r i n c i p l e " of p lan i f ica tedness , the oppos i t ion of p lan i f ica t ion 
and plan discipline to f r e e d o m of contract . (Világhy: ibid.) 
Vadas Gy.: A gazdasági jog vázlata (The Outlines of Economic Law). Budapest, 
1950. 
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law in the system of political economics did not advance the presentation 
of the interrelation of basis and the material of economic law. 
But Vadas was wrong in that he tried to squeeze the material of 
economic law, being in close connection to the economic basis, in the 
system of political economics that is treating with this basis. The economic 
basis is the basis indeed but political economics is nothing else but a 
system of views: a superstructure. 
The material of economic law cannot be separated f rom other legal 
material and transposed in the system of political economics because law, 
the entire legal system is an autonomous (though not independent) system. 
Eörsi 's view is different f rom the view of Világhy and the Soviet 
literature against economic law in that he does not hold economic law for 
'expansive law' : 
"It does not follow from the aforesaid that economic law should be 
expansive and should divert the law of ownership from private law. As I 
mentioned in one of my previous articles, it follows rather that as the so 
called economic law is devoid of the basis, treated in private law, the 
autonomy of the so called economic law should be terminated and the 
appropriate part of economic law should be incorporated in private law."5 
Practising economic specialists and the main part of legal professionals 
concerned by the material of economic law did not have any idea of this 
debate on economic law. The more interested and qualified lawyers working 
in the 1950's of economy were at a loss toward the debate. In the first half 
of the fifties, after Világhy's book, written with fine legal culture but still 
blowing the icy wind of witch-hunt, they remained numb and silent. Later 
they only smiled and considered the whole debate as a university fight of 
legal theorists around professorships. That is, they did not understand why 
economic law cannot be a mixed branch of law if labour law does; what is 
the reason for the autonomy of land law and the law of agricultural co-
operatives as a branch of law (not only as a separate university field of 
study) while economic law is not an autonomous branch of law, not even a 
main course at the university. To be sure, later on several special courses 
were dealing with economic law both within the field of private and 
administrative law but to avoid to "fall into sin", to call a spade, they 
were held under different intricate titles, specially as long as Világhy still 
had word and influence in university education. 
5
 Eörsi , Gy.: Gazdasági j o g és politikai gazdaság tan (Economic Law and Pol i t i ca l 
Economics) . Jogtudományi Közlöny VI 1951 No . 1 1, 671-675 . 
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The rather unilateral 1951 debate was followed by a long during 
silence. The problem of economic law scarcely came into question in the 
literature until the preparations of the 1968 reform of economic adminis-
tration. 
After the death of Stalin the study of economic law recommenced in 
the GDR and Czechoslovakia and in the latter even an Economic Code 
was introduced. This was reflected in the Hungarian legal literature at the 
beginning of the sixties as Mihály Samu treated the recognition of the 
autonomy of economic law sympathetically in his monograph on the structure 
of the legal system and several civilists, including Gyula Eörsi though 
continued to reject economic law but already on the basis of cool pro-
fessional arguments, wholly devoid of witch-hunt. 
In 1967, the last preparation year before the economic reform began a 
new debate on economic law on the columns of the journal Magyar Jog 
[Hungarian Law], 
Practising lawyers, among them Iván Meznerics, distinguished also as 
a theoretician, urged for the recognition of economic law, again not as 
calling for a separate dogmatics or a comprehensive code but as a demand 
for the recognition of the coherence and complexity of this field of law 
and especially of the adequate importance of economic law in the literature 
for practising lawyers as well as in the education. 
At this time Eörsi reacted negatively to the demand for the recognition 
of economic law. I remember an (unpublished) impromptu contribution of 
his at a meeting, chaired by Rezső Nyers, in which he answered to the 
contributions of economists calling for the recognition of economic law. 
He exposed that even if there might have been place for autonomous 
economic law in a system of economic administration based on breaking 
down the plan which was combining the method of administrative commands 
and civil contracts, there is no place for it in the new system of direction 
which reject the method of plan and breaking down and is based on the 
autonomous organising role of contracts. 
Eörsi expounded his view systematically in his monograph On the Law 
of the Switch-over to a New System of Economic Administration, published 
in 1968. 
In this work he does not mention yet internal and external complexity 
or the complex method but there appears the idea that the codification of 
private law shall be based on the specificities of the contract relations of 
socialist organisations and the specificities required by mass production 
shall be reflected in auxiliary acts, decrees and fundamental trading 
conditions of a complex character. 
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"Thus our conclusion is that the 'economic law oriented' conception of 
codification which proposes an autonomous code, co-ordinated to the Civil 
Code is not the best method to regulate legal relations of the people's 
economy. The same holds for the 'commercial law oriented' solution which 
equally urges a separate code for the regulation of legal relations of the 
people 's economy but in which the Civil Code would be the background law 
for this separate code. Against these two conceptions the conception of 
a unitary Civil Code shall be accepted, reorganised on the level of 
codification in the necessary measure according to the model of socialist 
organisations. The specificities deriving from the socialist character of the 
people 's economy and from mass production shall be reflected in auxiliary 
acts, government decrees and fundamental trading conditions of a complex 
character. This offers the required stability and mobility for the legal 
material of the people 's economy. However, it is evident that an economic 
code is in no way more mobile than the civil code."6 
The reason for Eörsi to reject economic law was invariably his persistent 
view that the systematic division of law shall rest on legal and not directly 
on economic reality. 
The system of law cannot be built directly on economic reality. Though in 
the last resort determined by economy, law is a relatively independent 
system of views and institutions.7 
"The difference between the traditional and the 'economic law oriented' 
conceptions lies not in that the traditional conception uses highly abstract 
concepts (property, legal person, contract etc.) as some representatives of 
economic law alleges, but in that the traditional socialist conception 
thinks in legal institutions while the socialist conception of economic law 
thinks in economic activities. So the latter reasoning is regrettably far too 
obvious within the circle of non-lawyers, among whom especially economists 
have an extremely great influence on decisions which irradiate to law as 
well. 
It follows that such statements according to which the growth of economic 
law to a separate branch of law is the same phenomenon as the separation 
of labour law, the law of co-operatives or family law as independent branches 
of law, cannot be substantiated. In these we are dealing with small 
collectives; by this way the unity of social relations shows up clearly and 
6
 Eörsi , Gy.: A gazdaságirányítás új rendszerére való áttérés jogáról ( O n the law 
of the Switch-over to a New System of Economic Adminis t ra t ion) . Budapes t , 1968. 
133. 
7
 Id. 8 8 - 8 9 . 
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also unitary legal principles and methods come to existence, fitting to the 
relations of the small collective. But in the domain of economic law there 
is no such perspective because as Világhy pointed out, economic law does 
not embrace the economy; tha t ' s why its boundaries can be laid out only 
arbitrarily."8 
Thus after all this said, we have to conclude that on the level of codifi-
cat ion, the most convenient solution, for this country too, is a single civil 
code. This solution on the level of codes implies also that, on the basis of 
codes, which are separated mainly according to legal branches, auxiliary 
acts, government decrees and fundamental trading conditions shall be 
created, to meet the requirement of complexity and greater variability.9 
I I I . 
Eörs i ' s outstanding theory on "internal and external complexity" which 
was leading to the gradual recognition of economic law without retracting 
his former theoretical position was comprehensively expounded for the 
f irs t time in 1972.10 
Already in the introduction he is more indulgent toward the conception 
of economic law than the Hungarian literature till then. 
"Present-day conceptions of economic law are based on a particular 
interpretation of economic determination and service role of law. They 
declare a certain scheme of economic activity for the backbone of the 
system of law, directly attach legal provisions to economic institutions, 
br ings law 'closer to the pract ice ' . 
So even the most determined opponents of economic law can not say 
that it is only about an infectious mistake."11 
Eörsi noted that the adherents of the conception of economic law and of 
civil law and administrative law were dealing with the same material. Their 
references were at variance not because they put different theoretical strait-
jackets on facts. The thing is that there was a difference between evaluations. 
For systématisation the first group emphasised economic structure, the second 
8
 Id. 32. 
9
 Id. 133. 
10
 Eörsi, Gy.: K ü l s ő és belső komplex i tás . A gazdaság i jog ké rdéséhez (External 
and Internal Complex i ty . On the Q u e s t i o n of Economic Law). Gazdaság és Jogtudo-
mány, MTA IX. Osz tá lyának Köz leménye i . Budapest , 1972. 
fl
 Id. 81. 
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accentuated legal institutions. The very close connection between state 
regulation of the economy and the administration of public property was 
clear for everyone. Some considered this fact as constituting branches of 
law, others did not, but both had a common purpose: more effective legal 
assistance for people 's economy and the society. 
Eörsi sketched two models of the mechanism of people 's economy. 
The first-essentially the model of GDR—conceived the entire peop le ' s 
economy as a single immense centrally operated "machinery". The second-
essentially the Hungarian model—was a "system" achieving the dynamic 
equilibrium within a space regulated by the national economic plan. 
In the "machinery" model legal elements constitute internal complexity, in 
the "system" model external complexity. 
By internal complexity he means that legal units integrate elements 
which are heterogeneous from the perspective of legal function and method 
(e.g. elements of civil and administrative law)—this is the conception of 
economic law. External complexity means that legal institutions essentially 
retain their contour and branch-of-law specificities. The institutions of 
different branches of law operate together without dissolving, in a way 
that they maintain their functional and methodical characteristics. The 
"machinery" model is the hotbed of internal complexity (the economic 
law) because it essentially consists in the mingling of administrative and 
economic elements, i.e. administrative law and civil law. External complexity 
corresponds to the "system" model as it separates administrative and 
economic, i.e. administrative law and civil law elements. Internal complexity 
is reflected in the branches of law as the maintenance of the traditional 
socialist division of the legal system. 
So, Eörsi relates the "machinery" model to the conception of internal 
complexity and economic law and the "system" model to the conception 
of external complexity. It is not the same as to link economic law to the 
planned economy with direct commands and the traditional socialist 
conception to indirect, decentralised systems, viz. to contend that the 
situation in socialist states before the reforms encourages economic law 
while the situation after reforms is favourable to the conception of external 
complexity. This view, which previously also Eörsi himself advocated, is 
to some extent simplifying and contradicts certain facts. It is very easy to 
grasp the system of direct plan commands by the conception of external 
complexity: this was the predominant practice in the law of European 
socialist states. It is not direct plan command system which is favourable 
to economic law but the "system" model, although, as we shall see, internal 
complexity, i.e. economic law leads almost by nature to the dominance of 
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centralism. Hence, the conceptions of internal and external complexity 
connect not with direct and indirect economic administration mechanisms 
but with "machinery" and "system" models. 
One of the important differences between the two conception subsisting on 
this common ground is the following: The conception of internal complexity 
which realises staatliche Leistungspyramide, is conceived in a vertical cross-
section. Every relevant theoretical construction is built f rom the peak of 
central organs to the base, by its nature with a strong orientation toward 
central elements. Market can find a place in this construction only artificially 
as it would imply, within the conditions of socialism, the "system" instead 
of "machinery". 
In contrast, the conception of external complexity is neutral f rom the 
point of view of orientation. Within this conception vertical and horizontal 
cross-sections as well as the internal relations of firms and co-operatives 
can be distinguished. In this way a space is created within which the current 
economic administration may determine the place and importance of different 
elements. The conception of external complexity is equally apt for the 
service of a more centralised directive mechanism and a decentralised one 
with a considerable role for the regulated market. 
The second important divergence of the two conceptions is essentially 
that they attach law to economy on different levels. 
Of course, the conception of external complexity seeks to influence 
economic processes too but in this respect the conception of internal 
complexity is specific inasmuch as it directly adjusts the legal system to 
the regulation of the economic process. The machinery of staatliche 
Leistungspyramide needs to attach law to certain elements of the economic 
mechanism at a considerably lower level so that the autonomous system 
of law loses importance. The re is no sense to think about institutions of 
law here. 
In contrast, according to the conception of external complexity law 
serves the economic mechanism as a specifically legal system based on 
legal institutions, operates comprehensive legal abstractions and attaches 
great importance to the institutions of law. 
The conception of internal complexity is a) linking the most divergent 
legal means to each element of the economy and in this way b) substitutes 
an economic system for the specific legal system, thinning away the legal 
element on a great scale. Often the writings on economic law can be hardly 
distinguished f r o m practical economic works: instead of institutions of law 
they primarily deal with legal means at tached to economic ends, methods 
and organisation. 
THE PROBLEMATICS OF ECONOMIC LAW IN THE WORKS OF GYULA EÖRSI 35 
In contrast, the conception of external complexity considers the relative 
autonomy of law as a condition of the development of special, character-
istically legal means and so the more effective service of the economy; 
that is what the conception of internal complexity denies. 
It involves, however, that the conception of internal complexity is 
hardly suitable for becoming the conception of codification since a code is 
characterised by the systématisation of a large area in law, i.e. it embraces 
law in a legal system. But, as explained, there is no much place for the legal 
system within the conception of internal complexity. It is due to this fact that 
in the country which enforces this conception the most consequently, the 
GDR, the great difficulties with the codification led at least temporarily to 
renounce to establish an economic code and to regulate the people's economy 
on government level, through a fragmented and not a unitary system. Meanwhile 
the codification of the civil code was being continued. In Czechoslovakia the 
Economic Code was effectively an act on economy systematised according 
to the branches of the people's economy. Under the title "general provisions" 
only 26 sections out of 400 comprised the provisions on the relations of 
direction. Other provisions were such that for the most part they could 
equally take place within a socialist civil law codification: 272 sections 
related to the law of obligations, all of them appertaining except for 43 
sections to the particular provisions of the law of obligations.'" 
In the final account, legal regulation of the people 's economy means 
the regulation of human activity, though it necessarily contains a great 
number of purely technical element. The legal element not only provides 
the official sanction for the economic element but transposes the ends 
posited and processes designed by economists and engineers. That is a not 
unimportant reason for the existence of law as a specific establishment, i.e. 
one which is not identical to its determinant, the economic system. This being 
granted, the "machinery" or "system" character of the economic mechanism 
orientates in different directions. The conception of internal complexity 
intended for the service of the "machinery" is dominated by the "regulation 
of processes". In the conception of external conception, intended for the 
service of the "system" the "regulation of activities" is dominant. In turn, 
the prominence of the regulation of activities brings about the prominence 
of the legal system. 
Eörsi points out two practical shortcomings of the conception of internal 
complexity. It does not take into account that civil law contracts need 
some common provisions, nor that a great number of contract types equally 
12
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apply for the public property sector and the personal property sector 
(credit, carriage, insurance, lease, deposit etc.) . 
The conception of economic law, however, cannot include the common 
provisions about contracts, only the provisions for those concluded between 
socialist organisations. 
According to the conception of internal complexity the integrity, 
namely practical economic integrity is formed by the obligations of the 
people 's economy; contracts between socialist organisations and individuals 
or between individuals themselves are excluded. For the conception of 
external complexity, however, the unity is made out of all commodity-related 
obligations (which relate relatively autonomous parties) irrespective of 
subjects and sectors; this excludes in turn the systematic integrity with the 
obligations deriving from the relations of governmental economic direction 
and of intra-firm management. 
The replacement of the legal system by a system based on the scheme 
of economic ac t iv i ty or organisat ion leads to split asunder inst i tut ions 
of law through the denial of systematising relevancy of high-order generali-
sations (socialist property law, contract of commodity or autonomous structure, 
responsibility etc.). The conception of internal complexity comes nearer to 
the everyday practice than the conception of external complexity does, 
both in the choice of its system, of the still useful level of generalisation 
and in the tendency of descending from the level of institutions of law to 
the level of legal rules. Before considering this as an absolute advance let 
us remind that the system nearest to the practice is that of the common 
law, it cannot see the wood fo r the trees, becomes pragmatist and remains 
in spheres that provide a natural medium for theoretical indifference. This 
of course does not hold for the conception of internal complexity; on the 
contrary, the manifestations in the GDR are the most ideological; but f rom 
a legal perspective, the result of these considerations come close to practicism 
because they tend to see in law nothing more than an administrative-
technical auxiliary device of the economic practice. 
The final conclusion of the work is that the compilation and especially 
the codification of the entire legal material of the people ' s economy is 
both unnecessary and impossible. It is unnecessary because nobody needs 
it in entirety. He who works as lawyer in the construction industry does 
not need the whole system of rules for internal commerce. It is also 
impossible because legal activity reaches back to general institutions 
overlapping the scope of economy (delay, invalidity, termination etc.). 
While the conception of internal complexity commingles legal instruments 
at the outset and causes the sketched problems in theory, policy of law and 
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practice in this way, the key issue of the conception of external complexity is 
to find the suitable level, measure and method to junct ion the institutions 
of different branches of law in the different areas of legal work: legislation, 
jurisprudence and legal education etc. This is a practical problem in all 
these domains. 
Different tools does not become similar as being used in the work on the 
same object: drill remains drill and hammer remains hammer. We have to 
manufacture and get the mastery of both tools separately but we have to apply 
them together. That is the essence of the conception of external complexity. 
Thus in this work of Eörsi we cannot find the recognition of economic 
law even as a secondary branch of law or as a discipline. 
In spite of this, Eörs i ' s theory of internal and external complexity gave 
full satisfaction to the needs of lawyers working in different fields. These 
lawyers were repugnant and at a loss toward the debate about the 
qualification of economic law as a branch of law f rom the beginning. 
They held for natural to unite legal institutions of the economy in a 
harmonic construction irrespective of their place within the branches of 
law. Eörsi's theory, determining the content of external complexity satisfied 
this need. They considered this theory as the recognition of the coherent 
work in the different domains of economic law and of the unconditional 
necessity of this work. The debate on the rejection or recognition of the 
autonomy of this branch of law was looked upon, a bit sceptically as one 
about the establishment of another professorship. None of these lawyers 
raised a claim to duplicate the general part of the law of obligations as it 
was done in Czechoslovakia by framing the Economic Code. But they surely 
claimed for the recognition and the legislative expression of the specialities 
of economic contracts by the framing of an economic code. They used in 
this respect a trivial but sound argument: although the re-soling of a shoe 
and the complete construction of a nuclear power plant are both realised 
through a contract of enterprise there is a great difference both in the 
content and the legal characteristics of the two contracts. 
After the reforms of 1968 Eörsi already accepted that by the regulation 
of the particular contract types in the Civil Code the requirements of the 
contracts important for the people's economy shall be taken into account 
as rules and the contracts for mere consumption shall be reckoned with 
when determining the exceptions. 
Why did the theory of internal and external complexity satisfy the needs 
of legal practitioners? 
1. A practising lawyer is cognisant of the importance of the limits 
between criminal law and civil law, substantive law and procedural law, 
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recognises the speciality of political law as a separate branch of law in the 
conditions of socialism but beyond that he does not care about the 
division of branches of law. For him it is indifferent whether law reflects the 
economy by internal complexity, i.e. by an autonomous branch of law or by 
external complexity i.e. by the harmony of institutions of law established 
within separate branches of law. 
2. They needed an accord among different legal institutions of the 
economy, that the important gaps of law shall not be filled or the collision 
of legal rules within different branches of law shall not be resolved by the 
practice. The theory fulfilled this need. 
3. This theory recognised also in civil law the dominance of economic 
phenomena by the formation of principal rules. 
The theory of complexity allowed for the silent, orderly and peaceful 
retreat of legal theoreticians in this stormy question. 
In my view the theory of complexity was, even before its full exposition 
in 1977, a de facto recognition of economic law without theoretical 
retreat. That makes the theory ingenious. 
I V . 
T h e further development of the theory of internal and external complexity 
is due to a fur ther advance on the way of de facto recognition of economic 
law. Eörsi's last monographic work, Law, Economy and the Structure of the 
Legal System was published in 1977.13 
As a point of departure he made a remark on the relation of law and 
extra-legal social phenomena. Law always regulates social relationships 
which do not respect its system. That lies behind the enchantedness of law, as 
Imre Szabó expressed it. However , the intensity of the state-controlled 
plan economy pushed this problem to the extremes. Instead of the regulation 
of behaviour, norms relating to the economy contain regulations characterised 
by the enumeration of a great number of parameters. 
"The structure of the legal system unites the internal and external 
aspects of law in a self-referring manner with respect to the structure of 
the special legal sphere: in real i ty we are dealing with the organisation of 
the 'external' (socio-economic relations) into a heterogeneous 'internal' 
system (the law). From the point of view of the special characteristics of 
13
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St ruc ture of the L e g a l System). B u d a p e s t , 1977. 
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law, the legal system shall be, as we will treat it at length, a closed sys tem 
of logic, while a branch of law shall fo rm a legally regulated complex of 
socio-economic relations into a sub-system. Thus, the type of socio-economic 
relations and the legal regulation, i.e. the 'external' and the 'internal', the 
social and the legal aspects are equally important for us. It is quite obvious 
that economic law, for instance takes into consideration only the first 
aspect. What concerns the specifically legal element, there is a danger 
here, that of legal formalism which may lead to a mere logical system. It 
can be avoided by not isolating the specifically legal element, as law 
cannot be isolated from the subject it refers to. Law shall be considered as 
determined by society in order to bring to bear its social effects in an 
optimal way. Thus the specific character and mechanism of law come into 
prominence. Socio-economic relations, otherwise groupable in a number 
of ways, shall be sorted into branches of law according to their identical 
or similar legal character and mechanism. That's what law as a speci f ic 
objectivation requires and the character of these socio-economic relat ions 
itself plays an important role in the grouping."1 4 
The structure of the legal system is thus given by the dialectics of 
socio-economic relations and the specific legal method. Based on this, the 
arrangement is determined by this pair of phenomena as filtered by cognitive 
and volitional media of legislation and jurisprudence and as finally expressed 
across certain fractures. 
The traditional theorem which says that the structure of the legal system 
is divided on the basis of certain groups of social relations and speci f ic 
legal methods, is not exact entirely. These two are not joined together by 
an 'and ' , because in real these are the external and internal side of the 
same thing. Although on the final account social relations determine law, 
the way it happens will substantially depend on the specificities of law, i.e. 
the methods which are available. From an external perspective the social 
relations are determinant, from an internal view, the legal methods. The 
social relation can determine the structure of the legal system on the final 
grade only by "putting on the dress of law", by adapting to legal specificities. 
Eörsi drew a difference between the structure and the division of the 
legal system: 
"Beyond the aforementioned double determinant of its structure, the 
division of the legal system is specified by every social or individual 
factor which determine how the effectual 'dividers' of the legal system 
express the needs of the legal system. 
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There are three determinants of the f inal result, of which the first two 
appear from the beginning as inseparably interrelated: 
a) The f ina l basis of the structure of the legal system lies in the socio-
economic relations. 
b) A social fact becomes legal fact only by integrating in the legal 
complex. This complex, however cannot 'smack itself on the face' , social 
facts have to be ' transcribed' in law according to the functions of law in 
compliance with the interests of the ruling class. These functions require 
the transformation of the social facts into teleological propositions of a 
concrete practical program. The relatively autonomous regularities of law 
formed in this way specify the integration of social facts in the system of 
law, and, in turn specify the second determinative element of the structure 
of the legal system, permanently leading to contradictions. 
c) The expression of law is not exempt of the intrigues of false con-
sciousness, i .e. the expression of law may be 'good or bad ' . At this point, 
deformations may be brought about by elements which are accidental f rom 
the perspective of the legal system but well determined on another line. This 
third determinative element relating to the division of the legal system is 
nothing else but the inadequate expression deriving from the above-
mentioned transcription."15 
Eörsi put the question whether the scientific-technical revolution makes 
the theoretical conception about the necessity of the division of law into 
homogeneous branches needless. Modern western pragmatism takes the 
distinction between branch of law and discipline for unnecessary because it 
does not hold for important whether a branch of law consists of homo-
geneous institutions of law. 
The dogmatic conception of the division of branches of law resulted also 
in the remission of the entire division problem into the mere practice. 
Finally, Eörsi concluded that the tension between the structure of the 
relations to be regulated and the structure of the legal system was increasing 
because socio-economic relations become more and more complex. This 
fact influences but does not eliminate the requirement that the legal system 
should have a structure suitable to its own regularities. This influence consists 
in the formation of quasi-branches of law which are still founded on genuine 
branches of law based on legal homogeneity. 
Eörsi's f ina l conclusion, the summit of the development of the theory 
of complexity is the following: 
15
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"However, beside branches of law the socialist conception recognises 
fields of law—usually called disciplines, but it is perhaps better to reserve 
the expression 'discipline' for a category of education and to speak here 
about quasi-branches of law—which form a unit f rom political or practical 
point of view without being branches of law. From a legal point of view these 
are characterised by internal complexity: they organise legally hetero-
geneous elements around a circumscribed socio-economic purpose. This 
conception subsisted especially about the legally heterogeneous land law. 
Furthermore, many regarded the law of agricultural co-operatives (which 
does not include every co-operative nor the entire agriculture) as such a 
field. Environmental law etc. may grow to such quasi-branches too. 
In this way, according to the socialist conception, law is primarily divided 
into legally homogeneous branches of law on an objective basis and 
secondarily, so to say "under the branches of law" it mixes the tools and 
methods of different branches, establishes legally heterogeneous complex 
domains or cuts out legal fields to unite certain complexes of relations for 
practical purposes, irrespective of the requirement of the legal homogeneity of 
the system. The system of legislation corresponds to this conception as it 
unites, although not in their entirety, the branches of law in principal codes, 
supplementing it by the complex regulation of certain fields of law."1 6 
We have accompanied Gyula Eörsi, the greatest Hungarian civilist of the 
second half of the twentieth century along his way, clearly not free of internal 
struggle, dealing with the recognition of economic law until he arrived to reconcile 
the purity of his theoretical views with the manifest serious requirements of 
the social practice. He was able to do that without need to recant his former 
views. He did not have to do so because he had not taken part in the witch-
hunt at the beginning of the 1950's, even if he had not "compromised himself ' 
with works on economic law. His views and debating manners were all along 
resolute but conciliatory to the opposing views at the same time. 
It is not my duty to evaluate his oeuvre here. I would not even entertain it. 
First, being without an aptitude for it and second because, owing to our sixty-
year-long friendship started at the school-bench I miss the necessary 
impartiality to do that. But I can undoubtedly assert that his magnificent 
oeuvre contains some works (e.g. his theory of responsibility) which are 
more important than the ones reviewed here. But still these cert i fy his 
great factual knowledge and legal creativity. 
Eörsi 's oeuvre was regrettably interrupted too much early. Within the field 
of the law of economy it was for his disciples to continue and accomplish it. 
16
 Id. 116. 

1216-2574 / 2002 / USD 5.00 
© 2002 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
43, Nos 1-2. pp. 43-56 (2002) 
V I L M O S PESCHKA* 
Gyula Eörsi: Philosopher of Law 
A b s t r a c t . The essay presents and praises the legal philosophical aspects of the works by 
the civil law jurist, Gyula Eörsi. It pays at tention especially to the analyses in his works 
on civil law that concern issues of legal theory and legal philosophy, let alone his par 
excellence legal philosophical treatise title „Jog — gazdaság — jogrendszertagozódás" 
(Law—economy—structure of the legal system). The present essay analyses the "external" 
and „internal" points of view by which Eörsi explored the relation of law to economy, the 
ref lect ive relationship of content and fo rm in respect to oaw, the complexity of legal 
phenomena, the internal and external complexity of law as elucidated by Eörsi, and, finally, 
the legal system and its structure on the bases of legal phi losophical aspects and an 
approach of legal philosophy. 
Keywords: phi losophy of law, internal and external aspect law, content and fo rm in 
law, economy and law, the complexity of law, the legal sys tem and its s t ructure 
" . . . b e c a u s e law is a m a t t e r of e rud i t ion r a the r than p r o f e s s i o n a l skill, 
and e r u d i t i o n is one a n d ind iv i s ib le , 
and it is a m i s c o n c e p t i o n that law can be learn t by learning; 
l aw can only be learnt by b e c o m i n g e rud i t e . " 
(Béni Grossschmied) 
A Philosopher of Law? 
Applied in a discussion of the oeuvre of Gyula Eörsi, the term "philosopher of 
law" is likely to sound surprising to many readers. Eörsi is widely known to 
have been an outstanding, internationally recognised scholar and professor 
of civil law whose works wielded considerable intellectual influence. It 
should in no way strike us as extraordinary that a legal scholar of positive 
law should expound abstract principles in a self-contained theoretical 
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monograph on jurisprudence, drawing a final balance of several decades 
of research in some particular branch of positive law, summing up his 
experience and knowledge at the general level of the philosophy of law. 
In fact, this is rather common, especially among outstanding experts of 
civil law, as the relevant work of Karl Larenz,1 Alois Troller2 or Albert 
Ehrenzweig2 test ify. Written during the latest years of his life, Eörsi's book 
"Law, Economics and the Systematization of the Legal System"4 fits into 
this illustrious series. It is not only a theoretical epilogue to the magnum 
opus on "Comparative Civil Law",5 but it is at the same time a general philo-
sophical reformulation of the ideas which derive more or less directly and 
obviously from his earlier investigations, an attempt to seek ways of developing 
further the problems and solutions he had previously formulated. This is not 
to say that an interest in and a sense for general philosophical problems 
inherent in law first came to be felt late in his intellectual career. It would be an 
exasperating task even to take stock of all the general philosophical questions 
he discussed in his works on civil law, beginning with his voluminous 
book on the evolution of property law,6 which he wrote in the early phase 
of his career, in which we can read discussions of law in general, the relation 
between subjective and objective law, security in the law, arbitration, the 
relationship between natural and positive law, the pure theory of law, the 
concept of a legal system and its articulation: there are few pertinent 
questions of central importance to anyone interested in legal philosophy— 
such as legal responsibility, unlawfulness, link of causality in the law, 
culpability—which he had not treated in a thought-provoking monograph,7 
not to speak of his investigations of legal sources and relations which are 
1
 Larenz, K.: Methoden/ehre der Rechtswissenschaft. Ber l in -Göt t ingen-Heide l -
berg, 1960. 
Troller, A.: Überall gültige Prinzipien der Rechtswissenschaft. Frankfur t am 
Main -Ber l i n , 1965. 1971. 
3
 Ehrenzweig, A. : Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence. Le iden , 1971. 
Eörsi, Gy.: Jog — gazdaság — jogrendszertagozódás (Law, Ecomonics and the 
Systematization of the Legal System). Budapest , 1977. 
Eörsi, Gy.: Összehasonlító polgári jog (Compara t ive Civil Law) . Budapest, 
1975. 
6
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7
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available in his book devoted to the fundamental problems of civil law. 
Last, but not least, the circle of problems of legal philosophy addressed in 
the grandiose monograph9—types of law, the concept of law, subjective and 
objective law, legal adaptation, legal interpretation, legal analogy, codifi-
cation, judicial practice as a source of law, law and justice, fairness and 
many others. One would have to write an independent monograph if one 
wanted to analyse the many threads of thought woven into the fabric of all 
his works. From the perspective of the philosophy of law this is not 
necessary as his work which concentrates on philosophical questions10 offers 
us the quintessence of Eörsi's position on philosophical questions of law 
and hallmarks his quality as a philosopher of law. In what follows, there-
fore, I will try to offer a glimpse of this quintessential opus. 
Internal and External 
Our first question is that of the internal and external aspects of law, an 
examination of law in terms which can be said to have been rather neglected 
in the literature. To avoid misunderstandings, I must say in advance that 
the internal and external aspects of law are most intimately connected, and 
can only be understood in terms of the mutual reference they make to each 
other and in of their interdependence. Investigations which shed light on 
the point and meaning of the internal and external view of law in general 
are of the greatest interest and worth for the philosophy, especially the 
ontology of law. Eörsi sums up this point and meaning as follows: law can 
be viewed from an external point of view, in terms of social and economic 
conditions, which are definitive of the genesis of law, on the one hand, 
and are the object of the effect of law, on the other. But law can also be 
looked at from the inside, which results in an emphasis on the specific 
laws of motion and structural features of law, in one word: on the special 
features which mark it off from other modes of social objectification. 
Obviously enough, this must not be emphasised at the expense of a total 
suspension of the external point of view or of an exclusion of links with 
social and economic reality, and the internal view of the law is not tantamount 
s
 Eörs i , Gy.: A szocialista polgári jog alapproblémái (Fundamental Q u e s t i o n s of 
Socialist Civil Law). Budapes t , 1965. 
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to a merely formal analysis of law. Of greater importance than these evident 
methodological points is the enlightening insight that a v iew of law as a 
totality can only be arrived at when the internal and the external point of 
view are applied in conjunction: "...the totality of law can only be grasped via 
a joint application of the two points of view. Yet, clearly, ... the two are 
not of equal rank. Investigations from the external point of view take their 
starting point f rom the determinative elements, while those from the 
internal point of view focus only on the ' h o w ' , the specific ways in which 
law lends real effect to the intents and purposes which fa l l , more or less 
fittingly, within its range."11 
Applied to the law, the internal and external point of v iew bring to the 
surface the internal and external aspect of law as a social complex. I may 
not be mistaken in believing that Eörsi is applying both the internal and the 
external point of view to the law in order to get a close-up on the specific 
features of law as a mode of social objectification which make it a special 
variant of social objectification. Eörsi always draws at tention to those 
features, regularities and specif ics which manifest themselves in the legal 
"transcription" of social and economic relationships. We have to do here with 
the specific features of the legal reflection of socio-economic conditions, of 
construing the law not as a description of material condit ions but as an 
active, creative and formative "transcription" into a homogenous medium, 
not a mode of photographic imaging but a specif ic way of reflecting which 
homogenises socio-economic conditions in a specific "ought" pattern, as a 
result of the practical character of the law, in such a way that it will result 
in an inevitable incongruity between socio-economic condit ions and the 
1 ^  
law. Following Imre Szabó, Eörsi speaks of the "social insensitivity" of 
law, emphasising that this insensitivity of the law is an appearance produced 
by the external point of view, "the internal manifestation of social activity".11 
This apparent "social insensitivity" of law which strikes the eye when it is 
viewed externally, shows that law reflects socio-economic conditions in 
such a way that it transforms and elaborates them, and it does so in order 
that the law should thereby become able to fulfil its social mission: the 
regulation of socio-economic conditions. "If law involved an internal social 
sensitivity, it would merely map the external relations and would lose 
much of its ef f icacy (it would e.g. put at risk the necessary level of the 
11
 Ibid. 9. 
12
 Szabó, I.: A jogelmélet alapjai (Foundations of Legal Theory), Budapes t , 1971, 
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generality of the legal rule, the internal, specifically legal typicality of 
legal institutions). This appearance therefore, when viewed from the inside, is 
a kind of reality which is necessary: the social sensitivity of the law can 
become effective only through this kind of social insensitivity."14 This 
incongruity between law and socio-economic relations is the primary 
object of interest and the primary subject to be investigated. It is the fact 
that law does not reflect the existing conditions of society in an adequate 
manner, the special "transcription" of these conditions in the homogeneous 
medium of the law, with special regard to the unequal evolution of the two 
spheres. 
Content and Form 
As we have seen, we can only arrive at a relatively fai thful picture of the 
totality of law if we complement an external view of the law with an 
internal one, i.e. if we apply the internal view to the end of unravelling 
those internal relations and properties of law which, f rom the external 
point of view, produced the appearance of a "social insensitivity" on the 
part of the law, resulting in the incongruity and inadequacy between socio-
economic relations and the law. Viewed internally, law can be distinguished 
into two relatively separate spheres, according to Eörsi, acts of norm-
setting which mediate socio-economic demands, on the one hand, and acts 
of norm-setting designed to lend practical effect to these settings (rules of 
organisation and procedure).15 The distinction we have here is that be-
tween substantive and procedural law and—as we shall see shortly—their 
relation. 
It is undoubtedly with respect to the relation between substantive and 
procedural law that the application of the external and especially of the 
internal approach to law leads to the most surprising discussions and state-
ments. In the internal view of law as espoused by Eörsi it is, surprisingly, 
the substantive part of law that is portrayed as external, while internal 
relations are identified as organisational, operational and procedural rela-
tions: ".. .when law is viewed under its internal aspect, i.e. not f rom the 
point of view of society, procedural law is internal and substantive law is 
external: the former is law directly related to law, the latter law directly 
14
 Ibid. 10. 
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related to society."16 This no doubt contradicts the tenet of traditional 
legal theory, according to which substantive law is internal and procedural 
law is external . This, Eörsi thinks, is not in contradiction with the claim 
which derives from the internal view of law, because it conceives of law 
from outside, from the point of view of society, and in the external v iew, 
"looked at f rom the vantage point of society substantive law becomes 
internal and procedural law (the form) becomes external,"17 The appearance of 
substantive law as something external and of procedural law as something 
internal revealed by the internal view of law opens up the way for a more 
detailed analysis of the par excellence legal, i.e. the law of procedure, 
their special position and features. It turns out that the internal relat ions 
within law are relations pertaining to the functioning of law itself, that 
procedural law is the area which "is saturated with the specific features 
which are unique to law". 
However, Eörsi goes fur ther than merely characterising the relation 
between substantive legal dispute and procedure as external and internal 
in terms of the internal view of law: to make this connection emerging in 
the internal view clearer, he brings the categories of form and content and 
their interdependence to bear on the connection in question, critically 
analysing the question whether substantive and procedural law, and a 
substantive legal dispute and procedure are or are not related as form and 
content. Finding the relation between f o r m and content ambiguous, Eörsi 
starts out f r o m the statement that these phenomena have a homogeneous 
content of their own, on the one hand, and a heterogeneous, extrinsic content: 
the law of procedure has the procedural relation as its homogeneous, the 
substantive legal dispute as its heterogeneous content. "It has an internal 
18 
relation to its own content, and an external relation to its extrinsic content ." 
As far as substantive law and procedural law are concerned, these are 
heterogeneous in terms of their own homogeneity, and as law receives impulses 
from economy, likewise procedural law receives impulses from substantive 
law. "Now," via teleological acts of norm-setting? "the extrinsic content , 
the external becomes only teleologically determinative, while intrinsic content, 
' the internal' is essentially internal as a result of the homogeneity of the 
procedural relation."14 
16
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As a friend of Gyula Eörsi ' s I am sure he would welcome the doubts 
and reservations which I might be pardoned for voicing in connection with 
the foregoing arguments. The doubts and reservations spring f r o m my 
conviction, based on the views of Georg Lukács and Hegel, that content 
and form are reflective determinations, "which means that form and content as 
applied to the individual object, the complex and the process etc. always 
determine their specific nature, their being as they are (including generality), 
in combination. But exactly for this reason it is impossible that one of 
them should contribute only as content, the other only as form, to the 
20 
determination of really different complexes". Although Lukács' ideas 
can be shown to have been far from foreign to Eörs i ' s philosophy of law, 
he clearly departs at this point from the tenets of the "Social Ontology", 
indeed, he positively contradicts them when he sees the connection between 
economy and law in terms of form and content. It must be admitted that 
21 
he, too, sees them as heterogeneous, and therefore portrays the relation 
between law and its extrinsic content—the economy—as external. Yet, as 
we have mentioned, the same applies, according to him, to the relation 
between substantive law and the law of procedure, despite the fact that 
substantive and procedural law are parts of the same social complex, viz. 
law, and are thus, as law, homogeneous. Thus what we have here is a 
reflective relation between content and form, while the relation between 
economy and law as separate, heterogeneous complexes can hardly be put 
down as a relation between content and form. The problem springs from 
several sources, primarily from the fact that the conception of the internal 
and the external view seems to be dubious in its application to the relation 
of content and form. Equally dubious is the pairing of the internal as deter-
minative and of the internal as determined. This is especially highlighted 
by Eörsi's outstanding discussion of the historical evolution of the relation 
between substantive and procedural law, which raises the question whether 
the law of procedure has the procedural relation as its content or substantive 
law, whether in other words, the relation between substantive and procedural 
law as a relation between content and form are determined by the approach 
(external or internal) taken to them, or their actual relations which manifest 
themselves in ontic genesis and existence. 
It would take an entire book to answer these questions in merit. In the 
present connection I have to restrict myself to raise a few doubts and 
20
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make a few remarks concerning the categories and links mentioned. It is 
interesting to follow through Eörsi 's arguments with an eye to the motifs 
of the internal, content and the determining factor, on the one hand and 
the external, fo rm and the determined, on the other, especially in terms of 
whether these relations appear in the external or the internal view. 
Considering that in the relation between content and form content, i.e. the 
internal, is the dominant feature, when the reflective relation between 
content and f o r m is applied to that between the internal and the external, 
it is content, i.e. the internal, that determines form, the external. In other 
words, when categories are considered in the abstract manner envisaged 
here, content, the internal is the determiner, and form, the external is the 
determined. W e might wonder how this basic categorial relation is 
affected in law, as internally viewed, more specifically in the link between 
substantive and procedural law, and the substantive legal dispute and the 
procedure? If we remain consistent, then we must hold, as we have 
argued, that in the internal view of law, procedural law is the internal, 
substantive law the external aspect, procedural law emerging as the 
content and thus the determiner, while substantive law is the determined, 
the form. To avoid misunderstandings it must be emphasised that this is 
jus t the result of the logical inferences carried through on the categories 
as they are interpreted by Eörsi rather than a claim explicitly made by 
him. Eörsi's extraordinary sensitivity to reality, the inherent realism of his 
knowledge of law and society prevent him from reaching this conclusion, 
which is logically correct but dubious in terms of social ontology. He 
himself shows the socio-historical absurdity of this logic of the internal 
view in his ingenious exposition of the historical genesis of substantive 
and procedural law. Primitive systems of law conjure up the appearance 
"as though procedural law determined substantive law, since substantive 
law was imbued with life by its recognition in procedural law, an 
entitlement existed only to what was appropriately related to an 'actio' or 
'wr i t ' . " Accordingly "What we call substantive law today was the content 
of an act of procedural law then. From the legal point of view, this act of 
procedural law was the determining factor, in the sphere of law ' fo rm ' 
determines ' content ' , the ' in ternal ' determines the 'external ' .""" This is all 
but appearance, however; in the reality of social ontology the situation if 
jus t the reverse. That this is clearly sensed by Eörsi is shown by his 
argument which casts a s h a d o w of doubt on this special link between 
the internal and the external, content and form, the determiner and the 
22
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determined, saying "Something has gone astray here: the 'internal' can 
determine the 'external' only if the determiner is inside rather than outside, in 
the present case in law rather than in society. This, however, is evidently 
not the case. In fact, if we pose the question from the point of view of 
society, then in this more basic context the case we have is just the reverse. 
The social demand for the entitlement in substantive law determines 'actio' 
23 
and 'writ'." The misleading appearance of the relation between substantive 
and procedural law resulting f rom the internal view is dissolved by the 
external view of law, which thus brings back into focus the real, ontic 
state of affairs. In the external view substantive law is the internal, the 
content, the determiner, while procedural law is the external, the formal 
element, the determined. This state of affairs is the exact opposite of what 
we saw in the internal view of law revealed to us. We can even add, in 
harmony with Eörsi 's views, that the structural properties of law revealed 
in this external view, are none others than the real, ontic processes of the 
social-economic genesis and existence of law. But this should not be taken 
as meaning that the internal and the external view, the distinction between 
internal and external structures and their application is without a raison 
d'être. On the contrary, we have to view law internally if we are to uncover 
the specific movements and features of law, just as we have to dispel the 
appearances thus discovered if we are to get within our grasp the real, 
ontic regularities of law. But it seems certain that the relation between content 
and form, the determiner and the determined just will not depend on their 
being viewed internally or externally: ontological structures are not affected 
by the gnoseological approach we adopt. 
Complexity 
Eörsi 's thought-provoking discussions of the internal and external aspects 
of legal effect and the internal and external complexity of areas of law 
bear out the fruitfulness of the distinction between the internal and the 
external in law and between the two kinds of point of view in legal studies. 
An analysis of the internal and external aspects of legal effect provides a 
sturdy underpinning to the legal investigations of the relation between law 
and morality and the moral influence of morality in law. The starting point 
of Eörsi's philosophical ideas on this area is the fact that law as a mode of 
influencing human conduct always exercises influence on the human psyche 
23
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on the one hand and that through this it exerts influence on the external 
world, aiming to set off or prevent certain processes. "In this sense the legal 
effect is a unity between the internal and the external, exerting its influence 
through the psyche (internal) on the society (external).""4 Keeping in view 
the general pattern of legal history Eörsi arrives at the statement that while 
in the beginning, in the times of primitive societies when societies and 
thus the law were interested one-sidedly only in the effect, the result, law 
was indifferent toward the psyche, it did not take into consideration the 
quality of human acts, their culpability. Legal consequences would be 
applied automatically on the basis of external effect and result, irrespective 
of the quality of the individual psyche of the doer. The real psychological 
background to conduct became important in law as a result of the expansion 
of private property and the exchange of goods. This meant the beginning 
of the influence of ethics on law, the appearance of the idea of culpability 
in the notion of legal responsibility. This ethical undercurrent can be seen 
to be at work in modern legal development and legal systems. Eörsi makes 
an interesting distinction in this respect: "Regarding the tenet of the legal 
effect being an union between the internal and the external, one must 
distinguish between cases in which the external effect dominates although, 
even then, the legal element has to make its way into people's thoughts, and 
there are cases in which the internal effect dominates although, even then, 
the ultimate end is directed at the external, viz. society."" The internal 
effect is directed at a "transformation of the set of motives entertained by 
people", while the external effect aims at a definite kind of conduct, the 
mere result externally arising in society. This distinction is important 
especially for legal dogmatics and legal regulation as it makes possible 
the right choice of legal means in dependence on whether the desired 
effect is internal or external. The basis of the ethical influence on law is 
thus provided by the direction of law at the internal effect. Moral categories 
become relevant undoubtedly when an effect on the psyche of the person 
expressing the conduct is aimed at, although, it is equally obviously, the 
final end of this effect on the psyche is the external effect. It is at this point 
that the philosopher of law is presented with the exciting philosophical 
problems of ethics and law that as far as its direct operation and validity is 
concerned, law remains indifferent to the psychic make-up of legal subjects. 
In contrast, when we come to think of the ontic existence and trans-
formation of law, the situation is different. The outlines of the internal and 
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external effects of law and their historical evolution offered by Eörsi are a 
fruitful ground for a philosophical clarification of these problems and a 
position which is worth thinking through. 
The Legal System and its Systematization 
The problem of legal theory indicated by the title has been extensively 
discussed and has not yet been brought to a satisfactory solution. It 
provides Eörsi with an opportunity to relate the external and internal view 
of law to the concrete phenomenon of law. We have to address a different 
aspect of the internal and the external, the internal and external complexity 
of the area of law. The distinction between the internal and external 
complexity of areas of law runs through Eörsi 's entire oeuvre: it can be 
found in his work on plan contracts written in 1957"6as well as in his 
grandiose Comparative Civil Law, which we have already mentioned. The 
internal and external complexity of law means quite briefly that external 
complexity is realised when in a given area of law different branches of law, 
i.e. legally homogeneous elements are effective together, while complexity 
is internal when an unified area of law is organised from legally hetero-
geneous elements, when different branches of law are dissolved via an 
abolition of their differences. With respect to the legal system and its 
branching this usually entails that the first is characterised by "a grasp of the 
area from a legal point of view (internal understanding of law), the second 
by a social-economic understanding (the external understanding of law) as 
bearing on a question—the question of the legal system-—which is an internal 
27 
question of law". Thus, in the question of the internal articulation of the 
legal system, Eörsi takes a stand contrary to internal complexity. 
Before examining more closely the role and significance played by the 
complexity of law in the articulation of the legal system as presented by 
Gyula Eörsi, it will be worth our while to observe the remarkable way 
in which Eörsi develops the prior question of the legal system and its 
articulation as an internal question of law. The branches of the legal 
system are shaped by the dialectic of branching and becoming branched. 
In this statement the old and much debated question of what the basis of the 
articulation of the legal system is finds new expression. Eörsi sees the legal 
system as the summation of the internal and external aspect of law related 
"
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to itself: "in fact we have to do here with the organisation of certain 
'externalities' (social and economic relations) into a heterogeneous sphere 
28 
(the law) into an ' Internal ' system"." It is equally important therefore 
from the point of view of the legal system and its articulation what kinds 
of social-economic relations and what kind of legal regulation we have to 
do with. Although it is true to say of the legal system and its articulation 
that law is in last analysis determined by economic relations, it would be a 
grave mistake to disregard the specific features resulting from the legal 
"transcription", especially the fact that if law is to serve its social function, it 
has to reflect social-economic relations in a special homogeneous medium. 
"Thus the essential point of a legal system is that legal homogeneity 
organises into an union the social relations which underlie the particular 
branch of law" - 4 It fol lows from all this that what Eörsi considers the 
foundation of the systematization of the legal system is the combination of 
sets of social relations of a certain quality and the specific methods of 
legal norms regulating them, together. "For this reason the traditional 
tenet according to which certain groups of social relations and the special 
legal methods are the foundations basis of the systematization of the legal 
system. The two are not linked by ' and ' because they are in reality the 
internal and external aspect of one and the same thing ,"20 Eörsi bolsters his 
conception of the branching of the legal system with a genuine jur is-
prudential trouvaille, viz. the category of a quasi branch of law. The area 
of law he refers to by the name "quasi branch of law" is not a branch of law 
because it embraces legally heterogeneous elements in internal complexity. 
They "form an unity f rom a political or practical point of view without 
being branches of the law".21 
What is the aim underlying this theory of the legal system and its 
branches? It is designed to provide theoretical assistance in coping with 
the crisis of the development of legal systems, which is, pessimistically, 
diagnosed by the author. It is a recurrent leitmotif in Eörsi 's thought to 
seek for the internal specific feature of law. The "transcription" of social-
economic relations into law draws attention to ever new specific features. 
Thus the insight that law is incapable of directly and adequately reflecting 
contradictions is the starting point for the pessimistic diagnosis and the 
vantage point from which a solution emerges into sight. Social and economic 
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processes are saturated with internal contradictions which foster change 
and fur ther evolution. Law however cannot reflect these adequately. If it did, 
it would let the contradictions gnaw at its own foundations, they would 
explode the internal consistency and logic of the legal system. This is one 
way in which the incongruity between law and economy manifests itself. 
Law f inds itself driven to express the elements of the contradictions in 
separate institutions (property law and contract law, company management 
law and trade union law etc.) within the framework of a dominantly 
harmonious system which lets these elements impinge upon each other only 
at the periphery. "Thus law is an imperfect instrument for the expression of 
contradiction: it is not suitable for adequately expressing either simultaneously 
prevailing, or evolving contradictions. This is a consequence of the same 
special nature of law which makes it capable of serving these contradictions 
with almost infinite dexterity in the interest of the prevailing social system 
within the confines of the objective possibilities of the system."" 
Examining the evolution of the branching of the legal system in terms of 
the general claims about law and contradictions, Eörsi unravels a whole 
series of critical details which all point to the conclusion that the 
development of branches of the legal system on a legal basis is in a crisis." 
Signs of this crisis include e.g. the fact that alien elements make their way 
into public law, on the one hand, and into private law on the other, that the 
boundaries between branches of law are becoming blurred in many respects, 
that the division of law into branches is losing much of its respectability, 
and that legal generalisations are being discredited, that homogeneous legal 
institutions become divided in the course of integration, that legal 
institutions are being relativised and legally heterogeneous units are being 
formed. "The division of law into branches is lying in ruins".14 
The situation is better described as one in which, with the theoretical 
foundations remaining the same as ever, as a result of scientific and techno-
logical revolution and especially of social transformations social-economic 
relations are becoming increasingly complex and tension grows between 
the structure of the relations which demand regulation and the structure of the 
legal system. This comes to be felt in developments such as the increase in 
the number and weight of quasi legal branches, a certain kind of dogmatic 
luxury, the increase in the number and weight of alien elements incorporated 
into civil law and the becoming blurred of the boundary areas of certain 
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between certain branches of law. "As a result of all this, the system of 
legal branches safeguards primarily the basic order of the legal system, 
provides underpinning for the entire legislation, but gives unity to the 
entire system of law much less than it used to."*5 
The Motto 
"Draw beginning and end/Together in a union"—Goethe writes. In light of 
this dictum perhaps there is no need to justify the motto standing at the 
beginning of the present essay. This review must have revealed to the Reader 
the fact that Gyula Eörsi was not only a distinguished lawyer but also a 
most erudite man, well-versed not only in law and jurisprudence but also 
in literature, the arts and—as we have seen—in philosophy. His eminence 
as a lawyer, which ranged from civil law to comparative law and to 
philosophy and made him an internationally renowned expert in juris-
prudence, was founded on his breadth and richness of learning. 
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"Tonio K r ö g e r . . . s tood b e f o r e the cold a l ta r , 
fu l l o f regre t and d i s m a y , at the fact tha t 
f a i t h f u l n e s s was i m p o s s i b l e u p o n this ea r th . 
T h e n he sh rugged h i s shoulders a n d wen t his way ."* 
Gyula Eörsi, in his principal work titled Comparative Civil (Private) Law: 
Law Types, Law Groups, the Roads of Legal Development [Összehasonlító 
polgári jog] by taking the role of law in society as a starting point, justifies 
a theory of legal development governed by practical needs. According to 
Eörsi, the "ultimately determining economic factors produce interests which 
unvariably have an influence on law through the transmission of ideas. 
Social ideas, as products of the mind, have a relative independence, but 
ideas which have an important bearing on society always have their roots 
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ultimately in economic factors." ' He characterises the role of social ideas 
as "important but not basic". 
The following analysis is devoted to the role of promise as a moral 
concept and, more narrowly, the relationship of promise and offer in 
contract law. Does law enforce the morals of promise, or, instead, does it 
enforce contractual obligations on the basis of more practical considerations 
determined by economic factors? Shifts in the public perception of the 
binding force of promises seem to have an impact on the law of contracts. 
However, Gyula Eörsi is right even after a quarter of a century: although 
the social idea of promise might have a significant impact on the law of 
contracts, it still is of secondary importance compared to economic interests 
that shape (or abandon) the social idea itself. 
The questions to follow are dictated by moderate outrage. It is disturbing 
that the given word is not respected, or, more precisely, that even this very 
proposition concerning the normative basis of expectation is disrespected. 
It is embarrassing when moral norms are violated, but it is bothersome 
when the moral norm is taken as non-existent. Those who keep their 
promises and especially those who hope that others will do the same are 
taken as queer fish in our days. True, the principle of "ein Mann, ein 
Wort" was professed by merchants and by otherwise rather unattractive 
military officers. Characters of long passed times: it is a recurring motive 
of Eörsi's book that the time of the Buddenbrooks is over. 
No era is marked for decline. In the words of Shakespeare: "Then fate 
o'er-rules, that, one man holding troth, A million fail , confounding oath on 
oath."" Yet, the decline of respect for promises is an important indicator of the 
state of a society. "To breed an animal which is able to make promises—is 
that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with 
regard to humankind? Is it not the real problem of humankind?"3—asked 
the great German philosopher. No, not Kant but ... Nietzsche. Nietzsche— 
in surprising conformity with Kant—celebrates the success of man in the 
ability to promise, in the "wil l ' s memory", in "an active desire not let go, a 
desire to keep desiring what has been, on some occasion, desired".4 The 
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man of promise, learning to render himself predictable, is able to have the 
fu tu re at his disposal. The man of promise can live up to his own image of 
the future. By making himself predictable, he became "a sovereign individual, 
. . . like only to himself, having f reed itself f rom the morality of custom, an 
autonomous and supra-ethical individual."5 
As we live in an unhappy (but even in this respect unexceptional) age 
that needs heroes,6 the heroism of obligation-generating promises could do 
no harm. This is so, even knowing the sins of faithful perseverance. Those 
sins hardly affect the mystery of the promise, so long as a promise is seen 
as a means of human autonomy, and not of subordination. 
The decline of the morals of promise is due to social and economic 
reasons, which can hardly be influenced. Still, may law, as a relatively 
independent normative system, come to the rescue of promise? After all, 
rumour has it that law is a manifestation and a pillar of morals. Considering 
the connection between contracts and promises that constitute contracts, 
and taking into account the central role of contracts in the functioning of 
law, it seems worthwhile to analyse how a promise may give rise to legal 
obligations. 
In legal philosophy, turning Is into Ought is just like the philosophers' 
stone. How does an obligation emerge? Why are we obliged to do some-
thing? A realist would hold that and obligation is not more than a self-
deceiving expression of our desire to avoid punishment. An alchemist of 
legal philosophy may attempt to locate the source of obligations in some 
specific feature of promise. Promises can really give rise to moral obligations. 
Kant made gold but could not pour it into bars or turn in into fancy legal 
bijouterie. Law can not really make use of a moral obligation stemming 
f rom promise. Although Kant discussed promises giving rise to contracts 
in his theory of right, and not in his theory of morals, the discrepancy is 
even bigger than he would have ever had imagined. 
Consider first the difference between "ordinary" promises and promises 
having a legal effect . A promise appearing in the context of the law of 
obligations, and especially in contract law, is a "promise aimed at a legal 
effect" , "offer and acceptance", or declaration. Although this distinction is 
utterly justified under modern circumstances, a historical survey would 
suggest that there was another possible connection. Theoretically, it was 
5
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and, even today, it is possible to establish a system of contract law, which 
consistently asserts that a promise in itself const i tutes an obligation, 
and, even more, an enforceable one. Conceptual analysis is followed by a 
detailed discussion of this issue. This discussion, however, will not explore 
in detail why modern systems of contract law distanced themselves from 
the legal protection of moral obligations arising f rom promises. 
Thereafter, the analysis explores to what extent does promise generate 
obligation. While there are several theories on this, the present discussion 
is centred around the Kantian concept, because the Kantian concept is 
based on freedom. Kant ' s metaphysic of morals provides moral norms of 
action as found in the state of freedom. Furthermore, the Kantian concept 
is the most consistent theory that locates the source of obligation in the 
person assuming an obligation. In comparison other theories appear to be 
heteronomous, as they just ify obligations from the perspective of society 
or of the promisee, or they explain an obligation rising from a promise 
with reference to customs or coercion. Also, contemporary theories of 
contract, drawing on Aristotle, proceed from the aim of the promise, and 
not f rom the free expression of will exposed in a promise. These theories 
accept a promise as binding and a contract as valid, if the aim pursued by 
them is acceptable. Needless to say, such efforts seek the reformulation of 
law in terms of material justice, being in overt tension with other concepts 
of law based upon the autonomy of the promisor or the parties. 
According to rivalling concepts, moral obligations stemming from 
promises differ in character and consequences—even for the purposes of 
law. The fourth section of the analysis is devoted to exploring which 
concept of obligation seems to provide the best way to establish the moral 
force of contract, and, in regulating contractual relations, what kind of 
moral order is reinforced and accepted by law. Experience suggests that 
the modern contact law is not guided by Kantian conceptions. Indeed, the 
same stands for modern legal systems in general, although allegedly the point 
of modern law is to safeguard liberty and a sphere of action for autono-
mous human beings. Legal norms—the promises of law—are indeterminate 
and disobeyed, features which suggest that the sovereign itself is not serious 
about its promises. Nonetheless, as suggested in the fifth part, this shall 
not prevent attempts to accord modern contract law with an individual 
moral of obligations pursuing Kantian conceptions of autonomy. May 
such efforts fail, an instrument for the critique of law has still been made 
available. 
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1. Promise and Contract 
Kant deals with promises in the context of acquisition by contract in his 
theory of right, when discussing the private law valid in the state of 
nature. Promise is an of fer that can be pleasant for the one who accepts it. 
Promise as a sign or phenomenon is quite different f rom legal phenomena. 
Using a term common in Hungarian legal terminology, a promise is not 
always of legal relevance [a "legal fact"], and even when it is a legal fact, 
it is often problematic to explain why it does not have a legal effect . In 
the ordinary sense of the word, any resolution addressed (communicated, 
intended to be directive or relative) to someone else concerning my 
actions amounts to a promise. In law only such public statements of will 
addressed to someone else are considered to be relevant, the addressee of 
which is identifiable. Certainly, such statements can be addressed to the 
general public. In his theory of right Kant discusses legally relevant 
promises in essentially similar terms. 
According to Kant, it is only "the juridical relation of Man to Beings 
who have both Rights and Duties"7 that results in an actual connection 
between legal rights and duties. In Kant 's analysis, however, although the 
binding force of law lies in itself, law must still correspond to morals. The 
notion of right implies the ability to bind others. Nonetheless, if law 
obliges one to do things that he should do anyway in compliance with his 
moral duties, then the legal order is a legal order of freedom. Thus, law 
derives f rom freedom, f rom moral law determined by our-selves. If my 
promise is not morally binding on me, no one can impose on me a legal 
obligation. Others who oblige me take advantage of the situation, which 
was created by the obligation implied in my promise. Taking advantage of 
an opportunity opened up by moral law, however, does not give rise to an 
obligation. Nevertheless, as soon as a moral obligation has been created, 
legal regulation takes advantage of it in a rather arbitrary fashion and 
allows others to make use of it as well, thereby distancing law from 
morals. For instance, contract law (i.e. legal regulations applicable to the 
enforcement of contractual obligations) treats the obligee 's claims mainly 
without respect to the contents of the actual promise, and, thus, refusing 
to follow the morals of promise. Such ignorance is possible even for Kant: 
"it is not in Ethics, therefore, but in Jurisprudence, that the principle of 
7
 Kant , I.: The Philosophy of Law, An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles 
of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right [Metaphysik d e r Sitten: Metaphys i sche 
Anfangsgrunde der Rechts lehre ] . Clif ton, 1974, 26. 
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the legislation lies, that 'promises made and accepted must be kept ' . 
Accordingly, Ethics specially teaches that if the Motive-principle of 
external compulsion which Juridical Legislation connects with a Duty is 
even let go, the idea of duty is sufficient itself as a Motive."8 
Kant was not at all the first to distinguish the moral binding force of 
promise f rom the binding force of contractual offer and acceptance, or 
contract itself. Kant—among others—dealt with the theory of right and 
virtue because it was obvious that actions, which follow the law of reason 
that was rendered possible in the state of freedom, do not necessarily 
occur in real life. Something must bring human actions closer to the state 
of freedom: this is what law is for. According to Kant, in contrast with 
moral law, legal rules provide for action not solely on the basis of moral 
obligations. If an action complies with the rule because it was guided by 
the idea of duty, then the action has morality ("duty of virtue"). At this point, 
Kant refers to promise as an example.9 A promise, which must be kept 
because of its enforceability, is a matter of legal obligation. But keeping a 
promise without external compulsion is an act of virtue ("fidelity"). 
According to Hungarian, French and German legal terminology and 
jurisprudence, a declaration which is not aimed to have a legal effect, does 
not give rise to a contract. The teleological character of the term "aim" might 
certainly become problematic. What should will and consciousness cover 
in order to trigger legal ef fects? An invitation to dinner might have 
connotations of boredom, dishwashing or a juicy stake for host and guest 
alike, while law does not cross their minds. Still, may one make a cruel 
joke out of a dinner invitation, when enforcing various legal consequences, 
the court will hold him for failing to seriously consider the foreseeable 
legal consequences of his actions. 
Pursuant to classic common law, a gratuitous promise (where there is 
no consideration) does not give rise to a contract. Due to lack of acceptance 
(consideration) the promise is not legally binding. A sheer promise to 
transfer rights can not bring about a contract, since without consent there 
is no free act of will on the other side. In this case a promise does not 
establish and obligation, rather, it is a prolegomenon to self-binding. That 
is, anything that takes another person to consent qualifies as an attempt of 
self-binding. Binding force is attached to acceptance (consent, consideration), 
reliance, or confirmation by another person. Hegel's position highlights this 
point: "the two wills are associated in an identity in the sense that one of 
8
 Kant: op. cit. 22. 
g 
Kant: op. cit. 22. 
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them comes to its decision only in the presence of the other".10 "My will 
may become objective to me."" From the perspective of the morals of 
promise, however, acceptance is not constitutive, it reinforces the irre-
versibility of a promise at best. Kant himself says that a believed promise 
can not be withdrawn, since—using a modern term—it induces legal effects. 
Withdrawal is self-contradictory. More precisely, a person is bound by his 
promise until its withdrawn. Acceptance functions as a limitation on 
withdrawal, it bans withdrawal for the benefit of the acceptor. 
Promisory estoppel and prompted interest (bíztatást érdek), its Hungarian 
equivalent, show that a promise (actions inducing it or the impression 
thereof) may give rise to an obligation without acceptance (consideration). 
This happens when a promise induces action or forbearance of another 
reasonable person, who suffers damages as a result. Thus, it seems that 
promise as a moral obligation has limited relevance for law: it is necessary 
to exclude the arbitrariness of the enforcement of a consequence, which 
corresponds to the promise made. Consent implied in a promise, its volun-
tariness repeals the arbitrariness of legal coercion. 
Modern legal systems distinguish promise f rom contractual offer and 
acceptance. Contract law applies to such promises which are about creating 
or transferring rights. From another perspective, legal consequences are 
manifested before performance if and only if the other party relied upon 
the declaration in question and was adversely affected. As Fuller and Perdue 
submitted in 1936, ~ expectations generated by the offer or interest associated 
with actions based upon those expectations are protected by contract law. 
In contemporary law, no one would be surprised if a statement concerning 
an expensive gift would only be enforceable if made in writing. (Hungarian 
professional discourse is likely to centre on who gets to counter-sign it and 
for how much exactly.) Why does law not recognise an obligation stemming 
from a sheer promise? Why does a simple declaration not suffice? Why is 
there a need for acceptance in case of a gift? The reason is not that law is 
hostile to promises, rather, it is because law serves legal policy consi-
derations as well. And, mainly, without a requirement of writing, highly 
uncertain situations could emerge, raising innumerable problems of 
10
 Hegel's Philosophy of Right [Naturrecht und Staa tswissenschaf t im Grund-
risse/Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts]. London—Oxford—New York, 1967, 58 
[8 .74]. 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op.cit. 58 [s. 73]. 
' " S e e Fuller. L. L. and Perdue , W. R.: The Rel iance Interest in Contract 
Damages , Yale Law Journal, 1936, 52. 
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evidence. Practice and theory are content with insisting that insignificant 
promises are irrelevant; legal policy considerations are not questioned; for 
they are obvious. Zweigert and Kötz take the casebook example for granted: if 
someone is invited for dinner but not allowed to enter the house, he can 
not successfully claim compensation for his taxi bill. In the name of 
seriousness, issues of promise, offer and legitimate expectations are put 
aside without any theoretical analysis. English law goes as far as stating that 
"An Englishman is liable, not because he has made a promise, but because 
he has made a bargain."13 
2. Protection of Promise in the History of Contract Law 
Roman law denied the binding force of a mere promise, and as such, the 
binding force of a promise of a gift. Canon law recognised the legally 
binding nature of promise, but its validity and enforceability depended on 
the aim served by the promise. Probably there was one moment in history— 
at the heyday of scholasticism—when contracts were meant to enforce 
promise-based obligations. In Gordley's view, however, this connection was 
based upon a conception of justice referring back to Aristotle.14 
According to jurisprudence influenced by late scholasticism (Connanus, 
1508-1551), the promisor was bound only in respect to belief.15 In a legal 
sense, a promise created an obligation to the extent breaching the promise 
would have violated the principle of "do no harm to others". Damages 
were adjusted to the credibility of a promise. Connanus' position was 
unacceptable for Grotius. First, Grotius, an advocate of natural law based 
on the law of reason, rejected Connanus' methodological presuppositions. 
Secondly, Connanus' position would also have destroyed Grotius' theory of 
international law. If a sheer promise is not legally binding, agreements of 
monarchs are irrelevant until they are being performed. And what is 
performance in the case of a peace treaty? Stopping the attacks, disbanding 
13
 Chesh i r e—Fi foo t ( -Furmston): The Law of Contract; 1991, 28. On quote in: 
Zweiger t , К ,—Kötz , H.: Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. Tübingen , 1996, 385. 
14
 This commuta t ive just ice cons idera t ion has been raising problems in law ever 
s ince . In this respect , in Hungary it is suf f ic ien t to re fer to the confus ion sur rounding 
laesio enormis, abuses and unpredic tabi l i ty of public and private law. 
ь
 On this point, Atiyah and Gordley exceptionally seem to agree. See Atiyah, P. S.: 
An Introduction to the Law of Contract. Oxford, 1989, 10. Gordley, J.: The Philosophical 
Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine. Oxford, 1991, 73. See also At iyah , P. S.: 
Promises, Morals, and Law. Oxford , 1981. 
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troops, or what else?16 For a promise to be binding, or, for a promisor to 
be obliged to keep his promise, an a priori rule is needed. Grotius found 
this a priori rule in natural law: promises are binding by nature. 
Grotius' position17 dominated social contract theories for a long time. 
Note that, although Grotius insisted that promises are binding, he was of 
the view that a promise is enforceable by the other party only if the 
promise was for transferring rights and if it was made in the proper form. 
In a similar fashion, Pufendorf believed that only those promises are 
"perfect" and, thus, enforceable which were made to transfer rights. It is 
not entirely clear whether by way of a perfect promise the promisor creates 
a claim, or whether it actually confers the right about which the promise 
18 
was made. Natural law dictates that promises shall be kept. Still, the 
obligation itself is based on the voluntary consent to transfer something 
that belongs to one. A simple expression of future intent does not make a 
promise enforceable. 
The idea to connect the binding force of promise with the binding 
force of contract gained further support in the Continent: in the sway of 
18th-century freedom movements the concept of liberty was tied to autonomy. 
For the purposes of an attempt to make law correspond with liberty, the 
claim that "I am obligated because I obliged myself in my promise" sounds 
more attractive than any other competing explanation (e.g. I am obliged 
19 
because the other party expects me to do something or did something). 
This is so since in all other cases the source of obligation is external. All 
this might be of little significance today, but in the 19th century the 
craftsmen of the basic—and still used—principles of contract law were 
eager to accord their conceptual devices with contemporary concepts of 
freedom. 
This emancipation based upon the principles of freedom was not at all 
accomplished by legislatures of bourgeois revolutions—revolutionaries 
16
 See Grot ius , H.: De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II, XI. 
17
 Grotius: op. cit., II. 11, IV. 
18
 See von Pufendor f , S. F.: On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural 
Law [De O f f i c i o Hominis et C iv i s Juxta Legem Natura lem], Cambr idge , 1991, 70 
[IX. 7.] 
19 
There is a moment in Hungar i an law, which is clearly domina ted by promise. 
An offer sent by mail becomes irreversible f r om its receipt until the arrival of the 
response. Suppose that initially the addressee was hesitant to accept the offer and 
bel ieves that no contract was made . Then, at the very last m o m e n t , he accepts the 
o f f e r on the phone . 
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were not concerned about moral elements of still preserved in law. Rather, 
they were bothered by the substantive and structural arbitrariness of law. 
Members of the draft ing committee of the Code Civil, while constantly 
referring to natural law and liberty, did not do more than editing Domat 's 
ideas—ideas which were formulated before the revolution. In his remarks 
on contracts Domat did refer to f reedom and will, in reality, however, all 
he (and others) did was cleaning law from concepts of scholastic theology, 
i.e. considerations of just ice in quid pro quo. The creative jurists of the 
18th and 19th century were busy with trying to identify those promises 
among all morally binding undertakings, which could have a serious legal 
effect. In doing so they relied on technical factors independent of ethics 
and morals: they used tools as "causa" and "consideration". In lack thereof, a 
promise could not amount to an expression or will or offer. At the same 
time, "promise" was replaced by "wil l" in the terminology of continental 
private law. It is worthy of attention that early advocates of the will theory 
occasionally did refer to will as a manifestation of private autonomy. Law, 
even when it becomes positive, can serve the morality of freedom—to this 
extent Savigny summarised the Kantian concept properly. Law safeguards 
the sphere of individual freedom of action. Law promotes morality not by 
executing moral norms. Rather, via legal institutions law makes it possible 
for everyone to realise their inherent moral qualities in conformity with 
the nature of things.20 In sharp contrast with just ice based approaches, 
Savigny insists that besides f reedom "there is no need for a second 
principle in the name of the common good"."' 
According to Gordley, however, Savigny's concept of freedom and his 
will theory are not connected to K a n t . " It is not longer promise that is 
binding—promise was replaced by will itself. A contract originating from 
the conformity of wills is but a metaphor. Nothing follows from two 
(expressions of) wills. Wills and words standing for them are not two atoms 
bonded in a molecule, the existence of which generates a new physical 
reality. Initially, craftsmen of the modern (Pandectist) contract theory did 
acknowledge this. In the words of Savigny, the act of willing is "an invisible 
event". An act of willing can only be inferred from an expression of the will. 
Still, an expression may only be relied on to speculate about the possible 
will expressed. 
20
 Sav igny , F. C.: System des heutigen römischen Rechts, I. 55. 
21
 Sav igny : op. cit., I. 54 . 
"
2
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The legal treatment of the binding force of an offer demonstrates how 
limited respect for freedom is, when it is contingent upon the respect of 
will. Law determines the unilateral binding force of the offer—including 
its commencement and duration—in an automatic fashion, without regard 
to the intent of the offeror. Considerations about trade security serve as a 
standard justification for the rule, which is appropriate. Nonetheless, it 
clearly shows how law distanced itself already in the 19th century f rom 
the idea of will and from the promisor. 
Replacing the problem of promise with the problem of the expressed 
will successfully detached contracts from the issue of moral binding force 
associated with promise, emancipated it from the confusing remains of 
moral thinking. The man of practice does not have to consider why a 
contract is binding. Promise emerged a novo as the moral basis for contract 
in the name of the protection of private autonomy when will theory lost its 
strength, owing not only to social and just ice considerations, but also due 
to its own operational difficulties (e.g. problems of long-term co-operation, 
etc.). A purely formal theory of corresponding wills was hardly able to 
provide a justice-based revision of contract law, to reject its modern 
limitations. A morality-based theory that can refer to autonomy may be 
more successful in this respect. 
3. Is a Promise Binding, And If So, Why? 
Stricto sensu, promise gives rise to moral obligation if it commands the 
promisor "from inside", without reference to external reasons, that is, if the 
promisor obliges himself by the promise. This position is clearly reminiscent 
of the Kantian concept of establishing obligations. The most convincing are 
those moral theories, which derive the moral obligation to keep a promise 
from individual autonomy. The promisor's freedom receives its fullest 
recognition in this approach: the promisor is bound only with regard to 
himself, he is the cause of his own action. Other conceptions of the binding 
force of promise take the position of the recipient, the acceptor or beneficiary 
as a starting point. These theories explain the binding force of promise as a 
matter of responsibility triggered by the acceptor's reliance on the promise. 
Furthermore, due to their influence on contract law, it is important to 
mention those moral conceptions which explain promise as a convention 
necessary for the functioning of society, without reference to corresponding 
duties. Also, there are theories which connect the binding force of promise 
with coercion mobilised in response to non performance. 
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Hobbes and Locke established the state by way of a contract . 
According to Locke, the power of government is based upon keeping 
mutual promises."3 As Hume pointed out, however, Locke could not 
succeed in justifying why the contract itself was binding. The idea that 
promise in itself might have some particular quality that makes it binding 
did not occur to Locke. As he argued against Aristotle, concepts and 
things had no essence for him. By rejecting essentialism Locke held, that 
promise is binding for otherwise the concept would not make sense. May 
this be the case, it still is no answer to the question. Promise certainly 
embodies the notion of acting upon an obligation that was undertaken 
voluntarily, and the concept is used in this sense. Still, a given use of a 
concept does not lead to an obligation to act according to a certain 
meaning, or, at best, it directs behaviour in the conventional sense of the 
word: meaning would be impossible without a certain correspondence of 
actual actions. Those who use the word "promise" generate expectations 
in the addressees. 
While this solution is popular even today, Hume was not content with it. 
According to him, the true explanation of binding force is a matter of 
convention. Within the context of direct relations of small societies, sanctions 
against those who failed to keep their promises generated a convention, 
which was then partly reinforced by law. In small societies, promise is 
aimed at co-operation (motivated primarily by self-interest). Breaking a 
promise renders this co-operation impossible. Expectations developed this 
way were internalised by time. This is why people act upon promises."4 "5 
According to Hume, one does not abandon up the benefits of his 
natural f reedom without compensation. Promise, thus, is conditional: it 
becomes unconditional and binding only in exchange for consideration (in 
politics, it is the protection provided by government / the sovereign). Of 
course, other than the rationality of interests, nothing explains why 
keeping a promise should be tied to the performance of others. According 
to this approach, only those promises are binding which are kept due to 
23 
Although the democracy of ancient A thens knew no cons t i tu t ion , was not ba sed 
on promise—its political organisat ion ex i s ted without s imul taneous events , any 
specific act of obl igat ion, or any act of obl iga t ion concerning the fu ture . 24 
See H u m e , D.: A Treatise on Human Nature (eds.: Sir L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. 
H. Nidditch). 2nd ed. Oxford , 1992. 541 [Book III, Part II, s.8], 
" This explana t ion , howeve r , undermines the binding force of promise, s ince 
breaching a p romise will on ly amount to the violat ion of a convent ion . See Fr ied , 
Ch.: Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. Cambridge, Mass . , 
London: Harva rd University Press , 1981, 15. 
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the dictates of self-interest (and of conceivable compulsion)—the rest does 
not count. This, however, makes promise an impracticable social institution, 
since the interests of the promisor are hard to foresee. This perception is 
in conflict with the concept of promise itself: under this approach a 
promise is not a statement about one 's future actions. 
Note, however, that Hume made an attempt to turn fidelity into a moral 
obligation via a self-limiting argument. He holds that people keep their 
promises, because society would crumble if promises were abandoned 
upon the dictates of self-love. Thus, rejecting the submission that promise 
is an act of self-biding brings by an even more absurd explanation. After 
all, the alternative explanation presupposes self-interested people caring 
for society, people who "limit themselves" by an ex post judgement driven by 
their concern for society, thus solving the bootstrapping problem."6 Still, 
when building a system on an empirical basis one has to acknowledge that 
people are free-riders. According to Hume, however, there is no need to 
base the obligation to obey the sovereign on some concept of promise (i.e. 
citizenship in modern terminology)—everything is "justified" by admitting 
that there is no society without allegiance and fidelity. The standard 
counter-argument holds that acknowledging the above will compel anyone 
to participation in upholding the institution. In a situation when self-
interest commands to the contrary, one is not likely to observe the binding 
force of a promise simply because otherwise the necessary institution will 
not function in the long run. That is, except if one is a moral being in the 
Kantian sense, or, if one is afraid of disclosure or coercion. 
Furthermore, Hume submits that in local communities, breaching a 
promise has extremely serious consequences among the members of the 
community. Aristotle claims that the one who does not keep a promise in a 
community, can not be virtuous. This consideration, however, does not 
apply in relation to outsiders: deception of strangers does not matter, more 
precisely, it is an admirable feint . As to legal agreements, Roman public 
and private law alike attributed little significance to promises (the 
institution of naturalis obligatio gained significance only later, partly due 
to Greek influence). Enforceable promises were established by sacral acts. 
What mattered was transfer {traditio), performance itself—this was the bar 
to reclaiming a promised and transferred object, or recalling performance. 
While this solution is appropriate for the legal needs of closed societies, it 
became inconvenient for the purposes of trade in imperial Rome. The tribal 
Hume, D.: Of the Original Contract (1748) , in: Hume, D.: Politcal Essays, 
(ed. : Knud Haakossen) ; Cambr idge , 1994, 197. 
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way of thinking, which attributes binding force to promises only within the 
group, is completely dysfunctional in modern, anonymous societies utterly 
settled upon exchange of goods. With the disappearance of the tribe as the 
natural background of binding promises, and in lack of a natural community 
within which promises should be kept, the fate of promise is sealed. There is 
no community any longer in which promises are to be kept: public sphere 
consists of strangers."7 
According to sociological or (in the Kelsenian sense) pure concepts of 
legal theory, a promise giving rise to a right shall be kept due to external legal 
coercion. Quoting La Rochefoucauld: "we promise according to our hopes, 
and we hold according to our fears.""8 
While for Locke contract is a means to construe government, for Hart 
promise is the baseline of the entire modern legal system. Hart regards legal 
rule itself as a promise. Legal rules are binding as promises. The legislator, 
the executive and the judiciary promise the application of the rule. For Hart, 
promise (and the legal rule that is in itself a promise) binds the promisor by 
way of external rules upon which the action promised is to take place. The 
binding force is dependent upon the external condition (the existence of 
27 
On the other hand , t ransact ions , both commerc ia l and polit ical, are not 
synchronic but lasting and multitudinous, thus, the need for mutual trust is increasing. In 
the anonymous mass society, social co-operation can funct ion successfully only as an 
au tonomous relation of f ree human beings , or in free re la t ions of au tonomous human 
be ings . Empirical ly, it is hardly possible , pe rhaps because peop le lack the ra t ional i ty 
necessary for making and keeping promises . A series of legal and social ins t i tut ions 
is set up to substitute i t—endanger ing au tonomy itself, h inder ing the promises of the 
a u t o n o m o u s human be ing f rom being real ised. Fur thermore , contracts are not made 
by men anymore, they are made by organisa t ions . The man of organisat ions is, of 
course, anonymous and enjoys the irresponsibility of anonymity. And as contracts that are 
dictated by organisations play a decisive role, the model of promise disappears , and even 
the peop le who creep for th f rom the mouth-hole of o rgan isa t ions behave as they are 
accus tomed to. E.g. product liability (which is limited even today) exist fo r mainly 
polit ical reasons and not owing to the logic of private law. Also, and more importantly, 
law tends to accept that one shall promise a lmost nothing to enter into a contract . 
Rough ly speaking, a bank is keeping o n e ' s money as a depos i t according to te rms it 
w i shes and condi t ions it sees fi t . (Pursuant to the pract ice of the National Savings 
Bank [ "OTP"] major cash d i sbursements may take place several days fo l lowing prior 
no t ice—al legedly for secur i ty reasons. Nobody seems to care that this does not at all 
serve the interests of the deposi tor . ) Does a statement that is subject to constant 
change fit within the concept of promise? And if the s ta tement of bank is not a 
p romise , then what is i t? Migh t iness based upon involuntary consen t? 
"
8
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the rule and some further factors behind the rule). Promise is to be kept for 
heteronomous, external reasons that do not concern the promisor."4 Hart 
takes promise as a means necessary in economic relations, as an instrument of 
self-biding. Empirically this approach might be close to contract law's notion 
of recognition of promise, but as a practical or utilitarian consideration, it 
amounts to an component of moral theory on law, and not a moral basis 
for law. 
According to Kant, the action following one 's own act of choice (reason) 
presents the action as objectively necessary, i.e. makes it a duty30 by 
adjusting it to the moral law. Just to avoid misunderstanding: "The activity 
of the Faculty of Desire may proceed in accordance with Conceptions; and 
in so far as the Principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, 
and not in its object it constitutes a Power acting or not acting according to 
liking. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the Consciousness of the 
Power of the action to produce the Object, it forms an act of Choice".31 It 
means (simplifying the point) that the act of choice is the action governed 
from inside and recognized as that. One keeps a promise because of the 
dictates of the law of reason. Any other action would be contradictory: if 
keeping promises is not rendered as the general standard of action, it will be 
impossible for anyone to promise. Promise ceases to exist just like the 
possibility of autonomous action. 
"For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to 
be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not 
keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself 
impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would 
laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses."32 
OQ 
" Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law. 2nd ed., Oxfo rd , 1998. 
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 Kant, I.: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
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T h e first part of the above quo ta t ion reads as fo l lows : "Another f inds himself 
u rged by need to bo r row money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it 
w i th in a determinate time. He would like to make such a promise, but he still has 
e n o u g h conscience to ask himself: is it not fo rb idden and contrary to duty to help 
onese l f out of need in such a way ? Suppos ing the he still decided to do so, his maxim 
of ac t ion would go as fol lows: when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall 
b o r r o w money and promise to repay it, even though I know this will never happen. 
N o w this principle of self-love or pe r sona l advantage is perhaps qui te consis tent with 
my whole future we l f a re , but the ques t ion now is whe ther it is right. I therefore turn 
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As the promisor follows his own law, his action corresponds to moral 
duty. But why does the rule of reason command promises to be kept? Duty 
is to be followed, says Kant. But why? When criticising Mendelssohn, 
Kant rejects the question itself. In his theory of right Kant submits: "The 
question is put thus: 'Why ought I to keep my Promise?' for it is assumed as 
understood as understood by all that I ought to do so. It is, however, 
absolutely impossible to give any further proof of the Categorical Imperative 
implied... It is a Postulate of the Pure Reason..."32 This remark applies to 
promise in contractual relations. So the question makes no sense in law— 
and only in law. George Fletcher, commenting upon Kant's above mentioned 
standpoint, f inds that in contract law f reedom of action fal ls under 
limitations by way of promise, as certain decisions are handed over to the 
other party. "The different outcomes under the moral and legal theory 
highlight divergent concerns: the former with the promisor's internal 
struggle and the latter with the problem of power and control between two 
distinct individuals."24 
Kant does not elaborate on the origin of the binding force of offer, 
f inding that it is impossible to prove and shall be accepted as a categorical 
imperative. Nonetheless, outside the theory of right it well might be 
possible to find some moral reason that explains the binding force of 
promise. Then, this moral basis might affect law, and, by the same token, 
contract as well. 
Certain versions of the Kantian conception do not take the promisor 's 
relation to himself as the basis for the obligation to keep promises. In this 
respect, Charles Fr ied 's attempt is remarkable. In his book of 1981 Fried 
establishes the binding force of modern contract upon promise: "since a 
contract is first of all a promise, a contract must be kept because a 
promise must be kept." ' According to Fried, men are free for they can 
the demand of se l f - love into a universa l law and put the quest ion as fo l lows : how 
would it be if my maxim became a universal law? 1 then see at once that it could never 
hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must necessarily 
contradict itself." 
The Kantian tenet of se l f -contradic t ion and the co l lapse of the social inst i tution 
of p romise as its consequence can also be found in Locke and in H u m e ' s con-
vent ional i sm. Kant, however , connec ts those e lements to au tonomous act ion, and 
turns them into an in ternal law of act ion. 
23
 Kant: The Philosophy of Law / Metaphys ik der Sit ten, op. cit., 103 -104 . 
34
 Fletcher, D.: Law and Moral i ty: A Kantian Perspect ive . Columbia Law Review, 
1987. 533, 547. 
35 
Fried: Contract as Promise, op. cit. 17. 
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establish contacts with others, human freedom is realised in those relations, 
and this is the source of the binding force of promise—and, at the same 
time, its moral basis, as it is an act of freedom. "An individual is morally 
bound to keep promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention 
whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect 
the promise performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to 
invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite."36 Immorality consists in 
abusing someone's confidence and, by way of that, not treating the other 
person as an autonomous being. This is morally wrong. 
A variation of Fr ied 's approach is to hold that the promisee's trust is 
an assumption regarding the promisor as an autonomous being. In this 
context failure to perform undermines the promisor's autonomy. One, who 
wants to be autonomous, also has to act as an autonomous being in 
relation to others. Promises must to be kept to avoid being seen as an 
abuser of confidence. Moral duty is replaced by virtue, or, perhaps, by the 
social sanction. 
While Fried takes into consideration the promisor 's morality, other 
theories seek the binding force of promise in its impacts on others who 
rely upon it. Promise triggers an expectation (confidence), and violating it 
is unjust or morally wrong. Scanlon,37 for example, derives the binding 
force of promise from the detrimental consequences caused by the violation of 
the promise to those who relied on it. According to principles requiring 
the avoidance of harm, a breach of promise adversely affecting another 
person is morally wrong. Everyone, including the promisor, is under a 
duty to refrain from causing disadvantage or harm to others. Avoiding 
wrongfulness is the promisor 's moral duty. (Consequently, if a breach of 
promise is not detrimental, there is no violation of duty. The same applies 
when some greater harm is avoided by breaching a promise.) 
When focusing on how the promisor may be discharged of the promise 
it is easy to point out the difference between this external justification of 
the binding force of promise implied in the assertion of claims and the 
Kantian justification that centres around the promisor. A promise is not to 
be kept if the promisee releases the promisor. Did the person released this 
way keep his promise? Shall he still condemn himself in foro internol 
Furthermore, how shall an external observer view the ones favoured by 
16
 Fr ied : Contract as Promise, op. cit. 16. 
17
 See Scanlon, T. M. : Promises and Cont rac t s . In: The Theory of Contract Law 
(ed.: Pe te r Benson). C a m b r i d g e , 2001. 
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benevolence and equity? What kind of a freedom can be completely 
dependent upon others? 
I regard a stricter version of moral obligation as valid. This approach 
seeks the basis of the obligation in the act itself, and not in the relation-
ship with the addressee. If a promise is kept because someone else expects 
it (or enforces it), then the cause of the action does not lie in the actor. 
What makes a being autonomous is the reason why he keeps his promise. 
He does not keep his promise for he promised to someone else, but 
because of himself. The duty to oneself becomes the basis for keeping a 
promise. The obligation derives from o n e ' s own freedom and autonomy 
and not from the recognition of another's autonomy via a promise. Assuming 
an obligation is an act and a consequence of freedom. Following Kant, the 
person who acts upon an obligation, is a moral being—who chooses to 
follow the law of reason. Thus, acting in fulfilment of an obligation that 
originates f r o m a promise amounts to a duty (unless the duty is not 
contrary to the law of reason, that is a very low standard). It means that by 
keeping a promise without regard to any other person, one justifies himself 
as a moral being. 
Promise leads to self-obligation as fo l lows. 
Suppose that I have an idea concerning some future action of mine. I 
may go jogging in the park today. It is time to go jogging in the park, etc. 
To this idea, I attribute the character of a decision. The question is 
what makes the idea of a fu ture action into a resolution. The issue can be 
approached in an empirical way—I adjust some of my plans and particular 
actions to it. The connection can be rather weak when this adjustment 
remains on the level of ideas. But if I go to bed earlier or prepare my 
shoes, I actually reinforce my decision by actions. I may also underpin my 
resolution by means of social representation: I make a vow. For a religious 
person, this is a serious obligation as the believer exposes himself to the 
judgements and sanctions of an imaginary external force. The force can be 
external in the sense that in the case of breaching the vow, one anticipates 
the punishment of fate—that is, one attaches a sanction to it. But one does 
not have to be a believer to be able to self-oblige. Self-obligation might be 
a case of normal schizophrenia or the ability of man to reflect upon 
himself. What transforms an idea into a resolution is that one renders 
the realization of the resolution to become the measure of his moral 
judgement on himself. Certainly, this is possible on different levels of 
consciousness, and can work not only in anticipation but subsequently as 
well. I have not gone jogging for a week (with all sorts of excuses)—if I 
do not go tomorrow, I am a good-for-nothing (lazy, stupid, etc.) man. (The 
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condemnation might be not only moral, but also intellectual, although 
even in the latter case it has a moral fault behind it. Stupidity or ignorance 
of health is one's moral fault.) 
Suppose that I announce: from now on, I will go jogging every morning 
• 38 
(I make an announcement that I made a vow to myself on jogging)." This 
promise will already be subject to sanctions (backbiting, contempt, etc.). 
What will be the ground for contempt? My own breach of obligation. I will 
be condemned for breaching my obligation, although my action was not 
detrimental to anyone else, no one could establish any material expectation 
on me: the action concerned only myself. 
Tell ing someone that "I promised myself to go jogging from now on" 
is not a promise in the legal sense of the word. It is different than saying: 
"I promise you to go jogging every morning". In a legal system based on 
the morals of promise, it would be a promise giving rise to an obligation, 
an enforceable promise. Whether law will really provide protection against 
breaching this promise is a different matter. After all, what kind of right did I 
confer upon the promisee? A right to see me jogging? Without conferring 
a right, there is no contract, no legal obligation. 
Before dwelling on the possible legal relevance of the concept of "promise 
as obligation", it is in place to mention a potential practical counter-argument. 
With becoming widespread such a practical approach undermines the very 
possibility of moral existence in everyday life. "Undermining" describes a 
situation where insisting on promises results in a recurrent failure of one 's 
way of living. The counter-argument holds that it is completely irrelevant 
how one defines himself—all that matters is the social context. The whole 
line or argument is foolish, it is the logic of the blockhead. Why would it 
be wrong to depart f rom one's resolution? Why should one do something 
that is unpleasant or that is against his interests? The principle of pacta 
sunt servanda is based on the premise that an offer can not be against the 
offeror ' s interests, as there is consideration for his performance. Where 
public opinion does not find the interest satisfied, promise is not binding 
and it does not have to be kept. Adaptation is freedom itself. Even the 
promise made to someone else is not to be kept unless the other party can 
force me to perform. As others have expectations, and costs based on 
those expectations, others put a system [like law] in motion if observing a 
promise is instrumental to their interests. 
This line of argument allows for the existence of promise only as mere 
reflectivity. Empirically a promise is binding to the extent there is a chance 
8
 Atiyah deals with this issue in another context. See Atiyah: Promises, op. cit. 54. 
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for successful enforcement. This approach may culminate in destructive 
tendencies: the less likely it is to expect a promise to be kept, the more 
resources are needed for the enforcement thereof. In the meantime, the 
chances of cal l ing an amoral promisor to account are diminishing, due to 
the availability of limited resources. Various dubious and desperate efforts 
were made in modern times to devise techniques for securing performance; 
solutions range from expensive guarantees to blacklisting violators and 
non-performers. Still, modern law and modern standards of conduct widely 
tolerate non-performance, they settle for paying damages. In these cases 
the amount of damages is adjusted not to the value of a promise, but to the 
"reasonability" of the expectation generated by the promise. In trade relations 
it is acceptable to breach a promise and to deliver to someone else, if the 
other person pays a higher price. A seller is reasonable as long as the 
profit made this way is higher than the damages to be paid, that is, as long 
as the contracting party suffer ing harm can obtain the goods at a price 
lower than the price received by the seller. According to economic analysis, 
this is about cost-effective expenditure, and, thus, constitutes a reasonable 
course of action. Morality seems to be irrational. Coercion to enforce a 
promise is expensive. Then why keep a promise? No one will be caught 
anyway. 
Any conception that takes promise as generating some obligation must 
respond to the following problem.1 ' I receive a thousand pounds in exchange 
for promising that I will pay it back. Do I have to pay it back because I 
received it? Or because I promised to repay it? More people believe that 
they would pay the money back because they had received it, because it 
does not belong to them. It may well be that this conception is backed by 
respect for property, and not by ethical premises upon the principle of 
promise. It would be unjust to keep what belongs to someone else. As a 
result of a fa i lure to follow the rule voluntarily, what is owed might be 
taken away in line with the requirements of corrective justice. Logic 
behind the rule of positive law also promotes the interest in seeing a loan 
returned: it has to be returned because it was given. The enforcement of 
returning a loan is not based on the binding force of promise; promise is 
almost irrelevant from a legal perspective, or from the perspective of the 
creditor. For law a promise to repay is less relevant than restoring the 
state of affairs that conforms with justice. That is, regardless of promise, a 
usurious interest rate on a loan does not have to be paid. Morally, for 
autonomous morals of obligation, one is not condemned for having obtained 
39 Atiyah: Promises, op. cit. 34 . 
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something, but because of the promise made in regard to that thing. 
Otherwise this case would be similar to finding a banknote, even knowing 
to whom it belongs—and not handing it over. This is not a great honour, 
but is not a problem of fidelity either. 
Promise is an act of freedom by which one establishes a rule to himself. 
If someone does not admit to being bound by his promise, he excludes his 
own freedom. Freedom is justified by way of voluntary (in Kantian terms, 
arbitrary) constraint, by voluntary self-denial. One has free will (one is free) 
only in case what is willed derives from himself, if one sets tasks for himself. 
4. The Relationship of Promise and Obligation Asserted in Contract 
and in Contract Law 
Contract law preserves something from the moral characteristics of promise. 
According to Fried contracts can be understood in light of promise as a 
moral concept. Scanlon holds that the similarities between promise and 
contract are due to shared values they are rooted in. Although, as Scanlon 
adds, these values trigger different reactions in law and in moral theory, 
thus, promise and contract are parallel concepts.40 
There are various, competing conceptions on the moral binding force 
of promise. Furthermore, despite all attempts of international unification, 
legal families provide different solutions. What is the role of obligation 
established by a promise in legal solutions? 
Kant sharply contrasts duties of virtue and duties of right, i.e. duties 
that can not be based upon the sense of duty that is to be found in every 
rational being.41 A creditor can not tell a debtor that "you are obliged to 
pay it back by your own reason". Still, there is such a moral obligation. In 
principle, it would be possible for a legal rule to enforce promise-based 
obligations. At certain points in history, law was not far from this, and the 
established principles of modern continental legal systems seem to 
correspond. Law, even if it becomes positive, can serve the morality of 
freedom. Even Savigny, this rather authoritarian Prussian minister of justice, 
thought that he had to believe and proclaim it. 
Regarding the relevance of promise for contract law, it is important to 
examine certain factors which create the impression that promise (the 
contents of an offer) is of secondary significance, if not irrelevant al-
40
 See Scanlon: Promises... op. cit. 86. 
41
 See Kant: The Philosophy of Law / Metaphysik der Sitten, op. cit., 24 -26 . 
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together. Especially German jurisprudence excels in reading clauses into 
contracts never contemplated by the parties. Nonetheless, promise, or 
offer may be relevant even if it does not cover the promised performance 
or its conditions. Also, if a party is released f rom a contract due to the 
change of circumstances [clausula rebus sic stantibus], it is not to mean 
that promises are not binding. The promisor 's intent does not have to 
extend to complicated future situations. In principle—unless there is a 
reason to suppose otherwise—it is acceptable as a premise that a promise 
covers everyday, common or foreseeable situations,4" and it is binding to 
such extent. Note that a promise is an act of f reedom and is universalis-
able to the extent it complies with rules of reason. 
In order to examine the validity and predictive force of various moral 
conceptions, it is instrumental to compare their views on the moral binding 
force of promise and the legal regulations of performance at the three stages 
of the contract's existence. Such an analysis might reveal moral conceptions 
underlying contemporary legal regulations. The three stages to examine are: 
conclusion of the contract—with particular reference to the binding force of 
offer; performance—focusing on the requirement of good faith and co-ope-
ration; and breach of contract—concentrating on the target of legal sanctions. 
1. How long is the offeror bound by the offer without any contractual 
stipulation in this regard? And, provided that promise has any significance, 
may the offeror set a date for that ex post? Regarding the binding force of 
an offer, common law and civil law jurisdictions developed radically different 
solutions.43 Under common law, an offer may be revoked any time before its 
acceptance, even in if the offer contained an express stipulation on its 
validity. This is an instance of complete disregard of the principle of 
promise. This effect is somewhat eased as the rule does not apply to offers 
made upon consideration. The binding force of an offer, thus, depends on 
an external factor, although not on the expectations of another person. In 
U.S. jurisprudence an offer is not revocable irrespective of consideration, 
when another person acted relying on the offer. The freedom of revoking an 
offer is further relaxed, as acceptance does not have to reach the offeror: 
an offer becomes irrevocable when acceptance is placed in the mailbox of 
the offeror. 
In Romanist legal systems, and, thus, in French jurisprudence, damages 
are due if an offer is revoked before its acceptance. Courts determine the 
42
 BH 1986/11. 469. 
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See Zweiger t—Kötz : op. cit., 351. 
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binding force of offer on a case-by-case basis. Some hold that damages 
are due because the revocation of an offer breaches a fictitious preliminary 
contract on the binding force of the offer. This is the fiction of the promise 
principle. According to another conception, however, this is a tort—a 
conception which is in accord with Scanlon's views. 
Pursuant to the promise-based solution of Art.862(3) of the Austrian 
Civil Code (ABGB), the offeror is bound by his offer , he could not be 
released by any act of revocation. S.145 of the German Civil Code (BGB) 
provides a similar solution. The of feror has to state that the o f fe r was 
made ohne obligo, this way turning the offer into a call for offers (tender), 
which upon acceptance is then transformed into a consent by silence on 
the basis of the principle of co-operation in good faith (Treu und Glauben). 
In theory this is a case for the morals of promise. Courts, however, are 
tampering with such promises. In addition, an of fe r is effective until it 
reaches the addressee. Regarding this rule the f indings of Zweigert and 
Kötz are characteristic of a legalistic approach. They hold that the German 
solution is rational because the events are controlled by the offeror , thus, 
it makes perfect sense to allocate risks on his side. 
The approach of the Hungarian Civil Code is also radical: an offer, a 
promise, is transient unless the will wants it otherwise. But the of fer (the 
"expression of intent") by its nature seems to disperse into air, unless the 
watchful acceptor catches it with the butterfly-net of his will before it would 
vanish altogether. This solution is utterly reasonable for the purposes of 
trade security. Still, what kind of promise is this, f rom the perspective of the 
binding force of promise? In the case of transactions between parties who 
are not present, the offer is binding as long as a response may be expected 
under ordinary circumstances. Pursuant to Art. 211(2) of the Hungarian Civil 
Code, the usual period is to be estimated with regard to the means of transmission. 
To this extent the Hungarian Civil Code is closer to the promise-principle, 
although it supplements the promise principle with trade customs and 
practices. The means of sending the offer may indicate the durability of a 
promise. To the extent the validity of a promise is established on the basis 
of its form, the reference to trade customs is used to establish the binding 
force of the promise. Still, the custom applicable to the arrival of the offer is 
about the qualities of performance, and not of promise itself. No matter how 
reasonable, the rule reinforces trade customs and practices, but not promise. 
Therefore, it does not follow the logic of self-binding reflected in promise. 
Promise, or will, creates an occasion for applying legal conventions. 
Promise as a source of obligation is secondary even in German and 
Hungarian law. Will mainly stands to make it possible for a party to 
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subject himself freely to the rules of the game prescribed in law. Even if it 
is supposed that the moral of promise is acknowledged in positive law, 
unless there are express reservations, an offer does not serve the observance 
of a promise—it binds the promisor pursuant to conventions defined in 
contract law. The logic of these conventions is by no means adjusted to 
the promisor's moral absolutism. Instead, it is guided by considerations on 
trade security and risk allocation. Conventions on the binding force of 
o f f e r do not maximise the binding force of promise. Without an express 
disposition of the offeror, the choice of an autonomous subject is rather 
limited: he makes an offer by mail, by telephone, his of fer is about sale 
and purchase, lease, etc. What is not mentioned in the offer , is added by 
statute and by courts. Such supplements, however, do not respect the 
presumable will of the offeror . With a rough offer, the offeror submits 
himself to contractual conventions. Like a chess-master, the offeror may 
pick an opening. A contracting party, however, has less freedom than a 
chess player, as parties to a contract shall make their fur ther moves in 
compliance with the law. This is far stricter of a constraint than deciding 
which figure to move. A contracting party who is silent about cogent and 
dispositive rules is like a chess player with no creativity, a player who 
opts for Nimzo indian defense and, after the opening, sticks to the moves 
of game 21 of the Capablanca-Alekhine title match of 1927. 
2. Co-operation upon good fai th is the guiding principle of the Hungarian 
Civil Code. This would even follow from the concept of promise: if a promise 
is binding, one has to act upon it as long as the promise is effective. 
Good faith concerns primarily the promisor. Secondarily and consequently, it 
a lso concerns the other party who makes a promise in respect to his 
consideration. The promisor—according to the convention concerning 
promise or his own law of reason—has to suppose that his partner is 
act ing in good fai th. Indeed, promise corresponds to a "univerzalisable" 
law of reason in the sense and to the extent that every promise establishes 
an obligation. Hence, one has to regard as binding not only his own 
promises but also those promises made by the other party, at least until the 
other party breaches his promise, or until one can reasonably suppose that 
the other party will breach his promise (the latter being recognized by 
English law as anticipatory breach) . Without a specific meaning attributed 
to it in law, an expression of will would mean that a promise is to be taken 
seriously, one can not be released from it upon random excuses. According to 
Cicero, it is un jus t to breach a standard created for ourselves: "justice 
rests upon the foundation stone of good faith, that is to say, truthfulness 
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and scrupulous observance of promises and covenants ... [T]he term fides, 
'good faith ' , originally signified a promise which has been kept (fiat)".44 
Law can do nothing about it. Economy needs average dishonest people 
who set up rules for themselves, or at least such judges are needed who 
would decide accordingly. In the name of fairness and good faith, one does 
not have to do everything at all to keep a promise. The standard of liability 
for cooperation is what is generally expectable in a given situation. 
3. Breach of contract . In order to render the rules of the game un-
ambiguous, the accomplishment of private law is to provide sanction for 
breach of conventions. Primarily this is achieved not by enforcing a proper 
step, i.e. a convention. A solution unusual in private law is to punish the 
mischief (although see the crimes of bankruptcy). Or, as a far more typical 
reaction, it proceeds from the assumption that the other party is expected 
to follow the law, and, thus, private law puts the party who (supposedly) 
relies on the behaviour of the other party to a state in which he would 
have been if the rule had been complied with. But private law does not 
restore or create a state called for by the promise. When contract law, or 
civil law in general, concentrates on damages caused by a certain conduct, 
it turns out to be indifferent about the conduct itself. 
As to expectations concerning the performance of a contract, at the 
outset, there is a remarkable difference between common law and civil law 
legal systems that were under Pandectist (and later German) influence. By 
now these systems, despite textual and doctrinal differences, have remarkably 
converged, just as it was predicted by Eörs i ' s "veiled convergence" 
theory. 7 Contrary to common law, civil law legal systems are based upon 
the principle of performance in kind, thus, promise appears to be enforce-
able, performable. "The principle of pacta sunt servanda, as has already 
been pointed out, was not merely a tenet enforced by the State but was on a 
highly respected place in the moral value scale. (...) The pacta sunt 
servanda principle was based on the 'sanctity' of private ownership and the 
44
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will of the private owner: it protected private ownership by attaching to the 
freedom of will the acceptance of responsibility for freely resolved acts."46 
In practice, however, legal systems that insist upon pacta sunt servanda 
offer a choice to the adversely affected party between performance in kind 
and damages. Despite the culture of will, promise is a ticket to a game 
where one either performs or pays according to the intent of the other 
party. Why would one insist on performance in kind by a party who already 
caused much trouble, when the problem can be easily settled through the 
market? The market of modern economy offers innumerably more options 
of covering purchase than closed society that was familiar to the Pandectists. 
The binding force of promise is weakened further in the light of the object 
of compensation, i.e. what damages are meant to cover, what state should 
the promisee be put via compensation. Does compensation really put a 
promisee in a state which he would have been, had the promise been kept? 
The answer goes in the negative in the legal systems of virtually modern 
market economies. The state of affairs as promised is rarely ever the sole 
control l ing factor. Typically, cour ts take into consideration the actual (or 
reasonably expectable) conduct of the acceptor. In this respect, the reliance 
theory of common law provides the most straightforward example, allowing 
compensation only for damages occurring in relation to conduct in reliance 
of the promise. Thus, compensation is based not on promise, but on the trust 
of the other party. In cases where only actual damages are covered the 
concept of restitution delivers a similar outcome in continental legal systems. 
In addition, Hungarian law imposes an active duty on the promisee to 
mitigate damages. The notion of damages does not cover the collapse of the 
promisee's personal expectations. Law is indifferent to mental frustration. 
De minimis non curat. Humiliation and unremedied resentment, even if 
cause by public authorities, belong to human condition. The other is not 
hell, but the business partner is at least purgatory. 
Consequently, while modern contract law, and especially continental 
contract law, preserves some components that refer to an obligation 
stemming from promise, the predicting force of a heteronymous concept 
of obligation is still greater. Nonetheless, even the latter is not asserted in 
a consistent manner, partly because of legal policy considerations (i.e. the 
46
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judiciary 's convenience), and partly on the basis of references to material 
just ice. 
When contract is cleaned f rom the ornaments of the phraseology of 
legal ideology, the difference between promise based on individual 
autonomy and facts constituting contracts is striking. From the perspective 
of moral of autonomy, contract, and even law as such, is amoral, or more 
precisely, immoral. Considerations relevant for concluding contracts can 
not contribute to the respect for promises, to reinforcing the moral order 
of freely assumed duties. Contract law turns its back on autonomy. In 
Germany, perhaps because it was impossible to live with the burdens 
imposed by omitting to repair the flaws of the BGB, courts reformulated 
contract law in the name of the principle of Treu and Glauben—and not 
only in cases where the parties were silent. Working against allegedly 
insensitive and selfish private autonomy, reformulation took place in the 
name of ad hoc social justice. 
In the history of contract law there were several attempts to link contracts 
with moral concepts other than the one based on promise. While such 
attempts may comply with the political agenda of the day, due to their 
judicial arbitrariness and desultoriness, they can not serve predictability. 
In order to define ethical standards, they refer to vague ideas of justice 
expressed in legal norms; such ethical standards are meant to determine 
which elements of a promise should be kept.47 According to this approach, 
justice dictates that a promise may establish a contractual obligation only 
by way of acceptance. The disciples of Pythagoras taught that justice lied 
in reciprocity. "Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain 
and a sort of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having 
an equal amount before and af ter the transaction."4 8 It would be unjust in 
respect to commutative just ice if one party failed to react in exchange 
for the actions of the other party. Promise becomes binding by way of 
acceptance and performance: as a gesture of avoiding injustice. Only such 
promises are binding that serve a just purpose, leading to the requirement 
equivalence of values exchanged. 
Still, there are logical difficulties concerning the assertion of just promises. 
The requirement of commutative justice will not resolve the problem arising 
47
 As an advocate of this standpoint, see Kronman, A.: Contract Law and Distributive 
Justice, Yale Law Journal, 1980. 472 . 
48 Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. In: The C o m p l e t e Works of Aristotle. The 
Revised Oxford Translat ion (ed.: Jonathan Barnes) , vol. 2.; P r ince ton , 1995, 1787 
[1132b], 
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from situations where both parties had made their promises but neither has 
performed yet. This problem is typical in consensual theories. When 
neither promise is enforced, commutative justice is not violated. Benevolent 
donations may cause further problems. Following Aristotle, Thomas of 
Aquinas proclaimed that, in respect to promises and gifts there is no 
reciprocity, while there clearly is a duty. Law must enforce promises 
serving virtue and justice. This ethical approach is reinforced by claims 
concerning material just ice and by the entire social conception of law. 
Suppression of the moral of promise in contract law is more than a 
simple change in ideology. Reference to morality affects obedience to law. 
It does matter whether the glaze is made of paper or burned sugar. Crème 
brulee is all about the glaze—try to replace it with cardboard. In the context 
of contracts, governmental coercion to enforce contracts or damages is 
accepted, and—even more—expected, because in doing so government acts 
in accordance with the requirements of good morals. It takes a closer analysis to 
show that moral expectations are irrelevant for the state, and that the state 
considers not the position of the one who is acting, but the position of the 
one who is expecting. Moreover, law determines when and to what extent a 
promise is worthy of enforcement without being consistent about moral standards. 
It is certain that law tends to promote the cause of the victims quiet inconsistently, 
at least as a pro forma gesture of self-justification. This still seems to be 
sufficient to preserve the façade of law's "morality". This is all what is left from 
the concept of "law's ethical minimum". It is still another issue, whether society 
is willing to acknowledge legal norms and their enforcers as effective safeguards 
of moral order on the basis of actual legal norms and their enforcement. 
5. What is Contract Law For, or, To What Extent is It Possible to Divert 
Legal Conventions Towards an Individual Moral Course? 
Gyula Eörsi would be right in f inding the lament on the decline of the 
morals of promise outdated.49 After all, the mobilising slogans of con-
temporary law are stabilisation of monopoly capitalist economy, social-
welfare issues, the "protection of the weak", economic and legal efficiency. 
However, there is no lamentation here, since as Vilmos Peschka rightly 
observed, subjective morality in itself can not determine the ethical.' It is 
still considerable whether autonomy may influence law at all via ethics, this 
49 
Eörsi: Comparative Civil (Private) Law. op. cit. See his discussion of Riperts ideas. 
50
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distillation of momentary truths. Keeping in mind the characteristics of law, 
a consistently promise-based law might not even be necessary. It is still 
noteworthy, though, that moral as reflected in socially filtered ethics 
determining law appears as distant memories of a teenage love affair. 
Even Kant did not hold that morals may determine law, or may determine 
actions against the law. He regarded legal obligations as autonomous. None-
theless, it is worth reconsidering the critical and assertive role moral premises 
may have vis-à-vis law. The mirror held by the morals of autonomy in front of 
the contracting party and contract law reflects a rather unattractive image. 
Codification attempts in the 19th century aimed to save the world f rom 
jurisprudence and unjust customs.5 ' Legislation could not find a better task 
ever since. What is the task of contract law, that is, of legal rules applicable to 
contracts? Can it promote the autonomy of the parties, if that holds one of the 
parties captive? What kind of justice can it impose upon the parties, and to 
what extent? By what dictates of reason does it remedy the weak predictive 
capacities of contracting parties and their treatment of unforeseeable events? 
Upon the morals of promise it was (and still is) possible to draft such 
laws for contracts, which would be more consistent about justice than the 
kind of material justice that invades contracts jurisprudence and suppresses 
autonomy. Promise-autonomy could become a basis for more stringent legal 
rules, which are not based on reliance. Such rules are not necessarily less 
effective than contemporary solutions. One-sided mightiness may well be 
reduced on Kantian premises, keeping in mind that one's freedom does not 
go beyond the boundaries of the freedom of other's. Within such a concept, 
abuse of power may result in invalidity without having to give way to 
convoluted attempts of judicial paternalism in the name of material just ice. 
As Lajos Vékás observed "social requirements concerning social jus t ice 
proved stronger than any ideal and classical principle ... [I]n industrialised 
societies assuring the common good to the greatest possible extent is possible 
by way of a democratic form of government".5" It does not follow, however, 
that this would require a kind of openness that renders possible nothing 
but judicially assisted business pragmatism and statutory intervention that 
satisfies the needs of political populism without consistent governmental 
enforcement measures. 
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It is not at all peculiar for dispositive (and, incidentally, cogent) statutory 
provisions to remedy gaps opened by carelessness or lack of time. The question 
rather is when comes the time for legal intervention to fill those gaps. 
According to Oliver Wendell Holmes, the point of departure for law is the 
"bad man". This is a reasonable and justified assumption, especially if one 
expects law to protect society from "bad men", including those cheating and 
lying when entering into contracts. But legal regulation based on a 
pragmatic conception may collide with a legal order based on autonomous 
morality. The latter being a legal order envisioned by legislators who do not 
intend to protect the members of society, but rather, intend to create such 
circumstances within which a person is a human being of moral choice. 
Promise may give rise to moral obligation if the promisor is rational, if 
he is able to render his actions universal (as demonstrated in the case of 
the promisor not willing to repay a loan). But this is regarded, even by 
Kant, not as an empirical but a normative condition: man has to be seen 
this way in order to be able to free him from his age of infancy one day. 
Knowledge, time, and information instrumental to reasonableness are 
limited. As an intellectual exercise, it is hard, costly, and—for the same 
reason—almost impossible to foresee the entire scope of an undertaking, 
to settle the risks in advance. Within certain limits, the legislator takes 
care of establishing a universal law, which contracting parties were not 
capable of , due to their intellectual or moral infancy, or hedonism. Legal 
provisions regulate some eventualities not foreseen by the promisor, in a 
manner as it is expectable from a reasonable man. (Then, the empirical 
legislator soon arrives at trade customs as depositories of universalizable 
maxims of action.) Most rules of contract law are dispositive, and that 
allows for deviations f r o m this supposed reasonableness. In certain cases, 
the legislator's efforts to make universal moral law into law might also mean 
including Kantian requirements therein. The legislator, playing the role of 
the Kantian man in place of contracting parties, declares that contractual 
clauses that treat other people as mere instruments are contrary to good 
morals. While a theory of law might promote morals, when following such 
laws one ' s actions will be only legal, and not moral. 
There is a further difficulty regarding intellectual capacities and charac-
teristics of everyday knowledge, which shall be remedied by law. In the 
Kantian examples, the promisor 's determination to perform is unlimited as 
much as his ability to perform is. The promisor did not only decide (and, 
thus, obliged) to pay 50 pounds, but he is able to do so. In reality, however, 
as promises are attempts to rule the future, even such a simple case is 
heavy with uncertainties that may dis turb the fulf i lment of a promise, or 
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may require its ex post revision. What if the 50 pound note was stolen, 
before it could have been handed over? What if by the time performance is 
due, the promisor becomes impoverished and lives on begging? What if by the 
time of performance the 50 pound note is worth nothing? The promisor's 
consciousness can not encompass such cases—law has to make up for it. 
And, especially in the case of contracts with consideration, law can not let 
the promisor determine ex post about what he wanted in the first place. May 
one insist upon a principle or a narrative of promise, will, or declaration, 
one has to hold that in law promise continues its own legal existence. 
Autonomy turns into heteronomy. What remains of freedom is submitting to 
a game by—at least from one ' s perspective—arbitrary rules. To conclude, 
in contrast to the Kantian assumption, law attributes legal significance to a 
will which is not fully determined: in real life, economic and other relations 
are run upon indeterminate obligations and partial promises. There is room for 
conditional promises and options. There is engagement before marriage that 
has legal consequences in many legal systems. The factual is taken as an 
obligation, it is elevated to the status of promise. 
Law can not handle promise as giving rise to moral obligation, for — 
as in law and in everyday life — the preconditions of autonomous promises 
are lacking. Regulations substitute these deficiencies with other assumptions. 
The first unrealised assumption is that a promise is made by a reasonable 
man, who can universalise his actions and their consequences. For this 
reason, many legal prohibitions prohibit promises. For instance, a contract is 
against good morals if it binds one party, while the performance of the other 
party depends on the occurrence of some event depending exclusively on 
his own intentions. This rule, already incorporated in the law of the European 
Communities, intends to secure universalisable promises.53 (From the 
perspective of Aristotelian ethics, such a rule might constitute a violation 
of distributive justice. One does not have to go that far, since such rules 
may also be made to protect autonomy.) 
If the binding force of promise is explained by submitting that in a 
promise the promisor recognizes himself as an intelligent and autonomous 
being (without which one can not expect to be recognised as such), why 
53
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does this have such a minimal relevance in contract law? The answer lays in 
the amorality of the world, of human relations and of law. Or, to phrase it in 
an even sharper manner, in a contract one does not only make a promise 
about goods or services: when concluding a contract, one also enters into an 
agreement about his trustworthiness (fidelity) and establishes a standard of 
expectations concerning the other party. This is demonstrated in contractual 
default penalties and liquidated damages, although indemnification, unilateral 
termination, and exemption from performance (even if they typically concern 
external circumstances) may also be mentioned here. Liquidated damages 
are far the best example: in case of breach of contract by the other party, in 
exchange for proper assignment, the obligee agrees to settle for part of the 
expected benefit. Thus, the obligee gives up part of the initially expected 
performance in exchange for a secondary, more secure performance.54 
Promise is transformed in the contract. It is not promise that matters but the 
extent to which the acceptor takes it seriously: the more seriously he takes it 
on the level of facticity (see reliance), the stronger the binding force of 
promise will be—although it is all a matter of agreement. Damages are not 
adjusted to reliance generated by the promise, but to the extent to which it 
was possible to rely on the promise on the basis of the agreement, or to the 
extent the obligee did actually rely on the promise. But even this brings by a 
practical legal twist: acceptance does not justify the obligee's unconditional 
confidence; it justifies what the court regards as acceptable according to 
trade considerations. At best, the standard is efficiency and de facto custom. 
Conclusions 
The relationship between promise as a moral category and facts treated as 
promise in law is almost accidental. If, at the outset, there was some ground 
to believe that law, and contract, should correspond with moral requirements 
of promise on an elementary level, now it seems that law is at least 
indifferent to factors that give rise to moral obligation based upon a promise. 
Perhaps it is beneficial that law was liberated from the tutelage of morals, 
as this way law was made more efficient . Nonetheless, law has become 
morally empty. Even public law references to autonomy serve the limitation 
of freedom. 
4
 See Craswel l , R.: Aga ins t Fuller and Perdue . The University of Chicago Law 
Review, 2 0 0 0 . 114. 
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Law uses terms that refer to morals and legislation—at least for public 
purposes—has insisted for a long time (and perhaps even today) that it 
asserts at least a moral minimum. In fact, however, for internal use, law is 
proud that its ethically tainted terms gained predictable doctrinal content 
as seen in the case of good faith or intent. That pride is truly justified for 
arbitrariness begins with the application of dogmatically undigested terms, 
where cases are decided with reference to brute public interest. Those 
cases follow the bare logic of power, the dictates of private interests. The 
separation of law and morals was widely celebrated—and there was some-
thing emancipating in it, paradoxically in the same sense as morals were 
sought in the present analysis. When emancipated from the dictates of 
morals, law served freedom better than legal norms formulated in morally 
coloured legal systems until the 19th century. 
Other moral critics hold law responsible for the loss of freedom, pre-
supposing that, following bourgeois revolutions, freedom was to be served 
by law. Indeed, even if law was a means of social liberation, it is to be 
received with reservations. Bourgeois revolutions—taking the French 
Declaration of 1789 seriously—promised freedom only within the framework 
of statutes: the private law of the Code Civil was freedom-loving only in 
its rhetoric. The record of classical private law in guaranteeing freedom is 
certainly remarkable, since it made possible all sorts of transactions among a 
growing number of people and even enforced these under certain conditions. 
However, freedom was of secondary importance for law, although, in respect 
to freedom (as can be experienced once again today), it is pleasing when 
public administration is bound by law. As far as private law, and contract 
law, is concerned, beyond rhetoric, it did not centre around freedom and 
autonomy. It strived for a kind of institutional or economic efficiency. 
Ethical or moral rhetoric has survived at least in part, but gradually it is 
losing its significance. According to Eörsi's summary—that does not sound 
melancholic or resigned at all—modern law is centred around problems 
that can not be solved by axiomatic methods as society is too complicated 
for their application. "Legal system as a coherent conceptual system has 
failed, and its constituents are now independently used for part-purposes 
which are often mutually contradictory." 
55
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enforcement, apart from some relevant litigation cases, practically did not 
take place. At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, however, the 
issue overrode the professional scope and was given publicity in connection 
with the case of Borsodchem Co. Ltd., as further in the paper I will revert back 
to that.1 The case also delivered a number of lessons and revealed problems 
of legislation and law enforcement, besides, undoubtedly, boosting the 
process of the revision of regulations in the relevant field. 
I. The Regulation of 1997 
1. Primarily, it is the notion itself that should be clarified. In terms of 
take-overs, an "enterprise" is construed as a business association, a public 
company. Take-overs do not cover either the acquisition of shares of a private 
company or of a stake in a limited liability company, even if the respective 
transaction results in a one-person company. That could imply an issue in 
antitrust law (see definition below), but does not pose a problem of take-
over legislation. Although the effect of the regulation of 1997 was not 
confined to quoted companies, it explicitly covered public companies, the 
majority of which are quoted at the stock exchange, however, in principle, 
public operation is not necessarily subject to official quotation at the 
stock exchange. 
A further notional element consists in the proportion of shares to be 
acquired, which has been limited at a rate of 33 per cent under 1997 statutes, 
and as I will point out, this rate didn't change under 2001 regulations, apart 
from relevant exceptions. 
Before revising the underlying principles of the 1997 regulation, I will 
look into the question whether and why the specific regulation is necessary, 
i.e., in what way the regulation of "take-over" relates to the regulation of 
the so-called acquisition of control, commonly known as antitrust law on 
the one hand, and competition law on the other hand. 
Concerning competition law, the crucial issue f rom the point of view 
of take-over and antitrust legislation to be highlighted is that neither 
antitrust law, nor take-over legislation can aim at gratuitous prevention of 
acquisitions of company stakes. The objective of state regulation, however, 
and Hungary is not peculiar in that respect, is the sustention of control 
over and transparency of corporate structure and the acquisition of stakes. 
1
 See b e l o w in Part 1.4. 
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Antitrust regulation has limited justifiability in case of private enterprises, 
which therefore remain relatively irrelevant to the following exposition. 
The primary and substantive role of the (antitrust) regulation of 
acquisition of control consists in the protection of minority shareholders' 
interests in associations, which poses a complex and manifold problem. 
Thereby, certain facilities that make information on acquisitions of various 
proportions accessible for minority shareholders are legally guaranteed. 
That objective of publicity in antitrust law is specified under Paras. (1) 
and (2) of Art. 292 of Companies Act on notification liability, the neglect 
of which is sanctioned by the reduction of voting rights. The facts of 
control acquisition (significant holdings over 25 p.c., majority holdings over 
50 p.c., and direct controlling interests over 75 p.c.) are stated in the 
framework of the Companies Act as ideal models of the way voting rates 
and the decision-making mechanisms are related in the association. A 
further legal instrument is provided by granting minority shareholders the 
right to sell their shares under given conditions on the one hand," or 
exercise specific minority rights if they retain their membership in the 
association, on the other hand. These legal instruments are supplemented 
by guaranteed protection for creditors, which gained momentum under 
Para. (3) of Art. 292 and Art. 296 of Companies Act. According to the 
principle of shifting responsibility, the provisions concerning the protection 
of creditors establish the direct responsibility of the acquirer under given 
conditions. 
With respect to the above mentioned facts, the limit of 33 p.c. specified 
under the take-over regulation of 1997 does not seem justifiable in the first 
approach, which, however, reveals the implementation of a distinctively 
different legislative purpose and the application of according instruments. 
As a matter of fact, the purpose of antitrust regulations is that minority 
shareholders and creditors of the association are notified about the acquisition 
of a specific proportion of shares, so that according decisions could be made 
in the event of the acquisition of majority holdings or direct controlling 
interest. Being aware of the acquisition, minority shareholders may opt for 
selling their shares to the acquirer. Pursuant to creditor protection, however, 
minority shareholders may also determine the scope of operation of the 
acquired control, i.e. the limits beyond which the principle of company law, 
stipulating that members are not held responsible for debts in specified 
forms of associations, is ineffective. On the grounds of take-over statutes (as 
2
 See Act CXLIV of 1997, Para. (1) of Art. 295 of Companies Act . 
3
 Para. (3) of Art. 295 of Compan ie s Act. 
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expounded below), the buyer is obliged to make a public offer to the share-
holders of the association for their shares.4 The public offer shall be 
implemented in a manner and on condition that both the association and, 
although that aspect is usually not referred to, its management are protected, 
whereas elements of creditor protection are completely neglected by take-
over regulation. The consideration of the aspect of creditor protection points 
to basic differences between antitrust law, which also covers transactions 
following the acquisition of shares, on the one hand, and the 1997 regulation, 
which confines the scope of take-over regulation to the transaction of the 
public offer , the completion of which concludes the case from the legal 
point of view, on the other hand. 
With regards to the underlying causes of take-over regulation, the most 
frequently mentioned factor is the publicity of the company. The operation 
both in case of a quoted and a non-quoted public company presupposes a 
wide scope of holders and the consequent fragmentation of company stock, 
which, furthermore, implies the potential control of the company owing to a 
relatively minor share. Of course, what is at stake is the assertion of the 
level, so as the regulation should not impede, restrain or prevent transfer of 
shares, which would contradict the structure and the role of a company 
limited by shares. The optimal solution is taking a middle course, which 
shall facilitate the achievement of goals favoured f rom the viewpoint of 
legal policy without hindering free movement of capital or the realisation 
of investments. The problem is not specific to Hungarian law, all countries 
that intend to settle the problem encounter this specific regulatory dilemma. 
Another problem is the relationship of take-over regulation to competition 
law. While antitrust law, as mentioned above, seeks to protect minority 
shareholders' rights and creditors' interests, competition law purports to 
maintain fairness of business and competition. Take-over regulation, however, 
concerns both fields, when, on the one hand, it protects minority shareholders, 
on the other hand, applies its own legal instruments to protect companies 
and prevent cases that present so-called hostile take-overs, which is a function 
similar to that of competition law. 
2. In retrospect, the exposition of the development of take-over legislation 
in Hungary will also focus on the relationship of company law to securities 
law. The fact that Act VI of 1988, i.e. the first Act on Business Associations, 
avoided the definition of that relationship is down to several reasons, 
4
 See Par t 1.7. below, on the potential col l i s ion of rules concerning acquis i t ion 
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primarily, that at the time of making the law, companies limited by shares 
were not considered as a major field subject to company law. Although, 
companies limited by shares were established at the time, the majority 
sprang up as the outcome of the transformation of large state-owned 
companies and the number of owners was comparably limited even after 
privatisation. Furthermore, the operation of these companies was private, 
whereas the first Companies Act confined the terminological distinction of 
public and private formally to the foundation of the company, thereby 
constructed public operation as the principal case and misinterpreted both 
the situation and the foreseeable trends. The 1988 regulation also limited the 
scope of antitrust statutes, by providing for legal proceedings exclusively 
in the event of acquisition of control of a Hungarian company limited by 
shares by another Hungarian company limited by shares.5 Such regulation, 
however, was unreasonable in 1988 and the following years in view of the 
situation in Hungary. 
Accordingly, the first Act on Securities (hereinafter referred to as A.S.) 
d idn ' t cover take-overs, nor did Act VI of 1990, although it provided for 
publicising securities and shares. The take-over issue was accentuated as a 
consequence of the development of European legislation on the one hand, 
and the change of Hungarian circumstances in the second half of the 
1990s on the other hand. 
The Companies Act of 1997, as it is known, revised the regulation of 
companies limited by shares substantively, and instituted profound changes in 
the field of antitrust law by significantly extending its personal effect. The 
relationship between the law on shares and law on securities, however, 
remained unsolved or became even more problematic. Unexpectedly, with 
reference to alleged or real interests of legal policy, the law on securities 
preceded the Companies Act under elaboration, and provided for several 
issues, in an objectionable way, which would be subject to the regulation 
of shareholders' rights, i.e. the Companies Act.6 After Act CXI of 1996, 
5
 The Supreme Court made an attempt at an interpretation propter legem by the 
purported extention of the term of "companies limited by shares" to foreign "corporations" 
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96 TAMÁS S Á R K Ö Z Y 
i.e. the Act on Securities, had taken effect on 1st January, 1997, the makers of 
the Companies Act were confronted with a fait accompli and the primacy 
of securities law was unquestionable in the codification process of company 
law. Another implication was that the passing of the Companies Act made 
amendments to A.S. necessary, since take-over regulation was contained 
by the latter (see Arts 94-94/H of A.S.), whereas doctrinal, structural and 
substantive considerations would have justif ied its integration into the 
regulation of shareholders' rights, i.e. the Companies Act. 
3. The basic principle prescribed under Art. 180 of Companies Act, con-
cerning both bearer and registered shares, is that shares are freely trans-
ferable. Which ful ly complies with the principle that a company limited by 
shares is an explicitly capital-based, not a person-based form of association 
and, motivated by the aspect of mobility, securities as the exclusive form of 
association representing membership rights shall be issued to members. 
Notwithstanding, the Companies Act contains restrictive provisions. Art. 200 
provides for pre-emptive, repurchase and purchase rights and purchase obli-
gations concerning shares, Art. 201 specifies that the memoranda of private 
companies may confine the scope of transferable shares and categories of 
shares to specific persons, while Art. 202 allows for protection from 
hosti le take-overs of private companies. According to a comparative 
analysis of the rule of the Companies Act and A.S., the transfer of public 
company shares under Art. 180 of Companies Act is feasible exclusively 
under the regulation of A.S. Which implies that the acquisition of shares 
under the limit of 33 p.c. is circumscribed under the Companies Act, 
however, the acquisition of shares surpassing that limit as specified by 
A.S. shall comply with the regulation of A.S. Under Para. (3) of Art. 94/H 
of A.S. of 1997, the violation of these rules incurred the nullity of the 
t ransfer of shares. 
The regulation was provided under Para. (1) of Art. 94 of A.S., which 
made the acquisition through direct or indirect transfer of voting shares of 
of bea re r ' s shares in to registered sha re s in case of private compan ies under Para. 3 of 
Ar t . 231 of A.S. 
7
 According to judgement of the author of that article, this propos i t ion is still 
va l id . Since i s sues of the c o n d i t i o n s of share t ransfer are covered under the 
regu la t ion of 2001 , it should have been integrated into the C o m p a n i e s Act. As far as 
the relationship be tween securi t ies law and c o m p a n y law is concerned , the second 
par t of this paper wil l point out that it has not changed , the amendmen t s to the A.S. 
u n d e r Act L of 2001 and the new d ra f t law on capi ta l markets are close to ignoring 
the viewpoints of bo th the C o m p a n i e s Act and c o m p a n y law. 
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a public company in excess of 33 p.c. subject to public offering. The text 
definitely implied that the acquisition of non-voting preference shares was 
not a matter of consideration with respect to the limit of 33 p.c. The acquisition 
of shares, not pursuant to transfer, but other ways, e.g. inheritance, was not 
covered by A.S. According to the provision of Para. (2), the proportion of 
shares of a company in excess of 33 p.c. is subject to public offer, which 
shall cover a further proportion of 50 p.c. of voting shares and convertible 
bonds if the company issued any. In other words, according to the statute, 
the acquirer of 33 p.c. of the shares can expect to be liable to buy a proportion 
of 83 p.c. of the company shares in case the public offer is accepted. 
The 1997 regulation included another crucial element, when it stated 
that making a public offer was mandatory only once, i.e. following the 
acquisition in excess of the limit of 33 p.c., since, according to the general 
rules of the Companies Act concerning the transfer of shares, the buyer, 
who later wished to increase the rate of control of 33 p.c., could do so 
without making a public offer . The rule was not stated expressis verbis 
under A.S., but, implicitly, the intention was obvious according to Para. 
(1) of Art. 94.8 On the other hand, since the application of take-over rules was 
person-based, if the first buyer wished to transfer the acquired proportion 
of shares in excess of 33 p.c. to another person, who thereby transgressed 
the limit of 33 p.c. through the respective transaction, the new buyer was 
liable to make a public offer .9 
4. The text of Para. (1) of Art. 94 of A.S. includes reference to the 
requirement of consideration of both direct and indirect transfer of shares 
upon the assertion of control, which exceeds the limit of 33 p.c. Para. (5) 
basically amended the previous rule by stating that shares indirectly held 
by the offerors need to be considered upon the calculation of the level of 
control as specified under Para. (1). That particular issue is worth thorough 
examination, since the existence or non-existence of indirect stock, at least 
formally, was a crucial point in the Borsodchem Co. Ltd., case referred to in 
the introductory part of the paper, furthermore, the formulation of the 
draft law left some room for improvement. Then again, the new regulation 
brought into effect in the summer of 2001 elaborates in detail on that point, 
making radical amendments, as further expounded in Part II. 
8
 C o m m e n t a r y on the C o m p a n i e s Act inc ludes an according s ta tement , in: Tár-
sasági törvény, cégtörvény (Compan ies Act, Act on Firms) Sárközy, T., 2nd revised 
edition, Budapes t , 2000, 569. 
4
 C o m m e n t a r y on the C o m p a n i e s Act, 570. 
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I will start with the interpretation of the letters of the law. If, 
according to other conditions and the proportion of acquired shares, the 
necessity of making a public offer shall be asserted, i.e. whether the 
proportion was under or over the 33 p.c. limit, then the calculation shall 
concern not only the shares acquired directly by the respective person, but 
the shares acquired indirectly and those to be acquired and directly or 
indirectly in the future. The primary problem was posed by the fact that 
A.S. in this part d idn ' t define the term of direct acquisition of shares. 
Point 36 of Para. (2) of Art. 3 of A.S., however, provided a definition of 
the term of indirect interest under the interpretative provisions. Accordingly, 
indirect interest is constituted by a share of holding in an enterprise or a 
share of voting and holding rights of the original enterprise, or by the 
voting and holding rights of another enterprise, the calculation of which 
shall be made as specified under Appendix 4 of Act on Credit Institutions 
(hereinafter referred to as A.C.I.).10 Owing to the definition, the calculation 
of the indirect acquisition of shares, not circumscribed in A.S., became 
feasible. Appendix 4 of A.C.I., referred to under the passage "Calculation 
of indirect interest" in A.S., specifies the calculation method of the 
proportion of indirect interest as fol lows: the share of holding in the 
"intermediate enterprise" circumscribed under Point III/12 of Appendix 2 
of A.C.I, (defined as another enterprise in A.S.) shall be multiplied by the 
share of holding or voting rights of the intermediate enterprise in the 
original enterprise. With the following example, I will model the scheme 
above. If a person intends to acquire a share of 20 p.c. in a public company 
(i.e. original enterprise), whereas the given person owned a share of 50 
p.c. in an enterprise (i.e. intermediate enterprise), which held a share of 
30 p.c. in the original enterprise, according to the rules, that person will 
own an indirect share of 15 p.c.. That proportion shall be added to the 
direct share of 20 p.c., which makes up a total share of 35 p.c. Since the 
proportion of acquired shares surpasses the limit of 33 p.c. in that case, 
making a public offer is mandatory. 
Appendix 4 of A.C.I., however, narrowed the scope of application of 
rules concerning the acquisition of indirect interest in two respects. It 
stipulated in one respect that the holding or voting rights under the rate of 
25 p.c. in the intermediate enterprise shall be ignored, in another respect, 
that a share of holding in an intermediate enterprise through more than 
one enterprise shall not be considered. As for the implications of these 
two rules applied to the example above, it follows that if the share of 
10
 See, Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Ins t i tu t ions and Financia l Enterprises. 
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holding in the intermediate enterprise is only 20 p.c. instead of 50 p.c., it 
shall be ignored, even if the share of holding of the intermediate enterprise is 
higher than 30 p.c., for instance 50 p.c. The explanation is obvious and 
makes both the purpose and meaning of the regulation understandable: 
what is at stake is not a matter of quantities, but a matter of the quality of 
control the buyer will exercise through the intermediate enterprise in the 
company to be acquired. Which, furthermore, explains the second rule 
mentioned above. The rule of the A.C.I., apparently and explicitly, broke 
the links of enterprises by taking exclusively one intermediate enterprise into 
consideration. If further enterprises, even one-person enterprises, interpolate, 
they shall be ignored, therefore indirect ownership of shares shall not be 
taken into consideration from the viewpoint of the 33 p.c. limit. 
With respect to the above, the case of Borsodchem Co. Ltd., is worth 
paying attention. As it is publicly known, Borsodchem Co. Ltd., is a public 
company with quoted shares, and a proportion of its shares was acquired by 
Russian and Austrian companies at the end of the year 2000. The Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Board (hereinafter referred to as Supervisory Board), 
allegedly upon the incentive of the company, however, quite justifiably, 
conducted investigation with the intention to reveal if any of the share-
holders had exceeded the 33 p.c. limit. If that had been the case, a public 
offer should have been made with special respect to Para. (3) of Art. 94/H 
of A.S., which states expressis verbis, that any agreement on transfer of 
shares shall be nullified in the event of violation of rules concerning the 
public offer transaction. 
The investigation revealed that Russian and Austrian companies, 
which acquired the shares, hadn't exceeded the legal limit, and the context 
was irrelevant to the case of the indirect transfer of shares prescribed in 
A.S. or A.C.I.. As a matter of fact, Appendix 4 of A.C.I., referred to above, 
apparently stipulates that the concerted acquisition of shares by distinct 
parties otherwise unrelated, or if the organisational alliance between them 
doesn ' t present a case defined under A.S. and A.C.I., shall not qualify as 
indirect transfer of shares. The Supervisory Board stated explicitly that, 
although, substantive legal offence hadn't been perpetrated in the trans-
action of the acquisition of Borsodchem Co. Ltd., shares, the transaction 
violated the spirit of the law, which (would have) served as a basis for 
intervention. No argument is necessary for the indefensibility and unlaw-
fulness of the statement above, which reminds me of an age-long doctrine 
recognised by every citizen in democratic states constituted on the rule of 
law, that exclusively the presentation of a legal case may incur sanctions 
in the event of statutory interdiction. 
100 TAMÁS S Á R K Ö Z Y 
An interpretation propter legem wouldn't offer solutions, whereas the 
amendment of the statute on the basis of the constitution, finally realised 
under Act L of 2001, certainly could. Nevertheless, the consequences of 
the effective law and the way it affects public companies raise further 
concerns. 
5. According to Para. (2) of Art. 94/B of A.S., at the request of the offeror 
and preceding the announcement of the offer , the board of company 
directors shall provide the necessary information on the operation of the 
company as a basis for definition of the terms of the offer. In practice, this 
provision led to serious problems and the collision of interests, because, 
on the one hand, the offeror obviously demands sufficient information for 
the elaboration of the offer, on the other hand, the boundary between the 
information reasonably demanded and the trade secrets of the company 
was ambiguous. In other words, the regulation does not make a clear-cut 
distinction between the data to be provided and the data that shall be or 
must be exempt f rom this obligation. Underlying the issue is the dilemma 
that no publicly accessible data needs to be requested f rom the company, 
and again, publicly inaccessible data, i.e. trade secrets, cannot be de-
manded until the offeror has acquired holding in the company, since the 
potentiality that the offeror is a competitor, cannot be ignored. The 
dilemma has remained unsolved both by the secrecy agreement applied in 
such case and the rule of Para. (3) of Art. 94/B of A.S., according to 
which the data obtained shall be treated and used according to regulations 
concerning trade and securities secrets. Neither could Para. (2) of Art. 94/A 
of A.S. supply remedies by obliging the buyer to publicise its conceptions 
on corporate policy and the future operation of the company to be acquired, 
or, if the buyer was an economic organisation, to compile an information 
brochure on its former business activities. 
An array of problems emerged concerning the application of the provision 
above. On the one hand, A.S. didn't specify the stage the offeror had to 
publicise the information at. According to the legal context, publication was 
due at the time of making the public offer, consequently after the information 
had been obtained from the company to be acquired. Which logically follows, 
since the elaboration of corporate policy on the part of the offeror is 
unfeasible without sufficient information. On the other hand, and obviously 
inconsistently with the law-maker's underlying purpose, the term of "business 
association" was once again introduced, which, in the Companies Act, had 
already proved inapplicable to foreign companies, which were not definable 
as business associations according to Hungarian law. 
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No argument can be made for the requirement of the provision of infor-
mation on the company to be taken over or for the motives of the regulation 
except that the public operation of the company confers both rights and 
obligations. While the take-over regulations above have been formulated to 
protect the shareholders' rights, confidential data of the company thereby 
could become public. In such cases the risk lies in the fact that, upon the 
assertion of the purported take-over, the competitor may request the board 
for and get access to data, whereas that competitor is later entitled to 
decline to make an offer without consequences. The rule of A.S. of 1997 
did not supply remedy for the problem. 
6. The text of the law left no doubts about the transaction of the offer. It 
had to be made for all shareholders and bondholders, and all the offerees 
had equal rights to decide whether to accept or turn down the offer (Paras. 
(3) and (4), Art. 94 of A.S. of 1997). The content and the elements covered 
by the offer were meticulously defined under Para. (1) of Art. 94/A of 
A.S. The quotation of the offer price regulated under Points a) and b) of Art. 5 
of A.S. is crucial in case the respective share is not registered. According 
to the rules concerning the transaction, the offeror shall simultaneously 
notify both the Supervisory Board and the board of directors (Para.l. of Art. 
94/B. of A.S.) about the offer. The authority of the board of directors was 
restricted for a period between 30 and 60 days provided for the acceptance 
of the public of fer , since it was not entitled to make any decisions that 
could interfere with the transaction. The A.S. included two modelling 
cases: even if the board of directors is entitled to, it shall not decide to 
increase the registered capital or to acquire company shares. Of course, 
the ban applies to the shareholders, therefore rights related to the ordinary 
meeting were not affected. 
7. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Board was given an extended 
field of authority over public offer ing and the transaction of the take-over. 
As mentioned above, the offer was reported by sending the material to the 
Supervisory Board. Under Para. (1) of Art. 94/C of A.S., the Supervisory 
Board was entitled to prohibit the acquisition of shares and notify the 
board of directors accordingly within 15 days of receipt of the report, if 
the offer didn't comply with legal requirements. If the Supervisory Board, 
however, didn't make a statement within the specified period of 15 days, 
that incurred acknowledgement of the report. 
A further authority of the Supervisory Board was that if the offer 
concerned unregistered shares, the equivalent of which was not quotable 
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under Point b) of Para. (5) of Art. 94/A," the Supervisory Board was 
entitled to quote the equivalent of the shares within the 15-day-period 
granted for the supervision of the report. 
Finally, the question concerning the relationship between the take-over 
rules exposed above and antitrust law is still unanswered, since the A.S. 
didn' t provide explicit rules on the relationship. The still effect ive Para. 
(2) of Art. 295 of Companies Act provides minority shareholders may 
offer their shares for purchase to the acquirer of majority holding or direct 
controlling interest, however, the rule shall not apply if the majority 
holding or direct controlling interest is acquired through a take-over as 
specified in A.S. The exemption is relevant exclusively under Para. (1) of 
Art. 295 of Companies Act, other antitrust law regulations shall certainly 
apply. Therefore, if the offeror has acquired a proportion of shares in 
excess of 50 p.c. as a consequence of a public offer, i.e. has acquired 
majority holding under the Companies Act, relevant antitrust regulations 
shall be applied after completion of the take-over procedure, such as, 
Para. (3) of Art. 295, under which the specified limit of 10 p.c. to 5 p.c. 
for minority shareholders was decreased, or Para. (1) of Art. 296 on 
creditors ' rights. 
Parallelly, if the offeror acquired a share in excess of 50 p.c. or 75 p.c. 
in a public offer transaction, the provision of Para. (1) of Art. 295 of 
Companies Act was ignored. The exemption concerned exclusively that 
particular provision of the Companies Act, other antitrust regulations were 
applied. Therefore, under the provisions of the Companies Act, if the 
offeror had acquired 65 p.c. of the company shares before a fur ther acqui-
sition of 11 p.c., then, as explained above, the public offer transaction was 
unnecessary upon the acquisition of 1 1 p.c., whereas the increase in 
acquisitions from majority holding to direct controlling interest had to be 
disclosed. In that case, the status of minority shareholders was specified 
under Para. (1) of Art. 295, and creditors' rights were provided under 
Paras. (2) and (3) of Art. 296 of Companies Act. 
" According to the provis ion, the o f f e r price in case of unregistered sha res shall 
not be under the average price quoted by the stock exchange for a period of 180 days 
preceding the date of the public of fer . 
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II. Take-over Regulation under Act L of 2001 
1. As an outcome of the Borsodchem Co. Ltd., case, both the financial 
circles and the press called for the urgent and overall revision of securities 
law. Before actual legislative work started in 2001, the prospect of the 
establishment of a so-called unified Act on Capital Markets including the 
fields of securities law, stock and commodity exchange, investment funds, 
and the comparatively small, nevertheless significant field of take-over 
rules, had already been discussed for a long time. The significance of the 
latter had been apparently demonstrated by the amendment of take-over 
regulations in line with tax regulations, fee and other financial rules under 
A.S., even before the new Act on Capital Markets was drafted. As a 
consequence of the amendments, Chapter XIV/A. of A.S. ceased to have 
effect and was replaced by new provisions, i.e. Arts. 94-94 /0 . Specific 
provisions defining the sphere of authority of the Supervisory Board were 
also amended with respect to the new law.12 Simultaneously, certain 
regulations of the Companies Act concerning public companies were 
modified in view of the objective of harmonising the Companies Act with 
the new law.13 
I need to remark finally, that while this paper is written, the draft of 
Act on Capital Markets has already been introduced to the parliament, as 
the outcome of an endeavour to broadly and meticulously regulate the 
entire fields of securities law, commodity exchange and investment funds 
under a single act.14 The rules are embodied in a highly detailed Code of 
435 Sections, while the Third Chapter (Arts. 65-80), substantively in-
corporates the rules of Act L. of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as A.S. of 
2001), which regulate the field of take-over, that is, according to the text 
of the law, the acquisition of shares in a public company. 
2. A major change was introduced as far as legal terminology is concerned. 
While A.S. of 1997 discussed the take-over of a company, A.S. of 2001 
covered acquisition of control. Before dealing with the crucial and far-
reaching substantive demarcation, I have to point out that the acquisition 
12
 See, i) of Art . 123; Para. (5) of Art. 128; Para. (3) of Art. 133; Para. (1) h) of Art. 
136; Points a) and f ) of Para. (3) of Art. 136; Para. (2) a) f) and 1) of Art. 137; Para. (3) of 
Art . 137; Para. (1 ) of Art. 142; Para . (2) of Art. 143 of A.S. of 2001. 
13
 See, Para. (6) of Art. 51; Para. (3) of Art. 229; Para. (4) of Art. 295 of Companies 
Act . 
14
 Comple t ion da te of the present paper is 10th November , 2001. 
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of control meant to be regulated by A.S. of 2001 has other reference basis 
than the acquisition of control in Chapter XVI. of the new Companies 
Act. Unprecedented rules have been introduced into Hungarian law by 
A.S. of 2001, which extends the scope of regulation in an extraordinarily 
broad manner. The application of the term of take-over would not be 
proper with respect to the law-maker's intention, because there is more at 
stake, however, antitrust law had already "reserved" and institutionalised 
the term of acquisition of control. Therefore, the "not perfectly in place" 
terminology of A.S. of 2001 is slightly bewildering. 
3. The differences f rom A.S. are obviously intentional and conceal serious, 
substantive incongruities. According to the definition of Para. (1) of Art. 
94 of A.S. of 2001, the term of "acquisition of control" covers the acquisition 
of holding or voting rights guaranteeing participation in decision-making 
at the shareholder's assembly of the company. That covers both the enforce-
ment of purchase and redemption rights, or of a dated purchase agreement 
related to voting shares, and the exercise of voting rights on the basis of 
using or beneficial rights. The same conditions apply, in case the control 
hasn't been acquired owing to directly coherent behaviour, but owing to other 
circumstances, i.e. inheritance, legal succession or the decision of the share-
holders' general assembly, which modifies either the proportional number 
of votes concerning voting rights or the reinstatement of voting rights. 
According to Para. (2), acquisition of control covers any agreement 
between the shareholders, pursuant to which, on the one hand a shareholder 
is granted electing or recalling rights concerning the majority of the members 
of the board of directors or supervision, on the other hand the parties under-
take unified control of the company. 
Rules of Paras. (1) and (2), are amended under Para. (3), which states 
that upon the assessment of the case and the rate of the acquisition of 
control, both direct and indirect acquisitions and these of next of kin shall 
be considered and added up. According to Para. (4), acquisition of control 
shall be established if it isn't the outcome of a transaction by related 
parties as specified under Para. (3), but the consequence of the concerted 
action of unrelated parties. 
Para. (5) broadens the scope further, and provides, in compliance with 
preceding sections, that the exercise of a shareholder ' s right on behalf 
of a third party is considered a voting right. According to Para. (6), non-
resident third parties are exempted f rom the effect of the rule above, if 
they register not as a shareholder 's proxy, but as a shareholder (residents 
are not covered by the exemption) into the stockholders' register. 
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The law-makers' intention is apparent in view of the meticulous definition, 
besides acquisition through transfer of shares, other share acquisition cases 
also have to be regulated and controlled in case of public companies. An 
even more fundamental step is the extension of the regulation to cases that 
don't concern devolution of the ownership of shares, but an agreement 
between shareholders on the management of the company. That endeavour 
is not peculiar to Hungary, almost all European countries with that kind of 
regulation, including the EU regulation attempt, have dealt with the concept.15 
The logical consequence of bringing the above case under the effect of 
the law is that several statutes had to be incorporated into the law, so that 
it was capable of regulating the case that was obviously more complex than 
a "mere" acquisition of control by purchase of shares. As an example, 
without asserting a claim for completeness, I refer to Para. (3) of Art. 94/C 
providing that a public offer is mandatory for all parties to the share-
holders' agreement, unless the parties consent to appointing a party. Therefore, 
the party denouncing the right to appoint a member of the board of directors 
or supervisors for the benefit of another shareholder, ad absurdum, shall 
have to make a public offer . Besides, the agreement on the person of the 
public offeror , shall not exempt other parties concerned from the respon-
sibilities related to public offer. 
4. Para. (3) of Art. 94 of A.S. of 2001 concerns not only direct but indirect 
acquisition of control. Beyond formal congruence with preceding rules, a 
major difference has been established concerning the scope of reference of 
the term "indirect interest". 
Under point 36 of Para. (2) of Art. 3 of A.S. of 2001, rendering definitions, 
the scope of indirect holding or control has been remarkably extended. 
Reference to the A.C.I, was avoided, a definitely beneficial decision with 
respect to editing, therefore two rules regarding the case above have expired. 
One of these rules provided that the share of holding below 25 p.c. is 
ignored or not taken into consideration in case the owner holds a share in 
the intermediate enterprise through more than one enterprise. However, 
A.S. of 2001 states that assessment of the rate of indirect holding and 
indirect interest of the acquirer shall be made by multiplying the higher rate 
of voting or holding rights of the acquirer in the intermediate enterprise by 
higher the rate of voting or holding rights of the intermediate enterprise in 
the respective company. In case the rate of voting or holding rights in the 
15
 See, e .g . Clause 1 of Chap t e r 5 of the d r a f t of EU Directive 13, wi thdrawn. 
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intermediate company is in excess of 50 p.c., it shall be considered as a 
whole ownership. 
As a consequence of the omission of the rules under Appendix 4 of A.C.I., 
the issue of how many links of interest in intermediate companies should 
be taken into consideration remains ambiguous under A.S. of 2001. Although, 
the currently standard interpretation of taking one link into consideration 
can be inferred from the definition, the omission of the preceding rule 
confers a message, which might be directive in interpretation. Rejection of the 
rule of consideration of "one link" results ultimately in the requirement of 
considering several links of interest, which poses the problem of where to 
set a limit. The law evades the definition therefore fur ther problems will 
arise. A likely interpretation of the reference to a share over 50 p.c. is that 
such a share of holding or voting rights shall be considered not indirect 
but direct interest, which suggests the likely interpretation again, that all 
links of indirect interest shall be considered. 
A further issue is the regulation of the share of voting and holding 
rights stipulating that the larger proportion should be considered. Disregarding 
the fact that the intermediate company may take any organisational form, 
provided that a party has no or a different share of voting rights from that 
of holding rights in the respective enterprise, that party may participate in 
decision-making with the voting rights, not with the holding rights. 
Possession of holding rights but no voting rights does not grant the right 
to participate in decision-making. The rationale underlying that particular 
regulation of A.S. of 2001 can be challenged, which the law itself also 
seems recognise when it provides a further rule. The requirement of making 
a public of fer under Para. (2) of Art. 94/C is subject to the acquisition of a 
25 p.c. share, in contrast with the main standard. Reasonably, the regulation 
in that case provides exclusively for voting rights and does not refer to the 
share of holding rights. 
5. A further, very essential change is the assertion of the standard share 
from the viewpoint of take-over or acquisition of control. With respect to 
the above, the only determining standard specified by previous rules was 
the 33 p.c. limit. A.S. d idn ' t construe these as subject to the issue of take-
over and provided no rules concerning acquisitions under the 33 p.c. limit. 
The regulatory concept underlying A.S. of 2001, as relevant from the 
above, is fundamentally different. Art. 94/B. of A.S. of 2001 provides that an 
acquisition of control up to a share of 5 p.c., then every further acquisition 
of a share of 5 p.c. shall be reported both to the Supervisory Board and the 
board of directors of the respective company within two calendar days 
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following the date of acquisition. Similar reporting obligations pertain to the 
decrease of interest of an equivalent rate. Para. 9 of Art. 94/B. allows for the 
memorandum of the company to extend the reporting and disclosure 
obligation to "an increase or decrease of interest at a rate of 2 p.c." That 
rule, apart from the fact that the assertion of an acquisition of control at a 
rate of 2 p.c. is rather peculiar, does not specify whether the reporting 
liability is applicable to each case of increase or decrease in acquisition at 
a rate of 2 p.c. or it concerns the lowest limit, exclusively. The latter 
supposition is just i f ied by the text, the former is supported by the context, 
and more likely. According to my knowledge, this rule concerning the 
rates of both 5 per cent and 2 per cent is unique with respect to the 
European Union regulations, none of which supplies us with precedence 
of such rigour. 
The introduction of the five-per-cent rule incurred crucial changes in 
the structure of the regulation. The acquisition of a share of 5 p.c. shall 
not imply the requirement of making a public offer, which is still confined 
to an acquisition of a share in excess of 33 p.c. under the normative rule 
of Para. (1) of Art. 94/C. l h However, each time an acquisition of a share of 
5 p.c. is made under the limit of 33 p.c. reporting shall be mandatory 
within an extremely rigorous and short period, the neglect of which, like 
all offences, is sanctioned by a f ine imposed by the Supervisory Board 
according to Point (m) of Para. (2) of new Art. 143 of A.S. of 2001. The 
value of the fine is fixed between the broad limits of amounts of 500 
thousand and 100 million HUF. Since rules concerning fines have not 
changed in other respects, according to Para. (1) of Art. 143, the conditions 
and basis of imposition of the f ine are subject to the discretion of the 
Supervisory Board. A further and ultimate sanction of the neglect of 
reporting liability, not subject to discretion, is the withdrawal of the exercise 
of membership rights in the company until compliance with the reporting 
liability. 
The most fundamental change incurred by the new regulation is that 
the former focus on making a public offer pursuant to an intention of acquisition 
of 33 p.c. has shifted to the requirement of the practically incessant provision 
of information to the Supervisory Board, since the reporting liability 
pertains to a relatively minor change in the status of shares of public 
companies and is extended to shareholders ' agreements. According to the 
rule of Para. (6) of Art. 94/B., the reporting liability pertains upon the 
lh
 See, Part 6 b e l o w on the exempt ion under Para . (1) of Art. 94/C of A.S. of 
2001. 
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acquisition of a rate of 50 p.c. control, whereas the disclosure liability is 
pursuant to the event of reaching the limits of 75 p.c. or 90 p.c. control. 
Which, on the one hand, provides evidence that the reporting liability in 
each event of the increase of control by 5 p.c. shall be construed separately 
f rom the requirement of making a public offer in the event of exceeding the 
33 p.c. limit. On the other hand, the rule above severed another link with 
the Companies Act, in the framework of which an acquisition of control of 
75 p.c. is construed as the upper limit with respect to antitrust law. 
Furthermore, Para. 8 of Art. 94/B., which bans the exercise of membership 
rights in the event of delay is applicable exclusively to the reporting 
liability, shall not concern the neglect of the disclosure liability, which, 
again, exemplifies that the law-maker attached great and exclusive 
importance to the provision of information to the Supervisory Board. 
Nothing is more revealing as to the rigour of the regulation than Para. 7 of 
Art. 94/B, which extends reporting and disclosure liabilities to agreements 
between shareholders that project the acquisition of control at a later 
date. The text of the regulation explicitly asserts that reporting and 
disclosure liabilities pertain to any, indefinitely postponed, foreseeable 
acquisition under specific conditions. As for deadlines, the date of the 
agreement shall be authoritative, and reporting liability shall be complied 
with within two calendar days of conclusion of the agreement disregarding 
holidays and disclosure shall also be initiated. 
Para. (4) of Art. 94/B of A.S. 2001 specifies what the report shall 
state. Accordingly, the name(s) of the acquirer or of the parties to the 
agreement, data on the location of the headquarters, the company registry 
code, the rate of control and definition of the relationship as specified in 
Para. (2) of Art. 94 shall be stated. Simultaneously, the acquirer or each 
party to the agreement shall proceed to disclose the report, implying that 
besides the Supervisory Board, the public shall also be notified about, 
formerly confidential, agreements between shareholders of the company. 
Concerning the media of disclosure, Art. 94/A provides that agreements 
shall be announced in the company and stock exchange journals and on 
web-sites. 
6. The transaction of public offer is regulated under Art. 94/C and the 
subsequent articles. The primary change concerns rates, since, whereas the 
limit of 33 p.c. remains normative, making a public offer for the acquisition 
of control in excess of 25 p.c. shall be mandatory, if no other party 
possesses voting rights, directly or indirectly, in excess of 10 p.c., except 
for the party intending to acquire control in the company. 
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It is to be regretted that the text is inaccurate, again, concerning the case 
when the party, who intends to acquire control, does not possess voting 
rights in excess of 10 p.c. either (for the time being). The text presumably 
implies that in that specific case the 25 p.c. limit is ultimately disregarded 
with respect to the acquirer, with or without a share of 10 p.c.. However, 
that should have been unambiguously and literally formulated in the text. 
The new rule of Para. (2) of Art. 94/C follows from the extension of 
the term of acquisition of control. In the standard case, when the acquirer 
intends to buy a certain amount of shares, a public offer shall be made 
upon the permission of the Supervisory Board under Para. (1). Notwith-
standing, under Para. (1) and further paras, of Art. 94, several other types 
of buyer behaviour and cases are specified as acquisition of control, Para. 
(2) of Art. 94/C, with reference to these cases, provides that the fact of 
acquisition of control completed in an according manner shall be reported, 
disclosed, and at the same time, the public offer shall be made within 15 
days following the date of reporting the acquisition. This rule applies to 
cases when acquisition of control is not the consequence of the acquirer 's 
directly coherent behaviour, but results from the enforcement of purchase 
or redemption rights, or the completion of a dated agreement. The same 
rules apply to acquisition according to a shareholders' agreement or an 
investigation conducted by the state receiver syndicate. 
According to A.S. of 1997, besides voting shares, convertible bonds, if 
any, issued by the company shall be subject to a public offer transaction. 
On the other hand, according to the regulation of 1997, the offer shall 
concern a minimum of 50 p.c. of the shares. However, A.S. of 2001 has made 
amendments to both of the above rules. On the one hand, it does not cover 
bonds, the text, emphatically and consistently, refers to shares, therefore, 
convertible bonds shall be disregarded from that aspect. On the other 
hand, under Para. (1) of Art. 94/F, public offers shall not be confined to a 
proportion of 50 p.c. of voting shares, however, they shall be made to 
cover all voting shares and all holders of voting rights. Which, in view of 
the above, implies the potential that a share acquisition above the 25 p.c. 
limit isn't feasible unless the acquirer purchases 100 p.c. of the shares, 
since the offer must concern the whole amount of shares. 
As a matter of fact, according to a more professional and accurate 
rendition, Para. (2) of Art. 94/K of A.S. of 2001 has incorporated the 
provision of Para. (5) of Art. 94/H of A.S. of 1997. Accordingly, on condition 
that the offeror has acquired more than 90 p.c. of the company shares as a 
consequence of a public offer transaction and fully complied with the 
liability of payment of the equivalent, the offeror shall be legally due 
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purchase rights for the shares not yet acquired within thirty days following 
the date of reporting to the Supervisory Board. In such cases, furthermore, 
for the benefit of other shareholders, a purchase liability applies under 
Para. (5) of Art. 94/K of A.S. of 2001, since at the request of the holders 
of the rest of the shares, it is the acquirer 's obligation to buy their shares, 
basically in accordance with the provision of Para. (1) of Art. 295 of 
Companies Act. 
7. Before entering upon an exposition of the detailed rules of the public 
offer transaction, I have to refer to the fact that A.S. of 2001 imposes 
different sanctions in the event of a share acquisition, which violates the 
rules of the public offer. As expounded above, A.S. of 1997 nullified such 
transfers of shares, which was ignored by the amendment of 2001. According 
to the recent Art. of 94/L of A.S. of 2001, if the acquisition of shares was 
implemented in a manner different from that specified by the rules of the 
public offer, membership rights in the company shall not be exercised. 
The acquirer shall be liable to alienate voting shares in excess of a rate of 
33 p.c. or 25 p.c., respectively, within 60 days. Membership rights unrelated 
to shares subject to the alienation liability shall be exercised exclusively 
after compliance with that liability. As a matter of fact, denouncing the 
radical nullity sanction on the part of the law-maker is remarkable, however, 
what may have accounted for that specific amendment were presumably 
practical reasons and, as an underlying consideration, incongruity with the 
effective rules of transfer of shares. According to the new settlement, 
transfer of ownership of shares implemented in compliance with relevant 
and effective rules shall be construed as valid, whereas the acquirer that 
violates these rules shall be subject to sanctions and face the risk of 
alienation liability. 
8. Effect ive rules of a public offer transaction d iffer from preceding A.S. 
regulations since they are more specific and provide for issues not covered 
by the rule of A.S. of 1997. What is of major practical importance, however, 
poorly constituted in the preceding regulation, is the accurate specifi-
cation of the binding substantive elements of the offer under Para. (2) of 
Art. 94/D. A significant aspect of the new regulation is that besides its 
provision for the requirement that the offeror submits a public statement 
on the conceptions concerning company policy,17 under Para. (4) of Art. 
94/D of A.S. of 2001 there is a reference to Appendix 8, which specifies 
17
 See, comments on the rule in Part 1.5. 
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the aspects the operation plan to be submitted should cover, i.e., the 
content and the media of publication, which had not been regulated under 
Para. (2) of Art. 94/A of A.S of 1997. Inter alia, the plan should include 
details on the foreseeable effects of the acquisition on the employees, and 
if the offeror wishes to alter the profile of the company significantly, an 
explanation on the objectives and reasons underlying the decision shall 
also be given. 
The rules concerning the report on the economic activity of the acquirer, 
which was not provided for under A.S. of 1997, are more relevant to my 
argument. The new regulation settles the terminology problem of "business 
association" by highlighting that related rules include foreign companies. 
On the other hand, this section of Appendix 8, tellingly, is a lot more 
specif ic than the provision on the operation plan, which, again, supports 
the view that information on the acquirer is of primary importance from 
the point of view of the Supervisory Board and the government. Let me 
refer to the requirement of submission of a report on the acquirer's company 
history, on leading officials and the members of the supervisory board, on 
all agreements, whatever, between the acquirer, including controlling 
parties in the acquirer, and the company, on the one hand, or, provided 
that they might affect the public offer, leading officials of the company, 
on the other hand. 
Concerning the requirement of appointing an external expert for the 
transaction of the public offer, there is no modification with respect to 
preceding rules. According to A.S. of 1997, the external expert could be 
an investment company, whereas A.S. of 2001 extends the scope by specifying 
that party as a distributor that, under Para. (5) of Art. 94/D, shall take 
responsibility, joint ly with the offeror, for the truth value of the report on 
the offeror 's economic activity, which obviously complicates the 
distributor 's situation. Which, also, may appear as a major snag in case of 
less familiar foreign investors, since both the distributor and the offeror 
shall be held liable for damages incurred by the submission of a 
misguiding report or the concealment of information. Another issue is, of 
course, who is damaged and in what way, since the liability of attestation 
of damages lies with the injured party under Hungarian law, and a further 
ambiguous point is what the term of the injured party covers. 
The regulation specifies the appendices to be attached to the request for 
the approval of the offer under Para. (6) of Art. 94/D, which shall justify the 
offeror 's possession of the equivalent of the shares subject to the offer (funds, 
state bonds issued either in Hungary or an OECD member state, a bank 
guarantee issued by a credit institution based in Hungary or an OECD state). 
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A statement on an agreement on the offeror's person shall also be submitted, 
if the acquisition of control is transacted upon a shareholder's agreement and 
the offer is not made jointly by the parties to the agreement. Furthermore, 
purchase and repurchase agreements shall also be included in the appendices 
provided that the acquisition of control is made with reference to these. 
The new regulation specifies a peculiar arrangement on the information to 
be provided for the offeror by the company. As pointed out above, the 
regulation of 1997 (Para. (2) of Art. 94/B), obliged the company to provide 
information, and compliance with the requirement was not exempt from 
problems considering the respective circumstances. The new regulation 
does not contain such a requirement, Para. (1) of Art. 94/H stipulates that 
in the event of provision of information by the board of company directors 
at the request of the offeror, the acquired data shall be treated according 
to the rules pertaining to the confidentiality of bills and notes on the one 
hand, and the prohibition on insider dealing, which is a new element, on 
the other hand. Accordingly, the provision and the quality of information 
shall be made dependent on the decision and the discretion of the board of 
directors. The significance of these changes can hardly be estimated in the 
first approach. On the one hand, they manage to ward off the apparent 
danger of release of trade secrets to a potential competitor, on the other 
hand, they can be assessed to model a legal policy, which expresses the 
intention to reinforce and benefit the existing structure of companies and 
demonstrates its non-preference for new investments. 
However, Para. (3) of Art. 94/H stipulates that the board of directors 
shall respond actively by giving an opinion on the offer and publicise it at 
the same place where the offeror 's operation plan and report on its economic 
activity are displayed for inspection by the shareholders. The recent Appendix 
9 of the law specifies the aspects according to which expert opinion shall 
be given. The opinion shall contain a statement on the support or objection of 
the board of directors concerning the offer, and include any member 's 
dissent with an explanation. The board of directors has legal entitlement 
to employ, at its own cost, an independent financial expert for the 
assessment of the offer. In that case the expert opinion shall be publicised 
and made available for the shareholders in compliance with the above. 
9. As for the specific rules of a public offer transaction, the following 
points will be accentuated: 
Under Paras. (1) and (2) of Art. 94/E, no changes have been made to 
expiry dates, the Supervisory Board shall make a decision within 15 days of 
the date of submission of the offer. In case the board does not respond, the 
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offer shall be considered approved. This rule has been amended by the 
provision of a peremptory term of 5 days by the Supervisory Board, on 
condition that the request is incomplete, therefore, subsequently completed 
requests shall be processed within 5 days. 
Under Para. (5) of Art. 94/E, the maximum period of the decision-
making procedure on the offer was reduced from 60 days to 45 days. 
As a logical consequence, Para. (7) of Art. 94/E includes a new provision, 
according to which neither the offeror, nor the parties to the share acquisition 
agreement or the business association, in which the parties above hold a 
share in excess of 25 p.c., shall transact transfer, alienation or debit of 
shares subject to the public offer in the approval period. Neither shall the 
distributor make a bill of sale concerning the respective shares during that 
period. In both cases, the transfer of shares subject to the offer are, of course, 
exempted. 
10. A binary amendment has been made to the way of setting the offer 
price. On the one hand, in contrast with the 90-day-period specified under 
the 1997 regulation, under Para. (1) of Art. 94/G of 2001 the average price 
of 180 days preceding the date of the offer shall be considered. This rule 
is, however, amended by the requirement of considering both the highest 
price stated in any agreement on the transfer of shares between the offeror 
and related parties during the above period, and the highest price and charge 
demanded in the agreement on purchase or repurchase. The offer price 
can ' t fal l short of the highest price listed above. In case the equivalent of 
the shares can't be set according to the rules specified by the law, Para. 
(2) of Art. 94/G provides that the offered equivalent can' t fall short of the 
price formed according to the calculation method specified in the offer 
and approved by the Supervisory Board. 
11. The preceding regulation failed to answer several questions concerning 
the transaction of the transfer of shares. According to Art. 94/1 of A.S. of 
2001, the statement concerning the acceptance of the offer shall not be 
withdrawn, furthermore, the offeror shall purchase all the shares covered 
by the accepted offer , unless offeror would acquire control that does not 
exceed 50 p.c., in the event of which the right to resist included in the 
offer applied. The agreement on the transfer of shares shall be uniformly 
concluded on the last day of the acceptance period, unless the offeror has 
arranged for a competition supervision procedure. In the event of which, 
under Para. (1) of Art. 94/D, the disclosure of the offer submitted to the 
Supervisory Board for approval shall include the details of the arrange-
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ment for a competition supervision procedure, as a consequence, the 
agreement on the transfer of shares shall be concluded on the date of 
permission fol lowing competition supervision under Para. (5) of Art. 94/1. 
Concerning the payment of the equivalent, the regulation, quite reasonably, 
specifies extremely rigorous rules. On the one hand, payment of the 
equivalent shall be made within 5 working days of the date of conclusion of 
the agreement on the transfer of shares. On the other hand, in the event of 
delayed payment of over 30 days, besides stating a claim for interest on 
default payment, the offeree may cancel the agreement. According to a 
specific rule, the cancelling party shall report the cancellation to the 
Supervisory Board within two working days. The regulation does not 
specify the consequences the neglect of such reporting liability may incur, 
nor does it state compliance with reporting liability as a criterion of the 
effectiveness of cancellation. Nevertheless, Para. (8) of Art. 94/1 provides 
that irrespective of cancellation or a claim for interest on default payment, 
the Supervisory Board may sanction the offence of rules concerning 
payment, which basically implies the imposition of a fine under Art. 141. 
The offeror, however, shall report compliance with the payment liability, 
or its failure and the underlying reasons, to the Supervisory Board within 
two calendar days after expiration of the payment period under Para. (1) 
of Art. 94/K. 
12. Finally, I cannot fail to mention that the new regulation also provides 
fo r the institution of counter-offer under Art. 94/J, with no changes to 
preceding rules. The period specified for the opportunity to make a counter-
offer has been shortened by 5 days. Since the new regulation stipulates that 
the offer shall cover all shares, the attractive aspect as a condition for the 
acceptance of the counter-offer is confined to the price. Nothing has 
changed in that respect, the price in the counter-offer is considered more 
attractive if the stated equivalent is at least 5 p.c. higher in HUF. 
13. Whereas the preceding rules didn't foreclose voluntary offer as a 
potential, the new regulation explicitly institutionalises it under Art. 94/N, 
applicable under the above rules with specific and according exemptions. 
As such, the provision of Art. 94/F specifies as requirement that the offer 
shall cover all shares, while Art. 94/H provides a rule concerning the 
liability of the board of directors to give an opinion and employ an 
independent financial expert. Furthermore, the rules of counter-offer are 
inapplicable, s ince making a counter-offer is foreclosed in the event of a 
voluntary public offer. 
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14. As mentioned in the introduction of this part, Act L of 2001 amended 
the regulations of the Companies Act in several respects. The amendments 
are meant to harmonise with the regulations concerning acquisition of control 
and logically follow from the rules propounded above. Para. (3) incorporated 
into Art. 229 of Companies Act is of particular importance, since the rule 
of Para. (2) of Art. 229 had allowed that the memorandum of a public 
company defined the highest rate of voting rights exercised by a shareholder 
with respect to registered shares. According to the recently incorporated 
regulation, the specific stipulation of the memorandum shall lose its e f fec t , if 
the acquirer purchases shares in excess of 50 p.c. through a public offer 
transaction. The rule of this act, however, according to Para. (6) of Art. 82 of 
Act L of 2001, shall not concern the effective memorandum regulations 
for the time being, in as much as the rule of Para. (3) shall not be applied 
until the last day of the f i f th year fol lowing the the date of enactment of 
the international agreement on Hungarian accession to the EU. 
According to Para. (4) of Art. 295, introduced as a new rule into the 
antitrust regulations of the Companies Act, in the event of acquisition of 
majority holdings or direct controlling interest in a public company, the 
value of the shares offered for purchase shall not fall short of the equivalent 
defined according to the rules concerning the acquisition of shares through a 
public of fe r transaction. In other words, with respect to a public company, 
the "market value" as specified under Para. (1) of Art. 295 is construed as 
effective according to the amendment of the new rule of Para. (4). 
The amendment that annuls Para. (1) of Art. 292 of Companies Act is 
somewhat ambiguous. The text annulled specified the requirement of 
reporting both an acquisition of significant or majority holdings and of direct 
controlling interest, including a statement on "the form and rate of control", to 
shares, and extend to limited liability companies, therefore, the the registry 
court. Antitrust regulations of the Companies Act concerning the controlled 
company cover both public and private companies limited by underlying 
reasons for the annulment of the requirement of "inclusion of a statement on 
the form and rate of control" as a consequence of the amendments to financial 
law are not clear. Since the law specifies registration as mandatory, regulation 
of the contents of the registration statement would only be proper. 
In other respects, the regulations of the Companies Act haven't been 
revised, therefore, the antitrust provisions shall apply according to the 
rules of A.S. of 1997. 
15. Effect. After the exposition of the recent regulations above, I will finally 
discuss the issue of the effect of the new provisions, which, according to my 
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viewpoint raises grave concerns in view of constitutionality, when they 
implicitly mean to introduce the statute with retroactive effect . The starting 
point is clear and right, in as much as the amended regulations of A.S., 
according to Art. 82 of the closing provisions of Act L of 2001, are applicable 
to acquisition of control following 18lh July, 2001, i.e. following enforcement 
of the law. If transactions of take-over of a company had commenced before 
the law took effect , they shall be conducted according to preceding rules. 
However, Para. (2) of Art . 82 states that if, before its entry into force, 
liabilities of reporting, disclosure or public offer as specif ied by A.S. of 
2001 had not been established by effective law, the obligor shall be liable 
to report and disclose the f o r m and rate of its existing control, according 
to the new rule, within 60 days of the date of enforcement of the law, 
practically by mid-September of 2001. A detailed explanation is presumably 
not necessary to point out that here a subsequently issued statute defines 
the existing control as acquisition of control, which, consequently, binds the 
shareholder to procedures (reporting and disclosure), which were legally 
not provided for at the time of the acquisition. 
Furthermore, I need to re fe r to Para. (3) of Art. 82, which stipulates 
that if the holder had acquired shares in excess of 25 p.c. or 33 p.c. before 
Para. (3) took effect, and in compliance with preceding law hadn't made a 
public offer, then the rate of that control can be increased exclusively under 
effective rules of public offer transaction. The provision above is problematic 
f rom a further aspect. If the acquisition of control was not subject to a 
public offer transaction, which may have motivated the acquisition of shares 
under specific circumstances, and the acquirer could expect to increase 
that stake under effective rules at the time of the acquisition, then the new 
regulation, with retroactive effect, ultimately prohibits the transaction 
formerly legal and specifies rules that the acquirer could not take into 
consideration. 
Para. (4) of Art. 82 stipulates a requirement that after its enforcement public 
companies amend their memoranda at their first ordinary meeting, i.e. at the 
spring annual meeting of 2002 at the latest, unless their memoranda regulations 
are in compliance with the new rules. The provision exempts memorandum 
regulations concerning the limit of the o f f e r and the calculation of the 
minimum amount of offer price, which shall be harmonised with effective law 
by 30th June of 2004. A further exemption concerns the later application of 
the recent Para. (3) of Art. 229 of Companies Act expounded above. 
16. Conclusion. The assessment of a recently enforced statute is by no means 
a simple, however, a rather risky undertaking, since the primary standard 
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of assessment is the application capable of evaluating positive and negative 
effects of the law. The evaluation is further complicated by the fact that 
professional (economic, financial) arguments are considerably intertwined 
with political concerns. However, I can hardly evade posing the question. 
It is a mere fact that both the European Union and the member states 
are making remarkable efforts to settle the issue of take-over regulation. 
The real dilemma is obviously constituted by the problem of locating the 
ruling boundary the regulative transgression of which would incur disturbance 
in the operation of major registered companies with significant share in 
the economy of the respective country, and thereby, regulation is construed as 
more damaging than yielding. In this respect, the case of Hungarian law is 
peculiar in the sense that the recent one and a half or two years of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange would justify loosening stiff rules, instead of 
setting new barriers. What is seen as a problem is that both the intention and 
the meaning of the regulation of acquisition of control seem to have tarnished 
in the process of law-making, whereas rationality has been outstripped by 
an effort to comply with the pervasive and ominous standard of rigorous 
rules and "order", although the majority of the rules established are not 
unfamiliar to European practice. There are, however, severe risks entrapped 
in the mechanical import of technical procedures, particularly in an area in 
the intersection of economy and law. The following years to come will 
either prove of disprove the concerns exposed above. 
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1. Competition Law and Company Law Approach 
In commercial law, shareholders' agreements are discussed from two 
different points of view: in a sense of competition law and in a sense of 
company law. 
In a sense of competition law, the shareholders' agreement (syndicate 
agreement) is a qualified cartel contract. The essence of the cartel is that 
it is an agreement limiting (precluding) competition—with regard to prices, 
quantity of production, conditions of business deals, geographic area or other 
aspects. In a more narrow sense, the cartel is directed at influencing market 
behaviour, at the market itself. The shareholders' agreement is stronger 
than the market cartel: it is broadened to include matters of production 
and product development, e.g. specialisation, cooperation of production, 
cooperation of research and development etc. 
In Hungarian competition law, the narrowly understood (market) cartel 
and the production-development or syndicate cartel are not separately 
treated. Arts. 11-20 of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market 
Conduct and Limiting Competition preclude as a general rule cartels in 
both the more narrow and the broader (syndicate) sense—proclaiming as 
generally illegal (with exceptions and the possibility of providing 
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exemptions—relative prohibition of cartels) all such agreements concluded in 
a written form, orally, or by actual conduct. Consequently in Hungarian 
literature the competition law meaning of shareholders' agreements has 
faded, we only talk of cartel agreements.1 
The company law interpretation of shareholders' agreements remains 
all the stronger. Precisely the multiparty and multisided, but at the same 
time—towards the outside world—cooperative-organisatory nature of the 
companies (organisational obligation as opposed to barter-based contracts: 
Steinbach), their characteristic as being based upon a long-term and generally 
significant joint ownership and a dominance of the community of interests 
of the parties and the companies ' relative separation from their members 
is the reason behind the fact that the members in the case of a number of 
companies 
— formed in perpetuity (or for a longer definite period of 10-15 years) 
— with large funds 
— and with legal personality 
— conclude a shareholders' agreement alongside the company agreement. 
The subject matter of the shareholders' agreement is thus the formation 
and the operation of the company. 
The shareholders' agreement, as its name in common law areas implies, 
evolved in relation to stock corporations with large funds . Later, however, 
in German and French law it appeared also in relation to larger limited 
liability companies and is even exceptionally to be found among firms 
created in the form of partnership or limited partnership. 
The shareholders' agreement thus became a general institution of the 
law of commercial companies. It must, however, be stressed that—in the lack 
of a statutory definition—the parties may conclude shareholders' agreements 
outside the realm of company law, e.g. it is not unknown for partners to 
complex investments to call their cooperation framework agreement a 
shareholders ' agreement. But shareholders ' agreements are found also in 
the law of non-profit organisations, e.g. among non-profit limited liability 
companies or associations. At the same time, in case of the formation of stock 
corporations by public share offering, the conclusion of a shareholders' 
agreement before the founders ' meeting is not usual, only maybe later, 
and even then not among all shareholders but only major shareholders. For 
similar reasons, the shareholders' agreement—as concluded on a founders ' 
1
 V ö r ö s , I.: Az európai és a magyar versenyjog összehasonlító elemzése (The 
Compara t ive Analysis of European and Hungar ian Compe t i t i on Law). Budapes t , 
1997. 
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meeting, alongside the articles of association—is also rare among co-
operatives. 
Following the general reform of Company Law new-regulation at the 
end of the 1980's, the instrument of the shareholders' agreement has also 
been reborn in Hungarian practice at the beginning of the 1990's. The 
spreading practice had been supported by scholarly literature." At the 
same time a lot of interesting and open legal issues arise in the topic of 
the shareholders' agreement. 
2. The Independence of the Shareholders' Agreement 
The shareholders' agreement is directed towards the operation of the 
company and regulates the cooperation of the parties to the agreement with 
regard to the operation of the company. At the same time the shareholders' 
agreement and the company agreement are two independent contracts, 
usually not even concluded at the same time. The shareholders' agreement 
is generally already concluded before the company agreement, there is, how-
ever, nothing to prevent the shareholders' agreement from being concluded 
after the company agreement. (A special form of the shareholders' agree-
ment, agreements as to the order of voting in the company's main organs 
are often concluded later.) 
The parties to the shareholders' agreement and the company agreement 
are generally the same, but 
— a person who is not a member of the company may be a party to the 
shareholders' agreement, either originally, even before the formation of 
the company, or he may " join" the shareholders' agreement through its 
modification later. The company may have members who were not originally 
parties to the shareholders' agreement. Anybody may cancel the share-
holders' agreement while keeping his share in the company (he may leave 
the syndicate) or new members who do not join the shareholders' 
agreement may join the company. 
— the shareholders' agreement may be in force only between a part of 
the company's shareholders. 
— generally by selling stocks or shares and thus becoming a member 
of the company one does not automatically become a party to the share-
For a book including an in ternat ional overview of the topic, see Kolben, Gy.: A 
szindikátusi szerződés (The Sha reho lde r s ' Agreement) . Budapest , 1996. 
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holders' agreement. The succession as to membership does not mean a 
change of parties or succession regarding the shareholders' agreement; 
the party has to join that separately. 
— in some instances (although rarely) it happens that the company as a 
legal person itself joins the shareholders' agreement (necessarily only after its 
conclusion, if the shareholders' agreement is concluded before the company 
agreement, but if it is concluded only afterwards, it may even be an 
original party.) 
The subject matter of the shareholders' agreement and the company 
agreement also necessarily differ, it may be mutually broader or narrower. 
The company agreement regulates the cooperation of the members, but 
— certain questions of cooperation are regulated only in the shareholders' 
agreement; 
— issues regulated in the company agreement or by Company Law do 
not fall under the scope of the shareholders' agreement, although may be 
mentioned in both the company agreement and the shareholders' agree-
ment; 
— there is nothing to prevent the parties from regulating in the share-
holders' agreement issues not touched upon in the company agreement or 
not falling under the scope of company law, e.g. issues of limitation of 
competition or matters of intellectual property law, the use of trademarks 
etc. 
3. The Shareholders' Agreement as a special atypical Contract 
The Hungarian civil law—as modern civil law systems generally—does 
not impose a limitation as to possible types of contract. The Part of the 
Civil Code on Specific Obligations lists the most common types of 
contract, but 
— separate pieces of legislation may regulate other types of contract 
(this is how the concession contract, the funds management contract, the 
sponsorship contract etc. have been created), 
— representatives of industry groups may create new types of contract 
through trade usages, standard form contracts (basically this is what 
happened in the case of the leasing or franchise contract, but 
— anybody at any time may also individually create new contracts not 
fitting into a statutorily defined type of contract. The shareholders' 
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agreement is in this latest group, it is so specific that general terms as to it 
may hardly be created. ' 
Qualification as an atypical contract only means that the given contract 
does not belong to a type of contract regulated in the Civil Code (and 
consequently recognised by statute). However, an overwhelming majority 
of atypical contracts are at the same time mixed contracts, i.e. they are not 
typical contracts also because they had been created using the charac-
teristics of several types of contract. Generally, also the Hungarian court 
practice developed in the direction to apply the rules of the type of 
contract that stands closest to the given atypical-mixed contract in cases 
when the contract fails to regulate a certain issue. This application, however, 
happens "adequately", often with the use of extensive interpretation, even 
analogy. 
The shareholders' agreement is a cooperative contract-, it is therefore a 
point of interest that the shareholders ' agreement belongs to a "type" that 
is itself not named within the law and exists only in legal theory. The lower 
level of cooperative contracts are merely of a moral nature, qualified as 
gentlemen's agreements. The shareholders' agreement is, however, a business 
contract and may not be qualified simply as an expression of best intentions, 
the breach of which in Hungarian law may only result in a possibility of a 
tort claim of damages for expenses incurred in reliance if intentional 
misleading conduct is shown. The shareholders' agreement is a contract 
falling under the Civil Code; a conduct in opposition to its terms is a breach 
of contract. 
The shareholders' agreement has certain aspects—especially if the 
shareholders' agreement is concluded before the conclusion of the company 
agreement and the shareholders' agreement is terminated with the formation 
of the company—which may qual i fy as a "consortium", as a partnership 
agreement and consequently may fall directly or by way of analogy under 
Arts. 568-578 of the Civil Code . The shareholders' agreement in other 
cases also stands close to the civil partnership as it is a contract with no 
requirement of form, although generally put down in writing, it may be 
concluded orally. As opposed to that, commercial companies (including 
partnerships) all over Europe share a mandatory requirement of written 
3
 Company or commercia l laws of West -European countr ies do not regulate the 
Shareho lde r s ' Agreemen t and it na tura l ly does not appear in the current Hungarian 
C iv i l Code either. Of the ccmpany laws created in Eas t -European countr ies in the 
1 9 9 0 ' , one is known to include r u l e s — o f course, hardly more than a def in i t ion—of 
sha reho lders ' ag reements , that one b e i n g Albanian law. 
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form, stock corporations and limited liability companies even a qualified 
written form (e.g. a notarial document), moreover the law defines the 
mandatory substantive elements of the company agreement (articles of 
association).4 Exceptionally in civil partnerships a mandatory requirement 
of written form may also be found, e.g. as to building communities; Art. 
578/B (2) of the Civil Code. 
A phenomenon similar to the more organised forms of the civil partner-
ship is that the shareholders' agreement creates an organisation independent 
of the organisation of the company whose operation is the subject matter 
of the contract. Such is for example the syndicate meeting that is usually 
held immediately prior to the general meeting of the company, although 
generally may be called together at any time upon the request of any 
member. On syndicate meetings the members of the company often bring 
more important decisions as to the operation of the company than on 
general meetings, or the syndicate decisions may determine the decisions 
of the general meeting. 
It may happen that the shareholders' agreement meets all the requirements 
of an agreement to agree or that the shareholders' agreement contains an 
agreement to conclude a company agreement as well. (The eventuality of a 
shareholders' agreement being solely an agreement to conclude a company 
agreement is rare in practice). According to Art. 208 of the Civil Code the 
shareholders' agreement qualifies as an agreement to form a company 
agreement if the parties to the shareholders' agreement oblige themselves 
to conclude a company agreement (form a given type of commercial 
company) in accordance with the terms of the shareholders ' agreement at 
a determined, later date. The agreement to agree usually runs out with the 
conclusion of the final contract, whereas the shareholders' agreement 
generally remains in force. 
The basic problem with the possible qualification of the shareholders' 
agreement as an agreement to agree in Hungary is that according to Art. 
208 (1) of the Civil Code the agreement to agree must be concluded following 
the formal requirements established for the final contract which, on the other 
hand, according to Art. 10 of the Act on Business Associations (hereinafter 
referred to as Companies Act) would entail drawing up a notarial document 
or the signature of a lawyer. The parties to the shareholders' agreement 
tend, however, not to follow the qualified written form. In case of company 
4
 About this issue, see Fischer, F.: Die Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts. Hamburg , 
1977. 271-280 . and Ulmer, P.: Die Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts. München , 
1980. 5 - 8 . 
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agreements the application of Art. 208 pars. (3)-(4) of the Civil Code is also 
hard to imagine. According to these rules, in case of a failure to conclude 
the final contract the court may create the contract—and establish its 
terms—at the request of any of the parties, moreover the court may 
exceptionally modify the terms agreed upon by the parties in the agreement 
to agree. Such an intervention by the court would, in case of multiparty 
contracts of a long duration, be in discrepancy with the principle of 
private autonomy. The rules of the company agreement would anyway be 
almost impossible to apply to an agreement to conclude a company 
agreement [Art. 208 (6) of the Civil Code]. Therefore I believe that the 
rules pertaining to agreements to agree in the Civil Code, modelled on 
barter-based contracts, are not applicable to the shareholders' agreement— 
even though its core subject matter is an agreement to conclude a later 
company agreement. Namely, as a result of its multiparty and multisided 
nature, the conclusion of the company agreement may not be regarded as a 
series of separate offers and their acceptance, the future partners must 
accept a unified draft contract and no mutual performances between the 
parties exist in the way as it does in contracts for the exchange of goods.5 
The shareholders' agreement is definitely not to be confused with the 
instrument of pre-incorporation company existing from the signing of the 
company agreement to the judicial registration of the company (Arts. 14-
15 of the Companies Act), although there is naturally nothing to prevent the 
parties from concluding a shareholders' agreement solely for this period. 
But even in this case the shareholders' agreement and the pre-incorporation 
company are different. 
The basic difference is that the commercial company is a company 
registered by the state. In the majority of European laws the company gains a 
commercial name and legal existence, or, in the case of stock corporations 
and limited liability companies, legal personality constituted by inclusion 
in the register (either ex tunc, i.e. retrospectively to the conclusion of the 
company agreement as in the 1988 Hungarian Companies Act, or ex nunc, 
i.e. for the future, as it is laid down in our current 1997 Companies Act). 
Therefore the process of the formation of the company—as modelled 
especially by Fritz Rittner, Professor at Freiburg University—may be 
broken down into two phases.6 
The first phase is the internal bargaining process of the future company 
members which may, in the given case, be regulated by the shareholders' 
5
 See Mül le r , R.: Gesellschaftsvertrag und Synnallegma. Z ü r i c h , 1971. 16-21. 
6
 See Ri t tner , F.: Die werdende juristische Person. Tübingen, 1972. 52 -72 . 
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agreement. The second phase, in which the future members play a mostly 
passive role, although it is initiated by them, is obtaining State recognition. 
Registration primarily means the state approval of the formation and operation 
of the commercial company which in the so-called system of normative 
requirements (in its historic origins crated to replace the general concession 
system) entails a control of legality and at the same time results in the 
inclusion of the company in the official register, providing publicity and 
thus the possibility of the control of publicity over the company to begin.7 
The juridical registration procedure is a process, situations arising 
under which—e.g. whether the company may or may not operate and if it 
may, under what conditions—must be regulated by law. If state registration 
comes to pass, the law must regulate the transition from the temporary 
State to the final state, in a way which in the case of an already operating 
company expresses the continuity of the company's operations, but also 
the qualitative leap which obtaining legal personality, the official recognition 
of the company entails.8 If, on the other hand, registration is denied with 
no further possibility of appeal, the preliminary formation operating in the 
hope of recognition must immediately be dissolved, but in a way so as to 
settle the internal (those between the members of the company) and 
external (e.g. contracts with third parties or employees) legal relationships 
arising between the conclusion of the company agreement and the refusal 
of registration. 
The phase between the conclusion of the company agreement and the 
state judicial decision on recognition may theoretically be regulated by 
law according to two models. 
a) The identity of the preliminary society and the f inal society may be 
denied and the "founding society", the "association of founders" may 
be regulated in both the internal and external legal relationships 
independently, following the analogous application of the loosest 
organisatory obligation, the civil partnership,9 The internal and external 
relations of the unregistered company, the different questions of 
liability may adequately be dealt with on the basis of the rules of the 
Civil Code. This solution is especially advantageous in the case of an ex 
1
 See M u m m e n h o f f , W. : Gründungsysteme und Rechtsfähigkeit. Berlin, 1979. 7 -
13. 
8
 See Büt tner , P.: Identität und Kontinuität bei der Gründung der juristischen 
Person. B ie le fe ld , 1967. 1 1 1 - 1 2 8 . 
4
 See Fabricius , F.: Vorgese l l schaf ten bei den A.G. und G m b H , ein I r rweg? In: 
W. Kastner Festschrift. W i e n , 1972. 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 . 
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tunc constitutive registration system, as in this case the registration 
process takes a longer time and therefore it is more correct if the 
decisions of the "preliminary" become the decisions of the company 
with the express decision of the highest organ of the registered company 
(this is why this solution was applied by the Companies Act of 1988). 
b) If, however, the preliminary operates until registration according to 
the rules pertaining to the final company, a pre-incorporation company 
is created which, contrary to the civil partnership, is some kind of a 
legal subject.10 The Vorgesellschaft had been created in relation to the 
limited liability company and the private stock corporation—these 
rules are harder to apply to the foundation of corporations by IPO, 
because of, if nothing else, the stricter imperative public law rules 
of the securities supervisory authority. In this case "continuity" 
dominates in the relationship between the "future" limited liability 
company or the future stock corporation and the final company; if the 
company is registered, the legal transactions of the pre-incorporation 
company automatically become—as succession is theoretically ruled 
out—the legal transactions of the final company (the limited legal 
existence melts into the full legal personality of the company)." If, 
on the other hand, the company is a "defective", "illegal" company and 
the court refuses registration after the exhaustion of possibilities of 
appeal, then the preliminary must be terminated basically according to 
the rules pertaining to the planned commercial company (although e.g. 
in Hungarian law, no formal termination takes place and the company is 
not dissolved either). Basically this German model had been transposed 
by the 1997 Companies Act, connecting this naturally with a maximum 
time limit of the registration process in the Law on the Process of 
Company Registration (Art. 44 of Act CXLV of 1997) and an ex 
nunc system of registration (Art. 16 of the Companies Act). The pre-
incorporation company of a Hungarian limited liability company 
(LLC) or stock corporation (SC) is already an LLC p.r. or an SC 
p.г., i.e. a company pending registration. (Interestingly enough the 
new Hungarian Law on Cooperatives, Act CXLI of 2000 dropped, 
with regard to cooperatives, the institution of "pre-incorporation 
cooperative", introduced fol lowing the 1997 Companies Act, and 
returned to the civil partnership solution.) 
See Kiesslig, E.: Vorgründung und Vorgesellschaften. Berlin, 1999. 3 1 - 3 9 . 
" See John, U.: Die organisierte Rechtsperson. Köln, 1976. 3 0 7 - 3 1 1 . 
128 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
It must, however, be stressed that no matter whether the legal order accepts 
the first or the second solution as to the formation of the commercial 
company, the shareholders' agreement may never—not even with the civil 
partnership solution—be equated with the pre-incorporation company. 
4. The Reasons Behind the Conclusion of a 
Shareholders' Agreement 
Concluding a shareholders' agreement "before" or "alongside" a company 
agreement may be due to several reasons. The most typical are the following: 
a) A typical purpose is to organise the cooperation of the future 
members in the possibly rather long period before the conclusion of 
the company agreement (or later, as the case may be, should e.g. a 
new member join) in order to enable a least problematic foundation 
of the company. In this case the shareholders' agreement, even if it is not 
an agreement to agree, is a "preparatory" contract. A typical element 
of this preparation is related to setting up the company's funds by the 
members with non-monetary contributions. The previous evaluation of 
contributions in kind—especially in the case of intellectual property— 
is a rather complicated question and may have consequences as to the 
future balance of power within the company, the involvement of an 
accountant or accountants is mandatory. (The parties should also 
regulate e.g. the procedure to be followed in case the court refuses to 
accept certain parts of the contributions in kind etc.) 
b) In the majority of cases the shareholders' agreement is not terminated 
with the formation of the company but remains parallel in force 
during the period of the operation of the company. In this case the 
shareholders' agreement shows the characteristics of a framework 
agreement, including terms pertaining to the conduct of the members 
in relation to the organisation and the operation of the company during 
the whole period of the existence of the company—thus whether e.g. 
on the general shareholders' meeting votes are to be cast so as to 
appoint to the board of directors the candidate of each of the members, 
or so that the supervisory board should elect the candidate of the 
minority member as the chairman of the supervisory board etc. We 
remark that in several cases the shareholders' agreement remains in 
force for a shorter period after the termination of the company—e.g. 
members may oblige themselves to abide by the so called non-
compete clauses, not to form companies with a similar sphere of 
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activity for a certain period of time with other partners after the 
termination of the company etc. 
5. Collisions between the Company Agreement 
and the Shareholders' Agreement 
If the shareholders' agreement and the company agreement are parallel in 
force, several interesting problems arise out of the independence of the 
two contracts. 
ci) The publicity of the content of the company agreement, the secrecy 
of the content of the shareholders' agreement 
It is characteristic of the law of commercial companies that it places 
the interests of business secrecy important in the economic life to the 
background in preference for the public interest of the publicity of the 
operation of the commercial companies (Publizitätskontroll). The Law 
on the Procedure of Registration of Companies defines the sphere of 
data to be included in the register, documents to be submitted to the 
court, rules that companies' accounts should be made public etc. 
Moreover, anybody may at any time—without even rendering probable 
an interest recognised by law as to this—inspect the register free of 
charge. (See the 1st EU Company Law Directive on Publicity.) 
An important purpose of the shareholders' agreement is to regulate 
those details of the cooperation between the members which the parties 
do not intend to make public and the publicity of which is not prescribed 
in a mandatory manner by the company law or the registration law. 
From these details the competitors may namely draw inferences, which 
would disadvantage the position of the company or its members in the 
market competition. 
b) Choice of law 
A large proportion of the members of companies in Hungary are foreigners. 
A significant number of Central-Eastern European countries suffer 
from a lack of capital and thus encourages foreign investment. These 
investments are mainly realised in the form of companies, even if the 
law of the State receiving investment provides the possibility of opening a 
direct appearance by the foreign company e.g. in the form of opening a 
branch subsidiary. Especially in the case of a foreign majority or owner-
ship by a single foreigner the foreigner wishes to transplant as much of 
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his law as possible, conclude contracts in his own language, have dispute 
relating to the foundation and operation of the company settled in 
court procedures he is familiar with. 
The company, however, has legal existence, the stock corporation and 
the limited liability company are legal persons, the stock corporation 
and the limited liability company are important actors in the economic 
life, therefore all countries insist on applying their own company law 
to companies which have their seat on national territory, to have the 
official version of the company agreement drawn up in the official 
language, as the registration process and the register itself are necessarily 
in that language. In company law therefore there is no general freedom 
of choice of law otherwise recognised among the principles of private 
international law—thus also the Hungarian Act on Private International 
Law (Art. 24 of Law-decree No. 13 of 1978). 
The shareholders' agreement, however, falls under the general rules 
of collisions on applicable law, therefore the foreigner may insist that his 
own law or perhaps some other foreign law be used as the supplementary 
legal system in deciding issues not regulated by the contract. There is 
nothing to prevent the parties in case of a limited liability company 
with two members, one of whom is Hungarian and the other German, 
to choose Swiss law as the law applicable to the contract as supplementary 
law, prepare the contract in several languages and proclaim for example 
the English version as official and provide for the resolution of 
company law disputes for a French language arbitration procedure by a 
Paris tribunal, for example. 
c) Limiting the mandatory nature of company law 
The legal regulation pertaining to the company agreement in case of a 
stock corporation is, as a general rule, mandatory in nature in the majority 
of he countries of the world, but mandatory regulation is rather 
widespread also in relation to the limited liability company. On the 
other hand, the shareholders' agreement as an atypical contract is 
regulated almost completely by non-mandatory rules—not taking into 
account a few exceptional provisions of the Part of the Civil Code on 
General Rules of Obligations, there is a possibility for honouring the 
intention of the parties almost completely. The parties therefore wish 
to make use of the shareholders' agreement in order to ease the strictness 
of the mandatory rules of company law. The question only is, to what 
extent does the law of the seat of the company accept the "inter-
vention" of the shareholders' agreement into the company law, up to 
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what point does it honour solutions in the conflict between company 
law and general contract law to the disadvantage of company law. 
The first question arises if some term in the shareholders' agreement 
conflicts a term in the company agreement. The view may be taken that 
a) the company agreement prevails 
b) the contract concluded later prevails 
c) the term in the prevailing contract automatically invalidates or 
12 
modifies the terms of the weaker contract . 
The prevailing—and in my opinion correct—view in Hungarian arbitration 
practice is that in case of a collision be tween the company agreement 
and the shareholders ' agreement the content of each contract must be 
independently ruled upon, in other words the issue of collision need not 
be solved. From this it also follows that a breach of the "additional 
requirements" of the shareholders' agreement may not have company law 
consequences. If accordingly e.g. in a shareholders ' agreement relating to 
a private stock corporation the majority Hungarian shareholder obliges 
himself to vote on a general shareholders' meeting on the candidate 
proposed by the minority foreign member during the election of the 
supervisory board and, to the contrary, with the help of his majority he 
turns down the persons suggested by the foreigner, the decision of the 
shareholders' meeting is valid in a company law sense and claims may 
"only" be put forward (e.g. for damages) according to the rules of civil 
law for breach of the shareholders' agreement. This is the reason why the 
parties try to ensure compliance with the contract by way of security 
instruments, e.g. penalty clauses. 
The content of the shareholders' agreement may, however, in the given 
case lead to the invalidity of the company agreement. The "covering" or 
"fictitious" nature of the company (Mantell- or Scheingesellschaft) may often 
be established f rom the content of the shareholders' agreement, thus e.g. 
that the parties chose the corporate form primarily to avoid taxation. The 
problem is that following the 1st EU Company Law Directive the possibility 
of establishing the invalidity of the company agreement is limited, con-
sequently even if a dispute over the shareholders ' agreement leads to 
finding a fault in the company agreement, it is not possible to draw the 
legal consequences of invalidity regarding the company agreement. 
12 
For this view see Juhász, J.: A szerződések ütközése a kft-n belül avagy felesleges 
duplicitás (The Collision of Contracts within the Limited Liability Company, or 
unnecessary Dupl ic i ty ) . Magyar Jog, 1991. No. 1 2 . 7 3 0 - 7 3 2 . 
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The question is more difficult when the terms of the shareholders ' 
agreement are in contradiction to the rules of company law. The fol lowing 
cases may possibly arise from this aspect: 
— the shareholders' agreement is in contradiction to the non-mandatory 
rules of company law; 
— the shareholders' agreement expressly derogates the mandatory or 
imperative rules of the generally applicable parts of company law or of 
the part relating to the given type of company; 
— the provisions of the shareholders ' agreement are not in express 
contradiction with company law but contain possibilities not mentioned 
therein or aim at a specific application of the provisions of company law. 
In the first case it would follow f rom the independent nature of the 
shareholders' agreement and the company agreement as legal transactions 
that it would only be possible to derogate the non-mandatory rules of company 
law in the company agreement. In this case Hungarian arbitration practice 
pierces the separation of the two contracts and generally makes it possible 
for the parties to derogate the non-mandatory rules of company law, i.e. 
those which allow for such deviation. In my opinion this practice is correct. 
In the second case the arbitration practice regards the terms of the 
shareholders' agreement conflicting the imperative or mandatory rules of 
company law (or even, with the application of Art. 239 of the Civil Code, 
the whole of the shareholders' agreement) as being an illegal contract 
under Art. 200 of the Civil Code and consequently null and void. Thus 
e.g. the parties may not agree—regarding a limited liability company— 
even in a shareholders' agreement not to hold a single general shareholders ' 
meeting a year and bringing decisions e.g. as to financial reports by way 
of casting votes by post. 
The third case represents the hardest problem and depends part ly on 
the interpretation of the nature of the regulation as mandatory or imperative. 
E.g. the Companies Act lists the types of preferential stock in Art. 183; 
the question remains whether one may introduce in the shareholders ' 
agreement types of preferential stock not regulated in the Companies Act. 
Does this still form a part of the contractual autonomy of the parties or is 
the mandatory nature of the Companies Act provisions on preferential 
stock to be interpreted in a way that this creates a numerus clausus with 
regard to the types of preferential stock, providing for new types of 
preferential stock being invalid as a consequence? 
In this question the arbitration and court practice is not unified neither 
internationally nor in Hungary. Some qualify as invalid, with a strict inter-
pretation of Art. 9 (1) of Companies Act, all applications not mentioned in 
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the Companies Act , whereas others qualify the freedom of contract of the 
parties as the stronger interest and regard these rules of the shareholders' 
agreement (which usually find their way into the company agreement as 
well) as valid.1* The practice generally classifies as valid those terms of 
the shareholders' agreement which aim at a particular application of the 
rules of company law in the company agreement. Such are e.g. the already 
mentioned shareholders ' agreements containing limitations on the practice 
of voting rights—voting agreement, Stimmbindungsvertrag. The traditional 
legal view, thus e.g. also the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) in the 1920s 
(see decision No. 3478/1925) considered voting agreements as conflicting 
the "morals of the good merchant", thus null and void as immoral. More 
recently, however, the American and Western European practice tends to 
recognise the validity of these agreements—accepted also by more recent 
Hungarian practice, as opposed to practice in the Czech Republic.14 
13
 The issue is extens ively dealt wi th in Balásházy , M.: Szindikátusi szerződés a 
tá rsasági és a p o l g á r i jog határán (Shareholders ' Agreement on the Borderl ine 
be tween Company L a w and Civil L a w ) . Gazdaság és Jog, 1993. No. 5. 
14
 See e.g. W a l d v o g e l , M.: Zu r Zulässigkeit von St immbindungsver t rägen in 
Tschechien . WIRO, 1997. No. 1. 1 3 - 1 6 . 
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The Rights of Future Generations, and Representing 
them in the Present 
Abstract. The Védegylet, a civic organisation for environment protect ion presented 1990 
a private draft for an Act on the Ombudsman of Future Generations. In this article the 
author of the Draf t Law describes the background to the Law. After a shor t survey of the 
development of the idea of a guardian of future generations in internat ional law the 
author discusses whether future generations can have "rights" and whether future interests 
can be anticipated. The article ra ises structural ques t ions of the p roposed ombudsman 
(who represent whom, before what institution) and points out the d i f f e rences between the 
existing ombudsmen defending individual rights and the speaker of f u t u r e generations, 
the latter being rather a representat ive of environmental interests and a mediator. Finally 
the author shows how the Hungar ian Constitutional Court created f avourab le conditions 
for introducing the new institution. 
Keywords: r ights of future gene ra t ions 
When former students reunite to pay their tribute to the memory of their 
Master, they bear testimony to the fact that Gyula Eörs i ' s work lives on 
and is transmitted to future generations not only in the books he wrote but 
also in the memory of the members of the school of jurisprudence he once 
headed, their work and the personal affect ion that many of them still 
cherish. Once again, it is Professor Eörsi 's spirit that is able, if only for a 
moment, to conjure up the scholarly community, which used to be His 
intellectual home as well as ours. The atmosphere was at once imbued with 
the strength of personal example, which counterbalanced the lack of a 
"director", with the cult of originality and performance. All this was 
supported by the practice of reading and commenting on every sketch and 
piece of work we did, a general tenor of detachment tinged with irony, and 
still some rare heart-to-heart conversations with the Boss about the role 
that he had chosen as his l ife mission. 
László Sólyom, Professor of Law, Budapest, H—1121 Budapes t , Kútvölgyi út 
103/b., Hungary. 
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Personally, I am particularly indebted to Gyula Eörsi . After my first 
publications he declared me a "private scholar", g iv ing me dispensation 
from participating in the collective projects of the Institute. I could pursue 
whatever interest I came to have. (In those days we would have added that 
this was happening in machtgeschützte Innerlichkeit). On one exceptional 
occasion, he asked me—"a man of leisure", as he put i t—to write an essay 
for the collection of papers on environmental law, which was imposed on 
the Institute as an obligatory exercise. Little did I, or anyone, know that this 
paper was to involve me in the movement for environmental protection 
and to be the source of instituting an unlimited access for everyone to the 
Constitutional Court. This actio popularis deeply influenced the entire style 
of the political transformation of 1989. I find it most appropriate to express 
my gratitude by publishing in this volume another offshoot of that 
felicitous imposition ra ther than a paper on a freely chosen topic. 
1. The idea of a speaker for the environment and the future generations 
entered the public opinion in Hungary in connection with two events: 
directly on the occasion of debates on introducing the institution of the 
ombudsman in Hungary, and indirectly through international law. In 
conclusion to his book on the 'ombudsman' (of 1992), László Majtényi reflects 
upon arguments that came up around the change of regimes, formulating a 
demand for an ombudsman to represent each and every right and interest, from 
the disadvantaged, through hospitalised patients to prisoners and also the 
environment. Majtényi pointed out that an environmental ombudsman differs 
from other parliamentary commissioners who defend a concrete, and already 
acknowledged right. The role of the environmental ombudsman would 
focus on the safeguarding and representing general environmental interests, 
rather than defending individual rights. Consequently, he/she is a mediator. 
However these thoughts were not taken up. The problem that the right to a 
healthy environment lacks in an individual subject was left to the Constitutional 
Court to interpret, and to draw consequences from. The Constitutional Court 
also discussed the nature of the right to life. In both cases the verdicts took 
a line favourable to introduce a commissioner for f u tu r e generations into 
the Hungarian legal system, even though the Constitutional Court itself 
was not concerned with this. 
Important events in international law occurred in the meanwhile. At 
the 1992 Rio Conference, the representative of Malta made the case for a 
guardian of future generations, whose role would be to keep our sense of 
responsibility to the future generations alive. A number of scientific groups 
adopted the suggestion, producing a profusion of l i terature on the subject, 
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which brought all the related theoretical and practical problems to the 
fore. International law is better suited to incubate such plans and to solve 
its problems, as its distance from political life does not allow for the 
exploitation of these problems for everyday politics. But no off icial sign 
of any State 's willingness to institutionalise the guardian has been given. 
The development of the law shows however a c lear trend. The thought, 
that mankind as whole can be the subject of international law has gained 
ground. International law has brought about the concept of "the common 
concerns of mankind," as well as "the common heritage of mankind." Though 
the institution of a commissioner has not been accepted, the UNESCO 
issued a declaration on the responsibility of the present generation towards 
future generations in 1997. Guaranteeing the f r eedom of choice to those 
who come after us is the theme of this declaration, and it states the 
responsibilities of our generation in regards to the protection and handing 
over of a heritage in the fields not only of our environment in its 
traditional sense, but also that of biological diversity, the human gene, and 
cultural heritage. 
In spite of these developments advance has been made largely in the 
theoretical fields. Apart from taking its own professional stance on the 
subject, international law has placed the idea of the guardian of future 
generations within the current theories of justice, and introduced it into 
debates on democracy, posing it as a question of participation, that is the 
future taking part in the decision making today. T h e question was raised, 
whether we should have to make concrete choices in the name of future 
generations (representing them), or whether we must make sure they will 
have the opportunity to make a choice once they are born. Would in not be 
better to save certain goods and to hand them down to the future generation 
instead of "representing" them? (As is commonly understood, whales and 
rain forests are such 'goods' today.) 
2. How can the legal personality of future generations be recognised, 
taking their uncertain notion? It is evident to a student of private law that 
anyone or anything can be given legal personality; if these are not 
individuals or natural persons, than legal entities are legal subjects. The 
subjects of international law however could originally only be states. Steps 
away from this position have been taken in two directions: individuals can 
also be subjects of international law (see the example of the war criminals 
brought to trial in the Hague), and in the opposite instance, mankind—as a 
whole—can also be legal subject in international law, having respecting 
rights. 
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The question, which may help to elucidate the status of future generations 
as legal persons is, what kind of rights would they provided with? It is 
appropriate to look at the " r ights" we believe future generations deserve 
as symbolic, and to think of the legal discussion dealing with them as 
metaphoric. What is present fo r us today of the future rights of those who 
are yet to be born, is the responsibility, the legal obligations we have towards 
them. International law assumes that future generations have "rights" in 
order to establish corresponding duties, for all rights are balanced by 
obligations. (We will see that according to the Hungarian Constitution the 
State may have responsibilities towards future generations, without giving 
them rights.) We are the ones who decide the rights of humankind in the 
future, based on our ideas, knowledge and needs. Respect for their 
autonomy requires that we make as few essential decisions for them as 
possible, passing on the f reedom of choice instead. 
The indefinable notion of future generations—especially in terms of 
time—shall warn us not to handle instead of the unborn generations. Lets 
hope there will always be fu ture generations—but how far can we look 
ahead, and take responsibility for the future? What time limit can we claim, 
for our decisions to be proved correct and justifiable? Two points of conflict 
come up when we base our responsibilities and duties on social justice. 
First we have to negotiate the clash of interests between present and 
future generations. What weight must we give the rights of the future 
generations, to place it over and above the poverty, and indeed life threatening 
circumstances (e.g. hunger in Africa) of generations alive today, belittling 
the later, and putting the fu tu re forward as the more important? The 
interests of the future generations cannot be brought up in i tself , separated 
f rom the solidarity and responsibility for all of mankind in the present. 
We can find some amusing examples in the literature: if it has been 
discovered that a comet will hit the earth in two hundred years, a certain 
percentage of the global GDP must be set as ide throughout those years, to 
avert the catastrophe, and everyone must accept this pledge. The inclusion 
of rights of the future generation in the legal system is jus t i f ied through 
democracy. But who is to decide, what load should be born by whom in 
the name of the future? 
The other controversial point is a clash of interests between future 
generations. A similar choice may come up between the fourth and fif th 
generations, or the fifth and the tenth. A beneficial decision for the next 
five generations may be lethal to the sixth. And why should all interests be 
global. Something beneficial to future Siberians and Alaskans can spell 
catastrophe in South-Asia. W e may be able to bring sacrif ices and even 
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force others to make sacrifices in order to save a species, but a virus it 
carries may wipe out future generations. For these reasons Rawls, a 
leading authority in social justice theory writes that we can only extend 
our guardianship to the next generation. One can put in the balance benefits to 
one's self, ones contemporaries and the future within the limits posed by 
this view. It is natural that we look after our own children—there is no 
need to go any further. Yet decisions made today, affect many generations 
to come—can a fair decision be taken without considering them? 
"Goods" being conserved for future generations, rather than the anti-
cipation of their rights and interests may partly solve the problems outlined 
above. This has a serious impact on the way the institution is built up. 
3. Who represents whom, and before what court or authority? And how 
many ombudsmen shall we say are needed? The answer to the question put 
forward in the previous point—whether "goods" are to be saved or actions 
in the name of the fu tu re generations to be made—will define the way the 
institution of the ombudsman will be structured. If the speaker is a guardian 
of future generations in general, than the person would have to be knowl-
edgeable in all fields, but essentially someone universally respected on moral 
grounds. (Yet is the moral authority of the person and universal respect 
enough? Will everybody bow to his/her position on a controversial subject 
such as abortion, or population explosion? Nothing affects the rights of 
the future generations and especially their right to life more than these both 
problems.) But if the protection of particular goods, i.e. certain objects such 
as the oceans or the whales is at stake, than an expert who can tell what is 
best for a whale is needed. In this case, we need as many speakers, as the 
number of protected goods. Who should be the speakers: a person or an 
institution, a State, a public authority or a NGO? Where should the platform 
be given for this speaker: should he/she make his/her case to the nation-
states, international institutions, to both or neither, bringing the case instead 
before a court? (Though would the process then no longer be the represen-
tation of certain interests, but an enforcement of rights.) And as we proceed, 
one feels more and more lost in a maze of questions. Even the question of 
how an ombudsman would relate—in terms of prestige—to the organisations 
already at work has come up. After all, every organisation in the field will 
claim to be serving the interests of future generations. Nor can it be 
argued that people working on stopping a virus (even in a single country or 
region) will not influence the well being of generations in the future. Another 
factor to be reckoned with is the claims of established ombudsmen who 
may feel that a speaker of future generations will trespass on their field of 
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competence. And governments may see the new ombudsman as another 
attempt to limit their powers. 
Following these structural questions, we can address the problems of 
the powers of the guardian of the future generations, and the nature of 
his/her activity. 
The role of this ombudsman is different f rom that of all others. For this 
reason this off ice does not involve any competition with commissioners of 
civil rights and data protection. The later protect the constitutional rights 
of the individual: clearly defined rights in a legal process that is also clearly 
defined. It must be mentioned, that presently the only environmental ombuds-
man of the world, employed in Ontario Canada, has the responsibilities 
traditionally associated with the ombudsman, helping ci t izens fight for 
their environment related r ights . A speaker for the future generations 
however, as I have said, will not be defending legal rights, but will have 
the office of representation. The term guardian, used in international law, 
makes its mark for this reason. Minors and those unable to take action in 
their own name have guardians. Future generations are not able to make a 
case for themselves, and therefore the speaker must do it in their name. 
On the one hand, the guardian helps to bring the issues touching on them 
to the legal recourse. On the other hand, the guardian influences the 
political decision making, as a representative, as well as by using public 
pressure. The fact must be stressed that the speaker for the fu ture genera-
tions is not a decision maker. He/She seeks to orient the politics of 
decision makers. This may also be considered a weakness. But the symbolic 
"rights" of the future generations are quite different from the fundamental 
constitutional rights protected by other ombudsmen. The other ombuds-
men are not authorities either; their recommendations take effect with a 
measure of the strength of the argument and the publicity given to it, and 
the personal prestige of the ombudsman. A smaller role is being proposed 
for the guardian of the next generations in the literature of international 
law: the right to speak out fo r the future generations—and of course full 
access to information. The Hungarian draft law for the sett ing up of the 
institution of a parliamentary ombudsman for future generations, which I 
prepared at the request of Védegylet, a civic organisation for the 
environment, goes to the limits of what is possible. ' Half-way between the 
Canadian and the Hungarian conception lies the Israeli parliamentary ombuds-
man whose of f ice was created af ter the publication of the Hungarian draft, 
1
 The D r a f t L a w on the O m b u d s m a n of F u t u r e G e n e r a t i o n s c a n be f o u n d in 
w w w . v e d e g y l e t . h u in the 3. i t em o f t h e menu: j ö v ő n e m z e d é k e k k é p v i s e l e t e . 
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and who is empowered to undertake preliminary norm control f rom the 
legal point of view of future generations. 
4. Why am I convinced that the situation in Hungary is conducive to the 
establishment of this institution, in spite of all the quest ions we have left 
open, and all the apparent difficulties? Firstly the legal environment is 
suited for the introduction of such an ombudsman. Secondly I trust, that 
both public opinion and lawmaking bodies recognise our responsibilities to 
future generations. The story of data protection, and its commissioner 
gives some cause for circumspect optimism. It has taken twenty years to 
reach from the conception of integrated records, ready plans for registers on 
the population, and the general acceptance of the personal identification 
number to the declaration of the fundamental right of informational self-
determination by the Constitutional Court in 1991, the establishing the 
office of the data commissioner, and the conscious everyday use of information 
rights. Our cause may run a similar course if we come to be aware of our 
responsibilities towards the generations of the future, and the attention of 
decision-makers is constantly drawn to the issue. 
The present legal background is favourable, because the Constitutional 
Court has declared the s ta te ' s duty to protect the condit ion of l ife for 
future generations. The Court also solved the question of how future 
generations can be a subject of law, a question that caused some diff icul ty 
in the international legal theory." The Constitutional Cour t has dealt with 
this question in all of its sentences that had anything to do with life and 
death: abortion and death penalty. According to the judgement of the 
court, right to life, which is a basic individual r ight, stands balanced 
against the obligation of the State, to protect life. The duty of the State 
goes beyond its obligation not to violate the individual 's right to l ife. It 
must also protect human l ife and its condition of existence in general. This 
latter duty is qualitatively different from aggregating the rights to l ife of 
individuals; it is human life in general, consequently human life as a value 
that is the subject of protection. Hence, the State's duty to protect human 
life extends to those lives, which are in their formation, just as it extends 
to the protection of living conditions of future generations. In 1998, the 
Constitutional Court put particular emphasis on the fact that not only 
individual rights must be brought under legal protection, but life and its 
2 
For the relevant dec i s ions and further explanat ion see S ó l y o m , L .—Brunner , 
G.: Cons t i tu t ional Judiciary in a New Democracy . The H u n g a r i a n Const i tu t ional 
Court . Arbor, A. : The Univers i ty of Michigan Press , 2001. 
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natural conditions must be institutionally protected beyond this given 
circle, i.e. the protection of the right to life does not only apply to the 
rights of (now living) individuals. The Constitutional Cour t has therefore 
declared that these objective duties of the state always extend beyond 
insuring the rights of the individual. Every person has the right to the 
freedom of speech. The responsibility of the State is to create and sustain 
the conditions that enable the formation of and upkeep democratic public 
opinion. Therefore the State is for example limited to a few, well-defined 
cases as regards the penalisation of the expression of an opinion or is 
obliged to pass a Media Act. In other words, we have here a rather extensive 
and impersonal protection of rights through institutions. With a similar 
reasoning f r o m the right to l ife follows that the State is responsible for the 
protection of the environment and the living conditions of fu ture 
generations. Environmental rights are concentration of duties of the State, 
according to the Constitutional Court. When we consider this responsibility, 
we may speak of corresponding "rights" only in symbolic terms: as the 
Court put it, nature itself could be the beneficiary of this right. So is no need 
to use the language of "the rights of animals and plants." W e might however 
add: there is a need to bring up the question of whether the future 
generations have rights or not, because it is valuable as strong propaganda. 
5. The Hungarian legislative draft 1 have mentioned was published a year 
ago. Since the theoretical difficulties in connection with the future genera-
tions are avoidable in Hungary only practical objections were raised and 
discussed. The ombudsman of future generations will be modelled on the 
parliamentary ombudsmen who are already established. The question we 
may expect will come up is: why is a new institution needed when so 
many seem to be dealing with these problems already? According to the 
draft, the commissioner for the future generations would have the powers to 
conduct examinations in the private sector as well (similarly to the data 
protection commissioner), while the general ombudsman is only able to 
examine State institutions. For this reason, the field of work planned for 
our ombudsman would not be fully accessible to the general ombudsman. 
The numerous authorities that look after the rights of our descendants as one 
among their many duties would also not be able to replace the speaker for 
the future generations. These are government agencies, acting in the strict 
framework of their competences, duties and procedural rules. In contrast, 
the ombudsman for the fu tu re generations has a free hand in the selection 
of cases to be dealt with, which she/he believes to be most important in terms 
of representing the future generations, drawing not only the attention of 
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various authorities to the matters, and making his/her case with them, but 
also the attention of the general public, giving the sense of responsibility a 
chance to develop. An actio popularis completes the institution: any person 
can put in a motion for an investigation. 
The draft act does not limit the powers of the parliamentary commis-
sioner of the future generations to environmental protection. The tasks of 
the commissioner cannot however be defined without reference to the 
Environmental Protection Act and the Natural Conservation Act. These in 
turn refer to a number of areas from the cultural environment and protected 
historical buildings and monuments to education. The field of investigation 
and activity for the ombudsman is very wide. Apart from the right to a choice 
in matters related to nature, the UNESCO declaration of 1997 mentioned 
earlier lists cultural, political and economic choice among the opportunities 
for decision that must be saved for the future generations. In the preamble to 
draft act all these are included; freedom of choice, quality of life, free access 
to energy resources; these are areas to which the powers of the ombudsman 
are extended. While the commissioner is invested with the powers to investi-
gate these legally definable fields, the office is never itself an authority. The 
powers of the parliamentary commissioner for the future generations are 
built on publicity, influence and pressure. He/she has the right to call for a 
public hearing, to give counsel on international obligations concerning the 
common heritage and the common concern of mankind, nature or environ-
mental protection and resources, prior to entering them. Neither State, nor 
business secrets can hinder the commissioner's access to data related to the 
state of the environment. 
As the cause of the guardian was not embraced by the States after 
1992, the Hungarian political establishment rejected the proposal for the 
institution of an ombudsman for fu ture generations. That the draft law 
made its way to Parliament and reached the stage of committee discussion 
was itself the result of political manoeuvring. However, government and 
opposition were of the same opinion: there were enough ombudsmen already. 
Yet if we come to think of the number of years it took the cause of data 
protection to get f rom official resistance to constitutional recognition and to 
the institution of the independent ombudsman for data protection, we have 
no reason to give up hope. 
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One of the most remarkable aspects of the uniquely productive publishing 
work of Gyula Eörsi is the legal scientific work he did analyzing various 
aspects of liability for damages.1 It is exactly for this reason that we chose 
a problem of tort liability as the focus of this publication dedicated to his 
memory. The choice of topic was also influenced by the fact that Eörsi 's 
work in legal theory was most notably well received internationally when 
contributing to the framing of international sales law. Professor Eörsi 
belonged to the select group of experts who participated already in the 
development of The Hague Sales Convention" that was adopted as early as 
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Schlechtriem, P. (Hrsg.): Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). 
München, 20003, 28. Gives a rather witty parody of the proceedings and atmosphere 
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1966, and he was also an important participant in the work done within the 
framework of UNCITRAL. In addition to the general international respect 
he commanded it was probably for this latter reason that he was elected 
President of the Diplomatic Conference3 held in spring of 1980, which 
adopted the Vienna Sales Convention that currently has more than 50 
member states.4 
Limiting Liability for damages in Hungarian Legal Theory and 
Practice5 
1. The starting point for the regulation in the Ptk. (Civil Code, hitherto 
C.C.) [339 § paragraph (1)] regarding the amount of damages to be paid 
is the principle of full compensation, and accordingly no statutory exemption 
is provided within the general rules in the area of contractual damages. 
The possibility of partial judicial relief from liability for loss on the basis 
of equity [339. § paragraph (2)] is only available in the case of tort 
damages [318.§ paragraph ( l ) ] . 6 On the basis of judicial practice of more 
than forty years it can also be seen that judges did not exercise their freedom 
to grant partial relief allowed by law on the grounds of fairness in non-
contractual damage cases ei ther . ' Instead, if they deemed it appropriate 
of the law-uni f ica t ion conferences Eörsi : Uni fy ing the Law (A Play in one Act, Wi th 
A Song). Am. J. Comp. L. 25. 1977 . 658-662 . 
3
 Eörsi co -au thored one of the f i rs t commentar ies of CISG g iv ing explanat ions of 
Articles 14-17 and 55: Bianca, M . С.—Bonell, J.: Commentary on the International 
Sales Law (The 1980 Vienna Sa les Convent ion) . Mi l an , 1987. 
4
 For the list of member s ta tes see Magnus, U. : Wiener U N - K a u f r e c h t (CISG), in: 
Staudingers Kommentar zum BGB, Berlin 19992 , page 27 at seq. ; Mád l , F .—Vékás , 
L . : Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok j o g a (InternationaI 
Private Law and Law of international Economic Relations). Budapest , 2000 . 322. et. 
seq. 
5
 For a comparative law out l ining of the problem see Hellner, J.: The Limits of 
Contractual D a m a g e s in the Scand inav ian Law of Sales . Scand. Stud. Law, 10 (1966) 
3 7 - 7 9 . (40. et. seq.). 
6
 We ment ion that Swiss Con t r ac t -Law (OR) charges the j u d g e wi th deciding the 
n a t u r e and size of the damage t o be awarded, especial ly in tor t cases (Art. 43 , 
Ar t .99) . 
7
 Even the or ig ina l intention of law makers sugges ted applying C.C. § 339. 2nd 
paragraph a l lowing mitigation of liability based on fairness only in "extraordinary 
cases" . Cabinet Min i s t e r ' s Exp lana t ion for the q u o t e d segment of the law". Indeed, 
legal practice u s e d the fairness p r inc ip l e sparingly, which was a l so the recommended 
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given the circumstances of a particular case, judges would partially rel ieve 
the party causing the loss from liability based either on insufficient demon-
stration of proof, or by limiting the chain of causality. It is difficult to answer 
the question whether a similar reduction of damages can actually be observed 
in contractual liability cases. We may assume this to be a good probability, 
however, this could not actually be proven completely, let alone quantified, 
as we are limited by the abridged nature of the case reports . 
It can be seen that although practice has (correctly) allowed for exceptions 
(from the principle of full compensation, nonetheless, court decisions on 
limiting liability for damages chose not to utilise the possibility of equity-
offered by the C.C. even in tort cases. Most often they argue for a partial 
dismissal of claims for damages by pointing to a loose or distant causal 
relationship between injurious action and loss. At the same time, analysis 
of the judicial practice also shows that court practice did not draw such a 
clear distinction between contractual and tort liability in this regard as 
theintended.8 
Reducing liability by way of drawing the boundaries of causality, 
primarily with the application of the so called principle of adequate 
causality, or by other means of limiting causality based on the cause being 
"too distant", "non-decisive" or "irrelevant" may in no way be disapproved. 
Most notably in German law, but also in Common Law, courts employ this 
method, and international scholarly literature also treats the problem as 
being an issue partially of causality and partially of distribution of risk. 
We should note, however, that in the world of contracts, (especially 
commercial contracts), the viewpoint of distribution of risk is dominant. 
Furthermore, the problem of causality is widely known to be a diff icul t 
position of the Supreme Cour t in its opinion coded PK 804/1. In the BH there were 
only two cases published in 1961 where the poss ib i l i ty of using § 339. 2nd pa rag raph 
presented i tself . In one of these cases the Supreme Court brought a questionable decision 
to apply the fa i rness principle (BH 1961/issue 12, No. 3024) , in the other case it 
correctly dec ided against such application ( B H 1961/issue 6, N o . 2910). The r u l e ' s 
application was triggered expressly by the in jur ious party's f inancia l position in case 
coded LB Pf . III. 21027 /1970 (this case is commented on by Petrik: Law of 
Compensation. Budapest , 1991. 33) . 
8
 The jus t i f i ca t ion given by the Minister in an explanat ion attached to C . C . § 
318. for the exclusion of the l iabil i ty mi t iga t ing fairness p r inc ip l e from con t rac tua l 
cases is as fo l lows : This d i f fe ren t ia t ion "is mos t ly explained by the position tha t it 
would not be justified to provide relief of liabilities fixed in a contract , i.e. such l iabi l i t ies 
that could be foreseen ." In border l ine cases, such as violation of a protected in te res t 
by breach of contract , however even the M i n i s t e r ' s explanation thought it poss ib le to 
allow the j u d g e the use of f a i r n e s s to mitigate liabili ty. 
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one bearing a lot of uncertainty. As a result , decisions arguing a lack of 
causality are often disputable and not always detailed enough, and legal 
literature is also correct in challenging the erroneous theoretical foundation 
of the principal of adequate causality. It is correctly argued by Géza Marton 
that this particular way of mitigating compensatory damages transforms 
the fundamentally legal policy problem of liability into the more matter of 
fact question of causality. Consequently, Géza Marton ab ovo proposes the 
principle of "adequate set-off" instead of adequate causality. According to 
his correct views the practice of limiting liability for damages by way of 
limiting causality in cases of liability based on fault would be under-
standable, although, even here its foundation in theory is flawed. However, in 
the area of liability independent of fault the logic of adequate causality is 
even methodologically inappropriate, because this way of cutting the chain 
of causation at a standardized point applies the notion of typified faul t 
even in a system of relief f r o m liability independent of fault .4 
2. In the case of Hungary the Vienna Sales Convention has been in 
effect since January 1, 1988.'° Consequently, in matters of international 
sales Hungarian Law applies the rule (Article 74, 2nd sentence) of that 
Convention, which in the case of contractual damages limits compensatory 
damages to only those foreseeable by the injured party, thereby deviating 
from the principle of full compensation. Compensation amounts awarded as 
reparation for breach may not "surpass the loss that at the time of concluding 
the contract could or had to have been foreseen by the breaching party 
based on those facts and circumstances that had to be considered as the 
possible results of a breach". 
In reference we mention here that in the case of a special problem 
involving the liability of a freight forwarder the C.C. itself operates on the 
principal of foreseeable damages. 500 §. paragraph (1) states that beyond 
the agreed penalty for late performance a freight forwarder is only responsible 
for a loss occurring as a result of late delivery if he agreed to the delivery 
date in knowledge of the other party's interest intimely performance." 
' Marton, G.: A polgári j og i felelősség (Responsibili t ies Under Civil Law). Budapest . 
1992, item No. 12J, 222. 
10
 Law-decree No. 20. of 1987; compare wi th Sándor, T.: A nemzetközi adásvétel 
(International Sales). Budapes t , 1990.; M á d l — V é k á s : International Private Law and 
Law of International Economic Relations, op. cit. chapter 22 ( 3 2 2 - 3 4 9 ) . 
" i t is w o r t h mentioning, p robably not as a coincidence, tha t in English c o m m o n 
law the f irs t cour t case to b e built on the pr incip le of fo reseeab i l i ty (Hadley v. 
Baxendale to b e discussed b e l o w ) has at its c e n t e r the award ing of unrealized p r o f i t 
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3. As a preliminary remark we also point out that the availability of 
possible mitigation of tort liability and its dogmatic method seem to show 
a close connection with the method of rel ief from liabili ty, and in fact 
can only be analyzed together. This is clearly shown in the practical 
application of the principal of adequate causality, and its previously 
mentioned well founded crit icism in legal literature. The C.C. could only 
provide a special "emergency exit"-like method of mitigation of liability 
based on the court 's discretionary application of the equity principle because 
it opened a rather wide and moreover f lexible window for exculpation 
with the possibility that the party causing damages prove that he acted "as 
it can normally be expected under the given circumstances". 
The Vienna Convention al lows only for a more stringent and objective 
way of exculpation. According to the Convention a party can only be 
relieved of responsibility for partial non-compliance if it proves that said 
default resulted from an obstacle that it could not have circumvented, nor 
could it reasonably be expected that at the time of conclusion of contract 
the obstacle be foreseen, removed, or its consequences be averted. 
4. The theoretical need for full compensation of damages resulting f rom 
breach of contract had been a persistent problem in C.C.'s judicial practice, 
which is also reflected in legal literature. As early as 1971 Miklós Világhy 
saw the need for the correction of the principle of full compensation in the 
contractual domain and similar ideas have been raised by Attila Harmathy 
a few years later. In 1993 Tamás Tercsák wrote a comparative study 
dealing explicitly with the question of limiting liability for damages with 
the help of foreseeability.13 
occurr ing as a resu l t of late pe r fo rmance of a t ransporta t ion con t rac t . Furthermore, 
leading even t o d a y ' s leading Br i t i sh handbooks d i scuss the top ic wi th a focus on 
bes ides contracts of sale those of t ransportat ion. See for example McGregor , H.: On 
Damages. London , 199716, 182 et. seq. 
12
 A translat ion of Article 79 paragraph (1) g iven by the author that is true to the 
or iginal English text and the re fo re differs s l ight ly f rom the o f f i c i a l text publ i shed 
wi th Law-decree 2 0 of 1987. 
13
 Világhy, M.: A Polgári Törvénykönyv fe lü lv izsgá la tának elvi kérdései II. 
(Theoretical Quest ions of the Revision of Hungarian Civil Code. (C.C.) II.), Hungarian 
Law, XVIII. 1971. 456; Harmathy, A.: Felelősség a közreműködőér t (Responsibility 
for intermediary third party). Budapest , 1974. 2 4 3 - 2 5 1 ; Tercsák, T.: Elöreláthatóság — 
mint a szerződésen belül okozot t kár megtér í tésének korlátja (Foreseeabi l i ty as the 
Boundary of Compensation for Damages Caused within the Framework of a Contract ) . 
In: Polgári jogi dolgozatok (On Civil Law), (ed . : Harmathy, A.) . Budapest , 1993. 
2 3 1 - 2 5 4 . 
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Világhy proposed the tightening of the rules governing the f inding of 
liability in cases of defective performance and simultaneously proposed 
the need for an exception to the rule of full compensation. (We should 
mention that before the 1977 Novella has entered into force the C.C. 
awarded a claimant compensation after the expiration of the warranty 
period only in very limited cases [original 307. § paragraph (2)]: in order 
to be awarded compensation the entit led had to prove that the default ing 
obligor acted fraudulently.) In limiting liability for damages he did not 
rule out the introduction of the foreseeability principle based on "the 
inspiration of English or French law and legal pract ice" as such a solution 
that "theoretically meets the criteria of the concept of contractual barter 
relationships". However, instead of introducing this principle "foreign to 
Hungarian legal thinking" by way of legislation, he rather suggested that 
"in legal regulation of the actual sum of damages a judicial practice would 
develop in the direction of the so called adequate causality principle and 
as a necessary consequence courts would award only that port ion of 
contractual damage that the parties had to have considered at the t ime of 
breach given the particular nature of the terms of the contract." Although 
here is little difference with regard to their effect, the foreseeability principle 
and the principle of adequate causality differ significantly in terms of 
their theoretical foundation, as this was pointed out above when 
discussing ideas of Géza Marton. While the predictability principle allows 
the normative limiting of making a party liable for damages based on a 
decision of policy, the doctrine of adequate causality provides a tool for 
artificially breaking of the existing causality chain based on a j udge ' s 
discretion. Világhy would solve the problem of how to flexibly limit the 
principle of full compensation in a way that would also provide a platform 
for a more organic development of law. He favored the use of the less 
unusual principle of adequate causality, deciding not to bother with the 
rather well founded theoretical criticism that were certainly known to him as 
well. Law No. 4 of 1978 essentially chose this same direction recommended 
by him. According to this law that is still in effect to this date the C.C. 
theoretically extended the defaulting obligor 's liability over all damages 
even beyond the warranty period, and left their potential mitigation up to 
the judge. Even today the methodology of mitigation can be based (of 
course not overtly) on the principle of adequate causality. This is certainly 
a faulty solution in terms of its foundation in theory. 
In his excellent monography on the subject of responsibility for the 
acts of intermediaries, Harmathy also deals with the issue of def ining the 
limits of claims of contractual damages. In building a foundation for his 
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deductions he gives a short yet sophisticated comparative law study on the 
dogmatic tools used to limit the size of damage awards in French, English, 
and German law as well as in Hungarian draft codes and socialist law. He 
sums up his position by writing that "there is a need across the board for 
limiting liability over breach of contract. This is understandable because 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the parties take into account a 
certain risk, a possibility of loss during the normal run of the process, and 
they agree on stipulations of the contract with these eventualities being 
taken into consideration." In his summary he explicitly argues for the 
condition of "foreseeability" to be inserted into the process of l imiting 
liability for damages caused by contract violation, because this solution is 
"most sensitive to business considerations". For establishing the forseeable 
amount of damages Harmathy suggests we simultaneously take into account 
both objective and subjective criteria. "An objective characteristic exis ts 
in that those parts of damage are included which given the particular 
circumstances had to be taken into account based on prior knowledge or 
experience; a subjective one, in that we take into account also that part of 
the damage which although could not be expected based on experience, 
but the person in breach of the contract came to possess such facts at the 
time of contract talks and the fixing of the terms of the contract, that 
would have suggested the probability of the occurence of higher than 
usual damages." 
Tercsák f inds it desirable to limit liability for damages to foreseeable 
damages in the area of contractual liability law based both on the grounds 
of economic rationality and as a measure of prevention. He compares this 
solution with various other methods of limiting liability for damages used 
in some of the more important legal systems, for example schemes that 
define liability for compensation as a direct function of the degree of 
culpability, or the use of assorted causality theories, etc . As his ult imate 
conclusion he proclaims that in the area of compensation for contractual 
damages boundaries of liability can be drawn most accurately with the aid 
of the foreseeability method compared with all others. 
5. In the following section we analyze the foreseeability doctrine. Our 
purpose is to contribute to the effort to reform the C.C. by providing an 
alternative solution to the problem of limiting liability in damages ar is ing 
from breach of contract.14 Providing such an alternative solution may be 
14
 Sándor a lso recommends the solution of the Vienna C o n v e n t i o n for the r e f o r m 
of the C.C.: Sándor : International Sales, op. cit. 276. footnote 9. 
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necessitated particularly by the fact that the reform of the C.C. is expected 
to bring about changes in matters of exculpation.15 This is important, 
because if proof of lack of culpability is not sufficient grounds for relief 
(as it is suggested in the new Concept of C.C.), rather it is necessary to 
provide proof of objective circumstances (similarly to the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention), then a more robust, and more importantly, a more 
predictable foundation must be provided for the limitation of liability as 
well, in comparison with the current state of affairs. The foreseeability 
doctrine would provide an internationally common and successful dogmatic 
framework for this issue. 
The Foreseeability Doctrine and its Related Institution in National Laws 
1. The foreseeability doctrine was likely approved relatively easily as 
part of the Vienna Convention because it is known in the several highly 
regarded legal systems.16 
a) In modern times it makes its first appearance in French Law,17 f rom 
which it spread to most legal systems, fashioned after French codification. 
The Code civil itself expressly states (Article 1150.) the requirement of 
foreseeability in determining the amount of damages. 
In French legal practice, however, this method of reducing compensation 
awards does not play a major role. This is in part due to substantive law 
reasons. As a matter of course the Code civil precludes the case of 
intentional breach of contract ("par son dol") from the scope of operation 
of the foreseeability principle. A further restriction in the application of 
the principle results from a unique distinction in French civil law between 
"obligation de résultat" and "obligation de moyens". Moreover, it is super-
fluous to refer to the necessity of foreseeability due to the special legal 
" C o m p a r e with Vékás, L . : Javaslat a sze rződések á l t a l ános szabályainak és a 
szerződés t ípusok szabályainak korszerűsí tésére (Vitaindító t éz i sek az új Ptk. K o n c e p -
ciójához, II. Rész) . Polgári jogi kodifikáció III. évf . [Recommendation for the updating of 
the general rules of contracts and rules governing various contract types. (Deba t e 
opening theses fo r the new c o n c e p t of the C . C . , part 2). Codification of Civil Law], 
vol. 3. 2001. i s sue 4 -5 . 
16
 Hellner: The Limits of Contractual Damages... op. cit. 47., with footnote's 3 and 4. 
l 7 Dupin , A . M. J. J. ( e d . ) : Oeuvres de Po th ie r , contenant les traités du droit 
français. Pa r i s , 1824. 1. k.: T r a i t é des ob l iga t ions , Nr. 159. et. seq. For the r o o t s of 
the principle in Roman law s e e Zimmermann, R.: The Law of Obligations (Roman 
Foundations of the Civil Traditions). Cape T o w n , 1990. 829. et. seq. 
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exemptions given both in the general rules of contracts (Article 1153.) and in 
18 
contracts of sale (1630. and following Articles, Article 1644.). In addit ion 
to these reasons we should also consider the procedural matter that a c laim 
based on the foreseeability doctrine (being a legal objection presuming 
deliberations of fact) may not be raised before the Cour de cassation. 19 
Finally, the less frequent use of the foreseeability rule can most likely be 
attributed to the fact that beyond the scope of damnum emergens and lucrum 
cessans the Code civil (Article 1151.) limits compensatory damages to the 
immediate and direct ("immédiate et directe") consequences of the breach 
of contract . 
b) A significantly more important role is played by the foreseeability 
doctrine in English common law. 
In English judicature this principle was first applied in Hadley v. 
Baxendale"0 by the Court of Exchequer. At the heart of this often quoted 
case was the dispute between a mill owner and a carrier . A part of the 
steam mill that had been off site for a necessary repair was delivered back 
to the mill only four days past the time of delivery that the carrier had 
agreed to and the miller sued the carrier for lost revenues. It is an 
interesting example of the unpredictable interactions that the history of 
law can produce that in this case the p l a in t i f f s at torneys and one of the 
judges referred to French Law"1 based on an American textbook." The 
l 8 M a z e a u d , H .—Mazeaud , L .—Mazeaud , J .—Chabas, F . : Traité théorique et 
pratique de la responsabilité civil délictuelle et contractuelle. 3 /1 . Vol. Paris, 19786 , 
Nr. 2190 (compare with Nr. 2 3 7 8 and 2390 as well); Ghest in, J .—Desché. В.: Traité 
des contrats — La vente. Par is , 1990, Nr. 853 . et. seq. 
14
 Viney: La responsabilité: effets. Paris, 1988, Nr. 324. 
20
 (1854) 9 Exch 341 156 Engl . Rep. 145(1854) ; for more recent analyses of the 
case see.: Danzig: Hadley v. Baxendale: A S tudy in the Industr ia l izat ion of the Law. 
Journal Legal Studies. 4 ( 1975 ) 249-284 . ; Faus t : Hadley v. Baxenda le — an Under -
standable Miscarr iage of Jus t ice . J. Legal Hist. 15 (1994) 4 1 - 7 2 . ; also compare with 
Z immermann : The Law of Obligations... op. cit. 830. 
21
 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch 341, 345 et. seq. According to the t ranscr ip t 
Judge Parke said the following during the trial: "I wish the sensible rule was es tab l i shed , 
that damages must be c o n f i n e d to what the parties r e a s o n a b l y anticipated. My 
attention has been drawn to the subject by reading Mr. S e d g w i c k ' work." Had ley v. 
Baxendale, 23 L.J.R. [N.S.] Exch 179, 181 (1854) . (Eörsi was k n o w n to enjoy " p l a y i n g 
a round" with English cases . ) Pothier's v i ews were inc identa l ly fondly adop t ed by 
English dec i s ions of the 19th century, in f ac t according to König (Zimmermann: The 
Law of Obligations... op. cit. 336. , 830.) the concept of fo reseeabi l i ty can be t raced back 
to Dumoulin in French pr iva te law (Mol inaeus . C.: Tractatus de eo quod interest: 
1546): König: Voraussehbarkei t des Schadens als Grenze ver t rag l icher Haf tung — zu 
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decision that was handed down in the case was written by Lord Alderson 
of the four judges produced an important procedural innovation not relevant 
to our subject, but it also contained a legal argument that was likely flawed 
23 
considering the particulars of the case which led to an unjust resolution. 
Nonetheless, to this day it is regarded as the leading precedent in English 
Law ("the most celebrated case in the field of contract damages""4 spelling 
out the the clause of forseeability, the "contemplation rule" (or "contemplation 
doctrine"). The holding of this famous judgment is that in a case of breach 
of contract, in addition to "general damages" (i.e. actual losses), such additional 
damages may be claimed on the basis of unrealized profit "as may reasonably 
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time 
they made the contract, as a probable result of the breach of it"."5 Dicta to 
the judgment emphasizes that if the party in breach could be made liable 
for that part of the damage which he did not have to fo resee at the time of 
breach, then it would not be in the injured party's interest to come to an 
agreement with the other party regarding the probable damages resulting 
from a possible breach. By the same token, the party later to be in 
breachcould not effectively protect himself from larger consequential 
damages by the appropriate limiting of his liability with suitable contract 
terms."'1 The foreseeability doctrine became a general principle of English 
judicial practice after 1854 and this remained unchanged a f t e r the 1893 Sale 
of Goods Act and even after its 1979 reform (Section 54)."7 
Art 82, 86, 87 EKG, in: Das Haager einheitliche Kaufgesetz und das deutsche 
Schuldrecht. (Hrsg . : Leser/von Marschal l ) , Ka r l s ruhe , 1973. 7 5 - 1 3 0 . (76. et. seq.). 
"" Sedgwick, Th.: A Treatise on the Measure of Damages. New York, 1847, 64. et. seq. 
23 
Danzig: Hadley v. Baxenda l e : A Study in the Industr ia l izat ion of the Law. op. 
cit. 260.; Faus t : Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens gemäß Ar t . 74. Satz 2 U N -
Kaufrecht . T ü b i n g e n , 1996. 80. et. seq. 
"
J
 McGregor : On Damages, op. cit. 157. 
" Bradley, J . : (1854) 9 Exch 341, 354; in E n g l i s h literature foreseeabi l i ty is a l so 
known as „test of remoteness". 
"
6
 Ibid. 355, the following Engl i sh court cases contributed signif icantly to solidifying 
or advancing the foreseeabil i ty doc t r ine : Victor ia Laundry ( W i n d s o r ) Ltd. v. N e w m a n 
Industries Ltd. (1949) 2. K.B. 528 . ; Monarch Steamship Co. L t d . v. Kar lshamus 
Olejfabr iker ( A / B ) (1949) 196., 224. The best gu ide to the deve lopment and s u b -
problems of the principal in Engl ish law are given by Ogus, A.: The Law of Damages. 
London, 1973. 7 1 - 7 9 ; McGregor : On Damages, op. cit. 157-184. ( i t ems 247-281) . 
" Ogus: ibid.; McGregor: ibid.; Guest, A. G.: Benjamin's: Sale of Goods. London , 
1997 s , §§ 16 -040 (856), 17-001 (894), 17-045 (929) ; also c o m p a r e with Faust: Die 
Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens... op. cit. 82. et. seq. 
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c) United States judicial practice also applies the contemplation rule as 
a classic common law principle."0 UCC § 2-715 (2) (a) spells out in detail 
the rule of contemplation with regard to consequential damages in the 
buyer 's assets: "Consequential damages resulting f r o m the seller 's breach 
include any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and 
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reasonably to 
29 
know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise". 
It is important to point out that UCC [§ 2-715 (2) (b)] does not apply the 
contemplation rule for damage to the buyer 's person or property "resulting 
from any breach of warranty". 
2. Although the BGB chose a slightly different path when limiting 
liability for damages the English "contemplation rule" managed to find its 
30 
way into German jurisprudence as well." Incidentally, the solution found 
in BGB is also interesting as well as instructive.4 Besides limiting claims 
of unrealized profit to the amount that could be expected with good 
probability (252. §), the German code allows for the reduction of damages 
within the context of the claimant 's responsibility to prevent damages 
28
 Howard v. St i l lwell and Bierce Manufac tu r ing Co. , 139 U.S. 199, 208 (1891); 
Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U.S. 1, 29(1894) etc. According to König 
Amer ican judicial prac t ice had applied the foreseeabi l i ty principle even pr ior to 




 The UCC gives no par t icular rule fo r damages s u f f e r e d by the seller due to the 
buye r ' s violation of con t rac t terms. This one-sided fea tu re is duly cr i t ic ized in the 
l i terature White, J . — S u m m e r s , R. S.: Uniform Commercial Code, vol. 1, St. Paul-
Minn, 19954, 412. et. seq. However, the literature also correctly points out that the buyer ' s 
potent ia l late payment is a possible cause of loss l iabi l i ty that can genera l ly be 
estimated with good accuracy ahead of time. Hellner: The Limits of Contractual Damages 
in the Scandinavian Law of Sales, op. cit. 78. et. seq. Huber, P.: Leistungstöhrungsrecht. 
vol. 2. Tübingen, 1999, 264. 3. footnote . ; compare with Schwenze r , I.: Freizeichnung 
des Verkäufers von der Sachmängelhaftung im amerikanischen und deutschen Recht. 
Frankfur t /M. 1979. 38. et seq. 
30
 Rabel , E.: Das Recht des Warenkaufs. Vol. 1. Berlin, 1936. (reprint: 1964), 491. 
et seq.', von Caemmerer, E.: Das Problem des Kausalzusammenhangs im Privatrecht . 
In: Gesammelte Schriften (vol . I.). Tüb ingen , 1968. 395. et. seq. 
31
 The B G B ' s damage liability laws were founded on Mommsen's s tudy: Zur 
Lehre von dem Interesse. Braunschweig, 1855. Mommsen believed firmly in the principal 
of full compensation: op. cit. 168. et. seq. and the BGB's d ra f t s also kept this principle 
almost uniformly, compare with Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 340. 
et. seq. 
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f r o m occurring. According to 254. § paragraph (2) the obligor in breach is 
not required to compensate for damage that the injured entitled failed to 
prevent or mitigateby actions of gross negligence. It is considered to be 
the injured's negligence if, preferably at the time of contracting, he failed 
to bring to the other party's ( the future breaching party's) attention such 
extraordinary risk of unusually large loss that was neither known nor 
could have been expected to be known to his partner.3" 
The solution offered by the BGB reaches similar goals to that of the 
contemplation rule by following a different dogmatic path. In this case risk is 
considered extraordinary if the level of damage significantly surpasses 
that which could be expected in a similar business scenario. For example 
if the result of a late bank t ransfer is the loss of a patent claim then the 
resulting damage can be considered unusually high. Naturally, the entitled 
can only be made responsible for negligence if he himself could have been 
aware of the nature and size of the damage. The entitled is not under 
obligat ion of disclosure if h is contractual partner himself knew or had 
to know the extraordinary risk.33 The disclosure of the possibility of 
extraordinary risk by the obligee can result in the obligor deciding to (in 
the first three cases, possibly simultaneously): 
— pay extra attention to specif ic performance of the contract 
— attempt to limit his risk by stipulations limiting or excluding liability 
— raise the price due to increased risk 
— decline to enter into contract due to impending large risk. 
Grossly negligent failure to disclose facts leads to a division of the loss 
between the breaching and injured parties. When distributing the burden of 
loss both the cause leading to the loss and the parties' negligence must be 
weighed.34 
The possibility of liability reduction offered by the f irs t sentence of 
the BGB [254. § paragraph (2)] (which incidentally is also open in tort 
cases) is very rarely applied in practice.35 In tort cases even the rule of the 
B G B can prevent only the fu r the r growth of existing damages such as the 
one that would result from late payment of a compensation award.3'1 The 
3
~ Lange, H.: Schadenersatzrecht. Tiibingen, 1990", 574.; Huber: Leistungstöhnmgs-
recht... op. cit. 263. et. seq. 
33 
' Lange: ibid. 
34
 BGB Handkommentar . B a d e n - B a d e n , 2001. Schulze , R.: ad § 254 , Rn. 10. 
35 
König: Voraussehbarkeit des Schadens als Grenze vertraglicher Haftung... op. 
cit. 96. ; Tercsák: Foreseeabil i ty as the boundary of compensat ion f o r damages caused 
w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of a contract , op. cit. 237. 
36
 See for e x a m p l e BGH 23.2. 1960 , VersR 1960, 526. 
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infrequent use of this rule in practice is undoubtedly related to the attitude 
of the BGB in granting relief f rom liability (besides being also related to 
other issues like the limited nature of the concept of lost profit and other 
restrictions governed by separate laws such as the HGB):as a matter of 
course, non-negligent breach leads to no liability for damages. 
3. In comparing the foreseeability doctrine and the solution provided by 
the BGB the following may be stated.37 Primarily, it is immediately clear 
that both solutions summarized above effectively surpass either the method of 
judicial cutting of the chain of causation or discretionary reduction of 
liability based on fairness in the sense that instead of leaving the key to 
resolution in the hands of the judge they both hand it over to the parties, 
and that is a significant plus in contract law. 
Almost undoubtedly, the foreseeability doctrine appears to give a more 
solid and specific point of reference to the contracting party in its effort to 
size up the risk of entering a contract in advance and make decisions 
accordingly. At the same time both solutions reflect a market-oriented 
attitude and treats the parties as sovereign and equal participants of a 
pecuniary transaction. One side is motivated to disclose risk, the other to 
evaluate it and base its business decision on that. 
The foreseeability doctrine is perhaps a bit more effective in that the 
obligor can always take into account the increased risk when determining 
counterperformance. In the case of the BGB this is not always possible 
because the contracting party is obliged to give notice of a higher risk not 
necessarily at the time of entering into contract but only when he becomes 
aware of the risk. Also, the claimant 's right to full compensation stays 
valid if no negligence is involved in his failure to give notice or if his 
negligence had no effect on the prevention of loss. Conversely, the BGB may 
be more effective in the actual prevention of loss. While the foreseeability 
doctrine does not provide cover for risk of loss that increases after the 
conclusion of contract the BGB makes even that possible as the obligee is 
required to give notice of higher risk throughout the entire length of the 
contractual relationship. Moreover the BGB is also a bit more fair in 
contrast with the foreseeability doctrine in that in the case of increased 
" C o m p a r e with Huber : Leistungstörungsrecht, op. cit. 267. et. seq.", Faust: Die 
Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 339. et. seq.-, On Limi ts of the appl ica t ion of 
the foreseeabi l i ty pr inc ip le , see Hel lner : The Limits of Contractual D a m a g e s in the 
Scandinavian Law of Sales , op.cit. Espec ia l ly 77. et. seq. 
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risk not foreseen by either party responsibility for the risk rests with the 
party in breach." 
However, as far as the effectiveness of either the foreseeability doctrine 
or the BGB rule is concerned, a hindrance is presented by the fact that 
(especially in the world of business) contracting parties are reluctant to 
shed light on their business strategies (often speculations). 
Finally, as we pointed out before, in a legal climate where a breaching 
party has to compensate for losses only in case of negligence, the importance 
of more subtle dogmatic ways of mitigation of liability is significantly 
reduced in comparison to a more stringent doctrine of liability. It is also 
clear that the most accurate (although by far the least harmonious with 
liberal market philosophy) tool of defining risk is the capping of liability 
by law. This solution is rather common in the area of freight forwarding 
and transportation contracts.39 
The Foreseeability Doctrine in International Conventional Sales Law 
and in Model Laws 
1. The foreseeability doctrine—based on Rabe I40—was an almost unchal-
lengeable part of even the earliest drafts (1935, 1939, 1963)41 intended to 
uniformly regulate international sales law, so it was almost natural that it 
became part of the Hague Sales Convention4" (Articles 82 and 86)43 and 
f rom here a direct path led to Article 74 of the Vienna Sales Convention.44 
There are only subtle differences in wording between the latter and the 
above mentioned rule of the Hague Sales Convention and according to the 
38
 Same as Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens... op. cit. 344 . 
34
 Compare with Huber : Leistungstörungsrecht, op. cit. 267. et. seq. 
40
 Rabel: Das Recht des Warenkaufs, op. cit. 4 9 5 - 5 1 1. 
41
 See Hellner: T h e Limits of Cont rac tua l Damages in the Scand inav ian Law of 
Sales , op. cit. 47., f o o t n o t e No. 3. 
4
" July 1st, 1964; compare with M á d l — V é k á s : International Private Law and Law 
of International Economic Relations. 320. et. seq. 
43
 Compare with Döl le , H .—Wei tnaue r , W.: Einheitskaufrecht. M ü n c h e n 1976, 
531 . et. seq., 537. et. seq., directly to the Hague Sales Convent ion: 543. et. seq. 
44
 Compare with Knapp, Ch. L.: in: Bianca-Bonel l : Commentary on the Inter-
national Sales Law. op. cit. 540. et. seq.; Stoll, H.: in: Schlechtriem (Hrsg.): Kommentar 
zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). 698. et. seq., 714. et. seq.-, Sándor: Inter-
national Sales. 275. et. seq. 
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working documents of the Vienna Agreement there was no intention or 
impetus for significant changes. 
As opposed to the negligence based contract liability law found in the 
Code civil and the BGB, Article 79 of the Vienna Sales Convention, as 
was pointed to earlier, mandates a higher standard of reason in granting 
liability relief. The introduction of the foreseeability doctrine into the 
rules of the Convention is essentially the supplementation of this more 
stringent system of relief. When liability for compensation is not linked to 
negligence of the party in breach then the entire risk for damages inherent 
in contract violation rests with the party in breach, al though only to the 
extent that was possible to predict at the time of enter ing the contract. 
Commentaries all emphasize the close connection of the concepts of non-
negligence based liability and liability limited to foreseeable damages. 
These two principles provide the fundamental pillars of the liability 
system of the Vienna Convention. The basic idea behind this system of 
liability is that a contract performs its funct ion of interest protection if the 
consequences of a possible breach do not thesubjective culpability of the 
party in breach, butthe risk he takes on is limited to that which he could 
clearly judge and knowingly take on at the time of entering into contract.48 
It is important to repeat: the foreseeability doctrine is given a primary role 
particularly in cases where there is a system of relief less forgiving than the 
requirement of non-negligence. Finally, it is also worth noting that contributing 
to the internal balance of the system of damage liability found in the Vienna 
Convention is another rule according to which awards of compensation 
are not limited to cases of "fundamental breachof contract" (Article 25) . 
2. As we briefly showed earlier the foreseeability doctrine was ful ly 
developed in English and American judicial practice. It is important to 
observe however that there are differences between the contemplation rule 
found in English common law and the foreseeability doctrine found in the 
ienna Convention, just as Article 74 of the Vienna Convention deviates 
from Article 1150 of the Code civil. 
a) Of these differences we need to emphasise the notion that, at least 
as a starting reference, common law treats as the upper limit of awardable 
compensation those damages that could be contemplated by both parties.46  
46 In contrast, the Vienna Convention, similarly to Article 1150 of the 
45
 Same v iew by Rabel as wel l : Das Recht des Warenkaufs, op. cit. 495. 
4 ( ,The Hadley v. Baxendale decision s ta tes this point exp l ic i t ly : "contempla t ion 
of both par t ies" : (1854) 9 Exch 341, 354. 
160 LAJOS VÉKÁS 
Code civil,47 limits liability to only those damages that could be predicted 
48 
by the party i.b. It is to be noted that more recent English decisions, 
although still always referr ing to Hcidtey v. Ba.xendcile, essentially focus 
on examining foreseeability only on the side of the party i.b.4' Despite 
some uncertainty a similar tendency can be observed in American judicial 
practice as well7 and the UCC specifically provides this very rule, which 
we even quoted earlier. 
Even as a general att i tude common law tends not to subject to 
compensation damages that could not be forecast with good probability at 
the time of contracting. Th i s exclusion applies not only in the case of tort 
damages, but also in judging contractual damages.51 The Vienna Convention 
is clear: it is sufficient enough reason if the breaching party could calculate 
the damage as the "possible consequence" of his breach. The "possible" 
nature of the resulting damage is not a strict prerequisite requirement. We 
can support the position that the "possible" nature of the occurrence of 
damage is to be judged on a case by case basis and it cannot be fixed in a 
general manner as with the use of a predetermined percentage.5" 
b) According to actively held belief the foreseeability doctrine of the 
Vienna Convention is to be applied in cases of negligence and even in 
cases of intentional breach of contract. In this regard the Vienna Convention 
deliberately diverges f rom the "source ru le" of Article 1 150 of the Code 
civil which, as we pointed to before, excludes the use of the foreseeability 
doctrine in the case of intentional breach of contract. W e should mention, 
however, that an opinion exists according to which the principles and 
general spirit of the Vienna Convention suggest we consider not using the 
4
 Mazeaud , H .—Mazeaud , L .—Mazeaud, J .—Chabas , F.: Trai té théorique et 
pratique de la responsabil i té c ivi l délictuelle et contractuel le . N o . ' s 2 3 8 1 - 2 3 8 2 . ; 
Viney: La responsabilité: effets, op. cit. 323. 
Stoll, in: Schlechtriem (Hrsg. ) : Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht 
(CISG) op. cit.; Magnus: W i e n e r UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), in: Staudingers Kommentar 
zum BGB. Ar t . 74, Rn. 31. 
49 
Most expl ic i t ly in the Cza rn ikow Ltd. v. Koufos (The H e r o n II) case: [1966] 2 
Q.B. 695, 7 3 0 (C.A.) 
5 0 Redgrave v. Boston S y m p h o n y Orchestra , Inc.: 602 F. S u p p . 1189, 1212 (D. 
Mass. 1985), 8 5 5 F. 2d 888 (1s t Cir . 1988), 4 8 8 U. S. 1043 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
51
 See f o r example the d e c i s i o n of the H o u s e of Lords in The Heron II case : 
[1969] 1 A.L. 350; similarly to Restatement of Cont rac t s 2d, § 3 5 1 . 
5
" Same w a y Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens. 33. et. seq. 331. 
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liability limiting tool of the foreseeability doctrine in cases of intentional 
breach.53 
3. According to the Vienna Convention foreseeability is an express and 
exclusive requirement related only to the contracting party 's possible 
damage and its size. Consequently, this requirement does not link the act 
of breach itself or its possibility with the causal relationship, because such 
an expansion of foreseeability would influence not only the size of the 
damage to be compensated but also the basis of liability. Furthermore, this 
would introduce into the required conditions of liability a new element of 
culpability not known in the Vienna Convention.54 
In the case of defective performanceof the contract it is particularly 
important to limit the requirement of foreseeability to the damage itself, 
because in these cases the application of the foreseeability doctrine is not 
very appropriate and indeed often impossible.55 Damage caused by a 
hidden fault is obviously not something the obligor could be aware of at 
the time of entering the contract or even during its execution, though he must 
carry the responsibility for it regardless.56 Most likely this is the reason 
why, as we mentioned before, the UCC treats this kind of damage case 
differently.57 
In the context of defective performanceof the contract with regard to 
the so called consequential damages, it is not possible to mitigate liability 
of the party i.b. on the basis that he did not foresee the damages or that it 
was under no obligation to predict them as these damages had to be taken 
53
 Enderlein, F .—Maskow, D.—Strohbach, H.: Internationales Kaufrecht. Berlin, 
1991, Art. 74., Anm. 8. Later we mention the European Principles (Article 9. 503.) which 
also does not limit responsibi l i ty to on ly those damages that were not fo reseeab le in 
cases of intentional or gross ly negligent behavior resul t ing in damage. 
54
 For the uni form op in ions in legal l i terature see Stol l : in: Schlechtr iem (Hrsg.): 
Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG) 715. wi th footnote N o . 152. 
55
 Compare with Hellner: The Limits of Contractual Damages in the Scandinavian 
Law of Sales, op. cit. 75 . ; Dö l l e—Wei tnaue r : Einheitskaufrecht, op. cit. 5 4 6 . et. seq. 
76
 Consequent ly the decision reached in LG Duisburg v. 16. 7. 1976 is erroneous 
brought (still) under the Hague Sales Law. Compare Stol l : in: Schlechtr iem (Hrsg.): 
Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). 7 1 6 . with in f o o t n o t e No. 153. 
It shou ld be ment ioned however that even von Caemmerer would make the seller 
l iable fo r faulty pe r fo rmance (given that he is not ope ra t i ng an es tabl ished business) 
only if he ought to have recognized the problem ahead of time, von Caemmerer : 
Probleme des Haager einheitlichen Kaufrechts. AcP 1978. 121-149. (149 . ) 
57
 U C C § 2-715(2)(b) , compare wi th Schwenzer: Freizeichnung des Verkäufers 
von der Sachmängelhaftung im amerikanischen und deutschen Recht, op. cit.. 
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into account by the party i.b. under all circumstances. Consequently, in 
these cases liability for compensation can generally only be mitigated 
based on a circumstance where the injured party is at fault for the damage, 
fo r example as in the case of improper use of a product conflicting with 
58 
guidelines established by the maker . We note here that the obligeeis of 
course obliged even under the foreseeability doctrine to prevent or 
damagesdamage.5 9 
At the same time we can observe in legal literature a clear tendency to 
expand the interpretation of the foreseeability doctrine to include possibly 
all damages in all breach of contract cases. According to this view the 
foreseeability doctr ine should be interpreted in a way that the party i.b. is 
to be liable for even those damages that a logically reasoning person in his 
posit ion ought to have calculated with. This interpretation would also give 
the judge deliberation power over the issue of logical distribution of damages 
or risk of damage between the contracting parties.6 0 This interpretation in 
and of itself is acceptable because it can be deducted from the expression 
„ought to have foreseen". However , even this way of interpreting Article 
74 of the Vienna Convention gives no particular help in evaluating the 
scope of the e f fec t s of defective performance. Therefore, with regard to 
this problem,61 that opinion appears more convincing which challenges the 
„omnipotent" nature of the foreseeability doctrine. Instead of the „normative" 
concept of the foreseeabili ty doct r ine recommended by Stoll it is indeed 
more realistic in the case of d .p. to disregard the foreseeability doctrine 
which is a frequently inadequate requirement in this area. Instead, if the 
particular case calls for it, it is bet ter to limit the liability of the breaching 
party for reasons of the injured party itself being at fault. 
58
 Magnus: W i e n e r UN-Kaufrech t (CISG), in: S taud ingers K o m m e n t a r zum BGB. 
Ar t . 74, Rn. 4 6 - 4 7 . Magnus neve r the l e s s sees a role f o r the foreseeabi l i ty doctrine in 
de t e rmin ing the d e g r e e of likeliness of an existing d a m a g e : ibid. 46. 
59 
Same Hellner: The Limits of Cont rac tua l D a m a g e s in the Scand inav ian Law of 
Sa l e s , op. cit. 78. 
60 
This view is foremost represented in Stoll: in: Schlechtriem (Hrsg.): Kommentar 
zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). op. cit. 716 . with f o o t n o t e No. 154.; 
Schlecht r iem: Internationales UN-Kaufrecht. Tt ibingen, 1996, 169. et. seq., 171. et. 
seq.; Magnus; W i e n e r UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), in: Staudingers Kommentar zum BGB. 
Art . 74, Rn. 35. 
61
 Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens... op. cit. 34. et. seq., 273. et. seq., 
3 3 1 . et. seq. 
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We note here that in charging the injurious party only those mitigating 
circumstances are allowed that were actually known to him, but not those 
that he ought to have known.6" 
4. Taking into account that the foreseeability standard of the Vienna 
Convention fixes the distribution of risk between the contracting parties to 
the time of contracting it is commonly held that the breaching party is not 
liable for damages that become apparent af ter the time of contracting 
(even if the time of appearance is prior to the breach).63 This view may 
present legitimate questions with regard to effective prevention of loss as 
was pointed out in comparing the solutions found in the BGB and the Vienna 
Convention. Perhaps this recognition is the root of those more recent 
American decisions that are beginning to treat as foreseeable damages 
those damages that become apparent from post-contracting disclosure of 
imminent risk of damage.64 
As far as the discernability of damage itself is concerned we should 
underline the following based on commentary found in the literature:65 on 
the one hand, it is not sufficient proof of existing liability for damages of 
6
" Same way Faust : ibid. 269., 307 . et. seq. 
63
 Knapp: in: Bianca-Bonell: Commentary on the International Sales Law. op. cit. 
542. ; Magnus: Wiene r UN-Kauf rech t (CISG), in: Staudingers K o m m e n t a r zum B G B . 
Art. 74, Rn. 38.; Stol l : in: Mádl -Vékás : International Private Law and Law of Inter-
national Economic Relations. 717. 
64
 See Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens decisions analyzed on 114. et. 
seq.; compare with Eisenberg: The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale. Ca l . L. R. 1992, 
5 6 3 - 6 1 3 . Eisenberg summarizes his opinion as fo l lows (599. et. seq.): „Finally, 
reasonable foreseeabil i ty should be determined as of the time of breach, so the in 
deciding whether to breach the seller must sweep into its calculus all the costs that it 
should reasonably foresee will be incurred by the buyer as a result of breach. 
Application of the foreseeability s tandard at the t ime of breach, ra ther than at the t ime 
the contact is made, gives precedence to the rate of efficient breach over the rate of 
precaution. However , it is inescapable in this context that one of these rates mus t 
dominate the other. It is preferable to give precedence to efficient b reach , because in 
practice the rate of precaution is l ikely to depend on contractual a l locat ions of loss and 
precontract j udgmen t s based on probabili ty, rather than on in format ion communicated 
at the time of contracting. Moreover, contracting part ies should not be encouraged to 
make decisions on breach that fai l to sweep into their calculus all costs that are 
reasonably foreseeable at the time the decision is made . " 
ft5
 Knapp, in: Bianca-Bonel l : Commentary on the International Sales Law. op. cit. 
541.; Stoll: in: Schlechtriem (Hrsg.): Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht 
(CISG). 717. ; Faust : Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 238 . et. seq. 
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the party i.b. that he was aware of the nature of the impending damage (as 
in the possibility of lost profit) at the time of contracting. On the other 
hand, it is not an additional requirement of f inding of liability that the 
party i.b. know the actual monetary valueof the damage at the time of 
contracting.6 '1 Liability is defined by the scope of the knowledge the party 
i.b. possessed or ought to have possessed about the nature and potential 
magnitude of the damage at the t ime of contracting. This is how the 
purpose of the norm can be achieved which is the pre-contracting ability 
to assess and plan for risk to be assumed. For example, if the breaching 
seller was aware at the time of contracting that the buyer was getting the 
contractual goods for resale, but the buyer did not disclose the actual 
amount of profit he expected to gain by his personal speculation, then the 
seller is responsible fo r lost profit only to the extent that general market 
conditions would imply, but he does not have to pay for any additional 
lost profit even if it could actually be proven by the buyer to have been 
achievable based on his speculation in the particular case. Of this 
speculative profit the seller did not know or had to have known at the time 
of contracting.67 
5. The foreseeability doctrine has considerably different significance 
in various kinds of breaches and damages. This was pointed out on several 
occasions earlier, it seems practical, however, to summarize. 
a) In the case of non-performance delayed performance turning into 
impossibility of performance the party i.b. must always consider as a possible 
loss the price of the goods on open market and administrative costs/overhead. 
This is so even when the market price of goods under contract is significantly 
higher at the time of covering purchase than it was at the time of contracting. 
According to common understanding the usual fluctuation of market prices 
is part of the risk of doing business and the would-be violator assumes the 
resulting liability by entering intocontract.68 The same conclusion can be 
drawn f r o m the interpretation of Art icle 74 as well . Damages resulting 
from the fluctuation of market prices must be categorized as those 
66
 Same view by Rabel as well: Das Recht des Warenkaufs, op. cit. 509. 
Stoll's example: in: Schlechtr iem (Hrsg . ) : Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-
Kauf recht (CISG). 717. 
68
 The situation isn' t as straightforward in the case of loss the entitled su f fe r s as a 
result of late payment and subsequent fore ign currency exchange where the transaction 
is completed at a conversion rate that had changed in an unfavorable direction when 
viewed f r o m the enti t led's perspective. C o m p a r e with Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des 
Schadens, op. cit. 21. et. seq. 
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consequences of breach that had to be foreseen at the time of contracting. 
Naturally, in this case as well (as usual69) the injured is expected to 
mitigatedamages just the same in accordance with Article 77.™ 
There is a similar situation when the obligeehas to take out a loan in 
order to balance the consequences of the breach. Interest on such a loan is 
to be paid by the party i.b. and related expenses incurred as the result of any 
appropriate action taken to prevent or mitigate damages (such as freight 
forwarding, warehousing, inspection, etc.) must also be covered. The solution 
is the same with regard to other costs and related expenses resulting f rom 
the repairing of the damage. 
We can say generally that the necessary cost and expense of averting 
the breach itself (as a form of damage) is the responsibility of the 
breaching party and the foreseeability doctrine has no bearing on this 
matter. This appears to be the correct view, although Articles 75 and 76 of 
the Vienna Convention contain a reference to Article 74 when regulating 
elimination of loss in covering sales and purchases as well as short sales. 
This legislative solutioncould theoretically mean that the foreseeability 
doctrine (as in the second sentence of Article 74) is in effect in this case 
as well. However, based on consensus on this matter the application of the 
foreseeability doctrine is correctly ruled out. Grammatical analysis in and 
of itself points in this direction: both Articles 75 and 76 talk about "other 
damages" established by Article 74 to be compensated, in this way 
automatically ruling out the foreseeability doctrine going into effect with 
regard to these damages. This view is further supported by arguments based 
71 
on legislative history, and on the system and the purposes of the 
Convention.72 
We have already pointed out that the foreseeability doctrine cannot be 
adequately utilized in the case of so called consequentialdamages that is in 
the case of reparations for defectiveperformance by way of compensation. 
b) As it is already clear from the preceding discussion, the true target 
of influence for the foreseeability doctrine is the issue of compensation 
for consequential damages and above all for unrealized profit in cases of 
69 Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 297. et. seq. 
" Magnus: Wiener UN-Kauf rech t (CISG), in: Staudingers Kommentar zum B G B . 
op. cit. Art . 74. , Rn. 4 0 - 4 1 . 
71
 S to ib in: Schlechtr iem (Hrsg.): Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht 
(CISG). op. cit. 718., f oo tno te No. 166. 
7
~ Faust : Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 26. et. seq., 329. 
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73 breach of contract. These damages are namely of ten connected to 
circumstances that are not known to the breaching party and could not 
have been known without the disclosure of theobligee. Consequently, in 
order for the affected contracting party to be able to measure the risk and 
the cost of i ts coverage and based on these have the ability to make an 
informed decision about whether to contract at all, or about counter-
performance and possible limiting of liability, he must be informed about 
the risks related to unrealized profit and consequential damages at the 
time of contracting. Or if such notice cannot be given because even the other 
party has no information on consequential damages that may result f rom a 
possible breach, or perhaps the party in possession of such information 
has overriding interests that run counter to sharing details of his trade 
secrets, for example, in order to protect his market position or business 
strategy then the breaching party is exempted, based on the foreseeability 
doctrine, f rom liability for compensation of those damages that he did not 
know or had to have known at the time of contracting. 
According to common understanding the party i.b. is only liable to 
compensate the obligeefor expected but unrealized profi t from planned 
resale if the intent of resale was know to him at the time of contracting. If 
the buyer is a merchantand the subject of the contract is commercial goods 
then the obl igor must, even without any pertinent additional notice, 
calculate with resale and its resulting benefi ts that in the case of breach 
manifest themselves as unrealized profit.74 Similarly, if the buyer of real 
estate is a f i r m engaged in the business of trading or leasing real estate, 
the seller must calculate with profit f rom resale as unrealized profit if the 
contract is breached. Also similar is the case when at the time of contracting 
it is known to a transportation outfit that the raw materials they are 
contracted to deliver are intended for processing in the client 's plant and 
there is an intent of eventual sale of the f inished product. 
In the s ame category we find the example of such cases where the 
breach forces the obligee's plant to temporarily suspend operation which 
causes a realistically expected profit not to materialize.75 On the contrary, 
73
 The same conclusions w e r e reached by Hellner's comparat ive law analyses as 
well: The Limi ts of Contractual Damages in the Scandinavian Law of Sales, op. cit. 78. 
4Rabel: Das Recht des Warenkaufs, op. cit. 509. A similar ly principled court 
decision is quo ted from the application of the Vienna Convention Stoll: in: Schlechtr iem 
(Hrsg.): Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). op. cit. 718., with foo tno tes 
No. 168-169. 
75
 Same w a y Magnus: W i e n e r UN-Kauf rech t (CISG), in: S taudingers K o m m e n t a r 
zum BGB. op. cit. Art. 74, Rn. 40 . 
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there are opinions in the literature that hold the party i.b. responsible for 
such a loss only if explicit prior notice was given of the danger of a possible 
temporary shutdown of operations. The rationale behind this train of thought 
is that in the absence of such warning the breaching party can assume that 
theo., being a professional practitioner of his trade or business, is himself 
prepared for just such an eventuality, possessing tools to avert loss, for 
example by stockpiling surplus inventory of spare parts, etc.76 
c) Similarly to unrealized profit, the foreseeability doctrine provides a 
guideline for those cases as well where the entitled suffers a loss due to the 
circumstance whereby the breach of his contracting partner prevents him 
from performing another contract with a third party, and he therefore becomes 
liable for compensation or other reparation (for example, obligations under 
a warranty) to the third party. If o.is a business person, obligor must 
without any express warning consider this consequence and therefore 
77 
must be responsible for this kind of loss. However, if the o.has taken on 
commitments toward the third party outside of or surpassing what is 
legally sanctioned (special guarantee or higher than industry-standard penalty 
for non-performance, etc.) he may transfer liability for the consequences 
of such commitments to the party i.b. only if he informed the would-be 
breaching party of the possibility of such damages occurring at the time of 
contracting or if the contracting party had to have independently known of 
these extra commitments.78 
d) The literature generally shows an even stricter standard when 
providing guidelines for the transfer of liability where harm to the entitled's 
goodwill is at stake as the consequence of breach (as in defective performance 
where the damage may take the form of loss of clientele. Even such an 
opinion exists that the o.may only enforce claims of such damages against 
the breaching party if at the time of contracting he gave express notice of 
76
 Schlechtr iem: Internationales UN-Kaufrecht. op. cit. 171. It is interest ing to 
obse rve that the j u d g e s reached a s imilar position in Hadley v. Baxendale as well. 
T h e loss at issue is seen even more f i rmly, as a mat ter of general pr inciple , by von 
Caemmerer as the liability of the ent i t led: von Caemmere r : Probleme des Haager 
einheitlichen Kaufrechts, op. cit. 147. 
77
 A similar court decision f rom the practical application of the Vienna Convent ion: 
M a g n u s : Wiener UN-Kauf rech t (CISG) , in: S taudingers Kommentar zum BGB, Art. 
74 , Rn. 45.; Stoll : in: Schlecht r iem (Hrsg.): Kommentar zum einheitlichen (JN-
Kaufrecht (CISG). op. cit. 719., f o o t n o t e No. 172. 
78
 Same way Stol l : ibid. 719. with footnote No. 173. 
168 LAJOS VÉKÁS 
such possible damage.7" A case adjudicated based on the Hague Sales 
Convention by the German Bundesgerichtshof found loss of goodwill and 
foreseeability of loss of business on the grounds of a trade usagefound in 
the particular business sector involved.80 
e) We should mention here that with the evolution of product liability 
laws a significant portion of consequential damages resulting from 
defective.perf.is governed by separate rules.81' 8~ 
6. It is difficult to arrive at a conclusive position on the allocation of 
burden of proof linked to issues of foreseeability. 
83 
a) There are various conflicting positions in English legal practice. " 
Nevertheless, according to a majority or perhaps even prevailing attitude 
84 
the burden of proof rests with the adversely effected party. It is his 
responsibility to prove that the loss at hand could be or at least ought to 
have been foreseen by the breaching party. A similar attitude is reflected 
85 
in American decisions as well. 
79 
Same Magnus: Wiene r UN-Kauf rech t (CISG), in: Staudingers K o m m e n t a r zum 
B G B , Art. 74, Rn. 50 . ; Stoll: in: Sch lech t r iem (Hrsg.): Kommentar zum einheitlichen 
UN-Kaufrecht (CISG). op. cit. 719. ( fo r d i f fe r ing v iews see: same place foo tnote No. 
175.) . 
80
 BGH 24.10.1979, quoted by Faus t : Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 
21. wi th footnote No. 94. 
81
 In Hungarian L a w the rules of Law No. 10 of 1993, which need to be ful ly 
in tegra ted into the C o d e during the r e f o r m process of the C.C.. 
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However, in French literature the opposite can be observed. Majority 
opinion puts the burden of proof on the party i.b., that is in order to be 
granted relief it is the breaching party whois asked to prove that the given 
loss could not be foreseen or that he ought not have been expected to 
foresee it.86 However, we should note that possibly among the reasons for 
this thinking are considerations of procedural law. 
In short, we can say that there is no consensus among those legal 
systems that serve as a foundation for the Vienna Convention in the matter 
of allocating burden of proof of foreseeability. Considering, however, the 
larger practical scope of the English and American cases it is more 
prevalent that the adversely affected party is actually charged with the 
task of proving foreseeability. 
b) Wiews reflected in literature dealing with Article 74 of the Vienna 
Convention are also remarkably split when it comes to the issue of 
allocating proof. 
Some simply reasonfrom the position that the foreseeability rule is a 
norm that is specific to the general rule of full compensation (1st and 2nd 
sentence of Article 74) and, consequently, burden of proof rests with the 
breaching party causing the damage. This view incorporates the under-
standing that preconditions of liability for damages (breach of contract, 
chain of causation, damage and its size) must be proven by the injured 
party, while the lack of foreseeability as grounds for partial relief must be 
shown by the injurious party.88 Magnus corrects this view in that he 
suggests the injured party must prove that the breaching party knew the 
relevant circumstances, especially those contributing to elevated levels of 
89 
risk, or at least had to have known them. 
^ L a l o u , H.—Azard, P.: Traité pratique de la responsabilité civile. Paris , 19626, 
item No . 495. ; le Tourneau , Ph.: La responsabilité civile. Par i s , 19823, item No . 246. 
Chart ier as a general rule a lso places the burden of proof with the injur ious par ty , but 
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damages, he holds the opposite view; according to him the assumption can be effectively 
chal lenged that the given damage was not fo reseeab le : Char t i e r , Y.: La réparation du 
préjudice dans la responsabilité civile. Par is , 1983. 
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170 LAJOS VÉKÁS 
The contrasting position considers the foreseeability doctrine itself to 
be part of the foundation of liability and therefore puts the related burden 
of proof on the injured party. According to the authors referred to earlier 
this solution is supported by the central thesis of the foreseeability 
doctrine: at the time of enter ing into contract the future breaching party 
had to know the resulting risk. So a position that would stipulate that the 
breaching party calculated with (or at least ought to have calculated 
with) all of the proven damage at the time the contract was concludedwould 
be at odds with this correct legal policy foundation at the heart of 
foreseeability. To the contrary, the party i.b. mayonly be held responsible 
fo r covering those risks of damage that he was proven by the injured party 
to have taken on as contractual obligations. This view therefore does not 
consider the foreseeability doctrine to be a rule of exception, rather it is 
understood to be part of the general rules of conditions of liability, in a 
sense equating foreseeability with the concepts themselves of breach, 
damage and the link of causality between the two.40 We consider this 
latter position to be correct, especially considering that the achievement 
of the purpose of the foreseeability doctrine necessitates this solution 
because in order for the fu ture breaching party to be able to make well 
founded and calculated decisions about taking on risk at the time of 
contracting, the future injured party must provide facts that create the 
condition for him to be in an appropriately informed state. Essentially, the 
future injured party has to be charged with providing the conditions, by 
way of adequate dissemination of information, for his contractual partner 
to be able to make decisions in the matter of taking on risk and calculating 
pricing accordingly, based on the largest possible degree of familiarity 
with the probability of risk of damage.7. Article 74 of the Vienna Convention 
is yet to produce signs of significant application in judicial practice. Even 
commentaries use cases connected to the Hague Convention on Sales for 
illustration. Nevertheless, we see a fundamentally well formed doctrine in 
foreseeability, reflected in the fact that this principle's essence is echoed 
by recent model laws. 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994)" 
determines the breaching party's liability for damages independently offault 
90
 Stoll: in: Schlechtr iem (Hrsg . ) : Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht 
(CISG). op. cit. 721 . ; Faust: Die Vorhersehbarkeit des Schadens, op. cit. 324. et. 
seq., 333., cer ta in irrelevant res t r ic t ions : 325., 326. et. seq. 
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 Among o t h e r s the text is pub l i shed in Eu. J. Law Reform, I ssue No. 1998/99.: 
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and excuses him f rom liability only on the basis of an impediment beyond 
his control such asvis maior.92 Article 7.4.4 states: „The non-performing 
party is liable only for harm which it foresaw or could reasonably have 
foreseen at the t ime of the conclusion of contract as being likely to result 
93 
f rom its non-performance". The meaning of this rule coincides with that 
of the norm found in Article 74 of the Vienna Convention, and it differs 
only in its phrasing slightly. Such a difference exists between „could 
reasonably have foreseen" versus „ought to have foreseen" and „as being 
likely to result f r o m " instead of „as a possible consequence". We should 
remark that in the system of UNIDROIT Principles the concept of „non-
94 
performance" universally applies to all forms of contract. 
I believe that in comparing the norm of the UNIDROIT Principles with 
Article 74 of the Vienna Convention the former leaves less of a doubt that 
the foreseeability doctrine belongs to the definition of damage as a 
precondition of liability of the party i.b. (Articles 7.4.2 and 7.4.3), there-
fore the burden of its proof rests with the injured party. 
b) The Principles of European Contract Law (1997) also finds liability 
of the non-performing party independently of fault95 and the foreseeability 
doctrine is used here to supplement this principle (Article 9.503).96 This 
solution differs f rom the norms established in the UNIDROIT Principles 
93
 Article 7 .17. , Force Majeure: Non-pe r fo rmance by a party is excused if that 
par ty proves that the non-per fo rmance was due to on impediment beyond its control 
and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into 
accoun t at the t ime of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome 
it or its consequences 
93
 The non-pe r fo rming party is l iable only f o r harm which it fo resaw or could 
r easonab ly have f o r e s e e n at the t ime of the conc lus ion of contract as being likely to 
resul t f r om its non-per fo rmance . 
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 Article 7 .1 .1 . : Non-pe r fo rmance is fai lure by a party to pe r fo rm any of its 
ob l iga t ions under the contract, inc lud ing defect ive pe r fo rmance or late pe r fo rmance . 
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 The rule matches the norm found in the above mentioned UNIDROIT pr inciples 
a lmos t word for w o r d . The only dev ia t ion is found in the case of damage caused by 
in ten t iona l or g ross ly negligent non-per fo rmance wh ich is excluded f rom the sphere 
of appl icat ion of the foreseeabil i ty c lause : „The non-pe r fo rming party is l iable only 
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in two ways. The European Principles [article 9.501 paragraph (2) b)], as 
a matter of course, orders compensation of only that future loss „which is 
reasonably likely to occur". At the same time, showing similarities with 
Article 1150 of the Code civil, it does not limit liability for damages via 
the foreseeability doctrine in cases of intentional or grossly negligent non-
performance. This latter solution, in our opinion, is not in satisfactory 
harmony with a system of liability independent of fault and is also at odds 
with the foreseeability doctrine which builds on considerations of distribution 
of risk along the principles of a free market, not to mention the complexity of 
burden of proof. 
Conclusion and proposal de lege ferenda 
1. Particularly In a system of strict contractual liability that is independent 
of fault, the inclusion of an appropriate mechanism for limiting compensation 
is an absolute necessity. Among the known dogmatic resolutions leading 
to distribution of loss the foreseeability principle appears to be the most 
appropriate one to fulfill this role. 
The foreseeability doctrine can be considered a proven tool of law in the 
distribution of market related or other contractual risk among contracting 
parties. It incites the o.to appropriately inform the obliged at the time of the 
conclusion of contract of the expected consequential damages resulting in 
the eventuality of breach, especially regarding the valueof the lucrum 
cessans and of the possible consequentialdamages. Knowing the risk of 
these damages is a condition of the obliged making an informed decision 
about whether to conclude the contract and under what conditions of 
counter-performance, possible limitation of liability, etc. Risk of damage 
that is unusually high because it significantly surpasses that which could 
be calculated as the normal consequence of the given contract can be 
known by the obligor only based on disclosure by theo. 
b) By the same token, the foreseeability doctrine is a rather flexible 
tool in the hands of the judge in the distribution of loss caused by non-
performance among the parties, above all loss of expected profit and 
consequential damages. The foreseeability doctrine defines the conditions 
of distribution of loss more precisely than a statutory enpowermentto 
97 
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reduction of damages based on the equity principle [for example C.C. 339. 
§ paragraph (2)]. Moreover, particularly considering conclusions arrived 
at previously, it is a better fi t for the att i tude of contract law, market 
considerations, and business rationale. 
2. A separate examination is required whether the foreseeability doctrine 
could be applied similarly in the case of tort damages. Naturally, in these 
cases issues mentioned under paragraph 1) have no relevance. Based on 
his analysis of German legal literature Tercsák finds the application of the 
foreseeability principle in limiting liability for damages in tort cases 
98 
„rather confusing". It is of note, however, that judicial practice of common 
law applies the foreseeability doctrine even in tort cases rather effectively 
and a rule of the BGB [254. § paragraph (2)] that shares a common 
purpose with the foreseeability doctrine is itself not limited to contractual 
matters. In his study written for the Concept of the New (Hungarian) Civil 
Code Lábady suggests the introduction of the foreseeability doctrine in 
adjudicating matters of unrealized profit even in tort c a s e s . " 
3. Considering the above it appears advisable that, with the ongoing 
reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, the system of liability for contractual 
damages (besides the relief power being converted from a discretionary to 
a more objective one) be amended, above all, by the foreseeability doctrine 
that provides a foundation for limiting liability for damages. The norm found 
in the second sentence of Article 74 of the Vienna Convention could serve 
as a guide for this purpose in the new (Hungarian) Civil Code. 
a) The foreseeability doctr ine would theoretically apply to all cases of 
damage caused by non-performance, i.e. it could be structured accordingly, 
without relevant limitations. Both the experience built by foreign legal 
practice and views reflected in the literature seem to point uniformly to 
the understanding that the foreseeability doctrine will play a significant 
practical role primarily in the adjudication of matters of unrealized profit 
and consequential damages. 
b) We ought to also consider, modeled af ter the UCC, that we exclude 
from the domain of the foreseeability doctrine those cases where the o.wishes 
that the party in breach should repair the defect in the performance itself 
98 
Tercsák: (Foreseeability as the boundary of compensation...) op. cit. 251. et. seq. 
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in the form of damages (and not as a warranty claim). This is so because, 
as we pointed out earlier, the foreseeability doctrine is not a good fit for 
this kind of damage. It is to be noted that this would turn out to be a rather 
limited problem if the new Civil Code, as it is suggested by the Concept, 
would allow the making of claims of these damages" at issue only during 
the period of implied warranty and not throughout the general limitation 
period. 
c) From the perspective of foreseeability the concept of relevant time 
is generally the time of conclusion of contract, or more precisely, the time 
when the obligor (the possible non-performer) makes a legal declarationt 
relevant f rom the perspective of the coming into existence ofthe contract. 
This is the time, namely, when the obliged can make contract forming 
decisions that are informed by knowledge of risk that correlates to his 
possible future liability. The relevant legal statement is typically the 
declaration of acceptance when the contract is actually concluded, but it 
could also be a declaration of offer. 
Moreover, it is also to be considered based on recent American judicial 
practice that the non-performing party be positively held liable for damages 
that become known up to the time of a grossly negligent or intentional-
breach. 
d) In the new Civil Code the uncertainty caused by the language of 
Article 74 of the Vienna Convention must be remedied so that it is clear 
that burden of proof related to the foreseeability doctrine rests on the 
injured party. 
e) Finally, we should calculate with the possibility that the norms 
established by rules of particular types of contractcreate an exception from 
the general rules of liability and reparation of damages resulting from 
breach of contract. In our case this would mean an exception to the rule of 
foreseeability.100 Such a solution can be found in the effective Code as 
well among the rules of specific kinds of deposit (Civil Code § 467-468 , § 
471), freight transportation (§ 500 and following), donations (§ 581). 
100
 Same way Hellner: The Limits of Contractual Damages in the Scand inav ian 
Law of Sales , op. cit. 79. 
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Abstract. In 1998 the government of the Hungarian Republic decided that a new Civil 
Code is to be drafted. In 2000 the Main Committee of Codification issued guidelines for the 
new Civil Code, determining, among others, that the new Code is to be cast into separate 
books, after the model of the Dutch Civil Code, and that one of these separate books is to 
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From the beginnings of the travaux préparatoires of the f irs t Hungarian 
Civil Code, Gyula Eörsi was an influential personality who left his distinctive 
mark on both the process, which began in 1953, and the final outcome, which 
was enacted in 1959 and became virtually the first legislative enactment on 
civil law to be made in Hungary. Obviously, the value of his contribution 
to its codification is not lessened by the fact that nearly 40 years after the 
Code had entered into force the changes in socio-economic relations which 
determined its substance at the time of its adoption and, in particular, the 
profound transformations that had taken place over the past ten years, 
gave rise, in 1998, to a need for elaborating a new Civil Code. 
Clearly, the new Code is not intended to decry the merits of the old one 
of 1959, which was drafted with the effective involvement of Gyula Eörsi, 
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accomplishments which are still adequate to serve the needs of present-day 
socio-economic relations. It is intended not only to replace the rules that, in 
terms of either approach or substance, no longer serve, or serve inadequately, 
the said pattern of relations, or to be better adapted to the law of the 
European Union, but also to extend its scope of coverage, incorporating 
fields of law which did not come under the aegis of the Civil Code of 1959. 
This concept led, firstly, to a statement of policy, according to which 
the Civil Code should follow the so-called monist principle by embracing 
the traditional commercial law, also called "private commercial" law, and, 
secondly, with the ruling of the Main Committee of Codification dated 1 
June 2000, to the decision, inter alia, that family law should l ikewise be 
part of the Civil Code, even if as a separate book. This was in contrast to 
the family-law legislation and legal practice as well as the view advocated 
or at least prevalent even in jurisprudence over the past 50 years since the 
adoption of the Family Act in 1952, which have treated family law as an 
independent branch of law. ' 
At the present stage of codification it will be noted, if only for the sake 
of completeness, that the two studies commissioned by the Ministry of 
Justice similarly stated the case for a separate codification of fami ly law 
rather than for its coverage by the Civil Code.2 What the Main Committee 
of Codification recognized was only the fact that family relations or family-
law relations differed f rom other civil-law relations in several aspects and 
that this point should be taken into account in the course of codification. 
Hence, in the new situation, it became the concern of codification to 
revise, on the one hand, the rules of family law—not necessarily those 
laid down in the Family Act only—in a context responsive to the need to 
bring those rules into closer harmony with the rules of the Civil Code 
where the specific features of family relations do not warrant deviation and, 
on the other, to consider, where appropriate, the peculiarities of familial 
relations and the principles which control them but diverge from civil-law 
requirements, which are basically tailored to economic conditions. Again, 
and this point is likewise worth making, the integration of family law into 
1
 See A Kodifikációs Főbizottság 2000. Június 1-i határozatai (1 J u n e 2000 
Decisions of the Main Commit tee on Codification), Polgári jogi kodifikáció (Codification 
of Civil Law) , No. 2 of Vol . II, 4. 
2
 Körös , A.: A Ptk. és a családjog kapcso la t a—a gyakor ló jogász s z e m é v e l (The 
Link between the Civil Code and Family Law, through the Eyes of a Legal Practitioner). 
Polgári jogi kodifikáció. No. 1 of Vol. I, 3 - 9 , and Weiss, E.: Az űj Polgári Törvény-
könyv és a csa ládjogi v i szonyok szabályozása (The New Civ i l Code and Regu la t ion 
of Family Law Relat ions) . Polgári jogi kodifikáció, No. 2 of Vol . II, 4 - 1 3 . 
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the Civil Code should prompt traditional civil law to take greater account, 
in some questions, of the interests of involved in the protection of the 
family than has been the case so far. 
There are two more aspects to which it is justif ied to call attention in 
connection with the integration of family law into the Civil Code. 
First, while in revising the material of civil law, looking as it does to 
economic life, the legislator will have to keep in mind approximation to the 
law of the European Union, and legislation on family law will have to be 
more responsive to the family-law provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, to the judicial practice followed in matters of family 
law by the Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg in pursuance of these 
provisions, and, among other international conventions, particularly to the 
United Nations Convention of 1989 on the Rights of the Child, for the 
added reason that members states are required to submit periodic reports 
on the application of this convention to the international forum of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
Second, while civil law or, more accurately, the law of property and 
the law of obligations as two principal areas thereof, should be open to 
economic policy and economic life in the first place, family law should be 
open to family policy and social policy, including children's rights, which 
equally affect family relations, and social rights. 
Moreover, the "private-law concept of the person", formed by Tamás 
Lábady as one to be retained in the codification of civil law, namely the 
"autonomous, sober-minded and risk-taking businessman who is bold enough 
to venture and has a sense of responsibility",' will not be, nor should 
necessarily be, a match for the concept of the person in family law relations. 
True, this concept of the person is not necessarily one either of all civil-
law relations or of civil-law property relations, especially if it is remembered 
that parties to civil-law relations may be infants incapable of action and 
even unborn children with retrospective effect in the case of live birth. 
We have chosen the following three topics to be discussed in the course of 
the codification of family law, notably the basic principles of family law, 
certain issues of matrimonial property law and matters concerning parental 
rights and duties and, related to them, the rights of children. 
Basic Principles of Family Law 
3
 Lábady , T.: A lko tmány jog i ha tások a készülő Ptk. szabályaira ( E f f e c t s of 
Const i tu t ional Law on the Rules of the Civi l Code under Preparat ion). Polgári jogi 
kodifikáció, No. 2 of Vol . II, 15-16. 
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The approach to the ongoing codification will recognize, where warranted, 
the raison d 'ê t re of formulating independent principles for the separate 
books of the Civil Code, including the book on family law. This calls for a 
review and a revision of the current principles of the Family Act and 
perhaps also just i f ies the proposal for reformulating them. At the same 
time, the codification is seeking to eliminate overlaps in, while giving 
more consolidated treatment of, the general principles of the Civil Code.4 
No doubt, this may also be true of the basic principles embodied in the 
preambular provisions of the book on family law. 
Some of the preambular provisions or, one might say, basic principles 
of our Family Act currently in force were taken directly from the Constitution, 
some others, were borrowed a little later f rom the Civil Code and were 
enunciated as basic principles also of the Family Act and, finally, the 
scope of its preambular provisions has recently been extended to include 
the requirement of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child to give absolute primacy to the interests of children. 
In the view of jurisprudence, moreover, the scope of the general principles 
of family law is not a closed one: some legal scholars consider it to be now 
wider, now narrower. Thus, for instance, there was a view, still repre-
sented during the 1960s and even in the early 1970s, which enumerated 
voluntary marriage, the f reedom of marriage and the f reedom to choose 
one ' s marital partner among the basic principles of family law.5 This may 
undoubtedly have been explained by the fact that these precepts had also 
been enunciated in Art. 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
in Art. 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
in Art. 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Still, in the 
context of our present-day conditions, we hold that application of these 
requirements can be ensured without formulating them as preambular 
principles of family law. Besides, among the constitutional principles, the 
principle of the separation of State and Church was likewise articulated in 
family law as a separate principle for a long time. This may likewise be 
dispensed with as such today.6 
4
 See Vékás, L.: in: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv koncepciója (The Concept of the 
N e w Civil Code) , 2001, kézirat (Manuscr ip t ) , 12. 
5
 For these views, with authors and sources indicated, see in: A családjogi törvény 
magyarázata (Commentar ies on the Family Act). Budapes t , 1988. Vol . I, 2 2 - 2 3 . 
6
 See A családjogi törvény magyarázata, op. cit., 1. е., in the p reced ing note. 
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Later, in the early 1980s, the question was raised whether the principle 
of equity should be accepted as a separate basic principle of family law.7 
This idea can be supposed to have emerged f rom a perhaps stronger than 
adequate endeavor of the legislators at the time of drafting the Civil Code 
to block the way to a judicial practice which admits considerations of 
equity, and the legislators continued judging such practice of "eroding" 
the law to be pernicious in later times. It was in opposition to that 
"retrenchment" that the need was expressed for a wider scope to be left 
for equity in judicial practice in consideration of the specific features of 
family relations.8 I believe that the requirement, formulated with effect 
even for the future, that both legislation and judicial practice concerning 
matters of family law should take into account the peculiarities of family 
relations will, in questions where appropriate, allow considerations of 
equity and that there is no need to formulate such a basic principle 
expressly among the family-law principles of the Civil Code now in the 
making. 
As regards now the basic principles of the Family Act currently in 
force, the integration of the family-law rules into the new Civil Code will 
naturally eliminate the need for the basic principles taken f rom the Civil 
Code to be enunciated as separate basic principles of family law. At the 
same time, it stands to reason that those preambular principles of the Civil 
Code which do not figure as such in our current Family Act—particularly 
good faith and fairness, which will in all certainty be retained by the new 
Civil Code as determinant principles underlying the exercise of rights in 
family law—will become general principles governing the exercise of rights 
in family law, as well.9 
It was as a result of the family law's being enunciated as a separate 
Act that the Amendments of 1986 to the Family Act took over from the 
7
 Csiky, O.: Csa lád jogunk f e j l ődésének újabb tendenciá i (New Tendenc ie s in the 
Deve lopment of our Family Law), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1980. 560. 
8
 Earlier Eörsi argued that the mere gap-filling role of equity itself was acceptable 
but wi th in rather na r row limits even in judicial prac t ice concerning f a m i l y law. As he 
wro te , care should be observed in i nvok ing equity a l so in family law because it may 
exer t a sapping and eroding effect e v e n there (Eörsi, Gy. : Megjegyzések a Legfelsőbb 
Bíróság Polgári Kollégiumának iránymutató döntéseire, 1965-1966 feb ruá r (Comments 
on the Authori tat ive Decisions of the Civil Division of the Supreme Cour t , February 
1 9 6 5 - 1 9 6 6 ) , Állam-és Jogtudomány, 1966. 260. 
9
 In the absence of a separate provis ion of law, Kőrös presents , r ightly in all 
certainty, this pr inciple as being a l ready one such, in: A családjog kézikönyve (Manual 
of Family Law). Budapest , 2000, Vol. 1.19. 
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Civil Code and incorporated the principle of the exercise of rights according 
to their designation—although reference to the related prohibition of the 
abuse of rights was only made in the ministerial exposé de motifs added to 
this statutory provision—and the principle of harmony between social and 
individual interests; the latter, however, was abolished in 1991 as a basic 
principle of the Civil Code. 
Of course, it becomes unnecessary to formulate these two requirements 
as separate basic principles of family law, but two of the pertinent topics 
may nevertheless deserve mention. 
First, as concerns the civil-law rules which prohibit any abuse of rights, 
neither legal practice nor jurisprudence is unanimous about the question 
whether the sanction set forth in Art. 5 (3) of the Civil Code—namely 
substitution of declarations at law or, more accurately, of declarations of 
consent for court judgements—is also applicable in family relations or 
this rule may not apply to the substitution of declarations at family law.10 
In my view, which I have set out on several occasions, the substitution of 
declarations at law for court judgements should not be recognized in the 
domain of family-law relations." With respect to several types of declaration 
at family law, the Family Act allows, without reference to an abuse of rights 
or even the intention to ascertain whether such abuse is the case, guardianship 
authorities to substitute their own declarations for declarations of consent 
thereof. In respect of consent by the blood parent to the adoption of his/her 
child, a question which has carried the greatest weight in past practice, it 
will obviously remain the appropriate solution to enumerate in the Code 
itself the certainly exceptional cases in which the consent of blood parents 
to adoption will not be required, again on grounds other than abuse of 
rights in the first place. 
Second, I would see merit in the idea of postulating harmony between 
family and individual interests rather than between social and individual 
interests, and this not merely on the plane of a requirement for the exercise of 
rights as presently prescribed for the accommodation of social and 
individual interests, but also at the level of legislation. 
As concerns the constitutional principles of family law, most of them 
are to be upheld in the future. 
10
 For a presentat ion of divergent v iews , see Kőrös: A Ptk. és a c s a l ád jog kapcso-
lata — a gyakorló j ogász szemével . Polgári jogi kodifikáció. op. cit. 6. 
" Thus , as early as in: A családjogi törvény magyarázata (Commentar ies on the 
Family Act), 1988. Vol . I, 33, and then: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv és a családjogi 
viszonyok szabályozása (The New Civil Code and Regula t ion of Family Rela t ions) , 8. 
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The constitutional principles to be upheld include that of the protection of 
marriage and the family (which conforms to Art . 15 of the Constitution), 
the equality of spouses in marriage and family life (which conforms to 
Art. 66 (1) of the Constitution spelling out the equality of men and women in 
several other respects and the application of related rules in the field of 
family law), the protection of the child and primary consideration for the 
interests of minors (which conform, on the one hand, to Art. 67 (1) of the 
Constitution and, on the other, to the broader defini t ion of these principles 
in the Preamble to and Art. 3 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child with respect to family relations.) 
The time is long gone when increased responsibility for the child and 
promotion of the education of youth—which are formulated by way of 
basic principles, as it were, in Art . 1 of the Family Act—were enumerated 
by jurisprudence among the general principles as ones which deserve 
special mention a long with other requirements of family law, even though 
they undoubtedly imply duties which fall, at least partly, within the domain 
of family law. 
Giving a separate formulation to the constitutional principles of family 
law in the preamble to the book of the Civil Code on family law is justified, 
apart from the importance of these principles, by the fact that, as against 
the opposite view embraced by jurisprudence, acceptance was gained, with 
regard to the general principles of the Civil Code, by the approach that the 
principles and the positive rules of the Constitution should exercise their 
hold over private-law relations and their subjects through the medium of 
12 
civil-law norms rather than by direct means. At the same time, the 
requirement as formulated in the concept of the Civil Code concerning the 
basic principles of civil law that those principles should not henceforth 
reappear in the rules of civil law cannot stand the test in the realm of 
family law. Both the requirement of the protection of the family and the 
principle of equality of spouses, and, in particular, the protection of the 
interests of the child are, where appropriate, repeatedly invoked in the current 
rules of the Family Act, and these norms must be adhered to in the future. 
Moreover, certain constitutional principles and precepts that are for-
mulated in general terms may call for further exposition and interpretation. 
We will mention but two examples at this point. 
Vékás, L.: in: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv koncepciója, op. cit. 4; for the 
oppos i te view, see L á b a d y , T.: Alkotmányjogi hatások a Ptk. szabályaira (Effects of 
Const i tu t ional Law on the Rules of the Civil Code). 13 et seq. 
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While, in respect of the principle of the protection of marriage and the 
family, what called for explanation earlier was the question of how the 
principle of the protection of marriage could be reconciled with the rather 
liberal rules of divorce law, today it is the principle of the protection of 
the family that calls for an answer to the question whether this principle 
should be limited to the traditional family based on blood relations or 
founded by adoption or should be extended to actual family relations. To 
the family lawyer, it has always been unambiguously clear that the family 
protected and contemplated by family law is not identical with the notion 
of the small or nuclear family as elaborated by sociology. With the present-
day pattern of family relations kept in mind, however, family relations 
increasingly mean actual family relations such as that between step-parent 
and step-child or foster parent and foster child. What is more, it is not 
exceptional today for the family lawyer to have to deal with confrontations 
between biological and birth parents. At any rate, it can be stated that the 
notion of family life protected by Art. 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights has increasingly been given an expansive interpretation by 
the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. 
With regard to the principle of equality of spouses it should be noted 
that such equality is expressly extended by Art. 5 of Additional Protocol 7 
to the European Convention on Human Rights to the period subsequent to 
the dissolution of marriage in respect of both the spouses and their children. 
There is no doubt, however, that to ensure the equality of spouses in that 
phase of family life is no easy task either for the legislator or for the 
courts and the custodianship authorities who have to decide and then to 
enforce the decisions in these questions. 
The protection of the interests of children presents a manifold challenge, 
and, obviously enough, only a part of those interests falls within the 
purview of family law. Yet, in regard to them, one may question whether 
there is a case for having some of the related principles and rules, which 
are explicitly treated as matters for family law in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as in the Hungarian Act on 
the Protection of Children, written into our family law as provisions or, 
where relevant, even as basis principles thereof. We will make but two 
special points on this score. 
One of the most important principles similarly relevant to regulation 
by family law concerns the requirement—absent from the current Family 
Act, but formulated in the Preamble to the aforesaid Convention—that the 
child should grow up in a family environment, and in a way spelled out in 
Art. 7 of the Convention, that is to say, that such environment should, where 
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possible, be his/her parental family, that the child should not be separated 
from his parents whenever possible or, more specifically, should only be 
separated when so required by his paramount interest (Art. 9, para. (1), of 
the Convention). The Hungarian Act on the Protection of Children extends 
this principle, and rightly so, to separation from other relatives, all the 
more so since Art. 8 of the Convention makes it a duty of the States 
parties to respect the right of the child to maintain his family relations. 
In this respect the Act on the Protection of Children recognizes wide-
ranging rights for children who have been removed f rom their family 
environment an committed to professional or long-time care in a social 
establishment. 
Among its rules relative to the right of parental custody even the current 
Family Act contains the right of children with power of discernment, as 
defined in Art. 12 of the United Nations convention on the Rights of the 
Child, to freely express their opinion in matters affecting them and to be 
heard in judicial or administrative proceedings in which they are involved. 
Certain additional rights, those designed to ensure the protection of 
children and safeguard their interests, could be given wider scope than 
they have today, if not by the provisions of family law which embody 
basic principles, by other family-law rules of the new legislation. Again, 
to give but one example, though Art. 8, paras. (1) and (2), of the Act on 
Protection of Children recognizes the right of the child to file complaints 
with the forums specified by law in matters of concern to him and the 
right as stated in Art. 7 of the Civil Code to take proceedings, where his 
fundamental rights are violated, before the court or other organs specified 
by law, there still is no forum which the child might, in cases presumably 
not so frequent, look to for help and support in such matters. 
Some Questions of Matrimonial Property Law 
1. Matrimonial property law is the part of family law which was hardly, 
if at all, adjusted to the changed pattern of socio-economic conditions, 
albeit adjustment would already have been warranted in many respects, 
and which therefore calls that the need should be addressed with the 
greatest momentum both for substantive change and for more detailed 
regulation than is the case at present. 
The rules of the Family Act of 1952 on matrimonial property law were 
framed in an era which sought to promote a speedy withering away of 
private property, which may explain why these rules were enunciated in 
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such sparing terms. It must be admitted that in respect of the personal 
property that remained, the legislator rightly sought to devise a matrimonial 
property regime which made due allowances for the equality of spouses, 
the differences in earnings between men and women, and the duties of the 
wife in the household and the upbringing of children. 
Rather soon, practice came to show that the rules on matrimonial 
property, set out in as little space as f ive articles, were inadequate to meet 
the needs even under conditions of shrinking private or personal property 
playing an ever smaller ro le in economic life, and that the Family Act had 
left numerous matters unsettled. The gap was first filled by judicial practice 
partly in the form of directives, partly in the form of individual judgements, 
and then some of the relevant rules were supplemented by the 1974 and 
1986 Amendments to the Family Act. By 1986, however, new times had 
begun to breathe in the patterns of economic conditions and property relations, 
but the Family Act was s low to respond to them. True, the Amendments of 
1986 adjusted standards by recognizing again the possibility of concluding 
matrimonial property contracts, which had been abolished in 1952, but the 
relevant provisions were even more laconic and incomplete even in 
comparison with the pre-existing rules of the Family Act . 
In addition, Directive No. 10 of the Supreme Court on matrimonial 
property law matters was repealed in the meantime on the ground, admittedly 
most questionable, that what had not been legislatively covered among the 
points raised in the Directive had meanwhile been similarly recognized 
and followed in practice. 
The past ten years have seen fur ther significant changes in property 
relations and in the direct or indirect participation of private persons, whether 
married or not, in economic life. In view of these changes, the rules of 
matrimonial property law call for much more f lexible treatment —more 
differentiated where necessary, but more elaborate, in any case—in respect 
of inter se relations of spouses, relations between spouses and third persons, 
particularly of relations between persons participating in economic activities. 
Yet the need is invariably for legislative regulation which takes account of 
the interest in the protection of the family , of the fact that the family life-
style influences the property relations of spouses and is normally shaped by 
their common will, and, naturally, of the interests of children. 
Moreover, mention should be made of the fact that even though it is 
the family-law rules on matrimonial property that come closest to matters 
dealt with in civil-law and have stood in need of application of the 
underlying civil-law rules in the past, these rules are treated by nearly all 
legal systems in a way different from other civil-law relations, in response 
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to the distinctive features of everyday family relations and of the jo in t ly 
shaped patterns of family living. This holds primarily for the rules on 
matrimonial property matters affecting the internal ( inter se) relations of 
spouses as well as their external property relations with third persons, 
though to a lesser extent. 
The rules of matrimonial property law are typically rules which were 
laid down in legislative enactments by all countries of Europe during the 
19th century or in the first third of the 20th century, enactments in which 
significant substantive and conceptual changes have since been pressed 
for either by the changing patterns of family relations, particularly the 
recognition of the equality of spouses, the growing predominance of dual 
income families, the increasing participation of women in economic life, 
or by shifts in the make-up of assets owned in the Western part of Europe 
as elsewhere. 
The trend of change, even if accomplished in different ways by the various 
systems of law, is towards laying down rules of matrimonial property law 
which, at least with the statutory matrimonial property regime prevailing, 
will ensure that both spouses share in the increase of their property achieved 
during marriage, even though by the activity of one of the spouses, and 
that their shares are equal, apart from a few exceptions as observed in the 
different legal systems. This requirement has consistently been satisfied by 
the Hungarian matrimonial property law in force. 
However, unlike the rules of Hungarian matrimonial property law, 
most foreign laws leave more scope for spouses to replace the statutory 
matrimonial property regime by another, contractually stipulated regime, an 
optional one, the detailed rules of which are similarly established by law. In 
the course of recodifying the family law there may be some ground for 
elaborating rules to govern such optional regimes of matrimonial property 
law in Hungarian law, too. 
Equal sharing by both spouses in property acquired during marriage or 
married life can, in principle, be ensured by either of two property regimes. 
One is the regime of the community of property, which is embraced in 
Hungarian law. Under this regime, any property acquired by the spouses 
during married life except for assets of separate property specified by law, 
is held in joint ownership from the moment of acquisition, and this community 
of property is indivisible. The other is similar to the community of jo in t ly 
acquired property regime of earlier Hungarian law, which, retaining 
proprietary independence and responsibility during marriage, recognizes a 
share for the spouses, at the end of marriage, in the increment of property 
taking place in the other spouse's property during the continuance of marriage. 
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While the marriage subsists, the spouses live under a separation of property 
regime, though subject to certain exceptions, but the property acquired 
during marriage will, at the end of marriage, be due to the spouses in 
equal shares, again subject to certain exceptions, regardless of the extent 
to which the property was acquired in common or separately. 
There is no doubt that this kind of matrimonial property is flawed jus t 
as the conjugal community of property regime under Hungarian law is, 
and that the failing of either regime can be remedied by statutory regulations 
only to a cer tain extent. Still , even if the current unrealistic restrictions on 
the disposal of common property should be modified by a new rule, what 
seems to be more realistic is a regime of community of jointly acquired 
property in respect of, e. g., property contributed by one of the spouses to 
his/her economic undertaking or to such undertaking with a person other 
than his/her spouse. Such an arrangement requires, on the one hand, much 
greater f r eedom of disposal, within the sphere of his/her undertaking, for 
the spouse engaged in economic activities and, on the other, allows scope 
for risk involved in the economic undertaking to be borne solely by the 
property of the spouse engaged in economic activities. Today, in point of 
fact, such an arrangement can only be made by stipulating the separation 
of property regime, which places at a much greater disadvantage the spouse 
not participating in economic activities and, indeed, at one which is 
presumably against the desire of most spouses. 
If this regime is adopted as an optional one of matrimonial property— 
or even if the right is recognized for the spouses to stipulate this regime in 
respect of their property assets such as serve a specific purpose, with the rest 
of their property remaining under the control of the statutory matrimonial 
property l aw—, there will emerge other issues that will , or may, call for 
regulation both in the inter se relations of the spouses and in respect of 
protection of creditors. A few examples will suffice. There will doubtless 
have to be a group of property assets—depending on the purpose for 
which it is intended, primarily a dwelling used jointly by the spouses—in 
respect of which it will be necessary to retain the right of joint disposal. 
Similarly, the right of separate disposal must not entail avoiding payment 
of expenditures on the common life and the upbringing of children, or of 
the property acquired by way of gift or inheritance may not invariably be 
regarded as an increment of property subject to distribution. Besides, more 
attention will have to be devoted to whether movements of assets as bet-
ween spouses are purported to take away the coverage of debts. 
It is not advisable to rule out, as an option, the regime of separating all 
assets of property. In such a case, the creation of conditions for joint 
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occupancy and defrayal of the expenses of a common household and the 
rearing of children may nevertheless be considered as matters that must 
be excluded from a full separation of property and may be in need of 
appropriate regulation. 
Of course, in respect of goods jointly purchased f r o m the earnings or 
incomes of both spouses, the marital partners may, even during marriage, 
have common property even under both matrimonial property regimes we 
have described in this paper. 
With the optional matrimonial property regimes recognized and duly 
regulated, it would be necessary for the community of property regime, 
commonly accustomed and accepted as it is, to be maintained as a statutory 
matrimonial property regime in the future. 
The current rules of this regime, however, call fo r various degrees of 
adjustment, modification or, where appropriate, interpretation.1 . It is all 
the more justified to keep this in v iew since, in Hungarian practice, 
marriage settlements cannot be assumed to gain currency in the future and 
consequently the statutory matrimonial property regime can likewise be 
assumed to remain in operation in the majority of marriages. 
2. The statutory matrimonial property regime of the Family Act is a 
community property regime which, but for the statutorily defined exceptions, 
creates a community of property acquired by the spouses either in common or 
separately throughout their matrimonial life. As against the terminology 
used by the Family Act, this community of property means not only joint 
ownership, but also a community of other components, notably of assets 
and liabilities, or of rights pertaining to the spouses and, with appropriate 
exceptions, obligations imposed on them, and the common property, again 
without the current Family Act spelling it out, is due to the spouses in 
equal shares, at least at the time the community property is divided. 
Legal systems which adopt, as a general rule, the community of property, 
i.e. the community of property acquired jointly during marriage, t end— 
one might say, as a matter of fact—to enumerate those items of property 
that do not form part of the community property of spouses; that is to say, 
they constitute their separate property—or liabilities—, but are not uniform in 
incorporating in, or omitting from, this structure of regulation the presumption 
that the property of spouses is jointly owned. While the Hungarian Family 
13
 For p roposa l s partly d i f f e r i n g from, par t ly wider in s cope than, those p r e sen t ed 
below, see the study by Kőrös : A házassági vagyonjog korszerűs í tésének e lv i kér-
dései (Concep tua l Quest ions of Streamlining the Matrimonial Proper ty Law). Polgári 
jogi kodifikáció, No. 2 of Vol . III. 5 -7 . 
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Act does not declare such a presumption, judicial practice persists in 
applying it and perhaps gives it, as often as not, greater emphasis than 
warranted. There is an opinion that the presumption of common property 
should be legislatively spelled out.14 
This notwithstanding, there are, admittedly, drawbacks, even if left 
unmentioned, to the statutory confirmation of this presumption and, in 
particular, to giving it too much emphasis. A legal declaration to the effect 
that forming part of separate property is any asset which, whether acquired 
prior to or during marriage, is not clearly shown—by e. g., a premarital 
entry in the real estate register or a certificate of inheritance issued dur ing 
marriage—to have the status of separate property cannot be claimed to be 
a confidence-building mark of a marriage at all. Such declarations at law, 
merely embodying the existence of separate property at the time of 
entering marriage and written into matrimonial property contracts, are not 
exceptional even today, nor can they be prohibited, but, in a society where 
conclusion of marriage settlements is far from common, they somehow 
imply that the intending spouses face up, ab initio, to the possibility of 
dissolving the marriage into which they are about to enter. 
The scope of separate property as def ined by the Family Act in force is 
more or less in conformity with regulations valid in other countries. In 
addition to acquisitions under any title be fore marriage, separate property 
chiefly includes, among the items acquired during marriage, assets acquired 
by way of donation or succession and serving exclusively for personal 
use, by one of the spouses. In our conviction, the matters and problems 
which judicial practice is seized of in connection with the statutorily 
defined items of separate property—and one might add that related questions 
do emerge in respect of all such assets—are to be sett led by practice as 
before and call for no modification to the relevant provisions of the Act , 
regardless of whether we endorse the current practice or would find the 
opposite to be appropriate.17 
However, what was omit ted from the Family Act and is in need of 
legislative coverage is this: while the scope of separate property was 
defined satisfactorily in the main, the Act is almost completely silent on the 
separate liabilities or debts of one of the spouses or, more accurately, the 
14
 See, e .g . , Kőrös: A házas ság i vagyon jog korszerűs í tésének elvi ké rdése i . 
Polgári jogi kodifikáció. op. cit. 8. 
15
 For instance, we have repeatedly stated that wha t we would d e e m appropriate is the 
opposite of the current practice, which , endorsed a l so by authors of commentary literature, 
regards property acquired under a succession contract as constituting common proper ty . 
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only point covered concerns the question whether the spouse withholding 
his/her consent to transactions effected without his/her consent is or is not 
liable, and to what extent, for debts so incurred. 
This matter cannot be solved by merely stating let alone presuming 
that a debt incurred before marital l ife is a separate debt and that a debt 
incurred during marriage is a common debt encumbering the common 
property of the spouses. 
Without claiming to be comprehensive, the fol lowing list of questions 
would call for regulation. The obligation of maintenance originating from 
a legal title prior to marriage or during marital life and imposed on one of 
the spouses could not normally be classified as a separate debt. Damage 
which one of the spouses has caused, even during marital life, to a third 
person by a criminal offence or otherwise willfully or perhaps through 
gross negligence would reasonably have to be classified as forming part of 
separate liabilities, while other cases of damage would not. As for the 
costs of the maintenance of separate property, it would be jus t i f ied to 
make regulation dependent on whether or not an asset of separate property 
is also used to meet the needs of the common life. Obviously enough, its 
consignment to separate debts is unwarranted in the former case, but is 
warranted in the latter. 
The question whether—in addition to an express enumeration of the 
items of separate property and statutory classification of all other assets as 
belonging to the community property of spouses—there is ground for a 
separate provision that the two sources of property form a community, 
may be at issue. One such item of property treated with emphasis in the 
Family Act is the proceeds of separate property or, more accurately, the 
net income derived therefrom. Other items include royalties pertaining to 
inventors, innovators, authors and other persons creating intellectual 
products and falling due during marital life. Whereas some foreign laws 
contain rules consigning the proceeds of separate property to common 
property, there are no foreign laws which treat royalties separately. 
Two points are worthy of consideration here. First, the fact that the 
explanatory comment added by the Ministry to the 1986 Amendments to 
the Family Act refers to the possibility and justifiability of making 
settlements on royalties diverging f rom the law as a reason in support of 
the fairness of matrimonial property contracts, which have recently been 
reintroduced by legislation. Secondly, it is far f rom unambiguously clear 
whether by framing that rule, the legislator has widened or narrowed the 
scope of common property, because the rule in question also implies that 
the particular intellectual creation itself (invention, innovation, etc.) 
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remains the au thor ' s own property, which the other spouse has neither any 
right to dispose of nor any matrimonial property claim to a share in, if its 
proceeds are realized in a fo rm other than royalty. Such a conclusion was 
reached by, e. g., the Supreme Court in its ruling which upheld the position 
of the Hungarian Bureau for the Protection of Authors' Rights in a case 
involving an au thor ' s estate with unsold f igurines. 
Some experts attack the in-force regulation in another respect, judging 
it inequitable that an author 's proceeds f r o m earlier work created before 
marriage should, if the royalty has fallen due during marital life, belong to 
common property, at least as a general rule. Such a rule is found to be 
inequitable especially in cases where an intellectual product was created 
during a previous marriage of the author, when the former spouse might 
have contributed, even if indirectly, to enabling the author to "safely 
engage in creat ive work".'6 Still , it is more than contrary to the actual 
fac ts of life to allot, by operation of law at any time after dissolution of 
the marriage, to the former spouse a share of royalties for work done 
during the existence of the marriage with him or her. 
3. A matrimonial property law which is to deal with three parts of 
property—the common property of spouses and the smaller or larger 
separate property owned by the spouses—should devote greater attention 
than do the current rules of the Family Act, to the intermingling or merger 
of these sub-divisions of property, to quest ions of investments or other 
outlays from the separate property of one spouse which increase the property 
of the other spouse or the common property, or, conversely, investments 
or other outlays from the common property which increase the separate 
property of e i ther spouse, and to whether or not such investments or 
outlays are to be reimbursed. 
This set of questions was not yet covered at all by the Family Act of 
1952. Some guidance for regulations was provided by Directives No. 5 
and No. 10 of the Supreme Court, which came to be incorporated—though in 
part only and certainly not at the proper places, among other rules - in the 
subsequent Amendments to the Family Act. 
It is only in an extended sense of the term that one may speak of a 
merger of sub-divisions of property in respect of separate property lived 
16
 See Tóthné Fáb ián , E.: A házassági vagyonjog egyes elemeinek áttekintése (A 
R e v i e w of Cer ta in Aspects of Mat r imon ia l Proper ty Law). In: Veres , J.: Emlékkönyv 
(Memor ia l V o l u m e ) , Szeged. 4 1 0 ; and this view shared or the i n - fo rce rule of the 
Fami ly Act is at l eas t held rigid b y Kőrös: A házasság i vagyonjog korszerűs í tésének 
e lv i kérdései. Polgári jogi kodifikáció. op. cit. 10. 
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off during marital life—and we might add—regardless of whether the 
spouses were compelled to do so by temporary difficult ies in meeting the 
expenses of the common household or the separate property was used up 
through the common will presumably of both spouses to secure a higher 
level of living, thereby affording extra opportunities for children or raising 
funds for an occasional spending of larger sums of money as a result of an 
acquisition of sizable non-communal property. 
The provision of the Family Act which in such cases does not, in general, 
recognize any claim for reimbursement to separate property is certainly 
right, but exceptional cases are likewise acceptable in which reimbursement 
in respect of lived-off separate property may be admissible. To take one 
example, the spouses secure for any reason their common life by using up 
the separate property of one of them, while leaving the separate property of the 
other spouse intact, thus creating a situation which, without a recognition of 
claims for reimbursement, would unbalance the financial standing of the 
spouses, and result in unreasonably great disproportions in their property 
holdings.17 
The intermingling or merging of common and separate property in 
cases where investments or other disbursements undertaken in one sub-
division and financed from another sub-division result in a significant 
increment value of the other sub-division should naturally receive different 
treatment. Strictly and practically speaking, it is only in cases of this kind 
that one is justified in speaking of an intermingling of sub-divisions of 
property. 
Such intermingling or merger of sub-divisions in the property of 
spouses can be said to be an everyday occurrence. The spouses may jointly 
own a house built on a building plot which forms part of the property held 
by one of them separately or may use their common property to enlarge a 
dwelling which one of them had at the time of marriage or inherited 
during marriage, or, conversely, they may draw on a sizable inheritance 
conferred on one of them to invest in an asset of common property, to 
enlarge it or to increase its value. Mere defrayal of the costs of management 
and maintenance of property in one sub-division out of funds in the other 
sub-division would not be deemed, at least in general, to be an instance of 
intermingling property even in cases like this. 
Moreover, for purposes of treatment under family law, outlays resulting 
in enhancement of value should likewise be distinguished according to 
17
 See A családjogi törvény magyarázata (Commentar ies on the Family Act , 1988, 
Vol, I, 373; and Körös: A családjog kézikönyve, op. cit. 193. 
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whether the increased value is still existent at the time of the distribution 
of the property or has been used up during the common conduct of life or 
may subsequently have become depreciated for reasons beyond the control 
of the spouses. The latter cases should be disregarded in respect of claims 
fo r reimbursement. 
As regards incremental property which preserves its value and is to be 
reimbursed to different sub-divisions in the course of the distribution of 
assets, present-day judicial practice is far f rom uniform and consistent in 
establishing when the intermingling or blending of sub-divisions affecting, as 
it often does, immovable property creates a claim for a share in property, 
with account taken of the increase in value, or a claim "only" for refund in 
money. Judicial practice has, recently in any case, recognized claims for 
sharing in property in a wider scope than do Art. 137 (3) of the Civil Code 
and Opinion No. 7 of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court, recognizing 
claims of ownership in respect of internal alterations and the provision of 
modern facilities which do not affect the structure of a building, provided 
that they have created new and enduring value. There is, however, no 
answer to the question about a rationale for such a practice, and the best 
one gets in justification, without that policy being questioned in principle, 
is that the effect ive rules of the Family Act confer no power on the courts 
18 
to adopt such a practice. Yet it may be questionable whether this matter 
should be one of those in which continuance of a practice deviating from 
the provisions of the Civil Code appears to be justified, once the family 
law has been integrated into the Civil Code. Supposing but not suggesting 
that it is, there would be a need for a statutory regulation to this effect, 
with a statement of its justif ication. 
For that matter, a distinction between claims of ownership and claims 
fo r refund in money is of relevance particularly to dwellings used by the 
spouses, where the question of whether the dwelling is in joint ownership 
or is separate property held by one spouse has relevance in deciding how 
the spouse/s may live in the family home after divorce. 
Among the provisions of the Family Act which govern claims for 
reimbursement, the rule under which no such claim in respect of investment 
f rom common in separate property or, conversely, from separate in common 
property is admissible "where the expenditure was incurred with intent to 
abdicate claims" does not work nor is it necessarily applied by the courts, 
though for a different reason. Such intent is certainly motivated by trust in 
18
 See Körös: A házassági v a g y o n j o g korszerűsí tésének elvi kérdése i . Polgári jogi 
kodifikáció. op. cit. 14. 
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the continued existence of the marriage, while reimbursement of the value 
of investment will take place upon dissolution of the marriage or, probably 
less frequently, upon termination of the marriage in the event of the death 
of one of the spouses. 
Numerous matters relating to claims for reimbursement and not covered 
by the Family Act are adequately settled by judicial practice which relies 
partly on the repealed Directives of the Supreme Court, but some of the 
arrangements adopted would nonetheless require legislative coverage, 
albeit without an unduly casuistic regulation. 
4. The integration of family law regulation into the Civil Code re-
quires that special attention should be paid to the specificity of the 
relationship between spouses and the function of conjugal community 
property. This, in turn, requires, that regulations different from the 
relevant rules on civil-law community property should be introduced for 
the use and management of conjugal community assets, the defrayal of the 
costs of maintenance and, in particular, the disposal of common property. 
Such a different regulation has been adopted by the Family Act, but 
some of the relevant provisions are in need of rethinking and revision, mostly 
in the wake of the changes that have taken place in economic conditions 
since their introduction. This holds for the rules on the management and, 
to an even greater extent, of disposal of, common property. 
With regard, first, to property management, the present-day patterns of 
daily relations and economic conditions require exceptions to be allowed 
to the general desiderate of joint management in respect of assets of 
common property necessary for the exercise of a profession or occupation, 
apart from the fact that, as against the current provisions of the Family 
Act, management extends not only to assets of property, but also to such 
other items as are in need of management. It stands to reason that the said 
assets of common property should be subject to exclusive management by 
the spouse who is assisted by them in pursuing his/her profession or 
occupation. 
Finding the appropriate way to regulate disposal of common property 
is a more sophisticated and complex issue, to achieve which the legislator 
had to accommodate two conflicting interests in the past and will have to 
do the same in the future. 
What common property should require, in any event during marital life, 
is, if only in general, joint disposal by the spouses and hence, especially 
in case of wrongful non-exercise thereof, protection of the rightful, 
reasonable interests of the spouse who is not involved in joint disposal. 
Still, on the other hand, legal regulation should also keep in view the 
194 EMÎLIA WEISS 
principle of security of transactions, considering that the right of disposal 
is, as a matter of fact, exercised externally, towards third persons. The 
requirement of joint disposal of common property, as would be dictated by 
the interest of spouses, would clearly be too much for the security of 
transactions to bear. A third person establishing a business relationship 
with one spouse cannot evidently be expected to pry into the marital status 
of his/her partner or, if the partner is married, into whether the other 
spouse has consented to the deal to be made with him. The rules of the 
Family Act, although stating the requirement for common property to be 
jointly disposed of, give priority to the interest of the security of onerous 
transactions, at least in general, by establishing the presumption of consent 
by the other spouse to a rather broad range of transactions with third 
persons. 
Nevertheless, this area would certainly need more differentiated and 
more realistic regulation than is the case at present. The question of the 
joint disposal of common property arises differently and raises other problems 
in respect of movable and real property, and emerges, again differently, in 
respect of the property brought by one spouse into a business undertaking 
and of the property used to meet the needs of daily life of the spouses. 
And this list could be extended by the different ways in which the 
consequences of wrongful disregard of joint disposal ensue especially in 
inter se relations of the spouses and in external relations with third 
persons. 
As for real property, if it forms part of common property and is regis-
tered as standing in the names of both spouses, joint disposal of it is an 
absolute requirement—real property may obviously not be either alienated 
or encumbered with consent not subject to formal requisites or based 
chiefly on presumptions—and a "mere" promise of the spouse effecting a 
transaction to obtain the consent of his/her spouse to the transaction will 
not authorize the third party to the transaction to use pressure to procure 
the consent of the other spouse. If, however, the real property which forms 
part of common property is, for any reason, registered as standing in the 
sole name of one spouse, the principle of public authoritativeness of real 
estate recording certainly must take precedence over the requirement of a 
joint disposal of common property. It is nonetheless justified to allow an 
exception to this rule in respect of dwellings used in common by the 
spouses, even if such an exception runs counter to the principle of public 
authoritativeness of real estate recording. 
With regard to movable property (including rights, entitlements, 
claims, etc.), subjecting joint disposal thereof to practically no restriction 
REMARKS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CODIFICATION OF FAMILY LAW 195 
is certainly an undue or excessive requirement. It is acceptable in respect 
of assets used for the common life of spouses, but is unacceptable in 
respect of assets necessary for pursuing an occupation or profession and 
of those contributed to a business undertaking run by one spouse. It is 
unrealistic, furthermore, to require joint disposal even years after termination 
of the matrimonial relationship or, in the spelling of the law, for the 
period between the termination of matrimonial life and the division of the 
common property. A new enactment should replace these unrealistic rules 
with more life-like ones. 
In the legislative process, however, what calls f o r a change is not only 
the excessive, unrealistic requirement of joint disposal, but also the protection 
of a spouse wronged in his/her intra-marital relation by the other spouse's 
act of unilateral disposal, and even the protection of that spouse against 
a third person acquiring property from him/her in bad faith, in the 
knowledge of the lack of consent on the part of the other spouse. The 
appropriate solution would be, again, to recognize claims for damages in 
the internal relations of spouses—claims that had once been recognized 
by, but were later omitted from, the Family Act—, just as it would also be 
appropriate to replace the current unrealistic rule governing cases in 
which one spouse is unlawfully deprived of common property by the other 
spouse after the matrimonial relationship is terminated but before the 
common property is divided. It would similarly be acceptable to recognize 
either claims for damages against mala f ide third persons in external 
relations or the right to sue for cancellation of transactions concluded by 
the other spouse with such third persons. Today these matters are not 
legislatively covered at all. 
5. And, finally, there are a few more matters relating to marriage 
settlements to be mentioned in the sphere of matrimonial property law. 
In addition to the rules on formal requirements for marriage settlements, 
the Family Act is practically confined to providing that in such a contract 
husband and wife, or even in a premarital agreement the intending spouses 
may depart f rom the provisions of the Act in assigning certain assets to 
common or separate property. This provision is supplemented by the 
Decree of the Minister of Justice on the Enforcement of the Family Act, 
stating that contracts of sale, exchange, donation and loan made by 
spouses with each other during the existence of the matrimonial relationship 
must also be deemed to be marriage settlements as defined by the Act. 
However, a marriage settlement may be of a content different from that 
determined by the Hungarian Family Act and, indeed, these differences 
boil down to either of two basic kinds. One is that which, as mentioned 
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earlier, is not covered by Hungarian law at all, namely the stipulation of 
an "opt ional" matrimonial property regime instead of the statutory regime; 
the other consists in the laying down of stipulations on certain details 
which depart from the relevant rules either of the statutory or of the 
optional regime. Such stipulations may also cover matters other than the 
specification of the assets of common or separate property which deviate 
from the provisions of the existing law. They may, inter alia, relate to the 
management or freer disposal of common property and make different 
arrangements in respect of assets used for business purposes or for the 
pursuit of an occupation in general, or of proceeds f rom separate property. 
The current rules of the Family Act, at least if interpreted literally, 
leave little or no room for making similar stipulations, which are, beyond 
question, responsive to the needs of daily life. It would be absolutely 
necessary for further progress to be made in this respect. Of course, not 
even a future legislation will be able, nor could it be concerned, to determine 
fully the substantive details of the marriage settlement. 
As regards the content of such a contract, however, it would be neces-
sary to determine the restrictions that would be needed and justif ied. 
Thus, on the one hand, it should be spelled out that the f reedom of 
contract may not prejudice fundamental interests of family protection and 
may not result in, among others, evasion of payment of expenses incurred 
in connection with the common conduct of life, or non-contribution to the 
sustenance of children, or in an unilateral exercise of the right of disposal 
in respect of the occupancy of a dwelling used by the spouses. On the 
other hand, and with adjustments for present-day economic conditions, 
such restrictions may also have a major role to play in ruling out the 
possibility of the f reedom of contract being instrumental in practically 
defrauding the creditors of one of the spouses. 
A further question which bears on the content of the marriage settlement 
may be that of whether such settlement should be allowed to contain a 
stipulation for the event of death, one which is, in this context, virtually a 
testamentary disposition or even qual i f ies as a joint testament of spouses, 
or of whether the f reedom of contract should not be allowed so wide a 
scope in terms of content. While acquiescing in the fact that stipulations 
of a matrimonial property contract, in so far as they determine the list of 
items assigned to common and separate property in departure f rom the 
law, are bound to have a bearing on what remains in the property held by 
the spouses in cases where the marriage terminates as a result of death. I 
would not subscribe to the admissibility of incorporating testamentary 
dispositions in marriage settlements even if the Civil Code now in the 
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making were intended to allow again a narrow scope for joint wills to be 
made by spouses.19 
Yet another question emerges as to the extent to which the general 
rules of contract law, laid down in the book of the Civil Code on the law 
of obligations, will or will not be applicable to marriage settlements 
fundamentally differing in function from contracts controlled by the law 
of obligations, particularly those tailored for commercial transactions. In 
all certainty, they will be applicable to a lesser extent in respect of the 
internal (inter se) relations of spouses, although defects of will existing at 
the time of contracting, for instance, may also be taken into consideration 
in this context, and they will be taken into consideration to an even 
greater extent if they bear upon the interests of third persons, creditors in 
particular. This question will call for closer scrutiny, especially once marriage 
settlements come into more general use."0 
Parental Rights and Duties-Certain Matters concerning Children's Rights 
1. Questions of the parent—child relationship as well as questions of a 
confirmation and protection of children's rights have gained prominence 
in both legislation and legal practice in the sphere of family law across the 
world today. 
Even though the traditional elements of the right of parental custody 
have seemingly remained unchanged, the principles governing exercise of 
the right of parental custody and some of the problems related thereto 
have undergone significant changes over the past few decades. 
It would be justified for the basic principles guiding the legal regulation 
of the parent—child relationship to be included among the introductory 
provisions of the chapter of the new law on the right of parental custody , 
even if most of these principles are by no means new to Hungarian family 
law. The case may be argued for formulating such principles also in view 
of the requirements set forth in the United Nations convention on the 
Rights of the Child, notably 
" For an o p p o s i t e view, see Körös: A házassági vagyonjog korszerűs í tésének elvi 
kérdései. Polgári jogi kodifikáció. op. cit. 16. 
20 
An addi t iona l question within the domain of matrimonial proper ty law can be 
that of creating a harmony between matrimonial property law and company law, or at least 
between the rules of matrimonial property law and the property relations of some forms of 
company. We will not be concerned with this matter in the present paper. 
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(a) the principle of the exercise of parental rights in the best interest of 
the child; 
(b) the requirement to involve children who are capable of making a 
decision, i.e. competent to formulate, and decide in, questions affect ing 
them, and to take their opinion into account where possible; 
(c) the right and duty of parents to exercise parental rights and 
perform parental duties in common; in this respect, however, the rights 
and duties of parents l iving apart f r o m their child are in need of separate 
regulation; 
(d) the provision to the effect that interference, whether by legislation 
or by administrative authorities, with the exercise of parental rights is 
admissible only in exceptional cases in the interest of the child; and 
(e) the recognition of the right of the child to maintain his family 
relations, including his actual family relations, 
In connection with the implementation of principles it should nevertheless 
be mentioned that the rights and duties of parental custody, particularly 
the duties of care and rearing, are seen and felt by a considerable majority 
of parents to be duties or responsibilities which are crucially different 
from legally prescribed rules and that parents generally find it natural, 
even without legal regulation, to exercise these rights and responsibilities 
in the interest of the child. The requirement that parental custody should 
be exercised in the interest of the child is nonetheless so fundamental , 
such a basic principle of family law that it is to be spelled out in this 
context even if it can be supposed to belong to the category of exceptional 
instances in which it will have to be enforced by legal means or, if 
disregarded, may even entail legal sanctions. 
Still, the approach which considers minors to be a priori "unprotected" 
by reason of their age or of their place in the family and consequently 
finds that the parent—child relationship calls for increased control by the 
State and increased administrative intervention is certainly in need of 
reappraisal. Such rethinking must also be reflected in the revision of the 
rules as regards parental rights to property management and the right of 
parents to legal representation. 
For that matter, the requirement of respect for the exercise of parental 
rights—and the exceptional nature of interference with the exercise thereof— 
follows f rom Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 5 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Art. 67 
(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, which, gives it separate 
expression save with respect to the choice of the type of education which 
parents wish to ensure for their children. 
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Where there is cause for intervention because of an improper exercise 
of parental rights and responsibilities, the relevant powers are vested in 
the guardianship authorities in the f i rs t place and in the courts in more 
exceptional cases. 
The right to parental custody to be exercised by parents in common 
was slow in replacing paternal authority, generally accepted as it was for a 
long time not only in Hungarian law, and the rules which, l ikewise 
characteristic not only of Hungarian law, drew a sharp demarcation line 
between rights of parental custody according as they were to be exercised 
over children born in or out of wedlock. 
However, the right of custody to be jointly exercised by parents living 
together, whether spouses or cohabitants without a formal marriage bond, 
has come to be definitively accepted by current Hungarian law and, more 
or less generally, by the laws of other countries, it being understood, of 
course, that the modalities of joint exercise are determined by the parents 
themselves, and practice shows that in the majority of cases, which can be 
said to be typical, joint exercise of this right is a reality, that parents 
living together share, whenever possible, in the everyday care and rearing 
of children as well as in the adoption of major decisions affecting their 
children, and that joint exercise is motivated neither by the relevant provisions 
of law nor by the requirements prescribed in international conventions, 
but is rather a life style which parents have adopted regardless of those 
requirements and which they increasingly look upon as natural. 
The question of how parents are to enjoy equality and exercise their 
rights in common after the termination of their matrimonial relationship or 
the dissolution of their marriage poses itself in a different way and is 
much more difficult to solve. From this perspective, it is inevitable for the 
joint exercise of rights to be prejudiced to some extent, but legislation is 
bound by international conventions to search means which are likely to 
reduce such prejudice and thereby to enable both the parents living apart 
from their child and the child living apart from one of his parents to 
maintain a parent—child relationship that is satisfactory by any measure 
even if al tered by the change in their respective situations. 
It is common knowledge that voluntary observance of the law is not 
typical of all such situations. In order for this requirement to be fulf i l led 
in ways other than by recourse to legal means, a rather high degree of 
cooperation would have to be practiced with respect to their child by 
persons who are often highly estranged as spouses or cohabitants. This, 
however, cannot release the legislator f rom his duty to settle the rights of 
parents who live separately, on the one hand, and the law enforcement 
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authorities f rom theirs to facilitate, wherever possible, the enjoyment of 
these rights on the other. We will have more to say about this issue later. 
As regards the right of children, as also embodied in Art. 8 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, to maintain family 
relations, wider than those of the parental family, pertinent rules can be 
found in the current Family Act and more of them in the Act on the 
Protection of Children, but further progress in this direction would 
certainly be salutary. 
2. Among the substantive elements of the right of parental custody, a 
revision may be called for by exercise of the parents' right to manage property 
and of parents ' right and responsibility to act as legal representatives. 
While the rules which empower the guardianship authority to take over 
regular control over property administration if the parents fail in their 
duty to manage the child's property are to be retained, the parental right to 
manage the chi ld ' s property in other cases should be adjusted to real-life 
situations more closely and with greater confidence placed in parents. 
Much broader than warranted are the powers of guardianship authorities 
today, as a result of which they have a say, ex off icio by operation of 
law, in the parents 's exercise of the right to property management and 
practically withhold that right from parents who otherwise take due care 
of the interests of their children. Besides, these rules are of relevance 
particularly to widowed parents who are to continue rearing their child on 
their own, cases in which property inherited from the deceased parent is, 
as often as not, placed under close control by the guardianship authority 
without any reason and, where legal practice is treating the child as a 
person having interests a priori contrary to those of his parents. In other 
cases it depends on the parent or some other close relative wishing to give 
the child a gif t to decide whether to give or not to give a child under 18 a 
gift of considerable value which is to come under close custody by the 
guardianship authority. 
Moreover, Art. 84 and 85 of the Family Act are no less unrealistic and 
at least as ignorant of the decision-making autonomy of the persons 
concerned in these aspects of the parent—child relationship. Nevertheless, 
enforcement or non-enforcement of these unrealistic provisions may, in 
these cases, be free from administrative intervention, and although these 
rules are, in a large majority of cases, most likely to have very limited or 
no application, it would be necessary for a new legislation to replace them 
with such rules as are more responsive to real needs. 
The rules on legal representation as formulated in the Family Act should 
be harmonized, on the one hand, with the provisions on the parental 
REMARKS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CODIFICATION OF FAMILY LAW 201 
administration of property, which are to be made more flexible, and, on 
the other hand, with the provisions of the Civil Code on legal representation. 
As for the latter, the current rules of the Civil Code, the Family Act and the 
Guardianship Decree fall a mile short of overlapping in certain respects. 
In addition, attention should be drawn to the fact that in the field of 
family law the parents' right to, and duty of, legal representation includes 
not only representation in traditional declarations at civil law but also 
procedure of legal representation required by declarations at family law or 
consent thereto, as well as—in an area still further removed from civil 
law—acts of giving consent to medical treatment. Revision is called for 
especially with respect to the exclusion of the parent as a legal representa-
tive f rom declarations which concern the establishment of the ch i ld ' s 
family status. 
Several rules, otherwise adequate in terms of substance, which govern 
exercise of the right of parental custody require re-casting at the level of 
laws as opposed to their present state of being part of the Guardianship 
Decree. 
3. The rights and duties of parents living apart f rom their child should 
be given more attention than they are accorded by the current regulation. 
Cases in which one of the parents came to be living separate because of 
the termination of the matrimonial or extramarital relationship, including 
cases of acknowledged paternity where the acknowledging father has 
never lived together with his child, but attaches importance to building an 
effective father—child relationship, and in which a parent came to be living 
apart f rom his/her child because of the need for the child to be removed 
from the parental family are to be governed by different rules. For that 
matter, the latter cases are regulated by the Act on the Protection of Children, 
even if not satisfactorily in all respects. 
The significant rise in the number of families affected by divorce or termi-
nation of married or unmarried common life and of children of such families 
as well as the fact that, under present-day socio-economic conditions, both 
parents increasingly participate in rearing and caring for their children while 
the couple are together, has lead to an increased need in separating parents to 
strengthen the rights they will retain in respect of their children and, in a 
number of cases which is by no means negligible, probably also to a similar 
need in children for the maintenance of satisfactory contacts with the parent 
who comes to live separately. At the same time, for the parent living 
separately to be capable of exercising his/her rights and responsibilities 
retained in respect of children after the termination of the matrimonial 
relationship, both parents are required to cooperate properly in one way or 
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another and to accept the fact that both of them continue being the parents 
of their children. 
Most of the rights recognized for, as also the increased responsibility 
resting on, the parent who lives separately in respect of his/her child are 
embodied in the parental right of joint custody retained, or adjudged, 
despite the dissolution of marriage or the termination of married life, and 
their actual substance is fo r the parents to forge. 
Joint exercise of parental custody af ter divorce or the termination of 
married life nevertheless represents a higher degree of cooperation which it 
is not justified to make compulsory, because this right may only be recognized 
for parents willing to undertake and practice such cooperation in the interest 
of the child. However, a lower degree of cooperation, particularly provision 
for the child, opportunities to maintain satisfactory contacts with his parent 
who lives separately, is a matter not of commitment, but of legal duty. A kind 
of cooperation wider in scope than this is prescribed by those rules of the 
Family Act which accord to the parent who lives separately a right of joint 
decision-making on essential matters that are expressly enumerated in the 
Act as affect ing the life of the child, so in the case of a dispute on matters 
in need of jo int decision the parents can have recourse to a court. 
The institution of joint custody was introduced by the Family Act as 
amended in 1995 on the model of foreign legislation and in pursuance of 
the principles and provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
The rules of the Family Act recognizing this right in seeking a settlement in 
divorce act ions or actions involving custody take due account of the 
child's interests as well as of the parents ' willingness to cooperate, but 
those which settle this matter in cases where the community of living is 
broken up without a settlement having been reached are in need of revision. 
The general provision that, unless the parents agree otherwise, the rights 
of parental custody must be exercised joint ly even if the parents no longer 
live together is unrealistic and needs to be revised. 
As against the arrangement adopted by some foreign laws, we must be 
aware that recognition of joint custody af ter the community of living has 
been broken up or after divorce is more of an exceptional solution in 
Hungary today, while it should be spelled out by the new legislation in 
clear terms that a verdict of joint custody must not amount to a placement 
of the child which is divided between the two parents and alternating, e. g., 
weekly, fortnightly or monthly. Such arrangements are not accepted by the 
European systems of law which regulate this institution, whereas the 
practice doubtless prevailing and by far not exceptional in America cannot 
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The foremost right of the parent who lives separately is to maintain 
regular contact with his/her child, a right which is today formulated by 
Art. 9 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child even 
as a right of the child in respect of his parent who lives separately. The rules 
governing this fundamental right of parents and children are currently laid 
down partly in the Family Act, partly in the Government Decree on Guardian-
ship. A new enactment should consolidate the relevant regulations at the 
statutory level, while eliminating minor deficiencies of substance in the 
existing provisions. 
Furthermore, statutory provisions should take greater account of the links 
that exist between the rules for the placement of the child and the right to 
contact with the non-custodial parent. 
This notwithstanding, as regards matters of contact with the non-custodial 
parent, mention should be made of the fact that questions more diff icul t 
than that of regulating the settlement of the issue of contact-keeping are often 
raised by the enforcement, by court order or the guardianship authority's 
decision, of the execution of sanctions against the parent who impedes the 
orderly exercise of the right of contact. Compulsory recourse to mediation 
might make some progress in this field, but such an obligation should 
naturally be imposed by law. 
4. The rules on termination and suspension of the right of parental 
custody need revision to a smaller extent, but future codification should 
devote greater attention to ensuring that, for cases in which a child is 
temporarily or permanently removed from the parental family either because 
of the suspension or termination of the right of parental custody or for some 
other reason, there should be a legal rule which expressly provides that the 
child should be placed, where possible, with hi/her relatives and that, again 
where possible, brothers and sisters should not be not separated. Observance 
of this requirement is in keeping with the provision of Art. 8 of the United 
Nations Convention on the rights of the Child which seeks to guarantee for 
the child the right to maintain his family relations. 
Finally, let us raise the question whether, given the present-day pattern 
of familial relations, there is a need for regulations that are more responsive to 
the desiderata of family-law aims and to actual parent-child relationships, 
to cover relations between step-parents and step-children or, where such 
relations are lasting, even between foster parents and foster children. 
Certainly, the questions discussed here must seem randomly selected 
from the perspective even of the process of codification which is going on 
at present. We have attempted to address—raise and answer—besides the 
basic family-law principles of the new Civil Code, some of the matters 
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covered by two main areas of family law, namely those dealing with 
marriage and relatives. Naturally, we do not claim that there are no other 
matters, either in these two parts or in the third part of family law on 
guardianship that do not call for debate or rethinking in the context of 
codification. 
Printed in Hungary 
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Z O L T Á N P É T E R I * 
Foreword 
The 16th International Congress of Comparative Law takes place at a time 
that can be characterized as transitory in several respects. Modern societies 
and their institutions are transformed at a quick pace by the ongoing 
tendencies of globalization: our familiar concepts gain new meanings. 
These changes also affect the world of law. It is not only the formation 
of the positive law of particular countries that is influenced: our view of 
law is thoroughly reshaped. It means more than outdaring for good the 
narrow, normativist view of law, namely understanding law simply as a sum 
of legal rules. As a consequence of this change of perspective, the wider 
social, economic, political and cultural relations of law are also involved in 
legal studies and in jurisprudence. Moreover, these changes mean more than 
just including value-relations of law as a social phenomenon in the frame-
work of a renewed view of law. It seems that the ongoing transformation 
today also affects an attitude that has characterised and dominated law and 
jurisprudence since the era of modern codification. It is manifested mainly 
in the fact that convictions concerning law as having a "national" character, 
the primacy, the supremacy or even the exclusiveness of domestic law are 
shaken or undergo a change. There is a growing interest in "otherness", in 
foreign institutions and forms of procedure, a growing aspiration to 
understand them. Patience and recipience towards them based on mutual 
respect plays an ever more significant role. 
It hardly requires much explanation that in this process of transformation 
comparative law plays a particularly important and even unavoidable role. 
This role, being many times emphasized by the outstanding representatives 
of international comparatistics, brings us closer to mutual understanding 
and reconciliation. In this spirit, comparative law becomes an instrument 
of developing and accepting the "common law" of mankind. Perhaps, we 
are not wrong if we believe that nowadays we witness a return to the classical 
Full member of the International Academy of Comparat ive Law. 
E-mail : peter i@jog.mta.hu 
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idea of the "ius commune" but in a new, modified sense. In respect to the idea 
of the nature of law as being "common", we talk about something more 
than the manifestation of the universal idea of law in national legislatures in 
several ways (in the sense of the slogan: "ius unum—lex multiplex"): the 
aspiration directed to the realization of the universal idea of law seems to 
come to fruition. In a not too far future , in the f ramework of a process of 
unification and harmonization of law unfolding on an international scale, 
it can result in the cessation of many differences that we see today. 
Even in the present, altered situation, the international exchange of 
ideas and experiences that has been made possible by other congresses of 
comparative law (organized by the International Academy of Comparative 
Law for many decades) can make a useful contribution to the realization 
of the unified world law. The unification of law has been the declared 
purpose of the international comparative law movement since the first 
International Congress of Comparative Law held in 1900. Our experiences 
support the claim that the exchange of ideas taking place in the framework 
of the congresses of comparative law has already contributed to the formation 
of the common future of the community of lawyers and the whole mankind. 
Thus, it is not an accident that the interest in these and similar programmes is 
ever growing, just like the number of meetings organized in the name of 
comparative law and the experts taking part in them. 
Since the very establishment of the International Academy of Comparative 
Law Hungarian jurisprudence has represented itself and has played an active 
role in its activities. In this respect, it is not only the example of Professor 
Elemér Balogh, one of the founders of the International Academy and its 
first General Secretary that can be a guideline for us, latter successors, but 
those more recent experiences related to Hungarian contributions to the 
International Congresses of Comparative Law in the past decades. Hungarian 
participation has been continuous since 1958, and, since the 6th Congress 
held in Uppsala in 1962, it is manifested in the publication of Hungarian 
national reports in independent volumes. 
Carrying on this tradition, the Hungarian national reports addressed to 
the 16th International Congress of International Law are compiled in a special 
issue of the periodical titled Acta Juridica in order to make them accessible to 
a wider public. These national reports indicate our unchanged commitment 
to the idea and practice of comparative law but, hopefully, also the freshness 
of thinking and the abili ty of renewal that is to characterize our response 
to the challenges of the tendencies of globalization in our world. 
1216-2574 / 2002 / USD 5.00 
© 2002 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
43, Nos 3-4, pp. 207-217(2002) 
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P É T E R KOVÁCS* 
The Legal Status of Minorities in Hungary 
Abstract. The Article gives a general overview of the Hungarian constitutional and legal 
framework for the participation of national minorities in the decision-making. The relatively 
low number of people belonging to national minorities in Hungary as well as the scattered 
patterns of their settlement and some aspects of the Hungarian legal traditions underlie the 
choice of the so called personal autonomy approach. The minorities can establish via a 
special electing mechanism local and national self-governments enjoying consultative and 
truly public law type rule-making and administrative competences. Having given the proper 
interpretation of the relevant article of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court also 
contributed to the birth of the Act on the Rights of Minorities. The basic reason behind the 
creation of a very complicated, multilevel institutional complex is that in this way, educational 
and cultural needs of minorities of different scale can be represented in a relatively coherent 
manner. This does not exclude at all the possibility of bringing modifications to the legal 
text in the light of a decade 's experience. 
Keywords: Hungary, minority, self-government, participation in decision making 
Hungary's position viz. the linguistic minorities is based in the consideration 
t j 2 
that instead of classic nation-state concept, the subsidiarity principle 
* 
Professor, PhD, dr habil, Miskolc University Faculty of Law, H-3515 Miskolc-
Egyetemváros, Hungary and Péter Pázmány Catholic University Faculty of Law, H-1088 
Budapest, Szentkirályi u. 28-30. , Hungary. 
E-mail: profpeterkovacs@hotmail .com 
1
 In the last years of our century, the institution of the nation-state, its advantages and 
disadvantages are subject to numerous scientific studies and colloquies. This is not by 
chance, because at the end our century we see things differently than before when it seemed 
so evident for thinkers and politicians to import western examples in order to get nearer to 
modernity. However certain phenomena perceived without doubt in the XlXth century as the 
deposit of evolution, have been questioned since then. It has become clear that the nation-
state has had drawbacks and even victims and it costs a lot today to mitigate damages and to 
promote small languages and cultures. The nation-state has a particular but apparently 
inherent temptation to uniformity and to cultural and linguistic hegemony. That 's why a good 
number of countries make efforts to reshape the internal administrative structure according 
to the principles of decentralization and subsidiarity. Hungary is one of these countries. 
We know well, that subsidiarity has a double meaning. It has become evident 
since the Maastricht Treaty that there are certain inherent limits of sovereignty-transfer to 
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should be applied. In this way, minorities can decide in the matters important 
for their identity. 
In addition to provisions linking international and national law, or providing 
safeguards expressed in the European terminology of human rights4 or in 
particular providing discrimination5 the Constitution enshrines the fundamental 
principles of effective participation by minorities in public life: 
§ 68 (1) The national and linguistic minorities in the Republic of Hungary 
shall share in the people 's power, being constituent elements of the state. 
(2) The Republic of Hungary shall accord protection to the national 
and linguistic minorities, ensuring their collective participation in public 
life, the cultivation of their culture, the use of their mother tongue, education 
in their mother tongue and the right to use names in their own language. 
(3) The laws of the Republic of Hungary shall guarantee the representation 
of the national and ethnic minorities living in the national territory. 
(4) National and ethnic minorities may set up local and national self-
governing bodies. 
(5) The enactment of the law on national and ethnic minorities shall 
require a two thirds majority of votes of members of parliament present. 
the supranat ional level , i .e. when the e f f i cac i t y of the act ivi ty is th rea tened e.g. when 
the organization which has acquired the given competencies is unable to use them or when 
the bureaucra t ic way k e e p s down the r equ i red activity. But subsidiari ty m e a n s also a 
cons t i tu t iona l and adminis t ra t ive d o c t r i n e in expansion which is r eady to grant a 
grea ter place to local se l f -government if advantages of f iscal i ty or e f f i c a c i t y jus t i fy 
it. W i t h o u t doubt, the s ta te has surv ived this sl imming diet and ci t izens have realized 
that as a result of the decentralization, a lot of things have become cheeper and simpler. 
3
 Article 7: "The legal system of the Republic of Hungary shall accept the generally 
r ecogn i sed rules of internat ional law a n d shall ensure harmony be tween obligations 
unde r international law and the mun ic ipa l law." 
4
 Article 8 (1 ) : "The Republic of Hungary shall recognise fundamental human rights 
as inv io lab le and ina l ienable and it sha l l be a prime du ty of the state to respect and 
pro tec t those rights. 
(2) In the Republic of Hungary, the rules relating to fundamental r ights and duties 
shall be determined by law, which never te less cannot restr ict the subs t ance of any 
f u n d a m e n t a l right." 
[Note : Human r ights are set out in Chap t e r XII—art ic les 54-70/K.] 
5
 Article 70/A (1): "The Republic of Hungary shall guarantee for everyone in its 
territory all human and civil rights wi thout distinction of any kind such as race, colour, 
sex, language, re l igion, polit ical or o t h e r opinion, na t iona l or social o r ig in , property, 
bir th or other s tatus ." 
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The Constitution laid particular stress on the institution of the ombudsman 
for minorities.6 Quite plainly, the Constitution can regulate no more than the 
truly fundamental principles and the specific conditions are established by 
separate legislation, notably on the rights of minorities. This law' passed in 
1993 associates the concept of individual rights with a collective approach, 
expressed generally as the manifestation of the concept of the "personal 
autonomy". 
In fact the solution prescribed by Hungarian law only partially corresponds 
to this idea of "personal autonomy": institutions securing it are indeed provided 
for in the letter of the law, alongside and as it were above the normal institutions 
of local self-government, the individual rights of persons belonging to minorities 
and the collective rights pertaining to these minorities. It is the essential 
ingredient in a coherent complex of instruments. Logically, self-government, 
present at various levels of socitey, tends to be linked with collective rights. 
At the same time, as it will be explained below, it embodies the applied principle 
of subsidiarity. Even so, in theory, self-government is also conceivable in 
the framework of the organisation of public administration and not 
necessarily in the human rights f ramework. Nor indeed is it alien to human 
rights — the Hungarian law find landmarks in European practice, like the 
ombudsmen and Lapp assemblies of the Scandinavian countries or certain 
Slovenian institutions. At the same time, Hungarian law is consistent with the 
undertakings made in international law: the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages, the Lramework-convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities in Europe and bilateral treaties—which are furthermore based 
on the individual as well as the collective approach to the protection of 
minorities, and establish bilateral supervision machinery7 are the frame of 
reference, supplementing the other stipulations of international law. 
6
 Article 32/B (2): "The parliamentary ombudsman for the rights of national and 
ethnic minor i t ies shall have the duty to e x a m i n e or have examined any irregular i t ies 
brought to his attention in connection wi th the rights of national and ethnic minorit ies 
and to ini t ia te general or individual m e a s u r e s to remedy t h e m . " 
[Note: He is elected by the par l iament , cf . article 19 (3) of the Cons t i tu t ion . ] 
7
 Hungary-Ukraine: Treaty on good-neighbourly relations and foundat ion of co-
operation (6. 12. 1991), Declaration on principles of co-operation in the protect ion of the 
rights of national minorities (31. 5. 1991) and Protocol thereto (31. 5. 1991). Hungary-
Slovenia: Treaty on good neighbourly relations (1. 12. 1992) and Convention on the special 
rights of the Slovenian minority living in Hungary and of the Hungarian minori ty living in 
Slovenia (6. 11. 1992); Hungary-Croatia: Convention on the rights of the Croatian 
minority living in Hungary and of the Hungar ian minority living in Croatia (5. 4. 1995); 
Hungary-Slovakia: Treaty on the good neighbourly relations and the co-operation (19. 3. 
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Self-government in terms of "personal autonomy" thus find its technical 
justification in the geographical and numerical patterns of minorities in Hungary.8 
Its legal justification is inferred from the aforementioned stipulations of the 
Constitution and to some extent from the law on local authorities;9 its 
political justification stems f rom the will of the minorities concerned— 
which conducted the negotiations as a united front: the government had as its 
associate and talking-partner and ad hoc representative body made up of 
delegations of the interest10—and the meeting of minds between the 
government and the parliament. (This is also expressed the virtual 
unanimity with which the law was passed.) The long drafting procedure, in 
which the commencement and the first draft date back to 1989-199011 also 
testifies to the fact that the minorities regarded the proposals founded on 
12 • 
traditional freedom of association as inadequate. 
1995); Hungary-Rumania: Treaty on understanding, good neighbourly relations and co-
operation (16. 9. 1996) 
8
 Hungary and h e r minorit ies: 
a) results of the census of 1980, 1990 according to the reply to the question 
about "nationality": Germans : 11,310 (1980); 30 ,824 (1990) ; Slovaks: 9 ,101 (1980); 
10,459 (1990); C roa t i ans , Slovenians or Serbians: 18 ,431 (1980); Croa t ians : 13,570 
(1990) ; Serbians 2 , 9 0 5 (1990); S loven ians or other: 1 ,930 (1990); Ruman ians : 8 ,874 
(1980) ; 10,740 (1990) ; Gipsies (Roma) : 142,683 (1990) . 
b) results of the census of 1980,1990 according to the reply to the question about 
"mother tongue": Ge rmans : 31,231 (1980); 37 ,511(1990) ; Slovaks: 16,054 (1980); 
12,745 (1990); Croat ians , Slovenians or Serbians: 2 7 , 0 5 2 (1980); Croat ians: 17,757 
(1990); Serbians: 2 ,593 (1990); Slovenians or other: 2 ,627 (1990); Rumanians : 10,141 
(1980); 8,730(1990); Gips ies (Roma): 48 ,072 (1990). 
c) governmental approximation following certain empirical researches in 506 
localities, according to the Hooz-method: Germans: min. 95,000; Slovaks: min. 50,000; 
Croat ians , S lovenians et Serbians: min . 38,000; R u m a n i a n s : min. 10,000; Gipsies: 
4 0 0 - 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 (global es t imat ion, w i thou t empirical researches) . 
d) estimations of organizations of minorities: Croatians: 80-90,000; Serbians: 5 ,000; 
Slovenians: 5,000; Rumanians: 25,000; Germans: 200-220 ,000 ; Slovaks: 110,000; Poles: 
10,000; Bulgarians: 3 , 0 0 0 ; Greeks: 2 , 5 0 0 - 3 , 0 0 0 ; A r m e n i a n s : 1,500; Ukrainians : 451; 
Ruthenians (Ruthéno-ukrainiens): 1,000; Gipsies (Roma): 600-800,000 ou 1,000,000. 
9
 Law n° LXV ( 1 9 9 0 ) on local authori t ies and l a w n° LXIV on the election of 
local representat ives f o r local author i t ies and of mayor s . 
10
 This body was work ing under the ti t le of " round tab le of minor i t i es" . 
11
 It was e labora ted by the Secre tar ia t for Minor i t i e s , directed by the deputy 
minis te r Csaba T a b a j d i . The basic app roach was e l abo ra t ed by Mr .Gáspá r Bíró. 
12
 Such a proposal was drafted by the Ministry of Just ice as an eventual alternative to 
the home rule principle, proposed by the Secretariat for Minorities (see footnote n°10). 
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Under the terms of the law, a national or ethnic minority is a community 
(Volksgruppe) in a numerical minority by comparision with the other in-
habitants of the state, which has resided in the territory of the Republic of 
Hungary for at least a century, and whose members—who are Hungarian 
citizens—differ from other population components in language, culture and 
tradition. According to this definition, evidently inspired by Mr Capotorti, the 
following communities are assumed to be traditionally settled in Hungary: 
Germans, Armenians, Bulgarians, Croates, Greeks, Poles, Romanians, Ruthenians, 
Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Gypsies. Minorities as communities are entitled to 
establish their own forms of social organisation and autonomy at local and 
national level. The Parliament has elected an ombudsman to supervise and 
further the effective exercise of the rights of national or ethnic minorities. 
Minorities as communities are entitled to establish their own forms of social 
organization and autonomy at local and national level. The Parliament has 
elected an ombudsman to supervise and further the effective exercise of 
the rights of national or ethnic minorities. The ombudsman's missions was 
important: mainly certain members of the Roma community asked for his 
fact finding and good offices in conflict-settlement. 
The law recognises the creation and operation of minorities' self-govern-
ment in the sense of cultural autonomy, as the most important requirement 
for minorities to assert their r ights . It thus enables minorities in the 
municipalities, the towns and the districts of the capital to establish their 
own municipal councils or to bring into being, whether directly or indirectly, 
self-government bodies with a local or a national remit.13 Where the minority 
is unable to form a local minority council, its interest are represented by a 
local ombudsman (speaker). 
Why was such an intricate and highly complex arrangement chosen? 
The four "manifestations" of the autonomy, namely municipal self-government, 
13
 A municipal counci l may declare i tself a minority counc i l if 50%+1 of its repre-
sentatives have been e lec ted as candidates in respect of a national or e thn ic minority. 
Where at least 30% of the members of a local assembly h a v e been elected as candidates 
is respect of the same minori ty , these m a y fo rm a local minor i ty council consis t ing of at 
least 3 members. (If the population is be low 1300, this body is constituted by 3 delegates. 
There are 5 in a municipal i ty with a popula t ion of over 1300. In towns, there are 7 and 
9 in towns which are coun ty capitals and in districts of the national capi tal . ) It is also 
possible to elect local se l f -government bodies directly by special local initiative. 
Elections of this kind were held on 11 December 1994 in conjunct ion with the 
municipal elections and were also held additionally at the end of 1995 by the decision 
of the government. 
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local self-government, the institution of the local ombudsman and the 
national self-government, differ in purpose. 
Municipal self-government ("municipal minority council" in the law) is 
in fact an other title of a local self-government in the European sense of the 
word. This can be practised in municipalities, where most of the electorate 
belongs to a minority. The geographical distribution of minorities is however 
such that some would be incapable of forming a local self-government body 
since generally speaking this would presuppose that the bulk of the local 
electorate belongs to a national minority present only in some municipalities 
even in the case of the more numerous minorities. Local minority self-govern-
ment ("local minority council" in the law), however, caters fo r situations 
where the linguistic minority constitutes a minority even in the locality; 
apparently this type of institution could become far more widespread. The law 
contains generally identical competences, regulated in the same paragraphs 
for both hypotheses.14 
14 
§ 26: (1) Municipal minority counc i l s and local minor i ty councils may , in matters 
a f fec t ing the situation of minorities, r e f e r to the head of appropriate administration in 
order to: a) request information; b) submi t proposals; c) request the application of 
certain measures; d) ob jec t to any prac t ice or decis ion relating to the operation of 
inst i tut ions and violat ing minority r ights , with a view to the modification or withdrawal 
of the decision in ques t ion . 
(2) The head of the adminis t ra t ion, in the cases d e f i n e d in (1) ab o v e , must make a 
subs tan t ive reply to the appeal within 3 0 days. 
(3) If the head of the adminis t ra t ion appealed to does not have competence or 
au thor i ty with respect to the subjects of the appeal, he shal l refer the appea l within 3 
days to a competent body . 
§ 27: Within their own sphere of competence and within the limits of the provisions 
made by the munic ipa l council, the loca l minority counc i l shall de t e rmine : a) its 
o rganisa t iona l and opera t iona l s t ruc ture and its rules of procedure; b ) i ts budget and 
f ina l accounts and the use of resources allocated by the local counci l ; c) the use of 
separa te resources a l loca ted to it f r o m the resources of the mun ic ipa l council in 
acco rdance with the provis ions of the p resen t law; d) t he name, e m b l e m s and honours 
of minor i ty council and the regula t ions on their c o n f e r m e n t ; e) the loca l holidays of 
the minor i t ies it r epresen t s ; f) in a c c o r d a n c e with the regulat ions pe r t a in ing thereto, 
the list of its protected monuments , commemora t ive s i t es and the local ru les for their 
p ro tec t ion . 
(2) On the ini t ia t ive of the minor i ty council , the representat ive b o d y forming the 
mun ic ipa l council sha l l determine t h e resources and asse ts which it is required to 
p rov ide for the use of the minority counc i l , i temising the movable and immovable 
asse ts and the f inanc ia l resources, so that the minor i ty council may discharge the 
f u n c t i o n s defined by law. 
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The local ombudsman 5 (speaker) is a special institution which operates 
when, despite the rules advocating posit ive discrimination, it has not been 
possible to elect even a local minority council. 
(3) Within its sphere of competence, the minority council may found and opera te as 
far as its resources permit institutions in the following areas in particular: a) local public 
educat ion; b) local press and electronic m e d i a ; c) maintenance of traditions; d ) culture. 
(4) Wi th in the f r a m e w o r k and l imits a s s igned to it, the minori ty counc i l may: a) 
found and operate en te rpr i ses or other e c o n o m i c concerns; b ) organise compe t i t i ons ; 
c) es tab l i sh scholarships . 
(5) If a decision by the municipal c o u n c i l is requi red in order to e n a b l e the 
minori ty counci l to exerc i se its r ights , t h e representat ive body shall p l a c e on the 
agenda of its next mee t ing the minori ty c o u n c i l ' s request f o r the necessary decis ion. 
Where the decision is in the remit of a n o t h e r se l f -government body, the l a t t e r shall 
take a dec i s ion within 30 days fo l lowing the submission of the request. 
§ 28: The mayor ' s o f f i ce , appoin ted b y the municipal council , is r e q u i r e d to 
render ass is tance in the proceedings of t h e loca l minority counc i l s in a c c o r d a n c e with 
its ru les of procedure. 
§ 29: (1) For the pu rpose of enac t ing local by-laws o n local public educa t ion , 
local media , main tenance of tradit ions a n d local culture and use of the language 
associa ted with the minor i ty p o p u l a t i o n ' s s tatus as a minor i ty , the represen ta t ive 
body of the municipal counc i l shall o b t a i n the consent of t he local minor i ty counci l 
represen t ing the minori ty population. 
(2) T h e consent of the local minor i ty counc i l is requi red fo r the a p p o i n t m e n t of 
heads of minori ty educa t iona l ins t i tu t ions and for decis ions concerning t h e t raining 
of m e m b e r s of minori t ies . In the absence of a minority c o u n c i l , an opin ion shal l be 
given by the ombudsman f o r the minor i ty o r , in his absence , by the local assoc ia t ion 
of the minor i ty . 
(3) Whichever au thor i ty holds the r igh t of approval and the right of inspec t ion 
shall n o t i f y its decision wi th in 30 days a f t e r receiving the reques t or be ing apprised 
of its conten t . Thereaf te r , these rights sha l l b e forfei ted. 
§ 30: (1) Municipal and local minority counci ls may maintain relations with any other 
minori ty organisat ion o r association and conclude co-opera t ion ag reemen t s with 
them. 
(2) Minority organisations, institutions and associations may enter state compe t i t i ons 
conduc ted in the f ie lds of culture, e d u c a t i o n and sc i ence on equal t e r m s with 
minori ty se l f -government bodies. 
§ 46: (1) Munic ipa l councils and l oca l minority se l f -government b o d i e s shall 
assist in assess ing needs in respect of m i n o r i t y education and its organisat ion. ( . . .) 
§ 47: Local minor i ty se l f -government bodies may not take over f r o m another 
body the control of educat ional e s t a b l i s h m e n t s unless the standard of educa t ion 
hitherto achieved can be maintained. T h e extent of s ta te support t o these 
es tab l i shments cannot be reduced af ter the t r ans fe r of responsibi l i ty . 
15
 § 40: (...) the local minority o m b u d s m a n is authorised: a) inasmuch as h e is not 
a m e m b e r of the local counc i l ' s r ep re sen ta t i ve body, to b e present in an advisory 
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National self-government16 (the "national minority counci l" in the law) 
is an elected body whose electors are persons working in the lower self-
capac i ty at its m e e t i n g s and those of all its c o m m i t t e e s , including closed sess ions , 
dea l ing with q u e s t i o n s concerning a minority; b) to propose to the mayor and to the 
commit tee cha i rman during counc i l or committee mee t ings that a deba te be held o n 
any issue a f f ec t ing the situation of minorities w h i c h comes within the remit of t he 
counc i l or committee; c) to initiate a review by the representative body of any decision by 
its committee c o n c e r n i n g the s i tua t ion of minor i t i e s ; d) during meet ings of t he 
representat ive b o d y or of its commit tee, to request information from the mayor, the clerk 
or the committee cha i rman on local government b u s i n e s s of concern to minorities; e ) 
to request f rom the mayor or the c lerk such informat ion and administrative co-operation 
as is necessary fo r the discharge of h i s duties; f ) t o request action b y the mayor, t he 
c le rk or any o f f i c i a l holding the appropr ia te respons ib i l i t i es in ma t t e r s affecting the 
minor i ty as such; g) to propose t ha t the represen ta t ive body, in mat te r s affect ing a 
minori ty , turn to a s ta te authority ( . . . ) 
(2) Pursuant to the initiatives provided for in sub-section 1, paragraph (b), the 
mayor or the commi t t ee chairman shal l submit the ombudsman ' s proposa l to the next 
session of the representat ive body or the committee, which shall dec ide whether to p lace 
the issue on the agenda and what preparatory steps will be taken for its discussion. 
(3) If the ombudsman requests information from the mayor, the clerk or the commit tee , 
a substantive r ep ly must be f u r n i s h e d either dur ing t h e session or in wri t ing within 15 
days thereafter. 
(4) On the o m b u d s m a n ' s r eques t , his s ta tement shal l be inc luded in the minu tes 
of the session o r — i f submitted in wr i t i ng —appended thereto. 
(5) Discussion of the issue w h i c h affects the s i tua t ion of minor i t i e s and has b e e n 
p laced on the a g e n d a fol lowing an initiative as p r o v i d e d in sub-sec t ion 1, paragraph 
(b) and in a c c o r d a n c e with the p rov i s ions of sub - sec t i on 2, cannot be postponed or 
r emoved from the agenda except at the o m b u d s m a n ' s request. 
(6) Before i s su ing any decree determining the r igh t s and obl igat ions of a minority, 
or before taking measures which general ly i n f l u e n c e the situation of minorities, the 
municipal counci l shal l consult the ombudsman. 
16
 § 37: The nat ional minority councils, under the arrangements and within the l imi ts 
established by l aw, shall decide independently on: a) seat, organisation and operation; 
b) budget, final account and property inventory; c) elements constituting its entire 
property; d) n a m e s and emblems; e) national h o l i d a y s of the minor i t i e s which t h e y 
represent ; f) h o n o u r s and condi t ions and rules f o r t he i r conferment ; g) principles and 
procedures for u s e of radio and television f r e q u e n c i e s at their d i sposa l ; i) r e lease 
press statements; j ) foundation of institutions, their organisation and rules of procedure , 
u p k e e p and ope ra t i on ; k) f o u n d a t i o n and ope ra t ion of theatres; 1) foundat ion and 
upkeep of m u s e u m or public co l l ec t ions cons t i t u t ed by col lec tors throughout the 
country ; m) cons t i tu t ion of l ibrar ies fo r minori t ies; n ) es tabl ishment and operation of 
an arts or science inst i tute or a pub l i sh ing company ; o ) maintenance of secondary and 
h igher education es tabl i shments u n d e r national au thor i ty ; p) p rov i s ion and operat ion 
of a legal aid s e rv i ce ; (....) r) d i s cha rge of other d u t i e s assigned to t h e m by law. 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF MINORITIES IN HUNGARY 215 
government bodies. Certain minorities may unable to avail themselves of 
other forms of self-government than this national-level one, far want of a 
sound local basis. In this case, the election is vested in the hand of special 
caucus, composed of electoral representatives designated for this purpose 
by the scattered communities. 
The powers vested in the different forms of self-government are fairly 
similar and essentially concern the fulfilment of minorities' educational, cultural 
and traditional needs. This is where the two classic expressions of autonomy 
are apparent: either true self-government or a co-decisional competence, implying 
a de facto veto right. In other areas, the right to consult the local or state 
governmental administration and the right to present them with initiatives 
(right of petition) are secured. The quality of the right of initiative is enhanced 
by the obligation of reply which is imposed on the body adressed. 
Despite the complexity of the provisions, there is no duplication at local 
level because the three modialities described above are alternative institutions 
whose actuation essentially depends on two factors: f i rs t ly the specifics of 
the geographical distribution of linguistic minorities and secondly their 
political activism. 
It was therefore expedient for the law to offer an array of instruments 
presenting a certain logical coherence and applying to the various minorities 
concerned while taking account of wide numerical differences. Subsidiarity, 
i.e. the devolution of powers, chiefly concerning matters of identity, education, 
schooling, culture and including the relevant budget, (alimented essentially 
§ 38: (1) The national c o u n c i l a) expresses its opinion on d r a f t laws a f f e c t i n g the 
minorities it represents as such, including decrees by the general assemblies of coun t i e s 
and the capital; b) may request information from administrative bodies on matters c o n c e r n i n g 
groups of minor i t ies they r ep resen t , submit p roposa ls to t h e m , and call for measures 
to be taken in matters within their competence; c) co-operates with the re levant state 
bodies in the professional supervision of primary, secondary and h igher education f o r the 
minori t ies it represents . (...) 
(3) For the purposes of leg is la t ion on the maintenance o f historical se t t l ements , 
the consent of the national m i n o r i t y counc i l —and the local m i n o r i t y se l f -government 
bodies in the case of legislat ion concerning t h e m — i s mandatory . 
If there is no local minor i ty council , it i s the spokesperson , or failing t ha t , the 
local minori ty associat ion, w h i c h gives its c o n s e n t . 
(4) With the exception of h ighe r educa t ion , the national counc i l has the r igh t of 
approval as regards preparation of the general syllabus for the educat ion of minor i t ies . 
§ 39: Within its sphere of activity, the na t iona l council m a y organise compet i t ions 
or es tabl ish scholarships . 
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f r o m the Fund for National or Ethnic Minorities but the Parliament'7 also 
contribute to special programs) at every level where self-government operates. 
Electoral legitimacy bolsters the responsibility of the representatives of 
minorities and at the same time, confers the of choosing between the various 
forms of organisation upon those directly concerned. In this way, it is a lso 
hoped to guard against government patronage (clientelism). 
The combined municipal and minority elections in 1994 and the minority 
elections in 1995 yielded the following results: 
The minorities and the self-government bodies 
Loca l minority Minority Loca l minority 
se l f -gov ' t village se l f -gov ' t 
(renamed as municipal 
Direct ly Indirectly minority se l f -gov ' t ) 
e lec ted elected Election Elec t ion 
11 Dec 1994 11 Dec 1994 11 Dec 1994 19Nov 
1995 
Total 
Bulgarian 2 2 4 
Roma 415 1 61 4 7 7 
Greek 2 4 6 
Croat 35 1 15 6 57 
Polish 2 5 7 
German 98 7 19 38 162 
Armenian 9 7 16 
Romanian 9 1 1 11 
Ruthenian 1 1 
Serb 19 19 
Slovak 28 4 6 13 51 
Slovene 2 3 1 6 
Total 622 12 45 138 817 
17
 The Pa r l i amen t authorized t h e Committee f o r Human and Minor i ty Rights and 
Rel igious A f f a i r s to pass the d e c i s i o n about t h e budgetary con t r ibu t ion to spec i a l 
programs. 
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What are the experiences of the seven year existence of this instrumental 
complex? The appreciation is globally positive. The following problems 
emerged during the practice: the very complicated way of the elections was 
criticized, but the greatest problem is the modesty of budget and the difficulty 
how to secure properly the control of the State Audit Of f ice concerning 
the use of the state-subsidies. There is another (but for the time being only 
theoretical) problem: how to treat the eventual bad financial exercise in 
order to avoid "bankruptcy". The harmonization of the co-decisional com-
petences should also be improved. It is interesting to see the two different 
main profils of the activities: the self-governments of the gipsy (Rom) 
community want to deal much more or essentially with social problems, 
establishment of special schools of special curricula, axed on the effective 
social rehabilitation, equality of chances etc. The government prepared a 
medium-term plan aiming to improve the Romas ' position in the labour 
market with educational programs as well as with certain initiatives to 
help them to establish small agricultural and industrial enterprises. At the 
same time, the classic linguistic minorities (Germans, Slovaks, Croatians, 
Romanians, Serbes etc.) are concentrating on linguistic educational and 
cultural matters, institutions etc. 
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The Structure of Legal System 
(The Concept of Multi-Layered Legal System) 
Abstract . In the study the legal system is conteptualized as a meaning system which 
contains the text layer, the layer of the legal dogmat ics , the layer of judicial precedents 
and in some modern legal system the layer of the constitutional t ights is added to these. 
The study outlines the connections among these layers of law compar ing the continental 
legal systems rooted in the Roman law to the common law systems. Wi th this concept of 
law the study analyses the history of legal theory and makes a typology of the tightening 
concepts of law which emphasize only one layer of the law. For example, for the French 
ecole de l ' exégèse in the 19. century the law was only the text, for the German Bergiffs-
jur isprudenz the law was the layer of the legal doctr ines, or for the legal realists the law 
was the judge made law; and newly for Ronald Dworkin and his fo l lowers the law is 
identified as the layer of the constitutional rights f i rs t of all. 
Keywords: legal system, legal theory, legal dogmat ics , constitutionalization 
If one decides to make a comparative analysis of the various modern legal 
systems, one will inevitably encounter the following phenomenon; namely, 
that the very same component which one finds in the legal systems of d i f ferent 
countries is of varying importance; in certain countries it plays a ma jo r 
role, while in others it is much less important. Such a comparative study 
which examines components of several different countries will reach a far 
more comprehensive result than research which only focuses on a single 
legal system. Therefore, an attempt to create an overall legal concept will 
be more precise if it is based on a comparative study of the various legal 
systems of the present, and further compared with the opposing influential 
legal theories of the last centuries. The result of such a comparison will 
show that these legal theories restrict the actually exist ing multi-layered 
legal systems. This can be easily integrated into an overall theory of law, 
which is the aim of this brief study. 
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1. Restricting legal theories and multi-layered legal concepts 
If one examines the development of the legal theories of the past two-hundred 
years, one observes the formulation of certain opposing legal concepts which 
identified law with phenomena that determined the rulings of court. 
Montesquieu's surprising statement, which declared that the judge is the 
mere mouthpiece of law, appeared in numerous tendencies of legal theory 
in the last two-hundred years. First, it was the French "école de l'exégèse" in 
the first half of the 19th century; later on it appeared in German legal 
theories by Julius Bergbohm and, some time later, by Hans Kelsen. Sub-
sequently it made its appearance in the theories of the Soviets. 
The legal concept which identified law with the text of the past decisions 
made by state bodies was opposed by the leading German legal concept of 
the 19th century, namely the pandectist jurisprudence, known under 
several designations, such as "Begriffsjurisprudenz" or "jurisdiction built 
on legal-doctrines", according to the terminology of its critics. This concept 
defined law as a "touched up", refined system of legal-terms. Its main 
representatives, Georg Puchta and Bernhard Windscheid, for instance, saw 
the determination of the judicial decisions through the hierarchical order 
of the legal terms, and when the first draft of the German BGB (civil code) 
was completed with the participation of Windschied in 1884, the practicing 
judges ot the time labeled it a "monstrosity ot jurists." It is impossible to 
deal with everyday cases, with all their tiny divergences, if legislation is 
based upon an abstract system of legal terms—this was the opinion of the 
practicing judges. 
This clarity of legal notions and the identification of law with the clear-
cut system of legal terms appeared in the United States in the 1870's, almost 
contemporaneously with Windscheid's works, through the participation of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the dean of the Faculty of Law of Harvard 
University. It remained the leading tendency of the American legal practice 
and influenced works on legal science for the next several decades. An 
opposing tendency emerged which defined law as the collection of all 
judicial decisions. In Germany, it was supported by the members of the so-
1
 F inkentscher , W.: Methoden des Rechts. (Band I.: R o m a n i s c h e r Rechtskre i s ; 
Band II. Anglo-amerikanischer Rechtskreis; Band III. Mitteleuropäischer Rechtskreis) 
Tübingen, 1975; Larenz, K.: Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft. 4. Auflage. Berl in— 
New York, 1979. 
2
 Duxbury, N.: The Theory and History of American Law and Politics. Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies. 1991/4. 589-597.; Grey, Th. С.: Modern American Legal 
Thought. Stanford Law Review. 1996. 
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called School of Free Law, while in the United States its representatives 
were the exponents of the trend of "legal realism". 
From time to time, although a few influential jurists appeared who endeav-
ored to include the multiple layers of law in their legal concepts, although the 
authority of the ruling tendency always oppressed these random attempts. 
The authors of multi-layer legal concepts therefore abandoned their ideas, 
and they too adopted the mainstream direction. The German Carl Friedrich 
von Savigny can be mentioned, for instance, who, in his earlier works wrote 
about legal institutions and legal dogmatics which analyze them and formulate 
general rules. Later on, however, influenced by Georg Puchta himself , he 
also shifted his attention towards a legal concept built on legal terms in spite 
of being one of the main supporters of the idea of a school of legal history. 
Another example is Francois Gény who, at the end of the 19th century in 
France, opposed textual positivism propagated by the "école de l ' exégèse" , 
and emphasized the importance of the multiple components of law. In 
1921 in the United States, Benjamin Cardozo emphasized the role of the 
multi-layered legal components in his book "The Nature of the Juridical 
Process".3 Later on, however, he adopted the views of the legal realists, 
who emphasized the central role of the rulings of the court. 
Thus, these theories define law as a "textual layer", "legal dogmatic layer", 
and "a layer of judge-made law", though it must be said that these theories 
only recognized one of the three layers as law at a time, and sometimes the 
coming into existence of one of these theories was in reaction to another. 
Another layer of the law was emphasized by an emerging legal theory 
in the United States in the 1960's, which can be identified with the name of 
Ronald Dworkin.4 This theory found the essence of law in the fundamental 
constitutional rights and basic constitutional principles. Dworkin's thesis was 
set out in his book "Taking Rights Seriously", though his legal theories are 
more clearly expressed if we paraphrase the title as "only basic rights should 
be taken seriously!". In the United States from the 1960's the extension of the 
judicial process based directly on the constitution led to the relegation of 
simple laws to the background while, in parallel, the doctrinal conceptual 
system of certain legal branches also lost its importance. These developments, 
which began in the United States, have emerged in several other countries 
in the past years, while in the U.S. they fell into the background.5 The 
3
 Ca rdozo , B. N.: The Nature of Juridical Process. New Haven , 1921. 
4
 D w o r k i n , R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambr idge , M a s s . and London, 1977 . 
5
 Posner , R. A.: The Problems of Jurisprudence. Ann A r b o r , 1990; Grey: M o d e r n 
American L e g a l Thought, op. cit. 
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textual layer, the doctrinal layer, the layer of judge-made law and, above 
all, the layer of fundamental constitutional rights—these notions summarize 
the most influential legal theories of the last two-hundred years. How is 
one to create an overall theory, a multi-layered legal concept out of these 
opposing legal concepts? 
2. The layers of the law 
If one examines the development of the modern legal systems, a striking 
feature of its progressive tendency is that the rules of law tended to take 
the form of decisions of the sovereign power, and that judicial decisions had 
to be made according to the texts of the state power. Based on the medieval 
continental European jurisdictions, which already possessed collections of 
customary laws, the legal practice that can be always amended by the 
central state power was rapidly accomplished with the influence of the 
absolutist rulers of the 1600's.6 Later on, with the sovereign power's growing 
démocratisation and the development of parliamentarism, it was only the 
place of making the final decisions that shifted from the royal authority to 
the parliaments. With this progress, law became the collection of the 
decisions of the sovereign power, but it primarily became a collection of 
legislated texts in countries with a democratic political system. In England 
and in countries influenced by England's common law system, however, it 
was attenuated by allowing the high courts to create judge-made law. 
With the adoption of a multi-party system and within the sphere of mass-
media based on freedom of speech, the parliament became the culminating 
point of the society 's political common will; so the law that appeared in 
legislative texts more or less depended on the will and majority opinions 
of society. The court decisions that depend on legislation fulfill society's 
self-governing nature: society itself decides when the judges apply these 
fixed laws in each individual case and dispute. Because law fundamentally 
appears in legislative texts and is a result of a democratic decision of the 
state power, it tends to express the empirical common will of society. 
When textual positivism identifies law with legislative texts, it emphasizes 
an important aspect, but it also commits two fundamental mistakes. One of 
these concerns the following: in the complex and intricate social context, 
thousands and thousands of legal regulations have to be perpetually created 
6
 Caenegem, R. C.: Das R e c h t im Mi t te la l t e r . In: Entstehung und Wandel 
rechtlicher Traditionen (hrsg.: Fikentscher , W. A . ) . München, 1980. 606-667 . 
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if they are to be consistent. If this is not done properly, they may end up 
canceling each other's effects through contradictory content. It might be well 
imagined what sort of legal chaos would result on the level of judicial case-
law. It is only a carefully prearranged system of legal concepts that can provide 
harmony amongst the many thousands of legal regulations. Furthermore, it 
is the unified application of these concepts in many legal rules that can 
maintain this intellectual systemic quality and consistency in a heightened 
form. Thus without a legal dogmatic layer, the layer of legal texts cannot 
function. Overlooking this fact is one of the errors of textual positivism. 
The other source of error is the failure to take into account the openness of 
the legal regulations. It is very typical of code-like laws to use overall, rather 
general notions and regulations, which renders divergence possible in its 
application. This could result in several different judicial decisions in a 
country in similar or even identical cases, which would easily create legal 
chaos. Thus without a Supreme Courts ' use of concretizing precedents, the 
imprecise legal regulations could not properly function.7 
Textual positivism, a concept of law built on legal dogmatics and the 
concept of judge-made law can be integrated into a multi-layer legal concept, 
if their striving for absoluteness is set aside. The textual layer of law, that 
can function as a consistent intellectual organization due to its prearranged 
doctrinal conceptual system, is connected to a democratic political common 
will, and among the existence of many thousands of legal provisions, it keeps 
the functioning of law in consistent order. The openness of the regulations 
that the texts of laws, that are formed from a legal-dogmatic point of view, 
contain, are counterbalanced by the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts. It 
is a jurisdiction built on precedent, and together with the doctrinally 
formed texts of laws, it renders a unified law for each country. 
The importance and function of the aforementioned three layers of law 
can be easily observed in continental European legal systems, as well as 
those built on the common-law system, though in different proportions. It 
can be stated, that the more abstract the codified law gets in a legal system, 
the more inevitable it becomes to concretize the doctrinal categories, and 
to shape the judicial processes accordingly. Furthermore, the loose regulations 
that the codes contain have to be concretized and updated with the current 
judicial precedents. In contrast, the more specific and concrete the legislative 
provisions, the less necessary it becomes to have a doctrinal layer or a 
7
 For the growing role of the precedents in the contemporary legal systems see 
Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study (ed.: M a c C o r m i c k , N . — S u m m e r s , R. 
S.). Dar tmouth , 1997. 
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concretizing body of judicial precedents. Accordingly, judicial precedent 
would instead function as a method of independent regulation, and not as 
a concretizing legal layer. The English legal system can be characterized 
as such a system, while the legislation of the United States started to shift 
in the last century towards that of the continental European countries' 
codified legal system and, compared to the English system, a stronger legal-
dogmatic categorical system was established in certain f ie lds of law. 
However, among the continental European countries' legal systems, a visible 
difference can be observed concerning the importance of each of the three 
legal-layers; while in the German legal system and in the other continental 
legal systems influenced by it, the doctrinal layer is of high importance, it 
is much less so in the French legal system. 
There is a divergence amongst the continental legal systems with regard 
to the development of the layer of judicial precedent. Although its signi-
ficance seems to be increasing everywhere in the course of the last few 
decades, it is mostly in the Scandinavian countries and Germany where it is of 
marked importance, while in the southern-European countries and France it is 
still not so highly emphasized.9 Among the post-socialist countries, it is in 
Hungary and Poland that a visible development can be observed concerning 
the importance of the aforementioned layer of judicial precedents.10 Besides 
the mere textual layer of off icial regulations, the layers of doctrine and 
judicial precedent are also an essential part of the legal systems of these 
countries. In Hungary, the empirical statistics which analyze the rulings of 
the courts prove that the position taken by the Courts is based on the texts 
of law, as well as on the interpretations of certain doctrinal notions, together 
with the precedents of the Supreme Court which provide solutions for 
some of the legal dilemmas which were left unsolved by the former legal 
regulations." The cooperation of these three layers of law is not recent; it can 
be observed in the legal history of the past centuries and, in some countries 
8
 Dawson, J. P.: The Oracles of the Law. Ann Arbor : 1968. 
9
 See Alexy, R.—Dreier, R.: Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: 
Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study, op. cit. 17-64.; La Torre, M.—Taruffo, 
M.: Precedent in Italy. In: Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study, op. cit. 141-188; 
Peczenik, A.—Bergholz, G.: Precedent in Sweden. In: Interpreting Precedents. A 
Comparative Study, op. cit. 293-314. 
10
 Wróblevski , J.: Statutory In terpre ta t ion in Po land . In: Interpreting Statutes. A 
Comparative Study (ed.: MacCormick, N.—Summers, R. S.). Dartmouth, 1991. 257-310. 
1
 See Pokol, В.: Statutory Interpretation and the Precedent in Hungary. East European 
Quarterly. 2000. N o . 3. 162-177. ; Poko l , В.: Rech taus legung und höchs t r ichter l ichen 
Prä jud iz ien in Hungary . Zeitshcrift für öffentliches Recht. 2000 Hef t 3. 
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where a Constitutional Court was established, it was even accompanied by 
a layer of constitutional rights. If we do not accept Ronald Dworkin ' s 
overemphasizing attitude on this field, and we attempt to integrate funda-
mental rights into an extensive legal concept, as a recently established 
legal layer, the following connections have to be emphasized. 
As a starting point it has to be stressed that this recent legal layer may 
have a different impact on the three already existing layers within the 
legal systems of various countries. Wherever the new legal layer comes 
into being with the establishment of a Constitutional Court, it inevitably 
influences the creation of the textual layer. A judicial decision which is 
declared unconstitutional loses its validity—this is the sole influence of 
the layer of fundamental rights. Its other important inf luence is due to the 
procedure of considering the essential normative bas is of the previous 
constitutional decisions before issuing new judicial decisions. 
A third influence can be observed if the fundamental constitutional 
rights and their concretizing constitutional restrictions are included in 
each legal branch's doctrinal activity, and the doctrinal system of legal terms 
of the criminal law, family law, labour law, etc. is (also) altered according 
to the legal layer of fundamental rights. If this is accomplished, the new 
legal layer, besides its e f fec t on the textual layer, will have an influence 
on the doctrinal layer as well. 
Finally, a third influence is that of fundamental r ights on certain court 
rulings; either through its inclusion in the analysis of judicial decisions— 
together with other evaluations, or through their exclusion—or relegating 
the relevant judicial decision itself to the background, and issuing a rul ing 
based on fundamental constitutional rights. If the latter occurs—as it did 
in the United States during the period of the activist Warren Court in the 
1960's and 1970's, then fundamental rights push all o ther legal layers into 
the background. In most legal systems which have constitutional courts, 
the layer of fundamental rights only influences the layer of the legal text, 
and jurists also form their "de lege ferenda" suggestions that consider 
fundamental rights according to the legislation and not with the a im of 
influencing the judicial decisions. 
In this restricted solution the traditional cooperation of the three legal 
layers remains, and the fundamental constitutional rights only slightly modi fy 
its final outcome. Aspects of righteousness, and influences that have a short-
term pacifying effect on the empirical common will, improve the functioning 
of the legal system. 
If the aforementioned ideal arrangement is established, the layer of 
legal texts, together with the layer of legal dogmatics and that of judicia l 
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precedents and fundamental constitutional rights together provide a unified 
legal system. This is the goal of the concept of a multi-layered legal system. 
Besides defining the ideal concept of law, it also points out the shortcomings 
of other legal concepts that strive for the absoluteness of one of the legal layers. 
3. The implications of the concept of the multi-layered legal system 
The broadening of the concept of law and the recognition of other legal 
layers engenders the necessity of reconsidering several legal phenomena. 
In the following, we shall examine a few of these. 
(The definition of law) One of the first aims of the necessary recon-
sideration has to be to redefine what law itself means. In other words, if we 
include the doctrinal system as an inevitable part of the law then, accordingly, 
it has to be expressed within the definition of law itself. 
There is another aspect in which law differs from non-legal norms. Namely, 
it produces an intellectual system, and af ter a certain stage of develop-
ment this emphasizes the notions and categories that are used by legal 
norms from other notions of everyday-thinking. The only way to eliminate 
the (possible) inconsistencies that might occur among the many thousands 
of legal norms is to deliberately create specific legal terms, expressions 
and classifications, and then systematically use these when dealing with 
any legal norm in question. Contrary to this, other non-legal, social norms 
rely on notions that are used in everyday-life, and the solutions based on 
these notions do not constitute a unified intellectual system. 
Taking all this into consideration, the definition of law can be given as the 
following: law is a system of norms and their terms that express regulations 
and prohibitions which, fail ing all else, is sustained by coercion of the state. 
(Legal dogmatics as a barrier of legislation) The prearranged system 
of legal terms that the legal norms are based on also has an influence on 
the modifiable nature of certain legal norms. Namely, the modified norm 
has to fit the already existing unified intellectual system and, for instance, 
a new legal norm can not use a classification that would clash with the 
classifications used by the already existing legal norms. For example, in the 
criminal law of most of the modern legal systems, the intentional character is 
separated f rom negligence when judging culpability—or rather these 
concepts are divided into different degrees. If a new legal rule contained a 
new classification of guilt, regardless of the already existing ones, the 
numerous restrictions of the criminal code would simply collapse. To replace 
a legal norm with a new one is only possible if it is doctrinally verified. 
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The emphasis of this connection sheds a different light on the ability to 
modify legislation and the role of legal dogmatics which ensures the law's 
intellectual unity. 
Often it is sufficient to include well-trained lawyers in the parliamentary 
apparatus and legislative committees in the ministries in order to verify 
the consequences of certain amendments. But if a more significant amendment 
or a new enactment of the legislature is at stake, the consideration of the 
doctrinal questions should be done by a specialized legal experts in the 
relevant field. This is especially so in the case of codified laws. 
Inasmuch as the politicians in parliaments of ten amend and interfere 
with laws which rely on a prearranged notional system, or rather establish 
new codes, and this does not affect the fundamentals of the legal-dogmatics, 
we have to hypothetically assume that there has to be a transformational-
mediator sphere in existence between the legislation and the legal dogmatic 
sphere, that somehow connects legislators following a political logic and the 
legal dogmatic sphere itself. In order to verify this hypothesis, the following 
things have to be taken into consideration: the methods of codification, the 
political intentions of the parties, or rather the professional organizations of 
legislation. As a result, the outlines of a legal-political sphere can be 
detected which, in some form or another, is present in every modern 
democracy, particularly in the case of the continental European countries. 
On the one hand, this legal-political sphere exists as a part of the legal 
subsystem that is directed towards politics, and on the other hand, some 
institutions can be found as part of the political subsystem that are involved 
with issues of legislation. Ideally, these two elements of the legal-political 
organization adopt parts of the "de lege ferenda"-type restrictions in a 
two-step transformational process, and in the course of a selected borrowing 
the political side gradually tables bills which were originally formed as 
part of a doctrinal activity, according to the logic of politics ( for instance 
the method of aspiring to maximize the number of votes). 
The part of legal-politics that is established as a part of the legal subsystem, 
typically consists of bodies and assemblies of the various legal professions. 
The conferences, programs, membership-meetings and publications of these 
bodies mostly emphasize proposals about amendments that react to the 
recent social problems, and that were previously outlined and supervised 
from a doctrinal point of view and already published in some of the legal 
periodicals. Thus, a part of the numerous "de lege ferenda"-type propositions 
that the legal experts of universities and the members of the high courts 
etc. outlined only f rom a juridical point of view, become the object of a 
certain filtering process. As a result , those propositions will come to the 
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foreground that are the reactions on the current social problems. At the 
same time, non-topical propositions that concern academic-scientific 
issues only excite attention in scientific circles and are the subject-matter 
of the legal periodicals, without having any influence on the functioning 
legal sphere. 
The other part of the legal-political sphere that is founded as part of 
politics, consists of the legal experts of the parties, the legal groups of the 
parliamentary party-factions, and of the groups of the jurists who are the 
members of the so-called "background-institutions" of the political parties, 
such as the political foundations and party-schools. Though the aspirations of 
the parties are mostly determined by the maximization of the votes (and due 
to this they try to include motions in the par ty ' s program that are likely to 
enhance the number of votes), the adequacy of the programs inquires 
aspirations that are more or less workable. On account of the latter reason, 
the legal experts of the parties can only choose f rom propositions concerning 
amendments that are adaptable f rom a legal-dogmatic point of view. Although 
it becomes very important method to start looking for such motions among 
the lot that would f i t the interest of a certain party the best, or rather to look 
out for those that would be against their interest the most. The jurists of the 
parties mostly concentrate on those "de lege ferenda"-type regulative propositions 
that were already emphasized on the assemblies and conferences of the 
associations of the lawyers, and the social consequences of which were already 
stressed in relation to certain propositions. Thus with a double transformation— 
despite the pushing of the pure legal-dogmatic point of view into the 
background and emphasizing the logic of politics—those regulatory models 
will appear in legislation, that do not violate the intellectual coherence of 
law. The legal experts of parliamentary committees are continually on the watch 
for motions concerning amendments that would violate the established legal-
dogmatic system. 
It is only this legal-politic sphere that mediates between law and politics, 
that can assure the proper operation of legislation, and the intellectual 
systematic character of law. 
(The expansion of the circle of legal sources) The inclusion of more legal 
layers into the concept of law requires the expansion of the circle of legal 
sources. As the multi-layer legal concept can be best observed in the legal 
systems of the continental European countries, let us look at their legal sources. 
It is the state bodies that are in charge of the textual layer of law, and the 
sources of the textual layer are those forms of decision making, that contain 
the textual layer of law. The most characteristic of these are the forms of 
decision making in the case of parliamentary acts, the forms of decision 
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making of the governmental orders, the orders of the ministers, or rather 
the locally prevailing forms of decision making of the local authorities. 
The first outcome of these forms of decision making is a series of open 
legal norms, that can only be accurately interpreted according to the legal-
dogmatic categories that the norms contain. The reduction of the occurring 
disparate possibilities and the establishing of a more unif ied interpretation 
can be achieved with the consensus of the legal profession. The employ-
ment of the accepted legal opinion in legal case-decisions, and—due to 
juridic decisions that refer to these—also the legal-dogmatic works that 
express legal consensus, all contain characteristics of legal source. This is 
typical of Germany, for instance, where in the case of legal dilemmas that 
have to be decided by the Supreme Court , the judges often refer to works 
of certain jurists.12 It is characteristic of numerous countries that when a 
decision has to be made about a legal dilemma, it is the commentaries of 
the law that they refer to, and not directly to the law as it applies to the 
case. According to this—although on a comparatively small scale—, some 
systematizing legal-dogmatic works may also serve as a kind of a legal 
source in certain legal systems. 
The legal textual layer ' s regulations—even if it is amplified with the 
legal-dogmatic interpretations—still remain open, and the layer of the 
concretizing judicial precedents that supplements it and creates a fur ther 
legal source, has to be perpetually observed by lawyers, if they want to 
know what they should expect in their cases. These judge-made laws, that 
gained considerable importance in the legal systems of the continental 
European countries, were mostly created by the Supreme Courts of the 
countries in question, and the forms of decision making of these judic ia l 
forums funct ion as a legal source. 
Finally, wherever a constitutional cour t is in existence, its concretizing 
decisions concerning fundamental constitutional rights and basic principles 
also serve as a legal source. These constitutional decisions have to be 
separated f rom the concretizing precedents that concern basic legal decisions, 
because the fundamental rights that these are based on are not systematized 
dogmatically, they are usually more abstract and compared to certain legal 
restrictions their openness is greater, or the fundamental rights contradict 
each other in some cases, respectively. This is one of the various reasons 
why, based on these, in the continental countries it is the constitutional 
court that decides in these cases, and their inf luence is reduced to 
1 2 Alexy, R.—Dreier , R. : Statutory In terpre ta t ion in t h e Federal R e p u b l i c of 
Germany. Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study. (1991) op. cit. 
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legislation, furthermore, they do not directly affect the judicial decisions. 
Naturally, there are great differences between the degree of influence that 
they have on a countries' legislation , and apart from most of the countries 
where the impact of fundamental rights and the decisions of the constitutional 
court (that serve as the interpretations of them) is restricted to the role of 
controlling legislation, in Germany they also influence certain judicia l 
decisions. In theory the judge, based upon the constitutional court decisions 
and the constitutional basic rights, could simply set aside the given judic ia l 
provisions that should be applied under those circumstances and directly 
refer to these in a constitutional case, as it was achieved in "the r ights 
13 
revolution" in the United States in the 1960's . (However, this did not 
become customary in Europe. In other respects, if this is not established, 
then it can result in the fa l l ing of the other legal layers to the background, 
and furthermore, in the course of the re-politicization of the law it can 
lead to the corrosion of the predictable judicial decisions—as it could be 
seen as one of the consequences of the " rights revolution" in the United 
States.14 The existence of these degrees show that the constitutional court-
decisions would only be of ful l value as a legal source if they had direct 
influence on certain judicial decisions, though this only appears as an 
exception in the continental legal systems. In most places their impact is 
narrowed down to the control of legislation, therefore their function as a 
kind of a legal source is l imited. 
(Broadening the methods of statutory interpretation) Having included 
numerous other legal layers into the theory of law and the legal system, 
and the discovery of the determined relations between them, influences 
the ways of legal interpretation as well. Let us look at a few connections 
visible on this field. 
The recognition of the importance of the textual layer of law br ings 
forth the recognition of the primary importance of grammatical interpretation. 
It is the parliament, as the chosen representative of society's polit ical 
common will, that is in charge of the proper interpretation and usage of 
the textual layer of jurisdiction, therefore to take the grammatical meaning 
of the text seriously is identical with taking the empirical common wil l 
seriously. The several ways of interpretations that rely on the other legal 
13
 See Epp, Ch . R.: The Rights Revolution. C h i c a g o and L o n d o n , 1998. 
1 4For the pol i t izat ion of the law in the U n i t e d States; see Scheingold, S.: T h e 
Struggle to Po l i t i c ize Legal P rac t i ce : A Case S t u d y of Lef t -Ac t iv i s t Lawyering in 
Seattle. In: Cause Lawyering. Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 
(ed.: Austin, S.—Scheingold, S.). New York, 1998. 118-150. 
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layers can only advance as far as it does not contradict the clear grammatical 
meaning of the legal text. 
The legal-dogmatic layer and the emphasis on the intellectually systematic 
character of law in the course of the functioning of legislation impels the 
employment of those ways of legal interpretation, that, beyond the grammatical 
meaning of the textual layer, help the judge in decision making in a given 
case. One of the possibilities is the interpretation based on the use of legal-
logical maxims, that, starting from the text's perceivable meaning, but not 
encroaching it or using judicial autocracy, manages to control the judicial 
procedure. The so-called "argumentum a minore ad maius" (to reach more 
from the less by inference), and the "argumentum a maiore ad minus" (to 
reach the less from more), their collective designation is "argumentum a 
fortiori", or the "argumentum a contrario" (induction from opposites) etc. can 
control jurisdiction with the extrapolation of the text's perceivable meaning. 
In order to remedy a situation when a legal gap occurs, the judicial decision 
that relies upon analogies shall also end up leaning on the legal-dogmatic 
layer, as it constructs the verdict directly from the legal principles (this 
process is called legal analogy), or it transfers a legal provision that was 
created in a similar case, so to base the current regulation on the former 
example (the method of statutory analogy). As to the doctrinal interpretation, 
it implements the embedding of the notions found in the textual layer, 
therefore it binds the textual and the legal-dogmatic layer together, in relation 
to the current case. 
The interpretation based upon precedents connects the textual legal layer 
with the layer of judicial precedents, and it specifies the open regulations, 
and therefore assures the nationwide unity of jurisdiction. Thus, this is of 
primary importance in the concept of the multi-layer legal system. 
From the multi-layer legal system's point of view it can be qualified as 
dangerous, when in relation to a current case, the verdict relies on an 
interpretation that is based on such constitutional court decisions that 
concretize fundamental constitutional rights and basic principles. The 
American legal practice that carried this into effect is a proper example to 
show how this process "re-politicizes" law, and how it instigates to push 
the other legal layers—besides the layer of the fundamental rights—into 
the background.15 The German legal practice is also liable to experience 
15
 See MacCann, M.—Silverstein, H.: Rethinking Law's "Allurements": A Relational 
Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States. In: Cause Lawyering. Political 
Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (ed.: Austin, S .—Scheingold, S.). New 
York, 1998. 261 -292 ; Scheingold S.: The St ruggle to Politicize Legal Practice, op. cit. 
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such a shift, and the only reason why it has not yet shown such negative 
sings is because—despite having accepted the fundamental rights as directly 
prevailing through the German constitution—in practice they are rarely 
included into the current judicial procedures. 
In Central Europe it was in Poland where, for only a few years, the 
Constitutional Court's legal interpretations were obligatory, that is, the 
judges were bound to take it into account. But the judicial opposition to 
the functioning of a re-politicized Constitutional Court led to its exclusion 
from the new constitution of 1997.16 The Hungarian constitutional court— 
even on an international scale—has a very great competence, and it has a right 
to eliminate laws, though the Constitutional Court decisions do not directly 
influence judicial decisions. In fact there are some lawyers and smaller groups 
of legal experts who—based on the American pattern achieved by "the rights 
revolution"—support the introduction of the Constitutional Court's direct 
influence on judicial decisions, but this has not been put into practice yet. 
Thus in order to conclude, the concept of the multi-layered legal system 
supports the idea of a law on a larger scale, accepting the parallel operation 
of several methods of legal interpretation at the same time, therefore it is 
against legal concepts that place a single legal layer into the center. 
16
 Poplawska , E.: Const i tu t ional iza t ion of the Legal Order. Polish Contemporary 
Law Quaerterly Review. 1988. № 1 - 4 . 115-133. 
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Abstract. Does the legal system have a structure (according to sources and branches of law, 
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The unquestionable hegemony of the idea of the positivity of law lasted until 
the third third of the 19th century on the European continent, all along the 
age of the exegetic application of statutory instruments, until the dawn of the 
movements of free law. Although re-codification was not effected in the 
second half of the 20th century—now disregarding the different direction of 
development taken by the socialist law—and the classical civil codes became 
gradually reduced, from their classical function of defining the law, to the 
increasingly passive role of being used as mere systemic /ocnj-providers 
and /ocMs-indicators of the direction and conceptuality taken by the judicial 
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law development,1 the legal doctrine has nevertheless successfully cut down 
the disintegration caused by the free law movement and maintained a 
positivistic domination for yet another century on the European continent. 
Though legal positivism was not shattered by the brief rebirth of natural law 
which took place after the Second World War (as a post-war German reaction 
to warmongering), finally, the way of posing questions in legal sociology in 
Europe (from the 1910s on, launched by Eugen Ehrlich), the American 
"realist" pragmatism (from the 1930s on, inspired mainly by Roscoe Pound), 
the transformation of the new English linguistic and logical analysis of law 
(from the 1960s on, initiated by H. L. A. Hart) into an American-type 
reconstruction of legal discourses (effective from the 1970s, represented by 
Ronald Dworkin), and, at last—as a stroke of grace—in Europe itself, the 
stabilisation of the so-called anti-formalist stand (formulated by Michel 
Villey and Chaim Perelman) in the debate on law and logic and its progress 
into a reconstructive inquiry of legal processes, on the one hand, and the 
foundation of a continental theory of argumentation, cultivated almost as a 
substitute to legal dogmatics (mainly introduced by Robert Alexy and Aulis 
Aarnio), on the other—well, all these challenged the validity of unconditional 
adherence to legal positivism—even if exclusively in theoretical explanation—, 
moreover, made it outdated by the 1980s.2 In brief, what had seemed, just a 
few decades ago, to be a demand (guided by wishful thinking) of the "decline" 
of legal positivism, is now rather anticipated by several visions—instead of a 
stigma of decay—as the image of a positive escape forwards, resulting from 
having been transcended as transformed into something new, in a way, however, 
accompanied by a reassuring continuity.3 
Nevertheless, the theoretical dominance of legal positivism in its era had 
offered two possibilities: notably, the acceptance of the actual definition of 
1
 Cf., f rom the author, Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest , 
1991, ch. V, para. 5, especially at 121. 
2
 For an overview, cf., f rom the author, Theory of the Judicial Process The Estab-
l ishment of Facts, Budapes t , 1995, ch. I. 
3
 For the decline, see, e.g., Villey, M.: 'Essor et décadence du volontarisme juridique' 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit 3: Le rôle de la volonté dans le Droit. Paris, 1958. As to 
continuity, it is characteristic tha t—only to take just one tell ing example—the editor of 
Transformation de la culture juridique québécoise dir. Bjarne Melkevik, Québec , 1998, 
Avant-propos, 7, had to leave his working hypothesis behind as unfounded. Albeit the 
sub- topic of the debate in question was heralded as „Est-ce la fin de l 'hégémonie 
positiviste?", it does not feature any longer in the printed collection of the proceedings, as 
the workshop has proven just the anti thesis, namely, , ,1 'hégémonie positiviste ne touche 
nul lement à sa f in au Québec, pas plus q u ' e n d 'aut res lieux". 
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the law by positive law in practical legal processes and the explanation of 
any kind of eventual difference as only an exceptional deviance, on the one 
hand, and taking the formal and off icial positivation of the law also as a 
theoretically descriptive conceptual criterion of legal phenomena, on the 
other. While the cutting back of the latter took place relatively soon as 
applied to the notion of juridicity itself,4 moreover, the former was also 
cut back in a conclusive way (as mainly replaced by explanation within the 
framework of the processes of an overall autopoietic system),5 paradoxically 
all this has not affected in nearly any respect the range of problems raised by 
"The Structure of Legal Systems". 
In the field of continental civil law, it seemed to be a self-evident fact, 
not questioned by anybody until the recent decades, that the structure of legal 
systems consists partly of their visible external division (according to branches 
of the law and, inside any of them, according to its formal sources)—that is, 
their division into individual branches of the law, including the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution, the appropriate code(s) and law(s), the eventual 
decrees and orders designed to ensure their implementation, as well as the 
judicial guiding principles, decisions for the uniformity of jurisprudence, 
and the individual judgements—, and partly of the internal (logical) self-
division of any legal (normative) regulation resulting f rom the axiomatic ideal 
of modern legislation, that is, the fact that regulation is mostly effected by 
4
 As a programme and a realisation, cf., f r o m the author, 'Que lques questions métho-
dologiques de la format ion des concepts en sciences j u r i d i q u e s ' [1970] Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit XVII I (Paris: Sirey 1973) , para. 4, in par t icular at 223 et seq. 
[reprinted in his Law and Philosophy Se lec ted Papers in L e g a l Theory (Budapes t : 
Eötvös Lóránd Universi ty Pro jec t on "Compara t ive Legal Cul tures" 1994) , 7 - 3 3 
[Ph i losoph iae Iuris}]. 
5
 Cf . , as a phi losophy of language recons t ruc t ion , f rom t h e author, Theory of the 
Judicial Process... [1987], pass im, and ' T h e Context of the Judic ia l Appl ica t ion of 
Norms ' [1988] in Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal 
Systems Festschrift for Robert S. Summers, ed. Werner Krawietz—Neil M a c C o r m i c k — 
Georg Henrik von Wright, Berlin, 1994, 495-512 . [reprinted as 'The Nature of the Judic ia l 
Appl ica t ion of Norms (Sc ience- and Language-phi losophical Considerations) ' in his 
Law and Philosophy, 295-314] , and, as a r es ta tement character is t ic of the cr i t ical legal 
studies, Conklin, W. A.: The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse The Judic ia l 
Product ion and the Discourse of Suffer ing . Aldershot , 1998. xi i + 258., respect ively . 
It is to be no ted that essays on the turn of the 19th and 2 0 t h centuries in Central 
Europe already explored such arguments fo r theoretical explanation. Cf., a b o v e all, 
Wurzel , К. G.: Das juristische Denken, W i e n , 1904 [ t rans . Ernest B r u n c k e n as 
'Methods of Juridical T h i n k i n g ' in Science of Legal Method, Boston, 1917 (reprint : 
New York , 1969), 286 -428 . (The Modern Lega l Philosophy Ser ies IX)]. 
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general rules and particular dispositions in the general, as well as the particular 
parts of the law-code in question, on the one hand, and by established 
principles, main rules (disposing of the particular area of regulation), rules 
(breaking them further down in concrétisation), exceptions (allowing concessions 
from these), as well as sub-exceptions (making additional concessions available 
with regard to their last specification), on the other. All this encountered 
no problems for a long time, because it was made visible exactly this way; 
however, also because a number of legal theories (including, of course, that 
of MARXISM) were trying to f ind (simplifyingly, viewing law as the reflection 
of something else, external to and outside of it, hence having to conform in 
features, structure, etc. to what it is a reflection of) a kind of correspondence 
between law and the spheres of (social) reality regulated by it, which is not 
merely instmmental and/or functional, but also epistemologically interpretable;6 
as well as because these theories took far too seriously the suggestion of all 
the positive l aw ' s staff on the exclusivity of established juristic methods in 
legal processes. This was the shift in codification from the casuistry to the 
axiomatic ideal, the transition f rom the creative precedential induction (method 
of comparing, assimilating and distinguishing those precedents, taking the 
individual cases for a starting point), to the reproductive and mechanical, 
deductive rule-application (starting out from the mass of provisions at various 
degrees of generality of the code, construed as constituents of one logical 
system, following the axiomatic ideal).7 
What the DwORKlNian theoretical challenge has made unambiguous is 
that there are principles in every system which are, as to their nature, not 
only different from the rules but, in fact, control the very policy of the 
6
 Cf., e.g., S a m u , M.: A szocialista jogrendszer tagozódásának alapja [The bas i s 
of divisions s t ruc tur ing the soc ia l i s t legal sys tem]. Budapest , 1964 . 268., and, as i ts 
ontological c r i t i c i sm, from the p resen t author, The Place of Law in Lukács' World 
Concept, Budapes t , 1985 [repr int 1998], ch. 5, pa r a . 3, especially at 123 et seq. 
7
 Cf., f rom the author, Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, Budapest, 1999, 
ch. 2, para. 1, 9 et seq. [Philosophiae Iuris], See, a lso from the author, as the first critical 
formulation of i ts primitive idea, with his proposit ion to transcend it, 'A magatartási 
szabály és az objekt ív igazság ké rdése ' [Rule of behaviour and the question of objective 
truth, 1964] in Útkeresés Kísérletek — kéziratban [The Search for a Path: Early Essays in 
Manuscript]. Budapest , 2001, 4 - 1 8 . [Jogfilozófiák] and, as applied to the paradigm of 
basis and superstructure in Marx i sm, 'Autonomy and Instrumentality of Law in a Super-
structural Perspective ' [1985] Acta Juridica Hungarica 40 (1999) 3 - 4 , 213-235. 
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applicability of rules and, thereby, also their actual practice.8 Well, it is 
not by mere chance that, based upon this, it was in the United States of 
America, the flagship of politicised aspirations and expectations, that the 
practice known as constitutionalisation (subjecting any issue at will to get 
reduced to—for being inferred directly from—basic rights or constitutional 
values)9 had evolved. In parallel with this, as a result of the compromise 
between the needs in changing life and the technical availabilities of fered 
by the law's codification, after the Second World War the German style of 
legal dogmatics had, as its own construction developed from the practice 
based on general clauses, already definitely nourished a conception of 
law, defining it as a texture made up of principles and rules.10 
However, as it can be told about the facts that they never get to the court 
by themselves, labelled and prepared for a syllogistic inference f rom the 
complex of facts and norms11 (but only as the result of a creative—both 
normative12 and constructive13—act of the judicial forum taking a decision),14 
g 
Since the classical topos by Ronald M. Dwork in ' s 'The Model of Rules' University 
of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967) , 14 et seq. , h is entire oeuvre seems to subs tan t ia te 
the under ly ing idea most ly in a const i tut ional contex t . 
9
 For a dissent in a similarly politicised mirror, see Bork, R. H.: Slouching towards 
Gomorrah Modern Liberalism and American Decline. New York, 1997. xiv + 382. Also 
cf., f rom the present author, 'Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk rac iona l izmusának 
d i lemmái ' [Man elevat ing h imse l f ? Di lemmas of rat ional ism in our age] in Sodródó 
emberiség Tanu lmányok Várkonyi Nándor: Az ötödik ember c ímű művéről [ H u m a n 
species dr i f t ing : On V á r k o n y i ' s The Fifth M a n ] Katalin Mezey ed. Budapest , 2 0 0 0 , 
6 1 - 9 3 , in par t icular at 7 1 - 7 6 . 
10
 Cf., above all, Alexy, R.: Theorie der Grundrechte. Baden-Baden, 1985, and, as 
built into a coherent theory, Pokol , В.: The Concept of Law T h e Multi-layered Lega l 
System, Budapes t , 2001, par t icular ly ch. VIII, 9 0 - 1 0 6 . For the overall debate, cf. , e.g., 
Carl E. Schneider 'State-interest Analysis in Four teen th A m e n d m e n t »Privacy Law«: An 
Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues ' Law and Contemporary Problems 
1988/1, 79 -121 ; Epp, Ch. R.: The Rights Revolution, Ch icago—London , 1988; K o c h , 
H.: 'Cons t i tu t ional iza t ion of Legal Order ' , Copenhagen , 1998. [a paper p resen ted at 
the XVth Wor ld Congress of Comparat ive L a w , Bristol]; Pop lawska , E.: ' C o n s t i -
tut ional izat ion of the Legal O r d e r ' Polish Contemporary Law 1998 /1 -4 , 1 1 5 - 1 3 3 . 
11
 "For cour t purposes , wha t the court t h inks about the f ac t s is all that ma t t e r s . 
For actual events [ . . . ] happened in the past. T h e y do not walk in to the court ." J e r o m e 
Frank Courts on Trial Myth and Reality in A m e r i c a n Justice, Pr ince ton , 1949, 15. 
See, e.g. , most expressed ly f rom J o a c h i m Israel, 'Is a Non-normat ive Soc ia l 
Science Poss ib le? ' Acta Sociologica 15 (1972 ) 1, 6 9 - 8 7 and 'St ipulat ions and 
Const ruc t ion in the Social Sc iences ' in The Context of Social Psychology A Cr i t i ca l 
Assessment , ed. J. I s rae l—H. Ta j f e l , L o n d o n — N e w York, 1972, 123-211. 
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similarly, nei ther the principles nor the rules are given in themselves, 
separated as such from each other in a way classified according to the l aw ' s 
taxonomic systemicity as bearing their own, separate meaning. As is known, 
all this can only be the result of a creative act. Based upon the doctrinal 
study of law, which classifies the law's notions by transforming them into a 
legal system, it is the judicial forum, exercising its authority while under-
taking its exclusive responsibility to decide, that builds different propositions 
into (or, proper ly speaking, uses them in its reasoning openly or implicitly 
as) either principles or rules, respectively. And, in parallel with this, it is their 
posterior analytical reconstruction that will also label them, interpreting 
the immense mass of normative regulations and reasonings used as just a 
raw material, as principles or rules. 
Does the legal system itself have a structure, or is any structure taken 
into (or given to) it from the outside? And if it is taken, whoever is taking 
it? I think it would be absurd to give any kind of negative answer: how 
would it be possible to transplant any structure into something thought to 
be unstructured by itself? Or, for the sake of any reasonable answer, we have 
to hypothesise the legal system as being structured in itself. However, the 
questions "what is it?" and "what does it consist of?", "how is it divided and 
into what?" and "what is the meaning of this all and of any of its structured 
components?", as well as "what is the significance of its being structured?"— 
well, all these depend already upon the sense given (or, more precisely, 
attributed) to law. 
Formerly, in a somewhat similar context , I had already presented the 
figure of th ree partially intersecting circles. This was intended to prove, 
as against the normativist message of legal positivism (claiming that by 
means of no rms alone one can bring about a medium of own existence, 
capable of effect ive operation in social practice), that the criteria for the 
law set when it has been made positive do not necessarily imply more than 
sheer manifestations of an intention that existed at the time of positivation. 
Therefore, the concern of what the law has been intended to be (i.e., to 
signify and represent) by its drafter(s) when it has been promulgated (e.g., 
in legislation) is not necessarily identical with the one of what and how 
the law is being formed into—when re-asserted, adapted, or ceased practically 
to exist—in either its official "application" (e.g., in judicial practice) or its 
13
 See, e .g . , most fo rce fu l ly , Hans Kelsen Reine Rechtslehre Einlei tung in die 
rech t swissenschaf t l i che Prob lemat ik , Le ipz ig—Wien , 1934. 
14
 Cf., f r o m the author, Theory of the Judicial Process, pass im. 
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actual community practice respecting the unofficial and spontaneous, popular 
ways of customary proceeding as legal.15 
Well, we can apply again the aforementioned figure (implying the 
practice of hermeneutical communities, giving and exchanging meanings) 
as reflected to the issue of the internal structuring of the legal system 
itself, by placing the intersecting circles into a circle partly closed. [Figure] 
The reason for this is that the legislator may influence the decision to be 
taken by the legal and/or the social community on what is what amongst the 
possible structuring components of the legal system and also on what kind 
of one-sided or symmetrical connection is being implied by each of these 
in what type of horizontal or vertical context. However, we also have to 
bear in mind that, according to the nature of things, any creature of the 
legislator can exclusively become productive in the hands and through the 
understandings of its addressees as clients—as operated by its professional 
official administrator and/or the practice of non-professionals—by their 
standardising pattern which, as conventionalisingly re-asserted, may become 
organised as and integrated into social tradition. There is one considerable 
difference from the instance invoked above, relating to the theoretical 
understanding of facts, notwithstanding. Namely, the entirety of processes 
and interactions in question is mediated through and within the bounds of a 
legal doctrine, that is, by the conceptual sets and contexts of its prevailing 
dogmatics, constantly refined by both practitioners and prudents of the law, 
i.e., by a dogmatics that albeit mostly lacks officially established and formal 
qualities, yet exerts, by means of professional socialisation, a practically 
exclusive impact upon how the law, as explored and solidified in its 
internal system, is actually understood and practised. And no need to say 
that the more the legal processes (legislation and administration of 
justice) are practised and controlled by the legal profession, the more the 
doctrinal representation and mediation of the law prevails. 
In consequence, it is not logic itself that labels anything as a structuring 
element identified either as a principle or as a rule, but we, who ponder, 
as the only possibility, always based upon the more or less successful 
comprehension of such a doctrine, projected through its re-consideration and 
reconstructive re-interpretation onto our given question, the mode of how 
to construct a sequence of distinguishing, deduction and justification, 
15
 Cf. , f r o m the author , 'Anthropolog ica l Ju r i sprudence? Leopold Posp f f î l and the 
Compara t ive Study of Legal Cul tu res ' [1985] in Law in East and West ed. Institute of 
Compara t ive Law of the Waseda Universi ty , Tokyo , 1988, espec ia l ly at 2 7 1 - 2 7 2 
[reprinted in his Law and Philosophy, 4 3 7 - 4 5 7 ] . 
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which seems to be uti l isable and conclusive enough to convince those who 
control the issue we propose, in the procedural hierarchy. In doing so, we 
start from a practically optional formulation of normative language and 
reasoning (or from any expressions or even fragments of these), and within 
the boundaries of the internal 'rules of the [legal] game' (of how to proceed 
in identification, argumentation and induction/deduction, etc.) as established 
and re-confirmed by the legal profession in practice. 
Of course, in practice all this appears as dynamism, and not as chaos; 
as openness to new issues, but by no means unforeseeability lacking any 
perspective. This assumes creative and constructive co-operation with norma-
tive force on behalf of all actors and, at the same time, also a community 
game processualised in formal sequences, as controlled in multiple ways 
many times; in which although equal chances are granted to everyone in 
principle, and anyone may innovate or deviate from earlier rules, yet anybody 
doing so not only has to give motives and justification for this, but also to 
derive this as inevitably resulting (even if not perceived and not practised 
by anybody so far) f rom the normative order which is continuously claimed 
to have remained untouched as a whole, and thereby again re-established 
and re-asserted (that is, re-conventionalised) in its overall arrangement.16 
In a f inal conclusion, notwithstanding, in the long run and in their 
practical continuity, bo th the structuralisation of the legal system and the 
considerable stability of the way it is made up can be taken as granted. As 
opposed to the obvious architectural analogy in this case, our edifice is not 
built into one single construction by assembling components originating 
from different sources and made up of different elements—in architecture: 
bricks, mortar and plaster. On the contrary, we build and live the lawyer 's 
16
 All th i s recalls the o b v i o u s parallel w i t h the chal lenge of Euclid's geomet ry by 
Bolyai and Lobachevsky. " F r o m an external point of view [ . . . ] the creation of »another 
new world« is manifest in the choice between equally eligible incidentalities and the 
presentation of the selected variant as perfect and logically necessary. [.. .] This concerns 
conceptualisation, namely the fact that conceptual systems, be they as perfect as possible 
from an in te rna l point of v i e w or had t h e y the most conv inc ing explanatory force 
when describing the external world, can merely be regarded as mental exper iments . They 
are nothing but games, which w e make use of faute de mieux." Varga Lectures, 38. 
It is to be noted, however , that legal systems achieving a mature and balanced state are 
characterised exactly by the conscious institutionalisation of the ability of challenging the 
system f r o m within the sys tem (as an own judic ia l solution on account of gaps in the law 
unfillable otherwise, pursuant to, e.g., overruling precedents in England or § 1 (2) of the 
Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch), however , due to the self-disciplining fo rce of the system, this does 
not proliferate in practice, be ing resorted to as a corrective measure only in the last resort. 
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profession using the only one material at our disposal, notably, language, in 
which words are selected to refer to concepts so that the suitable series of 
intellectual (logical) operations can be performed.17 Well, the question of which 
word stands in the place of what (the role it will be used in and what it 
will refer to in the given hermeneutical situation) depends, in addition to the 
18 
language use socialised and conventionalised, in a direct sense exclusively 
on those who perform the intellectual (logical) operation in question. And the 
person concerned is involved as a hermeneutical actor in the given circles 
of communication, on the one hand, and, at the same time, is also an actor of 
some sociological situation, on the other, who, in average cases, will act in 
the way he is expected to, not exceeding the justifiable boundaries of his 
professional socialisation(s). 
It can be established, therefore, that in our human world one acts amongst 
and as confronted with a huge number of various donnés crystallised in con-
ventionalised (and continuously re-conventionalising) tradition, that is, 
donnés that never stand by themselves as they are never freed f rom their 
humanly given meaning. Time after time construits are being generated out of 
these, for and to the benefit of man performing an action, which are going to 
be transmitted to his fellows and to the posterity, only to become a tradition 
which, in its turn, will be further handed down again merely in its quality 
as a donné.19 Well, if we inquire, in an ontological sense, about the continuity 
and practicality of these and the safety of their meaningful transmission, 
we can confirm that, throughout the historical process of conventional!-
20 
sations, a kind of "tendential unity" can always be safely recognised— 
both in the sense of the actuality of their functional correspondence to the 
overall social practice and of the reliability of their materialisation through 
speech acts. 
All in all, my report has intended to present, as a basis, the elementary 
component of the idea underlying the questions set forth above, namely, 
the apparent paradox traceable in it, according to which structuring features 
in law are, in their massive incidence, construed/constructed and con-
struing/constructing at the same time, for they do not and cannot exist in 
and by themselves at all. 
17
 For the stand of logic and conceptuality in human thinking, cf., f rom the author, 'Az 
ellentmondás természete ' [The nature of contradiction, 1989] in his Útkeresés, 138-139. 
18
 Cf. , e.g., Ost, F. : 'Le code et le dictionnaire: Acceptabilité linguistique et validi té 
j u r i d i q u e ' Sociologie et sociétés XVIII (avril 1986) 1, 5 9 - 7 5 . 
19
 For the express ion of François Gény, cf . Varga Lectures, 4. 
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Legal education has played an important role in the life of peoples for 
centuries as—according to an apt remark—it informs us about something 
substantial in regard to legal systems and the societies in which they operate. 
Legal education "provides a window on the legal system. Here one sees 
the expression of basic attitudes about the law: what law is, what lawyers do, 
how the system operates or how it should operate. Through legal education 
the legal culture is transferred from generation to generation. Legal education 
allows us to glimpse the future of the society." Thus, the topic that is on 
the agenda of the Congress of 2002 in Brisbane on the basis of the decision 
of the International Academy of Comparative Law deservedly commands 
the interest of the comparatists as the issue of the development or the 
comprehensive reform of legal education is on the agenda in not one or 
two countries but all over the world. This is true even if there are substantial 
differences in understanding the objectives and the methods of legal 
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education as well as in respect to organizing and financing it, and not only 
between particular countries but the traditions and present practices of 
whole legal families. So we can hardly speak about a uniform system or a 
universal paradigm of legal education. 
The ongoing tendencies of globalization today set new and new challenges 
for the development of law and jurisprudence, and comparative law either in 
national or in international framework cannot be reserved from those challenges. 
While on the first International Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900) 
ideas concerning the establishment of a future world law were presented as 
mere hopes, nowadays—after many earlier failures and disappointments— 
new and new substantial efforts have been devoted to the unification or, at 
least, the harmonization of law. In a growing number of countries, the 
activity of comparative lawyers provides the basis and the starting point for a 
legislation enacting legal rules that promote the accordance of domestic law 
with other legal systems or with a more general, widely accepted model. On 
the field of comparative jurisprudence, we witness a growing number of efforts 
that aim at clarifying the theoretical basis for the international unification and 
harmonization of law. As a consequence of this, comparative law shows signs 
of transformation: according to a summarizing evaluation, it is on the way 
to becoming basically "international" as opposed to remaining "national". 
Comparative method that earlier served basically the development and the 
reform of the domestic legal system, and was applied in the traditional 
framework of domestic law, now adopts itself to the needs of the new 
tendencies aiming at the "globalization" of the law with a more comprehensive 
objective. Even legal thinking—mirroring these efforts—is directed towards the 
establishment of a universal jurisprudence that centres around a comparative 
approach and that encourages its representatives to apply new methods, to raise 
new questions, to assert new points of criticism preparing us to the formulation 
of a new paradigm of comparative jurisprudence. Thus, it is fully justified to 
include a topic in the programme of the 16th International Congress of 
Comparative Law that makes us conscious about the new challenges originating 
from the objective of the international unification and harmonization of law 
also in the field of legal education. Legal education situated in a human 
society going through continuous and profound changes cannot remain intact 
from the effects of these new challenges. Thus, if we repeatedly raise the 
issue of what, why, and how we teach it is to be taken as an "evergreen" 
question even if the efforts of reform—mainly in countries inclined to 
respecting their traditions—rarely meet the "official" concepts of governments. 
Inquiries in this field fit into the framework of comprehensive initiatives 
that can be witnessed all over the world even with the aim of bringing the 
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teaching of comparative law to a new, higher level. The recognition that the 
knowledge of foreign laws plays an indispensable role in solving the 
problems raised by the ongoing globalization process has taken root both 
among the representatives of jurisprudence and legal practice. By now, not 
only the narrow, positivist-normativist view of law and the approach to 
solving legal problems on this basis that indisputably dominated the 19th 
century has been outdated for good, but also the "national" character of law 
and jurisprudence. Consequently, legal education can hardly limit itself to the 
teaching of domestic law (statutes, legal practice, jurisprudence) as issues raised 
on an international scale and situated in the framework of globalization require 
a supranational approach on an international level. Thus, the requirement 
that lawyers of the future are to be provided an education adapted to the needs 
of the modern world seems wholly justified. Of course, apart from raising 
repeatedly the issues of teaching comparative law, it involves in general the 
issues of law teaching and, possibly, a new approach to it as well. 
The changes of the world set an increased challenge to the teachers of 
comparative law just and now, us age-old traditions of teaching the law will, 
by all probabilities, suit to the new demands. We have to find and use the 
methods mainly by ourselves on a relatively new, hardly more than a hundred 
years old field of research. The achievements of the international movement 
that unfolded in under the slogan of "droit comparé" or "comparative law" 
cannot overshadow the fact that—partly owing to the terminology regarded 
by many as misleading or, at least, unclear—we have to face several questions 
still to be clarified here. Here, the "common denominator" could be the fact 
that the comparative law movement gradually expanding to the whole world 
includes all of those who take the comparative analysis of law and the 
application of the comparative method to legal phenomena as their task. The 
"communis opinio doctorum" that—at least in its broad outline—can provide 
the guideline for a legal education that preserves the valuable achievements 
of the past but takes into account the needs of the new world can be 
established only with their contribution. It can be hardly contested that 
putting down this topic in the agenda was a useful initiative even in respect 
to promoting the international exchange of ideas and experiences. 
2. Right for the sake of the success of this endeavour and to avoid the 
"dialogue of the d e a f ' , it seems necessary to formulate some preliminary 
observations in regard to our topic. During the preliminary work following 
the earlier traditions and preceding the implementation of the general and 
the national reports to be submitted to the Congress, it became clear that 
the terminological vagueness concerning the concept of comparative law 
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(droit comparé), recognized and rightly criticised by many distinguished 
comparatists,2 manifested itself even in the I.C. topic of the International 
Congress of Comparative Law. For the topic—as it was pointed out by the 
general reporter of the topic in his notice addressed to the national reporters— 
includes not one but two topics, although it is hard to draw a clear dividing 
line between them. The dividing line is seen by the general reporter as 
follows: the first topic deals with the actual teaching of comparative law in 
universities and in comparative law institutes, while the second deals with the 
impact of current global development on the teaching of comparative law.3 
One can hardly agree with drawing the dividing line this way. As this 
dividing line—as it stands out clearly from the French title (l 'enseignement 
du droit comparé et l 'enseignement comparatif du droit) as opposed to the 
rather aphoristic English one (Teaching of Comparative Law and Comparative 
Law Teaching)—is supposed to indicate the indisputable difference between 
teaching in the universities a study or a discipline having become inde-
pendent under the name of "comparative law" or "droit comparé" on the one 
hand, and the transformation or the reform of the whole legal education in the 
spirit of comparativism, on the other. So one aspect of the topic centres 
around the (partly taxonomic, partly educational-political) issue whether 
there is anything like an independent discipline called comparative law (droit 
comparé) and whether it can be taught anyway, while the other aspect 
concentrates our attention to the question of how one could make legal 
education in the universities "comparative" in its character, how one could 
turn its "national" attitude into a "supra-national" one. 
It can hardly be disputed that different understandings make it hard or 
even impossible for the general report to achieve the rightly expected synthesis 
of the national reports. For if we examine the topic only from a "technical" 
aspect, i.e. from the aspect of the methods applied in teaching comparative law 
considered as an independent discipline—as it is suggested by the general 
reporter—it necessarily pushes into the background—in our view—more 
important issue concerning the ways we could renew the whole legal 
education in a comparative, supra-national spirit based upon the recognized 
needs of our time. This aspiration—as it is indicated in the distinction between 
"Teaching of Comparative Law" and "Comparative Law Teaching"—concerns 
the "substantial" aspect of the problem well beyond the methodological one. 
Thus, it presupposes the rethinking of the basic issue of the whole legal 
As to the concept, it was characterized as "s t range" (Gutteridge), "unfor tuna te" 
(David) or "mis leading" . 
3
 Moens, G. A.: Note to National Reporters on Comparative Law Teaching. 1 -2 . 
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education, of the considerations concerning the objectives of the whole 
"curriculum" of the law faculties well beyond the mere "technical" issues of 
education—in fact, mainly as opposed to them. If we remain faithful to our 
starting point which takes the issue of raising and answering the questions of 
"what?", "why?", and "how?" as a permanently current task, we can hardly 
reach any other conclusion but an examination of this topic of the Congress 
that expands to these substantial issues. 
Yet, the difference in understanding the topic between the general reporter 
and ourselves raises—in our view—no inextricable difficulty. For according 
to the information gained f rom the general reporter, the questionnaire 
prepared by him and containing points preferred by him merely provides 
guidelines for national reporters. This allows us to follow the interpretation 
that we find adequate in formulating the national report. So we sum up our 
views not only concerning the methodological issues of the teaching of 
comparative law (droit comparé) considered as an independent discipline 
but also in respect to its renewal in comparative spirit—touching upon the 
basic objectives of legal education. 
I I . 
3. The application of the comparative method in the 19th century—as it is 
well known—yielded remarkable results in many fields of scientific s tudy. 
Although in this respect the study of law showed signs of backwardness 
not only compared to natural sciences but the study of language as wel l , 
the application of the comparative method proved to be a useful analytic 
tool; and not only in supporting the legal practice but also in the study of 
law as well. As a consequence of this, the opinion that comparative law 
(droit comparé) is not only the application of the comparative method on 
the world of law but also an integrated system of knowledge that can 
legitimately claim to be ranked as an independent discipline named the 
science of comparative law was put forward.4 It is also well known that 
listing the arguments supporting or refuting the claims concerning the nature 
of comparative law as being a method or a discipline became a favoured 
topic in the relevant literature.5 Although by this time these disputes have 
4
 This c la im is best expressed by the German t e rm "verg le ichende Rechts lehre" . 
5
 These disputes intensified especially in connection with the appearance and sp read ing 
of socialist law and ju r i sprudence , and often led to the denial of the comparabi l i ty of 
legal systems be longing to cont ras t ing social f o rma t ions . 
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lost their earlier, often passionate or even personal intonation, the question 
whether the application of the comparative method as a kind of "panacea" on 
legal phenomena can bring new scientific findings unattainable by other 
methods remained current. Thus, the quest ion is whether the comparative 
activity is characterised by specific criteria that, based upon the peculiarities 
of the subject and the method, may qua l i fy it as an independent kind of 
knowledge, viz. an independent discipline. And, if the answer goes in the 
positive, where one could find the place of this "comparative jurisprudence" 
in the system of the legal sciences. 
Answers to the questions formulated above were given in the 19th 
century in the English- and the German-speaking world within the f ramework 
of the comparative and historical inquiries into ancient law. The primary 
objective of these inquiries—as it is well known—was to reveal the so called 
objective laws of development taken as valid (also) in the world of law, or 
rather—following the pattern of the Darwinian theory of evolution—to 
extend the scope of these laws of development to social phenomena. Based 
upon the inquiries into the so called primitive human communities including 
"ancient law", Henry Maine could formulate his theory that interpreted the 
development of society as a progress f r o m "status" to "contracts".6 It can be 
taken as a result of the impregnatory ef fec t of the points raised by him 
that a "comparative" as well as "historical" jurisprudence emerged. First in 
Germany and later all over Europe, those results also led to the establishment 
of another discipline—both comparative and historical—under the name 
of legal ethnology.7 So Maine 's works created a new and lasting link 
between law, history and anthropology.8 As a result of his works, the 
comparative method became a distinguished tool for legal studies. Even Maine 
himself considered that his inquiries radically turned away from the schools 
that dominated jurisprudence at the time. Maine saw the difference, or even 
the conflict between analytically and dogmatically oriented comparative 
law and his new comparative and historical jurisprudence manifested in 
the fact that whereas the inquiries of the latter concern the historical process 
or—using a more current term—the dynamics of law, the so-called 
comparative law analyzes the law given at a certain point of time, namely 
the static of law. Of course, that excluded the point taken also by Maine 
6
 Sumner , M. H.: Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society 
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas. London, 1861 , 170-175. 
7
 Post , A . H.: Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz. Oldenburg-Leipz ig , 
1894-1895. g 
Pol lock , F.: Oxford Lectures and Other Discourses. L o n d o n , 1890, 159. 
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and his followers as the supreme criterion of scientific quality: the search for 
the objective laws of development. Thus, comparative law as an application 
of the comparative method to the legal phenomena of a given period could 
play only a secondary, supporting role compared to the real science of law, 
to a jurisprudence historical and comparative in character. This way, in a sense, 
Maine transcended the standpoint of analytical-dogmatical jurisprudence 
concerning comparative law. While comparative law—as opposed to the 
properly so called jurisprudence—could mean only a method for the analytical-
dogmatical conception, for Maine, this contraposition manifested itself in 
the opposition on the one hand of comparative law not worthy of being 
regarded as an independent discipline and the "real", historical and com-
parative jurisprudence centring around the idea of development, on the 
other. This way, Maine opened a way to recognize comparative law as a 
science. 
Undoubtedly, it was F. Pollock, Maine 's disciple and successor in his 
scientific efforts who played the decisive role in synthesizing science and 
comparative law. Already in his inauguration lecture in Oxford , he took an 
oath continuing the work of his predecessor by pointing out that the theory of 
development is nothing but historical method applied to the facts of nature 
and the historical method is the theory of development applied to human 
societies and institutions.9 Connecting comparative and historical research is 
not only natural and desirable but necessary as well in the field of juris-
prudence. The task is not to confront the "static" point of view of comparative 
law with the "dynamic" approach but to apply in the world of law the two 
methods—namely the historical and the comparative—jointly, in a mutually 
complementary way. Jurisprudence itself must be both historical and 
comparative.10 Thus, comparative law plays not a "secondary" or "supporting" 
role: both historical and comparative jurisprudence has an independent 
place in the system of legal sciences. 
4. As opposed to this conception, an alternative way of establishing the 
scientific nature of comparative law was formulated on the first Inter-
national Congress of Comparative Law (Paris, 1900). The new approach put 
forward on the Congress (by E. Lambert) claimed scientific independence for 
g 
Pollock, F.: English Opportunities in Historical and Comparative Jur isprudence. 
Oxfo rd Inaugural Lecture, 1883. In: Oxford Lectures and Other Discourses. London , 
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 Pol lock, F.: The History of Compara t ive Jur i sprudence . Journal of the Society 
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comparative law from the aspect of positive law or the disciplines of 
positive law that are more receptive to the needs of legal practice. Instead 
of searching for the object ive laws of development of society and law, this 
approach put a practical objective in the centre: the promotion of the 
convergence of national legal systems by way of revealing the common 
basis (fonds commun) of legal institutions and legal concepts. The concept 
was underlined by Lambert with a historical analogy: just like before when, 
in an earlier phase of the development of European law, the integration of 
French and German local customs resulted in a "droit commun coutumier" 
and the "Deutsches Privatrecht" which could provide the basis for codification 
as a kind of "common law", we, in a new phase of development based on the 
particular codified legal systems" might or rather must establish a "common 
legislative law" (droit commun législatif) The function of comparative law 
(droit comparé) lies in the promotion of this process: comparing the positive 
law of nations that are on the same level of civilization might reveal the 
common features of the measures chosen in particular legal systems on the 
one hand, and the removable differences originating f rom the contingencies of 
historical development and not from the political or moral "attitude" of the 
given nation on the other. This is exactly the long-term objective of com-
parative law (droit comparé). 
Lambert ' s new conception concerning the nature and the objectives of 
comparative law that was put forward on the Congress of Paris did not give 
up entirely the results of the earlier, historical-comparative research. By 
the term "droit comparé" he exerted a dual classification. He distinguished 
comparative law based on historical and ethnological research and serving 
exclusively scientific and speculative objectives, searching for the universal 
laws of the life and providing an independent branch of social sciences on 
the one hand, and another positive branch of legal sciences on the other 
concentrating its inquiries on the common elements of legislation in 
particular states or rather the civilised nations taken as a "common legislative 
law". This line of argumentation formulated in his report addressed to the 
Congress was later rectified by Lambert: he distinguished two independent 
disciplines that are relative to each other only in the application of the 
comparative method within the f ramework of the science named "droit 
comparé". One forms a part of legal sociology under the name "comparative 
history" (histoire comparative) and searches for the causal relations and 
1
 Lamber t , É.: Rappor t général au C o n g r è s Internat ional de Droit Comparé tenu à 
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Tome premier . 32. 
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regularities of legal phenomena, while the other discipline, under the name 
"comparative legislation", deals with the common elements of legal ideas and 
institutions, and, as a tool of lawmaking and the application of law, serves 
practical action.12 
Today, one can definitely point out that the historical way of modern 
comparative law was determined by the latter meaning both in respect to 
the theoretical issues and the practical tasks. This latter meaning can provide 
the starting point in determining the place of comparative law as an 
independent discipline in legal education. 
I I I . 
5. The place and the role of comparative law in legal education is determined 
by two points. On the one hand, it functions as an invaluable tool of 
extending the general legal culture and the lawyer ' s erudition. On the 
other, it mediates a kind of knowledge indispensable for practicing any legal 
profession. The joint and co-ordinate assertion of the two points—as it is 
well known—takes place in differing ways in dif ferent countries and even 
in different universities. The reasons for these differences are of ten con-
nected to basic conceptional differences concerning the objectives of legal 
education. 
The priority of one conception that appears in many universities of Europe 
as a continuation of the common tradition of universities dating back to 
the middle ages is not to train "technicians of law" in the narrow sense of the 
term: on the contrary it seeks to provide a comprehensive general education 
13 
that includes legal culture. It mediates a kind of universal knowledge 
beyond "professional" skills. It strives to educate lawyers who are able to 
recognize problems raised by the practice of their profession in their depth 
and social context, who are able to be aware of their responsibility and, by 
asserting a scale of values acquired and strengthened during their studies, to 
serve the cause of social progress. This might explain why certain subjects 
appearing in the curriculum do not have an obvious, immediate practical 
value, and prove their merit only in the long run (legal history, theory of 
law, philosophy of law, etc.). One can add to this list some social sciences 
1 2 ' 
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 David R.: Le droit comparé—enseignement du culture générale. Rapport présenté à 
la Conférence Commune du Comité International de Droit Comparé at the l ' International 
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(economics, sociology, political science) the teaching of with seems to be 
necessary to understand the socia l environment of law. In a sense, this 
paradigm of education—that is characteristic mainly for the universities 
of the countries of the "civil l aw"—can be depicted as "non-professional" 
or "non-technical" for it is in many respects "philosophical" or, at least, 
"abstract" in nature. It concentrates not on the solution of "concrete" legal 
issues that are of primary importance for the legal practice, and not on the 
functioning of legal institutions, but on the clarification of the theoretical 
issues of law, on the establishment of the theory or the science of positive 
law. Of course, this does not exc lude that one can put an emphasis on the 
social role of law as an instrument of human coexistence: it takes it as a 
start ing point that this role can be better fulfilled with keeping an eye on 
universal contexts. Such an attitude—also naturally—presupposes an under-
standing of the nature of law that goes beyond the traditional positivist 
v iew of law, namely understanding law as a sum of rules and procedures. 
Clearly, this conception of legal education takes law as a science that has 
had established subjects, systems of terms, categorizations for centuries 
which, for that reason,—even if t ime to time requires additions or modifi-
cations—can be an independent subject of a legal education that is based 
upon these traditions. 
The other conception that can be witnessed both in the world movement 
of comparative law and legal education—especially as a manifestation of 
the paradigm dominating in the United States—puts the primary emphasis 
on the needs of legal practice. It takes the lawyer—in the spirit of "social 
engineering"—as a person whose direct and everyday task is to solve the 
problems raised by the life of the society and who has at his disposal the 
professional and technical skills necessary to it. Thus, in a sense, the lawyer 
as an expert plays a key role in the formation of society, in arranging and 
attaining the necessary reforms. Legal education is also in the service of this 
cause: its objective is to prepare the young generation of lawyers from the 
very outset for their future social role, striving to train lawyers who are 
ready to work as lawyers right a f t e r their graduation. This conception pays 
less attention to the theoretical and the methodological issues of law, it 
ra ther puts the emphasis of educat ion on teaching thoroughly the positive 
law, the actual operation of legal institutions, the role of law in the 
formation of society. Its function is to study the legal system in action, to 
evolve a critical view on it, and, moreover, to prepare the necessary reforms— 
in the form of proposals aimed at improving the system. For this reason, its 
material can be taken as much less established or "settled", it is much 
more open to modifications necessitated by social changes. Using an apt 
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expression, one could say that the emphasis is on how we teach rather than on 
what we teach.14 Instead of the issue of subject, the issue of method comes 
to the front: how we can develop in the student the ability to distinguish the 
relevant f rom the irrelevant, to handle the massive amount of facts before 
him, to argue in defence of his standpoint, to consider "pro" and "contra" 
arguments, etc. Education is primarily directed to the development of these 
skills, contrary to the educational practice dominating the universities of the 
countries of "civil law" that provides knowledge, mediating a determined 
material of knowledge. 
6. The striking differences of the two conceptions are manifested even in 
the ways the tasks of legal education are understood and the questions of 
educational methods adapted to them are answered. The forms of legal 
education that serve rather practical objectives open the way to comparative 
law courses that are connected to the subject of particular positive branches 
or disciplines of law and that study them in a comparative way, by applying 
the comparative method. They deal with comparative law teaching instead 
of the teaching of comparative law. As opposed to this, for the conception 
that sees the function of legal education in mediating a comprehensive 
legal culture, it seems indispensable to provide a fo rm of legal education 
(as well) that—being basically theoretical in character—is to c lar i fy the 
nature, the objective and the method of comparative law. In this respect , it 
amounts to teaching of comparative law as an independent discipline. This 
would mean—as it was repeatedly put forward on various national and 
international fora—to initiate a so called introductory or basic course in 
legal education.15 
The justification of such an introductory course is provided by the 
consideration that without it even the above mentioned other conception, 
namely discussing the material of positive law with a comparative method 
and view cannot lead to the desired outcome: to discernment relevant to 
the practice. Without proper theoretical and methodological foundations, 
students cannot gain a knowledge that allows for or, at least, faci l i tates 
the understanding of the substantial issues—concerning the objectives and 
the social functions of the given legal institution—behind the terminology 
14
 Mer ryman: op. cit. 866. 
15
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applied in particular legal systems. In such circumstances, one can hardly 
hope for the understanding of similarities and differences of institutional 
and technical measures applied in part icular legal systems or in legal 
families, for the proper interpretation of thei r social role and function, and 
for the clarification of their practical consequences (for example, in respect to 
the various possibilities of the reception and the integration of laws). It 
hardly requires justification that this point is significant in regard to the 
tendencies of globalization today. 
By now, it has become clear that even law cannot be taught in a "s ta t ic" 
way in a world that generates fast changes. The particular legal institutions 
cannot be elucidated in their present form of appearance. The emphasis is 
placed right on the "dynamics", namely the historical transformation and 
variability of institutions. However, the historical point of view and approach 
involves taking into account the past experiences beyond the present and 
the future, and the way of fu ture development can be marked on the basis 
of the lessons of the past. In the formation of the future, past plays a role, 
and it is to be taken into consideration by legal education. 
If we add to this the insight originating f rom practical experiences that 
textbooks of the subjects of positive law are rather lengthy even without 
references to foreign legal measures, and the fact that the limited time for 
education is a serious obstacle to referring to foreign law and the points of 
comparative law in teaching domestic law, the claim that it is necessary to 
"teach comparative law" in the form of an independent introductory course 
that goes beyond "comparative law teaching" appears to be legitimate. The 
justification of such a course—beyond the reference to the necessity of a 
more comprehensive legal culture as a scholarly argument—is reinforced 
f rom the aspect of the practice as well.16 This leads us to the conclusion 
that in respect to the spreading of comparative law in university education, 
we cannot be content with applying the comparative method in the course of 
particular subjects of positive law. In addit ion to this and as an establish-
ment of this, we think it is necessary to have a course dealing with the 
theoretical, methodological, historical issues of comparative law. It follows in 
a logical way f rom the independence of comparative law as a discipline. 
Such an introductory course—according to an apt definition—is addressed 
to students who think it is necessary to integrate their knowledge on law 
into a cultural panorama expanding well beyond their own nation. It 
16
 Schles inger , R. В.: The R o l e of the "Bas ic Course" in the Teaching of F o r e i g n 
and Compara t ive Law. American Journal of Comparative Law. Vol . 19. N u m b e r 4. 
Fall 1971. 616 . 
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mediates a kind of knowledge that, apart f rom extending their legal culture, 
provides a more comprehensive foundation to the promotion of their career as 
lawyers. Accordingly, the course in question may consist of two parts.17 It 
introduces the world of comparative law to the students, makes them to 
understand the nature of comparative law, its objectives and functions, 
methods and history on the one hand, and gives a general overview of the 
main cultures or families of law on the other. Of course, within this general 
framework one can come up with a wide variety of measures concerning 
the ways of education, so it leaves open the opportunity of asserting the 
historical traditions of the given country and university or the paradigm 
dominating the education (or another one deviating f r o m that), or even of 
attaining certain practical objectives. But all this belongs to the technical-
methodological issues of education only indirectly connected to our line 
of argument. 
IV. 
7. In Hungary, teaching of law including comparative law has old historical 
traditions. The European university—as it is well known—is an invention 
of the middle ages. According to the dominating paradigm of science of 
the time, it provided the framework for teaching the entirety of the sciences, 
namely theology, humanities, law and medicine. Lacking any domestic 
university, the Hungarian students initially attended foreign universities, 
especially in Padova, Bologna, Pavia and Paris. Later they preferred the 
Central European universities established in the 14th century (Prague, 
1348, Cracow, 1364, Vienna, 1365) but the first initiatives to establish 
universities in Hungary soon manifested themselves. Although we have 
only fragments of information on the first attempts to establish universities in 
Hungary in the middle ages (Pécs, 1367, Buda, 1395, Pozsony, 1467), it 
seems legitimate to claim on the basis of research in this field that these 
attempts included legal education following the Bologna model. However, 
as a consequence of the of ten stormy turns of Hungarian history of the 
time, these early initiatives proved rather short-lived. 
17
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The same does not apply to the university established in Nagyszombat in 
the North of Hungary (1635) by Péter Pázmány, archbishop of Esztergom. 
We have detailed and exact information on it. The university that was 
originally named Studiorum Universitas had only a facul ty of humanities 
in the beginning (1636), and later a fur ther faculty for teaching theology 
(1638). The faculty of law was organized later (in 1667). On this faculty, 
besides the domestic customary law, canon law and Roman law were 
taught which one can interpret as a sign of an effort to create a kind of 
legal education transcending the framework of domestic law and to assert 
a more universal view of l aw if not an early manifestation of the idea of 
comparative law. Shortly af ter the foundation of the medical faculty (1769), 
the university moved to the capital, to the Castle of Buda (1777) by order 
of empress and queen Maria Theresa. Teaching began in 1780 there. The 
new order of university was settled by the educational regulation (Ratio 
Educationis) that was in fo rce all over the Habsburg Empire in all types of 
schools. The regulation strove to assert the ideas of enlightened absolutism 
even in legal education. In regard to legal education, it was based on the 
German natural law theory of the time, especially the theory of Christian 
Wolff mediated by the distinguished professor from Nagyszombat: Karl 
Anton Martini. These conditions—just like in other European universities— 
were not favourable to the spreading of the idea of comparative law for 
the acceptance of the idea of universal natural law put the emphasis on 
unity—and not diversity—in legal education. 
The first steps towards modern comparative law were taken in the first 
quarter of the 19th century in the so called "reform era" when the interest 
in foreign laws and the c la im to know and possibly take over foreign legal 
measures manifested itself. Although there were dif ferences in respect to 
the search for the ways and the methods of social progress (in the sense 
that the camp of reformers was divided between the revolutionary French 
and the more moderate, traditionalist English way of development), in the 
eyes of the representatives—especially the lawyers—of both standpoints, 
comparative law was a tool of "modernizing" the Hungarian society and 
its legal system burdened with the remains of the feudal era. It appeared to 
them that the way of transcending the Hungarian legal system of their age 
based on customary law and burdened with feudal remnants must lead 
towards modernization through knowing and comparing foreign laws and 
drawing lessons from it. In this respect, the results of the French codifi-
cation that became known very early on provided a mobilizing force. It 
can hardly be seen as an accident that the French model gradually came to 
be dominant in the reform movement. 
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These efforts took root in university education as well. Among the youth 
of the universities—and especially law students—there was a growing sense 
of dissatisfaction concerning traditional legal education, and the emotions 
of the revolution maturing in the entire Hungarian society had a decisive 
impact on the transformation of university life.19 It was a generally accepted 
requirement that university education including legal education should 
serve basically practical objectives, and, in this respect , the model to be 
followed (in regard to codification as well) were provided by the developed 
Western countries, especially France. Of course, it a lso paved the way to a 
better understanding of foreign laws and to comparative law in the modern 
sense of the term. However, the organizational and educational reforms 
necessitated by these tendencies did not take place in the reform era. 
Although the government of the revolution that b roke out parallel to the 
revolutionary movements unfolding all over Europe in 1848 took the first 
steps in this direction, the events leading into an armed conflict had set 
back for a long time the cause of the reform of university education including 
legal curriculum. The conditions of the reform were not given until the 
compromise of 1867 with Austria. However, one can evaluate it as the 
survival of the efforts of the reform era that on the University of Pest 
teaching of comparative law was introduced in 1850. 
The idea of comparative law, apart from university education, commanded 
attention to the theoretical aspects of the issue. In this respect, the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences founded in the reform era played an initiative role. 
A lecture given on a session of the department of philosophy and social 
sciences of the Academy characterized comparative law as one of the most 
important branches of the science of law which is to study "the legal life 
of the universal mankind". According to the lecturer (Gusztáv Wenzel, 
professor at the Faculty of Law in the University of Pest) , such an inquiry, 
besides pointing to the universal, common features of the development of 
law, should involve revealing the specific legal measures of the particular 
nations in order to get to the main principles of law and to promote the 
unification of "institutions and legal principles differ ing so much" as 
• • 2 0 
manifestations of the idea of law by way of comparing them. Perhaps, 
we might not be wrong in claiming that these ideas already involved an 
insight that later came to be generally accepted: it sees a difference between 
historical inquiries directed to the revelation of the universal laws of 
" H o r v á t h P.: Frank Ignác. Budapest , 1993. 107. 
20
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development forming one main branch of comparative law, and the activity 
committed to the needs of the practice and directed to the unification of 
law as the other. A quarter of a century later (1875), in another lecture 
also given in the Academy, Wenzel already put forward several ideas that 
are part of the paradigm of comparative law even today. Thus, he emphasized 
the importance of the distinction between the legal and the non-legal 
features to be taken into consideration by comparatists claiming that this 
distinction was to be asserted in comparing whole legal systems as well as 
their parts. He also pointed out that new scholarly resul ts cannot be 
brought by comparison unless it takes place between the legal systems of 
nations comparable in respect to their cultural level."1 
Among the results on this field, attempts to clarifying the comparability 
of the Hungarian law with Western legal system deserves special attention. 
The Hungarian legal system interwoven with feudal e lements had several 
features—i.e. the lack of a written constitution, the delay in civil law 
codification, the recognition of customary law as a source of law and the 
role of courts in the developing the law—that resulted in differences not only 
in respect to the European way of the development of law but compared to 
other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well. On the basis of 
these differences, the view that Hungarian law in its entirety and in regard 
to its historical traditions shows striking analogies to English law was put 
forward. Some thought that, to a certain extent, Hungarian law is independent 
of the Continental way of the development of law based upon the traditions 
of Roman law.22 On the basis of supposing such a "resemblance"—that is 
otherwise hardly justifiable and was criticized even in Hungarian juris-
prudence—, one could reach the conclusion that the Hungarian legal system— 
jus t like the English one—belongs to the "self-lighted" (sui generis) legal 
systems that cannot fit into the framework of the comprehensive Roman-
Germanic tradition. 
In the 20th century in Hungary—already adapting the results of the Congress 
of Paris that was a landmark in the modern comparative law movement—, 
there were attempts to define the nature of the science of comparative law 
using both natural law and positivism as starting points. As a consequence of 
these attempts, the point of view that understands the science of comparative 
21
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law as a branch of the science of posit ive law became dominant.23 There 
were successful initiatives to apply the comparative method to whole legal 
systems as well as branches of law and legal institutions. 
8. At the outset, the so called socialist jurisprudence faced several difficulties 
in regard to raising the idea of comparative law, and later in respect to 
making it accepted. As it is well known, the problem lied in the fact that 
socialist jurisprudence emphasized the qualitatively new character of the 
socialist type of law which cast doubt on the possibility of comparing the two 
conflicting types of law. Coupled with the distrust concerning any political 
ambition associated with the slogan of droit comparé, it had excluded all 
sorts of attempts of rapprochement for a long time. This situation had changed 
rather slowly but finally there evolved—both among the "Western" and the 
"Eastern" representatives of comparative law—an almost unanimous agreement 
concerning the possibility of comparing the law of countries of different 
social formations.24 In this respect, Hungarian comparatists played a significant 
and internationally recognized role. 
In Hungarian jurisprudence, raising and answering the theoretical issues 
of the so called socialist comparative law mainly fell on the representatives of 
the theory of state and law—as a general, fundamental discipline. Professor 
Imre Szabó whose name is associated with most of the initiatives in this 
respect, originally joined the dominant, majority opinion in socialist juris-
prudence, and understood the comparative activity as one of the methods 
of revealing the phenomena of state and law.25 Later, he gradually changed 
his position finally arriving at the conclusion that results gained f r o m the 
application of the comparative method add up to a general theory of 
comparative law.26 On Szabó's initiative, a scientific conference jointly 
organized by the Hungarian Academy of sciences and the three legal facult ies 
took place in December 1963 where the idea of the necessity of applying 
the comparative method in socialist jurisprudence and legal education was 
21
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put forward for the first time.27 This concept primarily concerned the legal 
systems of socialist countries, and manifested itself in the claim that 
socialist law is to be studied both on the level of "generality" (namely in 
respect to all socialist countries) and concretized on the particular legal 
systems. The posit ive law of the individual countries was understood as 
"particular" within the "general". On the conference, it was also emphasized 
that such a "pan-socialist" approach did not release the jurists from the 
obligation to s tudy carefully the domestic law. 
These results gradually led to the spreading of the ideas of comparative 
law in legal education. As a consequence of the fundamental turn in the 
history of the country after 1945, the opportunities of getting informed 
concerning foreign laws were in the beginning rather limited—and basically 
limited to the soviet law and its development (this was indicated by the 
introduction of the new courses of Soviet law in the legal faculties). 
However, the "melting" in jurisprudence soon resulted in a turn even in 
university education. Although comparative law as an independent discipline 
did not become part of the compulsory curriculum of the university, however, 
there was a significant progress in this respect during the years to come. 
Thus, on the one hand, there appeared and optional courses discussing 
particular legal institutions of some branches of positive law from a 
comparative point of view and with the comparative method. This was 
undoubtedly an important step towards the teaching of comparative law. 
On the other hand—especially in the f o r m of optional courses in the 
framework of the departments of legal theory—the teaching of the so 
called comparative law as an independent discipline took place in the form 
of an course. T h e subject-matter of this introductory course was primarily 
provided by the products of the international comparative law literature 
that fit into this function and were at hand, but the experiences stemming 
f rom the international educational fora of comparative law were also made 
use. Accordingly, the programme of the bas ic course on comparative law 
is still adapted to the settled and internationally wide-spread educational 
paradigm on this field in the sense that the course, besides the theoretical, 
methodological and historical issues, includes the presentation of the main 
legal families. T h e main form of teaching is giving lectures by the teacher 
but the students themselves regularly hold lectures, and—in narrow circle, 
with the participation of students showing increased interest in comparative 
law—seminar-like professional discussions also take place. It is worthy of 
27
 A magyar á l l a m - és j og tudományok és a t á r s a d a l m i gyakorlat (Hungarian legal 
science and soc ia l practice). Állam- és Jogtudomány, Vol . VII. No. 1. (1964) 9. 
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mentioning that the growing interest in the issues of comparative law and 
foreign legal systems is manifested in the fact that the students of ten take 
advantage of the educational opportunities provided by foreign universities, 
and many of them attends the postgraduate courses of the International 
Faculty of Comparative Law in Strasbourg. Of course, it presupposes certain 
language skills on the part of the students which—partly as a consequence 
of the favourable political developments of the recent years—is manifested in 
the achieved results. 
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1. New tendencies in international criminal law2 
1.1. Ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) 
established ad hoc international tribunals. Security Council Resolution 827 
established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Security Council Resolution 
955 established an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for acts of genocide or other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in 1994 in the territory of Rwanda and as far 
as Rwandan citizens are concerned, responsible for such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States. 
According to the Statute of the international tribunal on Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) the tribunal and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. The 
international tribunal has primacy over national courts. At any stage of the 
procedure, the international tribunal may formally request national courts to 
defer to the competence of the international tribunal in accordance with the 
ICTY Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY. (Art.9.) 
The Prosecutor initiates investigations ex-officio or on the basis of infor-
mation obtained f rom any source, particularly from Governments, United 
Nations organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. The 
Prosecutor assesses the information received or obtained and decide 
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. (Art. 18.) 
1.2. The Lockerbie case 
Besides establishing ad hoc international criminal tribunals the Security 
Council also interfered with international criminal jurisdiction by its 
decision in a concrete case. The UN International Court of Justice has 
confirmed such interference. 
2
 This chapter intends to illustrate the changing international climate in which the 
Statute was adopted and which serves as a frame for the current ratification procedure For 
past events see Bassiouni , M. Ch.: Historical Survey: 1919-1998. In: The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, A Documentary History, Complied by Bassiouni, M. Ch.: 
Transnational Publishers , Inc, Ardsley, New York, 1998. 
HUNGARIAN REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 265 
In the Lockerbie case the Security Council demanded in its Resolutions 
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) that Libya submit the two accused Libyan 
nationals for trial before a Scottish court. For the failure to comply with the 
resolutions the Security Council also imposed economic sanctions on Libya. 
As a response Libya begun proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice against both the US and the UK by arguing that they had failed to 
meet their obligations under the 1971 Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Libya 
claimed its willingness to prosecute those accused of the bombing and by 
this she would have fulf i l led her own obligations under the Montreal 
Convention. 
In a provisional order of 14 April 1992 the International Court of Justice 
decided that the Security Council Resolution based on Article 103 of the 
UN Charter prevails over the obligations of the Parties under any other 
international agreement including those under the Montreal Convention. 
Accordingly the Security Council in its Resolution 1192 (1998) of 27 
August 1998 called all states to co-operate to ensure the presence of the 
two before a Scottish Court in the Netherlands and suspended the measures 
imposing economic sanctions on Libya. The help of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations was decisive for the transfer of the accused. On 5 
April 1999 the two accused were first surrendered to a United Nations 
official at the Tripoli airport in Libya and later on the same day to the 
Scottish authorities in the Netherlands. 
1.3. Crimes under international humanitarian law 
In the Nicaragua case the International Court of Justice observed that the 
laying of mines in the waters of another State without any warning or 
notification is not only an unlawful act but also a breach of the principles 
of humanitarian law underlying the Hague Convention No. VIII. of 1907. 
The Court considered that the rules stated in Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, which is common to the four Conventions, 
applying to armed conflicts of a non-international character should be 
applied. This obligation derives from the general principles of humanitarian 
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.3 
3
 Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court 
of Justice. United Nations New York, 1992. 79. Case concerning the military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. Uni ted States of America) 
(Merits) Judgment of 22 December 1986 166. 
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In the Pinochet case Law Lords emphasised that the immunity of the 
Head of State would simply be incompatible with the provisions of the 
Torture Convention which clearly indicates the official or governmental 
character of torture as a constituent element of the crime. Under customary 
international law there can be no immunity for crimes of international law. 
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain grave offences is 
permitted on the basis of the universality principle. However, if one 
accepts the prohibition of torture as a ius cogens norm such immunity can 
not co-exist with that norm. Since ius cogens norms enjoy the highest 
status within international law they prevail over and invalidate other rules 
of international law. 
John Hopkins commented on the above cases as fol lows: "The cases 
show remarkable and, as it appears, unprecedented willingness to rely upon 
provisions of international law, both conventional and customary, in 
domestic proceedings. The relationship between international and municipal 
law will be viewed very differently henceforth. In particular, the apparently 
ready acceptance by the majorities of the notion of ius cogens and of the 
provisions of the Torture Convention (and of certain other treaties) as 
instances of the ius cogens is perhaps surprising."4 
1.4. The opinion of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court made the fol lowing elaboration in 
relation to crimes under international humanitarian law: 
The first sentence of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution, according to which the 
legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognised 
rules of international law, states that these "generally recognised rules" are 
part of Hungarian law, even without separate (further) transformation. An 
act of general transformation—one without a definition or enumeration of 
the rules—was performed by the Constitution itself. According to it, the 
generally recognised rules of international law are not part of the Consti-
tution but are "assumed obligations". The fact that the assumption and 
transformation are contained in the Constitution does not affect the 
hierarchical relationship of the Constitution, international and domestic law. 
This general internalisation of assumed obligations absolutely does not 
preclude certain "generally recognised rules" from being defined by specific 
international agreements (as well), and that regarding those a separate act of 
4
 Hopkins, J.: Case and Comment—Former head of foreign state—extradit ion— 
immunity. The Cambridge Law Journal, Volume 58 Part 3 November 1999. 465. 
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transformation takes place. The United Nations Charter and the Geneva 
Conventions, for instance, may contain such rules. 
Articles 7 (1) of the Constitution also means that by the Constitution's 
command, the Republic of Hungary participates in the community of nations: 
this participation, therefore, is a constitutional command for domestic law. It 
follows therefrom that the Constitution and domestic law must be inter-
preted in a manner whereby the generally recognised international rules 
are truly given effect. 
The second sentence of Art. 7 (1)—the harmonisation of the obligations 
assumed under international law and domestic law—applies to every 
"assumed" international obligation, including the generally recognised rules. 
In addition, harmony must be achieved for the whole of domestic law, the 
Constitution included. Thus, Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution requires the 
harmony of the Constitution and the obligations derived from inter-
national law—assumed directly under the Constitution or undertaken in 
treaties—as well as domestic law: is ensuring their harmonisation, attention 
must be paid to their particular characteristics. 
Historically, the distinction has been applied with respect of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World 
War. But the development of international law has continuously separated 
the sphere of "international humanitarian law" from the war context and 
made the prosecution and punishment of these crimes independent of the 
requirements and conditions of the domestic criminal law system, also with 
regard to statutory limitations, inasmuch as two conventions on the non-
applicability of statutory limitations for war crimes against humanity have 
been concluded. 
The rules on the punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity— 
since these crimes threaten the foundations of humanity and international 
coexistence—constitute peremptory norms of general international law (ius 
cogens). Those States which refuse to assume these obligations cannot 
participate in the community of nations. 
The norms on war crimes and crimes against humanity are undoubtedly 
part of customary international law: they are general principles recognised 
by the community of nations in the parlance of the Hungarian Constitution, 
they belong to "the generally recognised rules of international law". The 
Hungarian legal system accepts these rules , according to the first c lause 
of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution, therefore they fall, without separate trans-
formation or adoption, within those "assumed obligations under international 
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law" whose harmony with domestic law is required by the second clause 
of the aforementioned Article of the Constitution.5 
1.5. The universality principle 
According to Feller the universality principle reflects the special quality of 
the class of offences known as delicto iuris gentium, crimes under inter-
national law. These crimes threaten to undermine the very foundations of 
the enlightened international community as a whole, and it is this quality 
that gives each one of the members of that community the right to extend 
the incidence of its criminal law to them, even though they are committed 
outside the state 's boundaries and the offender has no special connection 
with the state. One essential prerequisite for the application of the municipal 
criminal law of a certain state in a particular case is that the offender be in 
its territory. The link between the offender and the lex loci deprehensionis 
is the injury which the of fence causes to the foundations and security of 
the entire international community. This is what endows every state with 
the power to establish by law the incidence of its own municipal criminal 
law on delicto iuris gentium if the offender is actually in custody in its 
territory. 
The universality principle must necessarily be of a general nature, i.e., 
the personal status of the offender cannot affect the incidence of the municipal 
criminal law by virtue of that principle. The offender may be the national of 
another state, he may be domiciled elsewhere, stateless or with no permanent 
domicile, nevertheless, in each of these cases he will fall within the scope of 
that law, provided that two basic conditions are satisfied, namely, he is 
within the territory of the state that seeks to apply its municipal law and the 
offence is one of those embraced by the universality principle. 
There is no point here in demanding, as a prerequisite of its applicability, 
the double criminality of the conduct in question, too. The principle holds 
good even when the conduct does not constitute an of fence in the place 
where it occurred, that is also the position when the of fence is committed 
in a place over which no state has sovereignty.6 
5
 Detailed in: Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court László Sólyom and Georg Brunner with a Foreword by Justice 
Stephen G. Breyer (The University of Michigan Press 2000), 2 7 3 - 2 8 3 . 
6
 Feller, S. Z.: Theories and Jurisdiction in: A Treatise on International Criminal 
Law, Volume II Jurisdiction and Cooperation (Charles С Thomas Publisher Springfield 
Illinois USA, 1973), 32-34. 
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By virtue of the universality principle, some legal systems (e.g. in Hungary) 
provide that proceedings are to be initiated only in cases of this kind by 
the head of prosecutions himself. The reason for this is that in addition to all 
the other considerations to be taken into account in weighing the initiation of 
proceedings in the case of extraterritorial offences, special legal problems 
arise when the offence is an international crime. 
It is necessary to pay attention to the Belgian Congo case, which is 
pending right now and which may also substantially affect the interpretation 
of the universality principle. 
An international arrest warrant was issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian 
investigation judge against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The warrant also sought his provisional 
detention as long as a request for extradition to Belgium for alleged crimes 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law are pending. 
Under the very terms of the arrest warrant, the investigating judge claims 
jurisdiction in respect of offences purportedly committed on the territory 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by a national of that State 
without an allegation that the victims were of Belgian nationality or that 
these acts constituted violations of the security or dignity of the Kingdom or 
Belgium. 
Congo pointed out in her reply that such universal jurisdiction is conditional 
on the perpetrators' presence on the territory of the prosecuting State, and 
these are exceptional heads of jurisdiction, which derive their compliance 
with international law solely from the treaties which provide for them and 
which are not part of general international law. 
In her declaration, the Belgian Judge Van den Wyngaert emphasised the 
importance of the case for the development of modern international 
criminal law. According to Van den Wyngaert international community 
undoubtedly agrees in principle with the proposition that the core crimes 
of international criminal law (war cr imes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity) should not remain unpunished. How this should be realised in 
practice is still the subject of much discussion and debate. Ideally, such 
crimes should be prosecuted before international criminal courts . 
However, not all cases will be just if iable before such courts and in the 
meanwhile national criminal prosecution before domestic courts is the 
only means to enforce international cr iminal law. States have not only a 
moral but also a legal obligation under international law to ensure that 
they are able to prosecute international core crimes domestically. 
Judge Van den Wyngaert draws the attention to the growing support 
for the idea that traditional limitations on criminal prosecution (territorial 
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jurisdiction, immunities) cannot be applied to international core crimes. This 
idea is gaining support, not only in legal doctrine but also in national courts' 
decisions such as the judgement of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case. 
In contrast to the above opinion the International Court of Justice rejected 
the request of the Kingdom of Belgium that the case be removed from the 
List and found that the circumstances, as they presented themselves in the 
Court, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 
41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.7 
The arrest warrant issued by the Belgian investigating judge is based on 
the universality principle and not on the priciple of forum deprehensionis. 
This is an important novelty of the case. 
2. The jurisdiction of the ICC 
One should examine the truth of the opinion according to which the 
Statute of the ICC is a step backwards from the position that had been taken 
for the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the concept of 
complementarity provides a major and unnecessary restriction on the 
jurisdiction of the court. Once it had been accepted that these core crimes 
were damaging to the international community and could be tried by an 
international court, the pride of national sovereignty should not have been 
allowed to obstruct the effectiveness of that court.8 
The Preamble and Art. 1 of the Statute laid down that ICC's jurisdiction 
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
of the ICC under Article 59 extends, to three well-established international 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They conform 
to existing international criminal law and fall within the meaning of ius 
7
 Case C o n c e r n i n g the Ar res t Warrant of 11 April 2000 (International C o u r t of 
Justice, 8 December 2000, General List No. 121). 
8
 Elliott, C. : A Permanent International Cr iminal Court: 'A Giant Step Towards 
Universal Human Rights' or 'Dead on Arrival'? The Journal of Criminal Law, 2000. 401 . 
Quotations in the title are taken f rom the comment of Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of 
the UN, The Times, Monday 20 July 1998. And front the comment of the American 
Senator Jesse Helms before the Rome conference (quoted by the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights at www.lchr.org/lchr/icc/rome/senate.htm). 
9
 The jur isdict ion of the Cour t shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole. The Cour t has jurisdiction in accordance with 
this Statute with respect to the fol lowing crimes: 
(a) The cr imes of genocide, (b) Crimes against humanity, (c) War crimes, (d) The 
crime of aggression. 
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cogens which is binding upon all states and which contains norms that 
carry obligations from which a state may not derogate. The Statute also 
lists the cr ime of aggression, which has yet to be defined and is therefore 
not subject to the ICC's jurisdiction.10 Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction 
also over crimes against the administration of justice and may impose 
sanctions (Article 70, 71). 
Bassiouni states that "the ICC is a treaty-based institution which is 
binding only on its states parties. It is not a supra-national body, but an 
international body similar to other existing ones. The ICC is not a substitute 
for national criminal jurisdiction and does not supplant national criminal 
justice systems, but rather is "complementary" to them. The ICC does no 
more than what each and every state in the international community can 
do under existing international law.11 It is the expression of collective 
action by states parties to a treaty that established an institution to carry 
out collective justice for certain international crimes. The ICC is, there-
fore, an extension of national criminal jurisdiction as established by a 
treaty whose ratification under national parliamentary authority makes it 
part of national law. Consequently, the ICC neither infringes upon national 
sovereignty nor overrides national legal systems capable of and willing to 
carry out their international legal obligations.12 
The Court can exercise jurisdiction over crimes that have been committed 
on the territory of a state party or by one of its nationals13. In addition, the 
ICC may exercise its jurisdiction when a state which is not a state party 
consents to the Court's jurisdiction and the crime has been committed on 
that state's territory or the accused is one of its nationals. 
Jurisdiction of the ICC is based on the principle of territorial criminal 
jurisdiction, and not on a theory of universality of criminal jurisdiction. While 
the reach of the Court's jurisdiction is universal, it does not represent the 
theory of universality, except for "referrals" from the Security Council, which 
are not linked to the territoriality of any state, whether they are Parties or 
non-States-Parties. It is clearly established in international law that whenever 
a crime is committed on the territory of a given state, it can prosecute the 
perpetrator even when that person is a non-national. Accordingly, every 
state has the right, in accordance with its constitutional norms, to transfer 
10
 Bassiouni, M. Ch.: Explanatory Note on the ICC Statute, in : Revue Internationale 
de Droit Pénal 71 e m e année, 1er et 2eme trimestres, 1 -39 . 
11
 Compare with conclusions of this chapter. 
12
 Bassiouni: op. cit. point 6. 
" B a s s i o u n i : ibid, point 15. 
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jurisdiction to another state which has jurisdiction over an individual 
accused of committing a crime, or to an international adjudicating body.14 
On the basis of the above Bassiouni argues that since the ICC is not a 
foreign legal system (such as that of a sovereign state), af ter ratification of 
the treaty, it becomes an extension of a state 's national criminal jurisdiction. 
This is not to be confused with the idea that the ICC is an extension of 
national criminal justice systems. The ICC is neither part of national criminal 
justice systems nor an extension thereof. It is an extension of national 
criminal jurisdiction established by treaty and implemented by national 
legislation. The closest analogy is that of transfer of criminal proceedings. 
Thus, an individual is "surrendered" to the ICC and not extradited.15 A 
consequence of that concept is that states parties could not invoke, in 
opposition to surrender, their domestic laws that prohibit extradition of 
nationals, or other defences.1 6 
In order to evaluate Bassiouni 's opinion it is necessary to know Article 
12, 13 and 17 of the ICC Statute. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
if one or more State Parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or 
a State which is not a Party to the Statute accept the exercise of jur i s -
diction by the Court (Art. 12). The Court may exercise its jurisdiction if: 
crimes appear to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a 
State, or by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, or the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation. 
(Art. 13.) The Court shall determine that a case is admissible if the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 
In order to determine unwillingness, the Court shall consider that the 
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
f rom criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Cour t 
or there has been an unjust if ied delay in the proceedings, the proceedings 
were not conducted independently or impartially (Art. 17). 
Bassiouni acknowledges that it is up to the Court to determine that a 
state is unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute, the proceedings 
are not conducted independently or impartially, national judicial system is 
17 
totally or substantially collapsed. 
14
 Bassiouni: ibid, point 16. 
15
 Article 102: For the purposes of this Statute: (a) "surrender" means the del ivering 
up of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute, (b) "extradition" means 
the delivering up of a person by on a State to another as provided by treaty, convention or 
national legislation. 
16
 Bassiouni: op. cit. point 94. 
17
 Bassiouni: ibid, point 58. 
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A conviction or acquittal by a national jurisdiction will not bar subsequent 
prosecution by the ICC if: (a) the purposes of the state proceedings were to 
"shield the person concerned form criminal responsibility" or the domestic 
18 
proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially. 
According to Art. 13 the Court may not only then exercise its jurisdiction 
if a States Party or a non-State Party initiates proceedings at the public 
prosecutor. The Security Council enjoys the same right, too. Next to those 
exists the public prosecutor's independent right to initiate proceedings. 
Although the public prosecutor's right of initiative is dependent on the 
support of one of the councils of the Court, it nevertheless removes the 
initiating of the procedure from the exercise of national jurisdiction. 
The Security Council besides its independent right of initiative may 
exercise further influence on the functioning of the Court according to the 
terms of Art. 16. The activity of the Security Council interferes with national 
jurisdiction as it happened in the Lockerbie case, when with its Resolutions 
748/1992 and 883/1993 interfered into a concrete cases and ordered 
economic sanctions against Libya. 
The Statute itself declares in Art. 17 when does the jurisdiction of the 
ICC overrides national jurisdiction. The principles of the primacy of national 
legal systems and the ICC's "complementarity" are evident in other provisions 
of the Statute. Article 15(4) requires the authorisation of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber before the Prosecutor commences an investigation proprio motu 
as opposed to when it is referred by a state party or the Security Council 
/Article 15/.19 Contrary to Bassiouni 's opinion, Art. 15 does not restrict 
the Court, it restricts only the prosecutor. 
Furthermore Art. 27 fundamentally restricts the exercise of national 
jurisdiction by prohibiting any immunities provided for in the national law 
in the course of the Cour t ' s proceedings. 
On the basis of the above one may conclude that it is the sovereignty 
of those states which did not ratify the convention that "obstruct the 
effectiveness of that court". On the other hand, for the states parties the ICC 
represent a restriction of their national jurisdiction. Moreover, the ICC does 
less than "what each and every state in the international community can do 
under existing international law",20 since according to international law 
states may prosecute hard core crimes on the basis of the universality 
principle regardless who committed those crimes and where. It is unclear, 
18
 Bassiouni: ibid, point 63. 
14
 Bassiouni: ibid, point 9. 
20
 See: supra note 12. 
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however, whether this is obligatory for the ICC upon prosecution initiated 
by the Security Council. This would be only then the case, if the Security 
Council is not bound by the complementary principle. 
Answers to the questionnaire 
3.1. Hungary has not yet ratified the ICC Statute. The ratification procedure is 
currently under preparation. 
3.2. There is no objection in Hungary against establishing the ICC. Never-
theless the ICC represents a brand new type of institution, therefore its 
implementation into the domestic law requires thorough preparation. One 
possible way of ratifying the Statute would be, if the Hungarian Parliament 
first ratified it with a special law and provided for the necessary modification 
of several Hungarian laws only then when the 60 ratifications are deposited 
and the Statute enters into force. There is so far no decision in Hungary 
about the method of ratification. 
3.3. Since the ICC interferes also with the exclusionary domestic jurisdiction 
based on the territoriality principle, the chapter of the Hungarian Constitution 
dealing with the court system needs to be modified accordingly. 
At present the Hungarian Constitution provides as follows: 
Article 45. 
(1) In the Republic of Hungary justice is administered by the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Hungary, the Court of the Capital, the 
county ourts and the local courts. 
(2) Special courts for specific groups of cases may be established by 
law. 
Article 47. 
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary determines the guidelines 
for the operation and administration of justice in all courts. The 
guidelines and principles established by the Supreme Court are of 
binding nature for all courts. 
3.4. Upon ratification the responsibility of the head of state as set out at present 
in Art. 31/A and 32 of the Hungarian Constitution requires modification. 
The Hungarian Constitution does not contain further provisions in respect of 
the responsibility of other leading politicians. 
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The responsibility of the head of state is regulated as follows: 
Article 31/A. 
( 1 ) T h e person of the President of the Republic is inviolable; protection 
f rom criminal prosecution shall be granted by a separate law. 
(2) Should the President of the Republic violate the Constitution or any 
other law while in office, a motion supported by one-fif th of the 
Members of Parliament may propose that impeachment proceedings 
be initiated against the President of the Republic. 
(3) A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament 
is required to initiate impeachment proceedings. Voting shall be 
held by secret ballot. 
(4) From passage of this resolution by the Parliament until the conclusion 
of the impeachment proceedings, the President of the Republic may 
not attend to any of the duties of his office. 
(5) The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction in such cases. 
(6) Should the Constitutional Court determine that the law was violated, it 
shall have the authority to remove the President of the Republic 
f rom office. 
Article 32. 
(1) If impeachment proceedings are initiated against the President of the 
Republic on the basis of an indictable offence committed in connection 
with official activities while in office, then the Constitutional Court shall 
also apply the basic provisions of criminal prosecution in its proceedings. 
The prosecution shall be represented by a Special Prosecutor elected 
from among the Members of Parliament. 
(2) In other cases, criminal proceedings against the President of the 
Republic may only be initiated subsequent to the end of his term of 
office. 
(3) Should the Constitutional Court find the President of the Republic 
guilty of an intentional criminal offence, it may remove the President 
of the Republic from office and simultaneously apply any punishment 
and measures prescribed for such offence in the Penal Code. 
3.5. Further immunities are not contained in the Constitution, but in special 
laws. Immunity means in those cases not the exemption f rom criminal 
responsibility. It contains special procedural rules for waiver of immunity. 
Such waiver is a prerequisite of commencing criminal proceedings. 
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The following special laws need to be modified: 
— Act No. 1972/V on the Public Prosecution Off ice 
— Act No. 1989/XXXII on the Constitutional court 
— Act No. 1993/LIX on the Legal Status of Members of Parliament 
— Act No. 1993/CX on National Defence 
— Act No. 1977/LXVI on the Structure and Functioning of the Courts 
— Act No. 1989/XXXVIII on the Hungarian Court of Auditors 
— Act No. 1978/IV on the Hungarian Criminal Code 
— Act No. 1996/XXXVIII on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
3.6. Once the ICC is implemented into domestic law, it would be a 
contradiction within the national legal system, if different rules applied to 
proceedings before the ICC and proceedings before a domestic court. 
3.7. Upon ratification of the ICC Art. 102 of the Statute becomes part of 
Hungarian law. Art. 102 distinguishes between extradition and surrender. 
The Hungarian Constitution does not prohibit the extradition of own nationals. 
Surrender is, however, a new institution also within the Hungarian legal 
system. It was first introduced by the ICTY Statute that Hungary ratified. 
Nevertheless no surrender of Hungarian nationals has taken place so far on 
the basis of that provision. 
3.8. Hungarian law contains provisions on lifetime imprisonment and 
Hungarian courts may decide that the sentenced person can be on conditional 
release only after a period of 30 years. Consequently, the ratification of the 
ICC Statute would not pose any problems in that respect. 
The part 10 of Statute the Enforcement. According to Art. 103 a sentence 
of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a 
list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept 
sentenced persons. Rule 199: Unless provided otherwise in the Rules, the 
functions of the Court under Part 10 shall be exercised by the Presidency. 
Rule 200/2: The Presidency shall not include a State on the list provided 
for in article 103, paragraph (1), if it does not agree with the conditions 
that such a State attaches to its acceptance. The Presidency may request 
any additional information from that State prior taking a decision. The Rules 
200-225 regulate the enforcement.2 1 
21
 In: Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 71е ш е année, 1er et 2eme trimestres 2000 
203-215. 
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3.9. According to section 3.3. of the present report, the proceedings of the 
prosecutor of the ICC may only serve as the preparation for the functioning 
of the previously accepted jurisdiction. 
3.10. Both Art. 29 of the ICC Statute and Art. 33(2)b of the Hungarian 
Criminal Code prohibit any statutory limitation in connection with the 
crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is rather unlikely that 
the perpetrator of such crimes may receive pardon. Should this be the case, 
however, in our view Art. 17(l)a of the Statute could then be applicable 
according to which it could be classified as if "the State is unwilling to 
carry out the investigation or the prosecution." 
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Abstract. Hungarian statutes and regulations contain a "without prejudice to inter-
national treaty obligations" clause as to the scope of their provisions. In such cases the 
international treaty—or maybe an existing mutual practice in its absence—shall be 
enforced based on the express provision of the domestic act. This process might prove to be 
quite lengthy, since the Minister of Justice is authorized to pronounce on the existence of 
such mutual practices. In the second half of the 1990's the Hungarian legislative branch 
(the Parliament) passed a statute on taxation which entered into force even though it 
violated the bilateral treaties concluded by Hungary to avoid double taxation. 
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I. General issues concerning the relationship between international 
law (including international treaties) and the Hungarian legal 
system 
In order to understand the specific the problems dealt with in the outline 
of the report, first of all one must define the status of international treaties in 
the Hungarian legal system. The question has been settled by the comprehensive 
revision of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary entering into force 
on October 23, 1989. Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution1—corresponding to the 
previous doctrine and practice followed in the absence of constitutional 
provisions—provides that no international treaty shall be applied directly 
by Hungarian authorities issuing legally relevant decisions. According to the 
above mentioned constitutional provision, the ensurance of the agreement 
between the accepted international legal obligations and domestic statutes is 
Professor , University of Szeged, Law School, H - 6 7 0 1 Szeged, Rákóczi tér t., 
Hungary. 
Fax: (36 62) 544-490; E-mail: drbodnar@juris.u-szeged.hu 
1
 Art. 7 (1) of the Consti tution (statute No. 20 of 1949 wi th several modifications) 
in its present form provides: "The legal system of Hungary accepts the generally recognized 
rules of international law, and furthermore, it shall ensure the agreement between the 
accepted international obligations and domestic statutes." 
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in fact the transformation of an international treaty into the Hungarian law, 
i.e. the promulgation of a treaty in the Official Journal (Magyar Közlöny) as a 
Hungarian legislative act in the form of an instrument of domestic law 
(regulation, statute).2 
Thus the Hungarian judiciary and other organs applying the law regard not 
the international treaty ifself but the internal legislative act as the source of law. 
However the regulation having the force of statute (tvr.) No 27 of 1982 on 
the conclusion of international treaties also provides for the mere publication 
of an international treaty in the official journal without actually transforming 
it.3 While the internal legal status of an international treaty already trans-
formed is clearly defined by the legislative act of promulgation, that of an 
international treaty merely published cannot be ascertained. In the present 
state of Hungarian law the priority of international treaties is not recognized. 
The provisions outlined above present several difficulties, especially for the 
judiciary. A judge, for instance, finds no guidance in the relevant legal materials 
as to the relationship between an international treaty promulgated by a statute, 
and another domestic statute on the same subject. It is unclear whether the 
principle lex posterior derogat legi priori is applicable. The situation is 
even more complicated if such a collision exists between a regulation of the 
Cabinet, and a previous or subsequent statute, i. e. in cases where reference 
might be made to the principle lex superior derogat legi inferiori. 
Some German courts—with regard to the provisions of the Grundgesetz also 
establishing a dualistic/transformational system—have on several occasions 
deemed an international treaty lex specialis in order to secure its priority 
2
 E.g. statute No. 100 of 1999 on the promulgation of the European Social Charter; 
regulation of the Cabinet No. 148 of 1998 (IX. 18.) on the promulgation of the Agreement 
between the Government of the Republ ic of Hungary and the Government of the Russian 
Federation concerning the cooperat ion in cultural, scientific and educational matters; 
however, the Exchange of Letters between the Government of the Republ ic of Hungary 
and the Commission of the European Communities on (The Rappor teur ' s remark: the 
promulgation of a legal instrument is the final phase of its adoption (in this regard, see: 
Creifelds, C.: Rechtswörterbuch. Munich , 1978 (5 th ed.) 224 and 890). Since the adopt ion 
of an international treaty is complete by signiture, ratification or accession, its promulgation 
seems superfluous and meaningless.) 
3
 Art. 13 of the regulation having the force of a statute (tvr.) No. 27 of 1982 provides: 
"(1) International treaties ratified by Parliament shall be promulgated by statute. (2) 
International treaties conferring r ights and duties on natural and legal persons in a direct 
and general manner shall be promulgated by statute, regulation having the force of a statute, 
regulation of the Council of Ministers or regulation of a Minister. (3) International treaties 
not referred to in paras. (1) and (2) shall be published. The Council of Ministers or the 
Presidium of the People 's Republic of Hungary may decide otherwise." 
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over the domestic legislation by invoking the principle lex specialis derogat 
legi universale,4 However the Hungarian judiciary has not developed a similar 
approach so far inducing the Hungarian judge to enforce the domestic act. 
On the other hand it must be emphasized that a number of important 
Hungarian statutes and regulations contain a "without prejudice to inter-
national treaty obligations"5 clause as to the scope of their provisions. In 
such cases the international treaty—or maybe an existing mutual practice in 
its absence—shall be enforced based on the express provision of the domestic 
act. This process might prove to be quite lengthy, since the Minister of Justice 
is authorized to pronounce on the existence of such mutual practices. 
At this point the national rapporteur would like to propose a general 
but very important concluding remark. In the post-1989 era the parties to a 
law-suit invoke the provisions of an international treaty with increasing 
frequency and success. In the second half of the 1990's the Hungarian 
legislative branch (the Parliament) passed a statute on taxation which 
entered into force even though it violated the bilateral treaties concluded 
by Hungary to avoid double taxation.6 The growing number of references 
to these international treaties compelled the internal revenue service (АРЕН— 
Bureau of Taxation and Financial Control) to issue an instrument of inter-
pretation to construe the domestic statute in a way conforming to the 
international obligations emanating from these treaties. (The question remains 
whether such interpretation of a statute by an administrative or executive 
organ is authentic or even constitutional. ) It must be noted however that 
without this kind of interpretation or modification the success of an action 
4
 FG Bremen 18. 2. 1970. (П. 114/68) E F G 1970, FG Baden-Württemberg 3. 9. 1970 
(VI. 58/69) E F G 1970, FG Baden -Wür t t emberg 29. 11. 1968 (III./II.74/67) E F G 1969, 
FG Münster 28. 2. 1965 (II .a.417/65) EFG 1965. In: Fontes Iuris Gentium. Ser ies A. 
Sectio II. T o m u s 6. 1966-1970. 6 - 7 . Nr. 107, 120, 73, 11. 
5
 For such provisions, see inter alia Art. 37 (1) of statute No. 100 of 1995 on cus toms 
duties, Art. 1 of statute No. 95 of 1995 on fo re ign exchange, Art . 1 of statute No . 112 
of 1996 on credi t banks and f inancial services. 
6
 The Agreement of July 18, 1977 between the Republic of Hungary and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the avoidance of d o u b l e taxation of income, profit and assets, 
promulgated by the regulation having the f o r c e of a statute No . 27 of 1979, provides 
that a State shal l not exercise its right of taxa t ion based on the seat of the enterpr ise if 
the income has already been taxed by the o ther State. 
7
 Cf. А Р Е Н (Bureau of Taxation and Financia l Control) guidel ines 1995/62 on the 
interpretation of the agreement between Hunga ry and Germany on the avoidance of 
double taxat ion. 
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brought before a court by disadvantaged individuals or companies would 
have been rather unsure. 
As far as the enforcement of foreign law in the area covered by private 
international law is concerned the relevant provisions are much better and 
safer. The Code on Private International Law8—internationally acknowledged 
for its quality drafting—is applied by the judiciary without reservations. 
Admittedly the judicial practice on the enforcement and enforceability of 
the treaties concluded under public international law is somewhat ambiguous 
and equivocal. But the effect of the decisions taken by international organi-
zations9 and of the rulings of international judicial organs is even more obscure 
since in this area legislative act or judicial practice is totally lacking.10 
II. Practical Examples 
1. From 1990 onwards the Constitutional Court many times had to face the 
interpretation of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution in attempting to define the 
relationship between international law (including international treaties) and 
the domestic legal system.11 
The most controversial decision so far concerned the constitutionality 
of statute No 90 of 1993 (the so-called "act of delivering justice"). The 
statute adopted by Parliament provided for criminal proceedings against 
persons who took part in the crimes committed against participants of the 
revolution of 1956 despite the fact that according to the Criminal Code in 
force at the commission of the act, the limitation period prescribed for 
these crimes has already expired. 
In consequence the Constitutional Court held that no criminal proceedings 
might be initiated under Hungarian domestic law, but if the acts in question 
constitute a crime under international law and the relevant rules of inter-
12 
national law so provide, an action might be based on these provisions. Both 
8
 See regulat ion having the force of a statute N o 13 of 1979. The regulation hav ing 
the force of a statute existed as a source of in ternal law until 1990. The Presidium of 
the People 's Republ ic was authorized to issue such instruments be ing in effect equal to 
the statutes of the Parliament. 
9
 Cf. UN Security Council Resolut ions 757 (1992) , 760 (1992) and 820 (1993). 
10
 Cf. Case concerning the Gaböikovo-Nagymaros project. 
11
 Cf. Const i tut ional Court decis ions 30/1990 (XII. 15.), 16/1993 (III. 12.), 53 /1993 
(X. 13.), 36 /1996 (IX. 4.), 4 /1997 (I. 22.), 30/1998 (VI. 25.). 
12
 In its decision 53/1993 (X. 13.) the Constitutional Court held that notwithstanding 
the expiry of the limitation per iod for a crime set by domestic law, if " the act commit ted 
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the Constitutional Court and the proceeding courts of justice declared such 
charges admissible basicaly by invoking common Art. 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions13 of 1949. In the opinion of the national rapporteur, f rom the 
viewpoint of international and constitutional law the main difficulty was created 
by Hungary's failure to transform the Geneva Conventions into internal law, 
publishing only the titles thereof in the official journal and completely 
omitting their texts.14 Accordingly the Geneva Conventions could not become 
is considered a war crime or a crime against humanity under international law and the 
rules of international law prohibi t the existence of such a l imitat ion period, Hungary is 
bound by international law to exclude limitation in these cases ." 
13
 C o m m o n Art. 3 of the Geneva Convent ions of 1949 p rov ides that: 
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Part ies, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, 
as a minimum, the fol lowing provisions: 
(1)Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their a rms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds , 
detention, or any other cause , shall in all circumstances be t rea ted humanely, wi thout 
any adverse distinction f o u n d e d on race, colour , religion or f a i th , sex, birth or weal th , 
or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the fo l lowing acts are and shall remain prohibi ted at any t ime and in 
any place whatsoever with respec t to the above-mentioned persons : 
(a) violence to life and person , in part icular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
t reatment and torture; 
(b)taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in paricular, humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d)the pass ing of sentences and the carrying out of execut ions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judic ia l 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by c ivi l ized peoples. 
(2)The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Commi t t ee of the Red Cross , 
may offer its services to the Par t ies to the confl ic t . 
The Part ies to the confl ic t should further endeavour to br ing into force, by means of 
special agreements , all or part of the other provis ions of the present Convention. 
The applicat ion of the preceding provisions shall not a f f ec t the legal status of the 
Parties to the confl ict ." 
14
 The exact words of the regulation having the force of a s ta tute No. 32 of 1954 are 
as follows: 
"Regulat ion having the fo r ce of a statute of the Presidium of the People 's Republ ic 
No. 32 of 1954 on the legal e f f ec t of the International Convent ions for the Protect ion of 
Victims of War done at Geneva on August 12, 1949. (The instrument ratification of the 
People 's Republ ic of Hungary have been deposi ted at Bern, on Augus t 3, 1954.) 
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part of the Hungarian law. The relevant decision of the Constitutional Court is 
based on the assumption that the Geneva Conventions belong to the generally 
recognized rules of international law, and thus became part of the Hungarian 
legal system by virtue of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution providing for the 
"general transformation"15 of such norms. 
The provisions of the Constitution referred to above were interpreted in 
1998 by the Constitutional Court in a more detailed and precise manner. The 
Court reinforced that an international treaty may become part of the Hungarian 
law only by an act of transformation. In addition the Court held that it had 
no jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of an international treaty 
itself but reserved the right to do so as regards the transformed version of the 
international treaty, i.e. the domestic act performing the transformation.16 
Following the same line of reasoning the Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional an instrument publishing the executive provisions of a 
protocol of the Association Council relating to Art. 62 of the Association 
Agreement concluded between the Republic of Hungary and the European 
Communities and their Member States (the so-called European Agreement), 
without having to pronounce on the treaty itself.17 
Art. 1 The Presidium of the People ' s Republ ic hereby incorpora tes the fol lowing 
Conventions f o r the Protection of the Victims of War done at Geneva , on August 12, 
1949 into its regulat ions having the force of a s tatute: 
1. Convent ion for the Amel iora t ion of the Condit ion of the W o u n d e d and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the F ie ld ; 
2. Convent ion for the Ameliorat ion of the Condition of Wounded , Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; 
3. Convent ion relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ; 
4. Convent ion relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Art. 2 (1) The Conventions enumerated in Art. 1 shall be e f f ec t i ve as regards the 
People 's Republ ic of Hungary f r o m February 3, 1955. 
(2) The competent ministers shall be responsible for the execution of the Conventions. 
Art. 3 The Minister of Fore ign Affairs shall be responsible f o r the communicat ion 
of the off ic ia l translation of the Convent ions to the public before the Conventions shall 
take effect ." 
15
 The t ransformation of cus tomary rules is inconceivable. The concept of "general 
t ransformat ion" have been invented by the dual is t ic doctrine and practice in order to 
provide for the internal appl icat ion of universal customary rules, and their recognition 
as a part of the national legal system. In this regard , see Müller, J. P .—Wildhaber , L.: 
Praxis des Völkerrechts. Bern, 1977. 134. 
16
 Cf. Const i tut ional Court decis ions 4/1997 (I. 22.) and 30/1998 (VI. 25.). 
17
 The Constitutional Court in its decision 30/1998 (VI. 25.) has reinforced its stance 
taken in decision 4/1997 (I. 22.): "According to decision 4/1997 (I. 22 . ) the Constitutional 
Court after f ind ing unconst i tut ional a provision of an international treaty, shall declare 
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2. For the analysis of Art. 7 (1) of the Constitution, it also might be of interest 
to take a look at the domestic legal effect of judgement No 92 of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) dated September 25, 1997 in the case 
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project inolving Hungary and Slovakia. 
In 1992 the Republic of Hungary terminated a bilateral treaty stipulating for 
carrying out a joint project originally concluded in 1977 between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. In doing so, Hungary—by an act of domestic legislation— 
abrogated the regulation having the force of a statute No of 1978 that 
transformed the bilateral treaty into domestic law.19 The ICJ held however that 
Hungary could not lawfully terminate the treaty and it is still in force. Never-
theless the statute No 40 of 1992 abrogating the regulations having the force 
of a statute No 16 of 1978 and No 6 of 1984 (the second act promulgated the 
1983 protocol of Prague modifying the original treaty) continues to be 
operational as far as the domestic law of Hungary is concerned.20 
3. The national rapporteur finally would like to note the difficulties that 
were presented by the application of the Security Council resolutions of 
1992-1993 imposing embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.21 In 
compliance with the resolutions, the Hungarian legislature amended the 
Criminal Code and provided for a new criminal offence. However the 
definition of this crime inserted in the Code was too general and vague for 
the courts to apply it in an exact manner, since it did not contain the 
enumeration of the acts falling under the scope of the resolution.22 Though 
the resolution itself usually was not available for the judges, they wouldn' t 
have been allowed to apply it in a way contrary to the Criminal Code (a 
statute) anyway because it was in part promulgated by an inferior source 
of domestic law (regulation).'3 The situation was further complicated by 
unconsti tutional the internal legal instrument promulgat ing the treaty. The declaration 
does not affect the international obligations of the Republic of Hungary." (Reasoning of 
decision 30/1998 (VI. 25.) Part VI. Section 2.) 
18
 Promulgated by regulation having the force of a statute No. 17 of 1978. 
19
 See statute No. 40 of 1992. 
20
 The statute No. 4 0 of 1992 was still effect ive on November 1, 2001. 
21
 See Security Counci l Resolutions referred to infra 11. 
22
 Art . 261/A of the Criminal Code provides: "Whoever violates the economic, 
commercial or financial restrictions imposed under international obligations of the Republic 
of Hungary, shall commit a crime, if such act is sanctioned by separate statute." 
23
 On this problem, see Kovács, P.: Nemzetköz i szervezetek szankciós t ípusú ha-
tározatai magyarországi é rvényes í the tőségének a lko tmányjog i gyakorlata és problé-
mái. (Const i tu t ional Prac t ices and Prob lems of Applying in Hungary the Reso lu t ions 
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the legislature's failure to provide guidance in distinguishing the resemblant 
cases of "smuggling" and "violation of embargo". 
In spite of the aforementioned constitutional problems as a matter of fact 
there are encouraging attempts to define the status of international treaties 
in the legal system of Hungary, to facilitate their application by the judiciary, 
and in general to honor their provisions. These attempts—even in short 
term—might contribute to the disappearance of a tradition of neglecting 
the international treaties in the domestic administration of justice that 
characterized the judicial practice between 1950 and 1990. For these ends 
the modification of the Constitution is indispensable in order to secure the 
application of international treaties and clarify their priority over domestic 
law. The remarks and proposals of the Hungarian scholars of international 
law are intended to support this process.24 
III. Treatment of individuals and entrepreneurs 
First of all one must point out that the law of Hungary recognizes the right 
of entrepreneurship and contains provisions on the protection of the rights 
of individuals. 
1. The fundamental rights of individuals are dealt with in a separate chapter 
25 
of the Constitution" and in other statutes laying down detailed rules for 
each fundamental right.26 
The protection of fundamental rights is also fostered by Hungary's 
becoming a party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
of International Organizat ions Impos ing Sanctions) In: EU-csatlakozás és alkotmányo-
zás. (Publication No. 2. of the Department of International Law, University of Szeged) , 
Szeged , 2001. 
24
 See part icularly the critiques by Bodnár, L.: The Relationship of International 
L a w and Domestic Law in our Cons t i tu t ion—de lege ferenda. Acta Jur. et Pol. Szeged, 
Tom. XLIX., Fasc. 8., Szeged, 1996.; Bragyova, A.: A magyar jogrendszer és a nemzetközi 
j o g kapcsolatának alkotmányos rendezése . (Consti tut ional Regulation of the Relation-
ship between Internat ional Law and the Hungarian Legal Order.) In: Nemzetközi jog az 
új alkotmányban (ed . András Bragyova) , Budapest 1997.; Vörös, I.: Az Európai Meg-
állapodás magyar bírósági alkalmazása. (Implementation of the European Agreement by 
Hungarian Courts.) In: Collega (Journal of the Loránd Eötvös University), 1997/3-4. 
25
 For the enumerat ion of fundamen ta l rights, see Chapter XII of the Consti tution 
(Art. 54-70/K) ent i t led "Fundamental Rights and Dut ies" . 
26
 See inter alia staute No. 2 of 1989 on the right of association, statute No. 3 of 
1989 on the right of assembly, s ta tute No. 7 of 1989 on strike. 
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the 1950 Convention of Rome and its 
Protocols), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted in 
1966 under the auspices of the UN. In addition Hungary took the necessary 
measures to enable other States as well as individuals claiming to be victims 
of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Convention or in the 
Covenants to access the Europen Court of Human Rights or to submit a 
communication to the Human Rights Committee by becoming a party to the 
relevant optional protocols, as well. 
2. The law of Hungary (e.g. statute No 144 of 1997 on incorporated companies, 
statute No 145 of 1997 on the company register, the publicity of company 
related informations and judicial proceedings concerning companies or 
statute No 24 of 1988 on foreign investments in Hungary) recognizes the 
right of entrepreneurship and promotes both individual and corporate 
enterprise. 
Accordingly there are tens of thousands of companies incorporated at 
the Hungarian registry courts. A significant percentage of these companies 
incorporated in Hungary is exclusively or in part owned by foreigners. 
The protection and promotion of foreign investments is facilitated by 
nearly 50 bilateral treaties. 
After abandoning the completely planned economy of the socialist era and 
abolishing State monopoly in international commerce, from 1990 on—subject 
to some limitations on quantity and compulsory licenses—both internal 
and external trade can be pursued by anyone. From July 2001 as a result 
of our membership in the OECD and the progress made in the negotiations 
concerning our accession to the EU, all restrictions on capital movements 
and current transactions and transfers have been lifted as regards individuals 
and companies allowing curbs only for the purposes of the oppression of 
money laundering.27 
3. Litigation concerning companies incorporated in Hungary may usually 
be initiated before the regular courts of Hungary. Even if the conctractual 
relationship involves international elements (e.g. damage suffered either 
at home or abroad during an international conveyance), in most cases the 
jurisdiction of a Hungarian regular court or court of arbitration can be 
27
 On the liberalization of capital movements and current transactions and transfers, 
see Cabinet regulation 88/2001. (VI. 25.). 
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established according to the provisions of the Code of Private International 
Law or the Code of Civil Procedure. 
If the case involving Hungarian citizens or legal persons is judged by a 
foreign tribunal, the protection of their interests and the assertion of their 
rights is facilitated by international agreements. The Republic of Hungary 
concluded some 60 bilateral treaties on judicial assistance in civil and 
commercial matters. The content of such agreements is of course not uniform, 
e.g. the treaty of 1965 between Hungary and Austria only provides for judicial 
assistance in civil matters and the recognition of official documents, 
however the treaties of 1980 between Hungary and France and of 1981 
between Hungary and Finland deal with judicial assistance in civil, family 
and criminal matters as well. 
The Republic of Hungary is also a party to many multilateral treaties on 
judicial assistance and on other topics with economic implications protecting 
and binding the Hungarian entrepreneurs and the Hungarian State, as well. 
Some provisions of international treaties have been incorporated into 
Hungarian statutes without modifications, e.g. Art. 8 of the Agreement on the 
Implementation of Art. VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
is reproduced in our 1995 statute on customs duties."8 
The ban on all kinds of discrimination is strictly enforced as regards 
individual rights and the f reedom of entrepreneurship. Discriminative 
practices have been used frequently by employers but firm State action has 
been taken in return. It is illegal for an employer to determine conditions for 
the filling of a vacancy based on gender or age. Exceptionally such discrimi-
nation is allowed only if the characteristics of the job itself so require. It is 
also illegal to publish job advertisments of discriminative nature. 
The real problems are of course presented not by the open and obvious 
discrimination but by the so-called latent discrimination especially directed 
against gypsies. In such cases the employer will not hire e.g. a gypsy or a 
pregnant woman but gives other reasons for refusing the application. 
Further work has to be done—not only in Hungary—concerning the 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and the rights of homosexuals 
and other persons with a not exclusively heterosexual attitude. These days in 
Hungary a huge debate is going on about a decision of the public guardianship 
authority allowing a well-known transvestite to adopt a baby. (Should a 
homosexual or a transvestite be allowed to adopt and raise a child?) 
28
 Cf. statute No. 100 of 1995, Art . 21 -33 . 
CONSTITUTION, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AND CONTRACTS 289 
IV. Foreign investments in Hungary, investments of Hungarian 
nationals abroad 
In the past ten years, since the beginning of the transformation of Hungary 
into a market economy a multi-speed process could be observed in this field. 
A separate statute was adopted on the foreign investments in Hungary in 
order to facilitate the influx of capital.29 
The single most important barrier is the prohibition of the acquisition 
of agricultural lands by foreigners. This situation is not expected to change 
until several years after Hungary's accession to the EU. Otherwise the capital 
moving into Hungary (first of all green field investments) was given pre-
ferential treatment, especially between 1990 and 1995. In the same time a 
number of treaties on the protection of foreign investments were concluded 
between Hungary and other States.30 
The liberalisation of the investments of Hungarian nationals in third 
countries was not completed until the aforementioned liberalisation of 
capital movements and current transactions and transfers. Accordingly 
investments of Hungarian natural or legal persons in third countries might 
be limited only in areas requiring special protection and only by invoking 
the internationally accepted causes of restriction (public order, national 
security, protection of cultural heritage etc.) besides being subject to the 
provisions of the host State. 
29
 Cf. statute N o . 24 of 1988 on foreign investments in Hungary 
30
 E.g. with the Federal Republ ic of Germany, Canada, Kuwait , Spain, Israel, 
Australia, Italy, Austr ia , Sweden, France, United Kingdom etc. 
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Abstract. The paper gives an overview of the Hungarian legal regulation of the legal status 
of the foetus. In this respect, it reveals the historical roots of the legal protection of the 
foetus in Hungary. It analyses in details the theoretical standpoints of Hungarian authors of 
civil and criminal law. It describes the unconstitutional legal practice of the period of 
communist dictatorship (1950-1990) that lead to the unparalleled destruction of 4,5 million 
embryos. It analyses in details the unconstitutional practice. The analysis also includes the 
treatment of he prevailing "Embryonic Life Protection Act". Finally, the essay determines, 
in accordance with Hungarian legal practice and jurisprudence, the legal status of the 
foetus and comes forward with proposals addressed to future legislation. 
Keywords: legal status of the foetus, decisions of the constitutional Court, "Embryonic 
Life protection Act" 
1. Foundations of the Legal History and in Law under Hungarian Law 
As far back as the Middle Ages, the status of embryo and foetus had some 
roots deeply entrenched in Roman law, which had been received into 
Hungarian law. 
In 1517 Werbőczy's Tripartitum, practically having the force of law, 
spelled out what held sway for three centuries: "Here we must realize that 
some of the offspring are called 'conceived' , others 'born ' , and yet others 
'posthumous'. Those conceived are ones who have been procreated in the 
mother's uterus by the sexual union of husband and wife, but are unborn. 
Given their nature, they enjoy equal rights with the offspring born and 
living, f rom the date of conception as evidenced by delivery". 
Embryo and foetus exist and have rights under medieval Hungarian 
law. While the rights of foetus are primarily rights to succeed, foetus is 
full-fledged in this field, that is to say that foetus, if born alive, must be 
regarded as having been living at the time of accrual of the inheritance. 
* 
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In addition, Hungarian law had never made any reference to the 
possibility of legal abortion down to the 20th century. King Coloman I ' s 
penal code of the 11th century referred to "women destroying embryo or 
foetus", who were required to "expiate before their archdeacon". This led 
the Council of Buda, held in 1279, to rely on the threat of excommuni-
cation against women procuring abortion. Pursuant to municipal laws, the 
courts passed severe criminal sentences for procured abortion during the 16th 
and 17th centuries. Sentences were severe especially in cases where "the 
foetus already had soul", a fact which occurred on the 40th day following 
conception, because that date caused such women to be sentenced for 
"filicide". Data testifying to death sentences passed on women for abor-
ticide are available from 1576, 1582, 1612 and 1655. 
The first Penal Code of the Hungarian State (Act V of 1878) contained 
uniform strict regulations under the hallmark of disestablishment of the 
Church. Articles 285 and 286 prescribed separate penalties for women 
procuring abortion (imprisonment for a term of 2 to 3 years) and for illegal 
aborters (imprisonment for a term of 2 to 15 years). 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, private-law practice, which was 
developing along the lines of customary law, granted foetus conditional 
capacity to rights, meaning that legal capacity was subject to live-birth. In 
other words, a foetus born alive was to be regarded as capable of rights f rom 
the date of conception. In one of its judgements delivered in 1892 the 
Supreme Court (Curia), held that "even foetus has rights, which, in case of 
birth, the court shall proceed ex officio to have preserved and enforced". 
Up to the first part of the 20th century there was no legal practice to 
change the legally absolute protection of foetus and there was no jurist to 
support the legalization of abortion. 
In 1933 a judgement of the Curia spelled out that abortion performed for 
the purpose of protecting a mother 's l ife and health was not punishable. 
This, in the absence of legislative authorization, served to introduce medi-
cally indicated abortion into medical practice under circumstances that 
made it virtually impossible to know when such indication was justified. 
Given that in 1945 thousands of Hungarian women were raped by Soviet 
troops occupying the country, a decree of the Minister of Health cleared 
the way to abortion for a period of a few months. 
In summing up developments during the period extending to 1950 it can be 
stated that the criminal legislation of Hungary accorded absolute protection to 
foetus, while Hungarian private law recognized conditional capacity to rights. 
The period of 1950 to 1990 saw radical changes in "socialist" legislation 
concerning the status of foetus and the legalization of abortion. 
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The distinctive features of that era were the following: 
— the status and the rights of foetus were not covered by a single 
provision of law or court decision, and the subject-matter was theoretically 
treated in brief by only a few writers; 
— the Penal Code retained the ban on abortion, while government 
decrees and departmental orders devised a system for the authorization of 
abortion that was the world's most liberal as compared to contemporary 
legal practice; 
— abortion as the only method of birth control was practised on a 
mass scale before the spread of contraception; 
— there was no explanatory work and, in the absence of the right of 
association, there existed no "pro life" organizations, with no possibility 
for protest against the existing legal practice even within the frameworks 
of the churches. 
All these features combined to result in the world's highest ratio of legal 
abortions in Hungary by comparison with the number of inhabitants (about 
10 million) between 1956 and 1990, with a total of some 4,5 million legal 
abortions performed. 
In more years than one, the number of abortions exceeded by far that 
of live-births (in 1969, for instance, there were 206,815 abortions against 
154,319 live-births). This caused Hungary to become a country with the 
worst demographic pattern, the number of inhabitants decreasing by some 
500,000 between 1981 and 2001. 
The period 1950-1990 witnessed the following changes in the legal 
system: 
— the years of 1953 to 1956 were a period of "abortionist terror", with 
legal abortion practically non-existent and with sentences of imprisonment 
for a term of 8 to 10 years often meted out for illegal abortions, while the 
social bases for the upbringing of children were lacking; 
— the period 1956-1973 was that of the most liberal system for autho-
rization of abortion in the contemporary world. If an expectant woman 
appeared before the "abortion committee" prior to the 12th week of 
pregnancy and said, without giving any cause or reason, that she wanted to 
receive abortive treatment, the permission had to be granted; 
— during the period of 1973 to 1988 there was introduced a model of 
indications of a rather wide scale: in case of 6 indications the abortion 
committees had to grant, while in case of 4 indications it might grant, 
permission for abortive treatment. The annual number of abortions fell by 
100,000 under the impact of that legislation; 
— the scale of indications for abortion was further narrowed in 1988. 
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After the collapse of the communist party state (1989-1990) the 
Constitutional Court was established in Hungary, and there came into being 
organizations for the protection of life. The Pacem in Utero association 
immediately applied to the Constitutional Court to have the party-state 
rules on abortion declared unconstitutional. 
In its Decision No. 64/1991. (XII. 17.) the Constitutional Court 
declared the whole body of relevant party-state legislative enactment 's to 
be unconstitutional and annulled the subordinate provisions of law. It held 
that this domain was to be governed by legislative acts only, because it 
involved fundamental constitutional rights, such as the foetus 's rights to 
life and legal capacity as well as the right of free disposal of one ' s own 
self. 
Several of the Court ' s decisions contained findings of paramount 
importance: 
— Foetus can be regarded as a person f rom the date of conception, 
subject, however, to an act of legislation. There is no bar to the law-maker 
recognizing "man as man from the date of conception". 
— Any authorization of abortion with no reason assigned is unconsti-
tutional. The grounds for authorization are to be stated by law, it being 
understood that both complete ban and fully legalized abortion are contrary to 
the Constitution. 
— The law-maker may provide that foetus is a human being, in which 
case nothing but indications of emergency are legal. Should the law-maker 
decide that foetus is not a human being, the State 's constitutional 
responsibility for the protection of foetal life is nonetheless incurred. The 
Court held that "protection of foetal life is a state responsibility f rom the 
date of conception". 
Constitutional Judge Tamás Lábady, in his dissenting opinion appended 
to the decision, maintained that "foetus is a person, viz. a subject at law, 
and has, from the date of conception, a subjective right to be born". 
Act LXXIX of 1992 on the Protection of Foetal Life was adopted in the 
wake of the above-mentioned decisions of the Constitutional Court. It has failed 
to spell out that foetus is a "person" and to invest it with legal capacity and 
with rights. Although protecting foetus in principle, this Act can practically 
be considered to be an "act on abortion". It presents some positive as well 
as negative features with regard to the protection of foetal life, namely 
— it states that "foetal life beginning with conception shall enjoy 
respect and protection"; it introduces a "pregnancy allowance" due form three 
months of embryonic life; makes it a duty of the State to do explanatory 
work and to provide information prior to termination of pregnancy; 
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— it introduces a system of indications for abortion, including a broadly 
termed "crisis indication", up to 12 weeks of pregnancy. Medical indications 
are likewise formulated in a rather wide sense. It is silent on the protection 
of embryo formed by way of artificial fertilization. 
The status of embryo formed by way of artificial fertilization as well as the 
related procedures are regulated by Articles 165-187 of Act CLIV of 1997 on 
Public Health, which distinguishes embryo and foetus. Considered as embryo 
is a viable human embryo from the date of conception to 12 weeks of pregnancy, 
while defined as a human being is a foetus from 12 weeks of pregnancy. The 
Act affords little legal protection for embryo and deems artificial fertili-
zation, embryo donation and research on embryo to be a basically medico-
technical issue. While gratuitousness is held to be the general rule during 
the related procedures, the Act consistently uses property-law terms (embryo 
"donation", "deposit" of embryo, "disposal" of embryo, etc.). 
The aforesaid two enactment's are silent about the starting date of human 
life. The date of conception is determined by Art. 9 of the Civil Code: 
"the three hundredth day preceding the date of birth shall be considered 
the day of conception, but it shall be open to proof that conception took 
place at an earlier or a later date". 
It is likewise provided by the Civil Code that a curator must be 
appointed before the birth of the child, if such appointment is necessary for 
safeguarding the interests of the child (Art. 10). It was pursuant to this 
Article that in the "Dávod Abortion Case", which found an extremely great 
echo, the Town Court of Baja, by its Judgement No. 8.P. 20.367/1998/7, 
prohibited the performance of abortion on a girl mother aged 13. The Court 
based its judgement on the foetus 's constitutional right to life. This not-
withstanding, the abortion was performed subsequently. 
2. Foetus as a "Person" in Hungarian Law, and Rights of Embryo and 
Foetus 
With regard to recognition of foetus as a "person" and to "rights of embryo 
and foetus", distinction can be made in Hungarian law between views of 
legal theory and civil law and the approach of positive law. 
2.1. Recognition of foetus as a "person" and of the related rights of 
embryo and foetus has always been a majority or dominant opinion in the 
history of the science of Hungarian private law. 
István Werbőczy's Tripartitum (1517), which was of decisive importance 
in Hungarian private law for three centuries, declared an embryo conceived 
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to have equal rights with a foetus born.1 Based on it, Emericus Kelemen ' s 
first textbook of note on private law (1804) divides "persons" into three 
groups: persons conceived (conceptas), persons born (natas) and persons 
born after their fathers ' death (,posthumas). It states that "favourable 
opinion" regards them as being of ful l standing. Kelemen points that the 
expectant mother enjoys benefits in the interest of foetus ("Quin favore 
foetus").2 
Hungarian legal folkways in this f ie ld are interesting. According to 
traditions, "abortion in a sin form the outset, but once the foetus has quickened 
it is a murder, because thenceforth the foetus has soul". Another tradition 
has it that "aborting women go to hell", "fall victim to the devil", and "have 
to eat the aborted foetus in the hereafter".3 
Károly Szladits, a determinant figure of Hungarian jurisprudence in the 
20th century, asserts that "in case of live-birth a foetus is similarly personable, 
its legal capacity is not limited to certain rights or modes of acquisition, but is 
general yet conditional for it (foetus) has to be born alive". He even names 
some rights pertaining to foetus, such as family rights, rights of inheritance, 
rights to damages, maintenance, gift, and mortgage registered in its favour, 
and the right to make certain contracts through its representative.4 
Andor Sárffy, too, accepts the f o e t u s ' s capacity to rights: "Once we 
accept the tenet that legal capacity is possible without disposing capacity, 
concerns are allayed that one who cannot exercise his rights cannot have 
legal capacity either".5 Bálint Kolosváry argues that the principle "Nasci-
turus pro iam nato habetur, si de commodis eius agitur" (One to be born 
is to be regarded as born if one 's benefi ts are involved) certainly prevails 
in Hungarian law.6 According to criminal jurist Ferenc Finkey, the object 
1
 Werbőcy István Hármaskönyve ( Is tván Werbőczy ' s Tripartitum), Révai 1897, 
Part II, Ti t le 62 , §§ 2-4 . 
2
 Ke l emen , E. : Institutiones Juris Privati Hungarici, Pest , 1804, 178-180 . 
3
 Tárkány-Szücs, E : Magyar jogi népszokások (Hungarian Legal Folkways), Budapest, 
1981, 113-125 . 
4
 Szladits, К.: A magyar magánjog vázlata (An Outline of Hungarian Private Law) , 
Budapest , 1937, 74. 
5
 Sár f fy , A.: A jövőbeli ember jogképessége (Legal Capaci ty of Man Yet Unborn) , 
in: Szladits Károly emlékkönyv (Essays Presented to Károly Szladits) , Budapest , 1938, 
47-55 . 
6
 Ko losvá ry , В.: Magánjog (Private L a w ) , 1930, 78. 
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in law of the crime of procured abortion is constituted by "the right of 
foetus to l ife".7 
The most definite stance in 1946 was represented by István Szászy, a jurist 
of European fame, claiming that "even a foetus and even a human yet to be 
conceived are persons and consequently have legal capacity, because in our 
law both are vested with rights, and with rights not only prospective but also 
present, while legal obligations devolve on them, and, to be sure, one either 
entitled or legally bound can only be a legally capable person".8 
After 1945 the communist system of law unconstitutionally introduced 
an extremely liberal machinery for the authorization of abortion, which it 
was impossible to protest against openly. Still, the traditional views appeared 
in the pertinent literature and none of the jurists supported the abortion 
policy of the party state, which allowed 4,5 million abortions. In 1965 
Károly Törő posited that "legal capacity pertains to man, not from birth 
and not f rom the development of human consciousness, but from the date of 
conception.. . Man is endowed with personal rights in certain respects fo rm 
the time legal capacity is acquired. Most important of such rights is the right 
to life, the sine qua non for the acquisition and exercise of any other r ight".9 
In 1986 he added that "even before birth, f rom the date of conception, our 
legal system ensures the protection of interests of the child to be born. 
Although the foetus is not yet a person, it carries the real possibility of a 
legally capable person being born".10 Also, in the debate of 1990 over the 
rules on abortion, he said "this regulation is unsatisfactory... It should be 
recognized that foetus is a human being capable of independent legal 
protection". Barna Lenkovics contended that it was untenable that protected 
animals were afforded a greater protection of the law than "foetal man" was, 
even though his right to life emanated form several rules of the Civil Code.1 1 
This opinion is shared by Gábor Jobbágyi, the present writer, whose 
views, set forth in several professional articles and two books, can be 
summed up as follows: foetus exists in law, as it flows fo rm many articles 
of the Civil Code and the Penal Code; "foetal man" is a human being fo rm 
Finkey, F.: A magyar büntetőjog tankönyve (Textbook of Hungar ian C r i m i n a l 
Law), Budapes t , 1914, 594. 
Szászy, I.: Magyar Magánjog, Általános Rész (Hungarian Pr iva te Law, G e n e r a l 
Part), Budapes t , 1948, 5 - 8 . 
Törő, К . : Az orvosi polgári viszony (The Medico-Civi l Re la t ionsh ip) , B u d a p e s t , 
1965, 1 5 3 - 1 5 7 . 
10
 Törő K.: Orvosi jogviszony (Medico-Legal Relations), Budapest , 1986, 269-274. 
Törő K.: A meg nem szüle te t t magzat j o g i védelme (Legal Protec t ion of U n b o r n 
Foetus) , Magyar Tudomány, 1990/7 , 8 4 5 - 8 4 8 . 
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a medico-moral point of view and is entitled to medico-moral protection; 
legally, foetus is a human person in a procès of formation, and its condition 
as a subject at law is already independent of that of its mother and fa ther 
form the date of conception, a reason why foetus cannot be "disposed o f ' ; 
the legal capacity of foetus is general, equal and temporary; foetus is vested 
with personal and property rights; its personal rights include the right to 
life (subject to restrictions in very exceptional cases only), the right to dignity 
and the right to health; its property rights include capacity to inheritance, 
"capacity to claims" (e.g. claim for damages), and capacity to be a beneficiary 
(e.g. sale, donation, insurance); in legal relations, foetus is represented by its 
legal representative(parent, curator).12 
Three renowned jurists acting as constitutional judges appended dissenting 
opinions to Decision No. 64/1991. (XII. 17.) AB.h. of the Constitutional Court. 
— Tamás Lábady argues that "foetus is biologically a human, not a 
thing, not an object, but a genetically completed person, an individual, 
and individual human l ife is a unique process from conception to biolo-
gical death. Foetus is therefore a person, or a subject at law, who has a 
right to be born form the moment of conception". 
— János Zlinszky contests the possibility of foetus's full legal capacity, 
but he claims that foetal l i fe as a value is to be protected by all means. 
"Foetal life is human l ife to be protected by law", with "disposal" of it as 
a subjective right pertaining neither to the mother nor to the father. 
It is important to stress that the above-mentioned Decision of the Consti-
tutional Court contains a crucial fining, the Court holding that foetus's ful l 
legal personality, or its condition as a person is in conformity with the Consti-
tution, but it cannot be established except by the law-maker. That Act LXXIX 
of 1992 did not grant foe tus the status of "person" is a different matter. 
At the same time, Hungarian law contains provisions vesting embryo 
and foetus with rights: 
— the Civil Code recognizes the capacity to inheritance for en embryo 
conceived (Art. 646); 
— where it is necessary for safeguarding the rights of foetus, particularly 
if there is a conflict of interests between the child and its legal representative, 
a curator shall be appointed for foetus (Art. 10 of the Civil Code); 
— foetus may be a beneficiary under a contract of l ife insurance (Art. 
560 of the Civil Code); 
' " Jobbágy i , G.: A méhmagzat életjoga (The Right of E m b r y o and Foetus to L i f e ) , 
Budapest , 1997, 207-214 . 
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— the prohibition of "abortion" in criminal law is placed by the Penal 
Code among "offences against life, bodily integrity and health", "foetal 
life" being one of the values to be protected (Art. 169); 
— the Preamble to Act LXXIX of 1992 on the Protection of Foetal 
Life provides that "beginning with conception, embryonic and foetal life 
deserves respect and protection"; 
— pursuant to Art. 20 (4) of Act CLIV of 1997 on Public Health, a 
patient may not refuse life-sustaining or life-saving intervention if she is 
expectant and is likely to have a normal pregnancy; 
— Art. 9 of Act LXXIX of 1992 contains a provision expressly aimed at 
protection of embryo and foetus, ordaining that a staff member of the Family 
Welfare Service must inform a mother asking for abortion in a crisis situation 
"in the interest of keeping the embryo or foetus", in particular about 
— state and other support, material and in kind, available in case of 
accepting the child; 
— conception, development of embryo and foetus, hazards of abortion 
and its effect on eventual later pregnancy; 
— the possibilities of and conditions for adoption. 
3. Foetus and Mother: Rights in Conflict 
The Hungarian rules for authorization of abortion (Act LXXIX of 1992 on 
the Protection of Foetal Life) are silent on the "rights of embryo and 
foetus", but refer to the mother 's "right of free disposal of one's own s e l f ' 
in regulating authorization of abortion. Pregnancy nay only be terminated 
in case of "risk" and under the conditions determined by the Act (Art. 5). 
At the same time, in determining the causes of indication (Art. 6), the Act 
permits abortive treatment in view of the pregnant woman's situation. The 
indications for abortive treatment in Hungarian law are: 
— causes gravely endangering the health of a pregnant woman; 
— pregnancy resulting form a criminal offence; 
— grave genetic impairment to foetus; 
— crisis situation of a pregnant woman. 
Termination of pregnancy is subject to a written request of a pregnant 
woman (Art. 7). 
An expectant woman requesting abortive treatment is required to 
participate twice in antenatal counselling by the Family Welfare Service. 
Counselling must not be neutral, but must serve the protection of unborn 
life, respecting pregnant women's emotions and human dignity (Art. 9). 
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4. Date of Conception and Protection of Embryo and Foetus 
The date of conception is determined in Hungarian law by Art. 9 of the Civil 
Code: "The 300th day preceding birth shall be considered to be the date of 
conception, but it shall be open to proof that conception took place at an 
earlier or a later date. The day of birth shall be included in this period". 
Accordingly, the date of conception in Hungarian law is a presumptive one, 
which is subject to proof by medical experts to the effect that conception 
took place at either an earlier or a later date. "A live-born child shall have 
legal capacity from the date of conception" (Art. 9 of the Civil Code). Thus, 
under Hungarian law, conception creates a "conditional legal position", 
which becomes final upon the child's birth or the failure of delivery. On this 
ground, Hungarian law endows foetus with conditional legal capacity. 
The details concerning the possibilities for the protection of embryo 
and foetus in legal theory and legislative enactment's have been set out in 
the preceding two paragraphs. 
5. Legal Position of Father toward Embryo and Foetus 
In actual fact, Hungarian law confers no right on the father with regard to 
the birth of foetus. The Act on the "Protection of Foetal Life" is confined 
to stating that crisis counselling must, so far as possible, be provided in 
presence of the foetus's father (para. 1 of Art. 9), but the father is not entitled 
to make declarations at law. 
6. Protection of Embryo in Case of Artificial Fertilization (IVF 
Procedures) 
"Special procedures for human reproduction and research on embryo and 
gametes" are covered by Hungarian law in Chapter IX of Act CLIV of 1997 
on Public Health (Articles 165-186). 
The preambular provisions of the related part of the Act distinguish 
"embryo" and "foetus" in the following terms: "Deemed to be an embryo 
is every viable human embryo from the completion of fertilization to 12 
weeks of pregnancy" (Art. 165). 
The Act itself regulates in detail the general conditions for repro-
ductive procedures, gamete donation, embryo donation, and research on 
embryo. 
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This part of the Act can be said to lego-technically regulate in vitro 
fertilization without vesting embryo with any rights. The Act creates rights 
and obligations for the participants in procedures (physician, spouses and 
life-companions). For that matter, it is characteristic of the Act to use property-
law terms in connection with embryo ("deposit" of embryo, "possession" 
of embryo, "disposal" of embryo). 
Such approach can be construed to mean that the embryo becomes a 
"thing" during IVF procedures. 
Resolution 1100/1989 of the Counsil of Europe is known in the pertinent 
literature, but it has no influence to bear on the legislative text. 
The main provisions of the said legislation are these: 
— a reproductive procedure may be executed at the request of spouses 
or heterosexual life-companions in case of infertility; 
— applicants must be advised in detail, orally or in writing, of the 
reproductive procedure; 
— the "right to dispose of an embryo" formed outside the body and not 
implanted must be exercised in common by the spouses (life-companions). 
"Disposal" can be threefold: 
a) "deposit of embryo" for purposes of later use; 
b) donation to other persons; 
c) offer for medical research; 
— an embryo deposited or donated may be stored for a period not 
exceeding ten years and, after the lapse of that period, must be destroyed 
without separate procedure or may be used for medical research; 
— an embryo may not be formed for research on embryo and may not 
be used for such research except with the approval of persons entitled 
thereto; to that end, there must be formulated a plan and purpose of research 
to be approved by the Human Reproduction Committee; 
— currently no proxy pregnancy (surrogate motherhood) is admissible 
(although the original wording of the Act allowed such pregnancy, but it 
was repealed later). 
7. Protection of Embryo and Foetus in Vivo 
Hungarian law does not regulate the methods of and conditions for 
conducting diagnostic procedures in the uterus. 
Act LXXIX of 1992 on the protection of Foetal Life enumerates the 
conditions for termination of pregnancy on grounds of genetic impairment 
among the causes for abortive treatment: 
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a) pregnancy may be terminated for genetic reasons up to the 12th week if 
the embryo "seems likely" to be gravely handicapped or otherwise impaired; 
b) pregnancy may be terminated up to the 20th week if the probability 
of the foetus 's genetic or teratological impairment reaches 50%; 
c) pregnancy may be terminated up to delivery if the foetus shows a 
disorder incompatible with postnatal life. 
Any reason of health concerning embryo and foetus is to be unanimously 
established by an obstetrical-gynaecological specialist of the genetic 
counselling service, the centre for prenatal diagnosis or the designated 
hospital each. The Act does not specify the causes or diseases that may justify 
termination of pregnancy on genetic grounds. 
8. Foetus as an "Organ Donor" in Hungarian Law 
The Hungarian legislation in force neither permits nor prohibits the use of 
viable foetus as an organ donor. In the case of living foetuses this possibility 
is probably ruled out in practice. Dead (aborted) foetuses may happen in 
practice to be used as organ donors. 
9. Representation of the Interests of Embryo and Foetus in Hungarian Law 
Act LXXIX of 1992 on the Protection of Foetal Life and the Chapter on 
Human Reproduction of Act CLIV of 1997 on Public Health (Articles 
165-186) are silent on representation of the interests of embryo and foetus. 
Art. 10 of the Civil Code allows appointment of a curator for an unborn 
child if there is a conflict of interests between such child and its legal 
representative. This means in practice a conflict of interests in matters of 
property law (e.g. both mother and foetus are heirs to assets of an estate). 
The curator is appointed by the guardianship authority. 
It was in a single case, which received great publicity, namely in the 
"Dávod Abortion Case" (Decision No. 8.P. 20.367/1998 of the Town Court of 
Baja), that the guardianship authority appointed a curator for the foetus of 
a 13-year-old girl, who became pregnant through depravation. Since the 
termination of pregnancy was requested by the girl 's legal representative 
(mother), the curator of the foetus instituted proceedings in the letter's 
interest. The court of first instance allowed the action by relying on the 
foetus 's right to life and also recognized the curator 's right to act in the 
case. The County Court (judgement No. 1 Pf. 20.532/1998) subsequently 
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overruled the Decision, holding that the foetus had no capacity to rights. 
The abortion was performed. 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
The position of embryo and foetus is contradictory in Hungarian law de 
lege lata. The contradiction results form the fact that the current regulations 
recognize and value the existence of embryo and foetus form the date of 
conception, affording protection for them, but are essentially silent about 
their status, legal capacity, rights and representation, particularly as 
regards the most important issues (abortion, IVF). This contradiction gave 
rise to serious debates over the past decades, with even the Legislature 
addressing the matter on three occasions in pursuance of two decisions 
handed down by the Constitutional Court. 
The contradiction and the issue itself, however, have remained unresolved 
in legislation. 
In my opinion, it is the foremost duty of the world 's legislators and 
jurists to settle de lege ferenda the status and protection of embryo and 
foetus. The statement my be ventured that solution of this issue, or its present 
lack of solution has a decisive influence to bear on the existence of human 
civilization, since it has profound implications for the fundamental rules 
on procreation, family life, sexual life, and the medical profession and 
thereby for the existence or non-existence of individual human communities, 
for fundamental human rights. 
Embryo of foetus is a human person of full value, medically as well as 
morally, f rom the date of conception. 
It is inevitable for the legislative fora, both international and national, 
to resolve the questions affecting the status and the rights of embryo and 
foetus as well as the protection of their rights in such a way that the law will 
consider embryo and foetus as human persons in a process of formation. 
Such arrangement will result in solutions for a limited capacity to rights 
from the date of conception, for recognition of specific subjective rights 
for embryo and foetus, and for the protection of their interests and rights 
through representation. 
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The Regulation of Public Institution Insolvency in 
Hungary 
Abstract. In the Hungarian legal system—after 50 years—, formerly known legal insti-
tutions (such as self-governments, private companies, public institutions) reappeared. These 
legal institutions are independent of the state, they have their own revenues and properties. 
Thus the possibility of their insolvency was brought up naturally. The Hungarian legal 
system does not provide an unambiguous definition of public institution. However, with an 
eye to foreign legal solutions and the Hungarian specialities, we can formulate the concept 
of public institution which includes organs that are actually separated from the state, that 
have autonomy, legal personality, independent budget, their own booking (accounting), and 
that perform tasks of public utility. These criteria are met by three types of organs: self-
governments, public bodies, public funds. However, legal regulations concerning these 
types are not homogeneous. After 1990, when public institutions were established, the state 
drew back from several public functions and has striven to withdraw itself from the res-
ponsibility for inadequate financial administration ever since. 
Keywords: insolvency, public institution, self-government, liquidation 
Introduction 
From time to time the natural (peaceful) development of Hungary's legal 
system was interrupted by the conquests of external forces (the Turkish 
Empire, the Habsburg Empire, and the Soviet Union). Due to these influences 
the homogeneity of our legal system that was built on the Roman law ceased 
to exist as well from time to time. 
This statement is especially true for the period of 1945-1996 when Hungary 
was put into the zone of interest of and under the authority and guardian-
ship of the Soviet Union—based on the agreement made between the winning 
powers of World War II in Jalta. The Constitution declared as Law No. XX in 
1949 made it clear that Hungary had come off the course of civil society 
abandoning the multi-party system, the division of powers and the equality 
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of the forms of ownership. Instead Hungary started to build a so called socialist 
system of society that did not recognize the basic values of civil society. It 
was built on the one-party system, the unity of powers, and the exclusiveness 
and extreme priority of state property. The emphasis of these principles of 
course resulted in the rejection of market laws and the creation of the state 
planned economy. During the period of socialism the state took all the public 
functions, furthermore, it was the only party in the economy through its com-
panies. All this resulted in an extremely centralized central and local administ-
ration (Soviet pattern: the council system) where there was no private property, 
nor autonomy. Some changes occurred in this social and economic system 
beginning in the 1970s. Private enterprises and companies appeared in Hungary, 
the force sticking the local administration to the central authority lessened. 
This was the social and economic environment the legal system was adapted 
to. The socialist model meant that a series of institutions (economic companies, 
local self-governments, public boards, and public foundations) that had existed 
before 1945 had vanished from our legal system. At the same time a series of 
institutions had been established according to the Soviet pattern (state 
companies, councils). The speed of change in the legal system is properly 
demonstrated by the fact that 13769 measures were accepted (acts, govern-
ment regulations, ministry regulations)! Due to the omnipotence of the state 
the question of insolvency was not raised at all (not even in the economy!), 
nor was the transfer of particular public tasks to private organizations. 
1. The effects of the political changes in 1989-1990 
As it is widely known, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought freedom 
to the Central European countries (Hungary as well) that belonged to the 
Soviet zone of power according to the above mentioned agreement made 
in Jalta. The people's republic ceased to exist in Hungary in the fall of 1989 
and Hungary became a republic. The Constitution has been considerably 
amended. The Constitution now declares that Hungary is an independent state, 
it is a democratic country based on the multi-party system, the division of 
powers, the equality of forms of ownership and the market economy. 
According to these principles a proper state organization has been established 
that meets the requirements of constitutionality. New organizations have 
been created (the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office, local self-
governments, ombudsman etc.), and the powers and tasks of the institutions 
that had operated earlier (the Parliament, the Government, courts etc.) have 
changed. A radical transformation of the legal system has begun. 
THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC INSTITUTION INSOLVENCY IN HUNGARY 307 
(For the sake of historical fidelity it must be recorded that the need to 
change the state organization and the legal system could be strongly felt in 
the middle of and at the end of 1980s. The transformation of the legal system 
and the preparation for a radical transformation already started in the mid-
1980s. This is demonstrated by the fact that 47% of the 1835 valid acts and 
73% of the 2082 ministry regulations were canceled!) 
I would like to emphasize only those laws—besides the modification 
of the Constitution—that are most important in the subject regarding the 
radical transformation and renewal of the legal system: 
— Act No. VI of 1988 on the companies, 
— Act No. II of 1991 on the procedure of bankruptcy, liquidation and 
final settlement, 
— Act No. LXV of 1990 on the local self-governments, 
— Act No. XXV of 1996 on the settlement procedures of local self-
government debts, 
— Act No. XLII of 1993 on the amendment of the Civil Code (Law 
No. IV of 1959), 
— Act No. XXXVIII of 1992 on the public finances, 
— Act No. CLVI of 1997 on public utility organizations, 
— Act No. XL of 1994 on the Hungarian Academy of Science, 
— Act No. II of 1989 on the right of association, 
— Act No. CXXI of 1999 on the economic chambers, 
— Act No. XXXVIII of 1989 on the State Audit Office. 
These laws mark the legal frames of creation, operation and winding-
up of public institutions not owned by the state, including the procedures 
to be followed in case of insolvency. 
The radical transformation of the Hungarian legal system is proven by the 
fact that Hungary has closed 22 chapters in 2001 in the negotiations on the 
accession to the European Union and the country has a real chance to close 
the negotiations completely by the end of 2002. The Hungarian legal system 
is practically compatible with the Union's legal system, the "acquis com-
munautaire". 
2. The sphere of public institutions in the Hungarian legal system 
To define the sphere of public institutions one must start from the concept of 
public tasks. In my standpoint public tasks, in a vague sense, are all those 
tasks that must be carried out by the state as a whole entity. This includes 
legislation, executive tasks and jurisdiction as well. In a narrow sense 
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public tasks are those tasks that must be carried out by the executive 
branch of power according to the laws. 
The state (the Parliament) has the public tasks of the narrow sense carried 
out by the government, ministries and the national central authorities and 
the local organizations of the latter. Also the state orders the local self-
governments to execute some of these tasks or creates organizations that 
carry out public tasks independently but supervised by the state (public 
boards and foundations). In Hungary the organizations belonging to the first 
two categories (state administrative organizations and local self-
governments) make up the executive branch of power and they represent the 
organizational system of the Hungarian administration together. 
The local self-governments can take other public tasks besides those 
prescribed by the act. They can do this with two restrictions: 1. the tasks is 
not ordered to be done by another organization according to the law, 2. the 
performance of these tasks does not endanger the performance of the 
mandatory tasks. The local self-governments can establish public foundations, 
public utility companies and even economic companies to carry out the 
tasks of the local self-government. 
In my standpoint due to the above mentioned facts it is necessary to give 
a definition of public institutions in a vague and a narrow sense as well. In a 
vague sense public institutions are all those state and non-state organizations 
that carry out public tasks (including the state administrative organizations as 
well). In a narrow sense public institutions are those that are really separated 
from the state and that carry out public tasks as independent legal entities 
with their own budget and accountancy. In my standpoint the following 
organizations belong to this category: local self-governments, public boards 
and public foundations. 
The present review introduces the public institutions according to the 
narrow sense, concentrating on their management and insolvency and trying to 
answer the questions given by Professor Knapp who made the main review. 
3. The viewpoints of the main review 
The viewpoints of examination given by Professor Blaise Knapp raise the 
following questions regarding the insolvency of Hungarian public institutions: 
1. What kind of sources of finance do these organizations have based on the 
law or whether they are entitled to take loans only as accepted by practice? 
2. Whether the loans taken by these organizations are subjected to special 
administrative procedures or to the general rules of taking loans? 
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3. Whether it is necessary to provide a deposit toward the creditors (if 
yes, what kind of deposit)? 
4. Whether there is a rule of law regarding the highest possible limit of 
indebtedness. Or this limit is defined by the supervising organization 
or by the principles developed during the operation, i.e. whether the 
highest possible limit of debt is determined by the general principles of 
"ordinary" management (balance of the budget)? 
5. Whether there is a rule of law for the supervising organizations to make 
steps and inspections to prevent these institutions f r o m getting into 
debt (internal audition, investigation of external organizations, Audi t 
Office, Financial Supervising Body)? 
6. How to def ine the concepts of indebtedness and that of insolvency? 
Should the public institution exceed a limit defined by law or exceed 
the ability to pay back the credits and interests? Or it does not have any 
more chance to take new credits, nor to extend the term of earlier credits? 
Or does insolvency mean a permanent state of indebtedness? 
7. Who (which person or organization) should make steps in case of permanent 
insolvency and what kind of steps should be made to end insolvency? 
a) Should this be done by the public institution involved? (For example it 
increases the incomes by imposing more tax or by selling means or 
by reducing expenses or services or by reducing the quality of these 
or by privatizing the public services?) 
b) Should it be done by the supervising organizations? (Are there such 
organizations and what kind of authority they have?) 
c) Should it be done by the creditors? (who go to court) 
Do these possibilities complement or exclude one another? 
8. Whether the creditors can ask for liquidation or termination of the 
public institution from the court? If not, what kind of possibilities do 
the creditors have? 
a) Selling the existing goods, 
b) giving an extended deadline for the payback of credit and its interests, 
c) giving up the claim, 
d) other means. 
9. Whether the state is responsible for the debts of the public institutions 
without any legal basis and if yes, this responsibility is universal or 
complementary (secondary)? Can one make difference between the public 
institutions as legal entities or institutions having a budget separated 
from that of the state? 
10. Can those creditors whose demands have not been met sue the organi-
zations doing external inspection or the state because they have not 
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controlled the management (accountancy, budget) of the public institution 
properly? 
11. Whether the situation is different when the state gives the task to a private 
organization (state-owned corporation or joint venture)? 
12. Can criminal procedures be started against those persons who are 
responsible for the state of being in debt? 
In Chapter 2 I referred to the fact that the concept of public institution 
is not homogenous, it is a collective concept for different organizations. The 
order of establishment, management, control and termination for the different 
types of public institutions is not uniform, it is different for each type. 
This means I need to answer all the 12 questions for each type of public 
institutions! Before answering the questions, however, I need to introduce 
the appropriate part of the Civil Code on legal entities (Chapter VI) to 
make understanding easier. Also I need to introduce the most important 
appropriate parts of the Law on public finances (Act No. XXXVIII of 
1992). The latter is important because the assets of the local self-govern-
ments and the assets transferred to public bodies belong to public 
finances. 
4. The appropriate and most important rules of the Civil Code and 
the Act of public finances 
According to the Civil Code a legal entity is able and if the Act does not 
order otherwise, this ability extends to all those rights and responsibilities 
that can be connected not only people. The Act has an independent chapter 
on the different rules regarding the different types of legal entities. The 
following legal entities were named: 
1. state-owned companies, 
2.trusts, 
3.other state-owned organizations, 
4.budget financed organizations, 
5.co-operatives, 
6. economic companies with legal entity, 
7.public utility companies, 
8. associations, 
9. public corporations, 
10. companies of some legal entities, 
11. affiliated companies, 
12. foundations, 
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13. public foundations, 
14. syndicates. 
Due to the conceptual features of public institutions mentioned above, 
types 4, 9 and 13 are important for us. Type 4 is important because—as we 
will see later—the institutions established by local authorities and public 
corporations (schools, medical and social institutions, cultural institutions 
etc.) are budget financed organizations. The Act declares that the state is a 
legal entity as the subject of the legal relationship concerning assets. Finally 
I also need to refer to the fact that the local self-government is a legal entity 
too according to the Act of local self-governments. As regards the Act of 
public finances, the following features need to be emphasized: 
The public finances is a system of the central government, the separated 
state funds, the local self-governments and the Social Security that performs 
and finances state tasks. This system has appropriate sub-systems: the 
budgets of the central government, the state funds, the local self-govern-
ments and the Social Security. These budgets together make up the national 
budget. 
The budget of each sub-system is a f inancial plan that contains the 
approved expenses (as an estimate) for the performance of the tasks for 
the given period and also the expected incomes (as incomes). 
The state performs the tasks belonging to the public f inances through 
the so called budget organizations or it t ransfers the coverage partly or 
completely at the same time it transfers the task to the local self-govern-
ments, public corporations or public foundations. 
A budget organization is a legal entity that is part of the public finances 
and performs tasks that satisfy social common needs as basic tasks. They are 
not for gaining profit and they operate according to the liabilities recorded 
in the founding charter or document with the recorded professional and 
economic supervision and sphere of jurisdiction and operation. The types 
of budget organizations are the following: 
1. central budget organizations, 
2. local self-government 's budget organizations, 
3. public corporat ion's budget organizations, 
4. society inowance budget organizations. 
The Parliament, the Government, the leader of the organization supervising 
the budget section, the local self-governments and the public corporations can 
establish a budget organization by law or foundation document. Then the 
budget organization is registered by the Minister of Finances. 
A central budget organization cannot establish a foundation, but it can 
establish so called social organizations with the permission of the Govern-
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ment. To establish an economic company or to optain shaire in economic 
companies the central budget organization should have a permission from 
the organization supervising the given budget section with the consent of 
the Minister of Finances. 
A local self-government or public corporation's budget organization 
can establish a social organization or a foundation only with the per-
mission of the local self-government or the public body. The local self-
government budget organization can establish an economic company with 
the permission of the local self-government and it can optain shaire in 
such a company. 
It is a serious restriction to state that a budget financed organization can 
take part in an economic company where its liability does not exceed the 
extent of its contribution in assets. The budget financed organization is 
subjected to manage within the estimate. It cannot loan money, cannot be 
a guarantor, cannot buy bonds — except the bonds that represent its share in 
the economic company, it cannot draw nor accept bills of exchange, cannot 
issue bonds. The budget financed organization has liabilities exceeding its 
budget. In this case the organization establishing the budget financed organi-
zation (the state, the local self-government, the public body or the Social 
Security) must hold on. This liability is valid in the cases of compensation, 
pay-off and making amends and also in cases when the organization took 
liabilities toward a well-meaning third party. 
The law on public finances states that the exclusive purpose of the assets 
belonging to the sub-systems of public finances is the service of public 
interest. The Parliament makes arrangements regarding these assets by law 
and it should manage these assets with responsibility and according to the 
purpose. The treasury assets, the assets of local self-government's and the 
society inowance belong to the public finances. Also the assets transferred 
to public corporations by law belong to the public finances too. The Parlia-
ment controls the management with the assets belonging to the public 
finances through the State Audit Off ice . The assets connected to the sub-
system of public finances—beyond a value limit determined by law or local 
self-government resolution—can be sold, its right to utilization can be 
passed only to those who make the best offer. This is done through a public 
tender. The proprietary and management rights can be transferred free of 
charge, the demands can be waived only in the cases and in the ways 
determined by law or by local self-government resolutions. 
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5. The first type of public institutions: the local self-government 
5.1. General informations on local self-governments 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the local self-governments are old-
new institutions in the Republic of Hungary, because they had been 
operating before 1950 at a local and regional level, which was similar to 
the Western European pattern. In 1950 the councils took the places of 
these institutions—according to the Soviet pattern. Since the councils 
did not have autonomy nor own property, and they were supported only 
from the central budget, the problem of insolvency never came up. One 
of the determining changes in the state administration during the polit ical 
changes of 1989-1990—as I also mentioned—was the cancellation of 
the council system and the reconstruction of the local self-government 
system. 
According to Article 41 of the Constitution the territory of the Republic 
of Hungary is divided into a capital city, 19 counties, 260 towns and 2850 
villages. The capital city consists of 23 districts. 
Article 42 of the Constitution states that the citizens of the capital city 
and its districts, the counties, the towns and the villages have the right for 
local self-government. This liberal regulation means that practically all 
towns and villages have operating local self-governments and the number 
of these is about 3200! 
The local self-government provides public services and manages local 
public affairs. It has its own legal entity, it has own property and incomes. 
It manages independently its own property, its incomes and expenses. It 
carries out its mandatory and voluntary tasks from its own budget. The 
budget of local self-governments is an organic part of the public finances. 
The budget of local self-government is separated from the public f inances 
but they are closely related to each other because of the state subsidies 
and budget connections. The local self-government can freely establish 
associations with other local self-governments and can have enterprises 
for its own responsibility. The enterprise cannot endanger the mandatory 
tasks. The local self-government can take part only in such enterprises 
where its liability cannot exceed the extent of its support in assets. A 
further restriction regarding enterprises is that the so called basic assets 
(public utilities, public buildings owned by the local self-government, streets, 
squares) of the local self-government current or can be current only with 
restrictions. 
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5.2. Answers to the raised questions 
Ad 1. The income of local self-government, taking out credits 
The local self-government carries out the mandatory tasks regulated by law, 
the voluntary tasks via its own organization as a budget financed organization, 
or by establishing public foundations, public utility companies, economic 
companies or by concluding contracts with other management organizations 
(concessions, services, purchase etc.). Most tasks are practically carried out by 
the own organizations, but the other ways mentioned above are becoming 
widespread too. The local self-government chooses the forms of management 
freely adjusting to the type of the task. Also it creates the rules of concern 
within the frames of law. The necessary resources to carry out the tasks are 
taken f rom the incomes that make up the income part of the local self-
government budget. 
The incomes are the following: 
1.) Own incomes: 
a) Local taxes regulated by law. These taxes are determined and imposed 
in local self-government regulations (The law permits the local self-
government to impose asset type taxes, communal taxes and local 
trade taxes), 
b) profit, interest and rental coming f rom own activities, enterprises and 
returns of local self-government assets, 
c) a determined portion of duties, 
d) received financial means (e.g. f rom ministries or separated state funds), 
e) a determined portion from fines of environmental protection and 
protection of monuments, 
f) incomes from the utilization of hunting rights that belong to the 
local self-government, 
g) other own incomes. 
2. Central taxes given over by the Parliament: 
a) a determined portion of income taxes collected from individuals (The rate 
was 100% in 1990, 50% in 1991 and 1992, 20% in 1998 and 5% in 2000), 
b) other divided taxes. 
3. The normative budget contribution provided by the Parliament: 
(About two third of the state subsidies go to the local self-governments 
in this way!) The local self-government can have the normative budget 
contribution in two ways. The normative division of the financial means 
coming from the central budget cannot handle the local self-governments 
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that differ from the average, so the law ensures additional subsidies as well. 
These are the following: subsidies dedicated to special goals, addressed 
subsidies and additional state subsidies. These are further claims for 
further incomes. 
4. Subsidies dedicated to special goals: 
The Parliament determines the socially relevant goals. The budget deter-
mines the sphere of subsidized causes, the order of priority for these 
causes, the amount and conditions of subsidies. The state wants to orient 
the local self-governments to get them to achieve important community 
goals (sewage network, construction of public facilities). The goal subsidy 
can be used only for the given goal. 
5. Addressed subsidies: 
The Parliament provides this for the local self-governments to f inance 
some investments demanding major expenses. Can be used only for 
the given goal. 
6. Additional state subsidies: 
The Parliament provides this kind of subsidies for local self-govern-
ments who do not have their own suff icient resources. The amount is 
regulated in the law on State budget. (The total amount was about 10 
billion HUF in 2000.) The purpose of additional subsidies is to enable 
local self-governments with insufficient resources to operate or to get 
them to operate, so that they could carry out their basic tasks even if 
they do not have sufficient own resources. The Parliament decides on 
the amount and conditions of subsidies in the budget law. 
Summary: regarding the incomes and the financial conditions, the local 
self-governments can manage about one quarter of the financial means 
centralized and re-distributed at the public finances. The current yearly 
expenses are around 1300 billion HUF, the value of their assets is beyond 
2000 billion HUF. During the past 10 years the portion of incomes coming 
from the central budget decreased gradually (from 50% to 30%) among 
all available incomes. Meanwhile the portion of own incomes has been 
increasing (especially the local taxes). The local taxes were only 2 .4% 
of the local self-government incomes in 1991, while in 1999 it was 
12.9%. Of course this is still far behind the 52.8% of Switzerland, the 
49.8% of Norway and the 34.9% of Germany. 
The question of taking out credits 
The Act on local self-governments also regulates the major questions of 
local self-government management besides the income claims. The Act 
states that the local self-government: 
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a) can establish a public foundation and can take on public tasks, 
b) can take out credit and issue bonds, but cannot use the basic assets 
and the incomes mentioned under Id, 2a, 3 and 6 to cover these, 
c) decides to deposit the resources not connected to special goals, 
d) decides on using other bank services. 
It is a major rule to state there is an upper limit for taking on those yearly 
liabilities that could create debts. This is the so called own current income. 
This is 70% of the yearly estimate for the own current income minus the 
proportional part of the short-term liabilities for a year. 
Ad2. The procedure of taking out credits 
I referred to the fact that the law entitles the local self-governments to take 
out credits and there is no regulation that requires asking for permission. 
The bank and the local self-government make an agreement regarding the 
conditions of granting credits. 
Ad3. Deposit 
Whether the creditors ask for deposit or not, it is their business, whether the 
local self-government gives deposit, it is their business. So they have the 
power of choice in this matter. However, we cannot ignore the fact that 
there is a restriction: the basic assets and the incomes mentioned under Id, 
2, 3 and 6 cannot be used as deposit. 
Ad4. The extent of indebtedness 
The answer is under 1, so there is an upper limit! 
Ad5. Control 
The Act on local self-governments states that the representatives of the local 
self-government are responsible for the safety of management, the mayor is 
responsible for the regularity. If the local self-government as a legal entity 
manages with losses, they must bear all the consequences as well. So the state 
budget is not responsible for the liabilities taken by the local self-government. 
In case of loss-making management, a debt-arrangement procedure must 
be carried out. During the procedure the local self-government must stop 
financing the tasks (except authority tasks and the basic services for citizens) 
in order to rehabilitate solvency. (This topic will be mentioned later!) 
The law on local self-governments puts emphasis on the control over the 
management. The following major rules are stated: 
The State Audit Office controls the management of local self-governments. 
There is an independent law on the State Audit Office (Act No. XXXVIII 
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of 1989). This law states that the State Audit Office is the financial-economic 
controlling organization of the Parliament. It controls according to expedience, 
lawfulness and efficiency. The control of local self-governments by the 
State Audit Office is impeded by the scattered system of local self-govern-
ments, since there are nearly 3200 local self-governments, 13,000 local self-
government institutions (budget institutions). The State Audit Office practically 
cannot control these at least once in a quarter of a year due to lack of capacity. 
The State Audit Office selects the local self-governments to be controlled 
according to a scientifically developed sample-taking system. In 1999 the 
Off ice controlled 802 local self-governments and 1533 institutions. 
It is important to emphasize that the financial-economic control of local 
self-governments is not the monopoly of the State Audit Off ice , the state 
created a wide network of internal and external control. The external control 
can also be done by an independent certified public accountant (CPA) besides 
the State Audit Office. The audition is extended to the following: 
a) the verification of reports, the balance, the yearly report on circulation 
of money and the statement on results, 
b) making statements about the bylaw drafts on the budget and final 
accounts, 
c) analysis of the financial situation. 
The employment of a CPA is mandatory for only 30% of the local self-
governments: the local self-governments of counties, those of the capital 
city and the capital city districts and the local self-governments of cities 
and also those local self-governments where the expenses of the preceding 
year exceeded 100 million HUF, the local self-government has credit or 
takes out credit. 
The internal control is carried out by the mandatory Financial Committee 
and the internal auditor whose qualifications are determined by law. Another 
type of control is the mandatory control of the leaders and the control built 
in the processes of work and management. 
Ad 6. The concepts of indebtedness and insolvency 
The concept of indebtedness is not defined by law, the concept of insolvency 
can be defined on the basis of the law on debt arrangement procedures 
(Act No. XXV of 1996). According to this the debt arrangement procedure 
can be initiated by either the local self-government or the creditor at the 
competent county court. The procedure can be initiated if the local self-
government or its budget financed institution 
a) the invoice or notice sent by the creditor has not been disputed nor 
paid within 60 days after the date of fulfillment, 
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b) the debt was not paid against the agreement made at an earlier debt 
arrangement procedure, 
c) the debt toward other sub-systems of the public f inances was not 
paid within 60 days af ter the receipt of the immediate collection notice. 
The result of these conditions is that insolvency means the following: 
the procedure can be initiated if the above mentioned conditions exist. The 
insolvency is a relatively permanent condition of being in debt (60 days), 
but it does not depend on the sum of money. Before starting the debt 
arrangement procedure the local self-government has a chance to solve the 
problems itself. Example: reducing expenses, taking out credits, selling 
real estates, imposing taxes, privatizing public services, however, all these 
activities have restrictions by law. If the procedure has started, the chances of 
the local self-government are reduced to those that are regulated by the 
law on debt arrangement. 
Ad7. The question of permanent insolvency 
I have already given a part of the answer in the preceding section and I am 
giving the other part here according to the following: 
The debt arrangement procedure has a dual purpose. The first one is the 
protection of the local self-governments (and their institutions) and that of 
the creditors. The second purpose is the rehabilitation of the local self-
government 's solvency and ability to operate so that they can carry out 
their public tasks. It is necessary to emphasize that these purposes do not 
give any reasons to the state to take any responsibility for the local self-
governments. The court publishes the decision on starting of the debt 
arrangement procedure in the Company Gazette, the mayor publishes it in 
two national newspapers with an announcement to the creditors, asking 
them to announce their claims within 60 days. The court assigns a financial 
administrator at the starting of the procedure. The mayor is obliged to 
inform directly the county administration office and the account-keeping 
bank about the starting of the procedure. After this the bank can charge 
the account and pay out money only with the financial administrator's counter-
signature. After the start of the procedure the local self-government cannot 
make any more decisions on taking extra liabilities concerning assets, 
cannot establish any enterprises, cannot gain any property in enterprises in 
a commutative manner, cannot pay out any earlier debts. Except for the 
regular personal benefi ts and the expenses according to the crisis budget. 
The financial administrator registers the creditors who announce their 
claims, examines their claims and informs them within 15 days whether 
their claims are acceptable or not. The local self-government is obliged to 
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establish a debt arrangement committee within 8 days af ter the start of the 
procedure. This committee is entitled to decide on all economic issues, except 
for the issues that come under the exclusive authority of the board of repre-
sentatives (personal affairs , making bylaws). The notary compiles a bylaw 
draft about the crisis budget within 30 days after the start of the procedure. 
This budget includes exclusively those expenses of services and authority tasks 
that are listed in the appendix of the law (example: operation of cemeteries, 
cleaning of public areas, ensuring water supply, street-lighting, operation of 
kindergartens, schools and health facilities etc.). The local self-government 
cannot finance such institutes where the capacity is less than 50%. 
The debt arrangement committee (which includes the mayor, the notary 
and the financial administrator) discusses the bylaw draft, then the board of 
representatives passes it. The board of representatives makes a reorgani-
zation program and an agreement resolution. The program describes the 
economic situation of the local self-government and records the proposals 
regarding the utilization of assets involved in the debt arrangement and 
other planned steps (example imposing taxes, increasing taxes, reducing 
expenses, taking out credits). The agreement resolution lists the creditors 
into groups. The financial administrator sends the reorganization program and 
the agreement resolution to the creditors and invites them to a meeting of 
agreement. Minutes must be kept at the meeting. An agreement can be 
reached only if more than 50% of the creditors accepts it and their c la ims 
are 2/3 of the whole claim. The financial administrator hands in the document 
of agreement to the court, which wraps up the procedure and orders the 
announcement of this in the Company Gazette. At the same time the court 
relieves the financial administrator of their position. If there is no agree-
ment accepted between the parties, the court orders the division of the 
assets within 210 days af ter the start of the procedure. The court orders 
the division of the assets if: 
— the board of representatives is out of operation (due to any reason) 
or the dissolution of the board has been initiated due to operation against 
the constitution, 
— the board has not accepted the bylaw on the crisis budget, 
— the reorganization program and the agreement resolution has not 
been made, the creditors have not made their own proposal of agreement, 
— the court has not accepted the document of agreement handed in by 
the financial administrator. 
The local self-government can carry out the tasks only according to the 
resolution on the crisis budget until the court divides the assets. The f inancial 
administrator determines the forms of carrying out the mandatory tasks in 
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a report and determines which properties need to be sold to cover the 
expenses of these tasks and what central budget subsidies are necessary and 
also determines which properties can be included in the debt arrangement. 
The financial administrator sends the report to the creditors and the local 
self-government. They can make their comments within 15 days at the court. 
After the assenting decision of the court inures, the financial administrator: 
— lists the creditors' claims in 30 days, 
— attempts to sell the assets involved in the debt arrangement within 
60 days (creditors have pre-emptive right). 
After then the court obliges the f inancial administrator to execute the 
division of assets, then the court wraps up the procedure and relieves the 
financial administrator of their position. The law determines a mandatory 
order of pay-off . Until the first creditors' claims in the order are not paid 
off, the later creditors are not paid off. 
If the local self-government established the conditions of the agreement 
with the creditors by taking out a credit, the central budget—at request— 
provides an interest-free refundable subsidy to pay off that part of the 
interest that the local self-government does not have coverage for. (About 
200 million HUF were available for this purpose in 2000.) 
The debt arrangement procedures of local self-governments occur very 
rarely in Hungary, opposed to the bankruptcy proceedings of companies. At the 
time of making the law on local self-governments in 1990 and in the following 
5 years there was no need to make such a law. The explanation of this situation 
is that the local self-governments have been managing with responsibility 
and they rarely have taken on liabilities exceeding their abilities. When in 
1995 several local self-governments indicated that their management had 
become troublesome, the Parliament modified the law on local self-govern-
ments (restricted the upper limit of taking on liabilities) and then made the 
Act No. X X V of 1996 on the debt arrangement procedure of local self-
governments. In the past years there have been altogether 7 cases when such 
procedures were executed. In 5 cases agreement was made with the creditors, 
while in the other two cases the court divided the assets. It is noteworthy that 
it was not the creditors who initiated the procedures in either case! 
Ad8. Can the creditors ask for bankruptcy proceeding, liquidation? 
The answer is yes resulting from the fac ts mentioned above, but the terms 
of bankruptcy proceeding and liquidation can only be used in case of eco-
nomic companies. In case of local self-governments—as we could see— 
the right term is debt arrangement procedure. The creditors can initiate 
debt arrangement procedures, the experience shows there have been such 
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cases so far. The local self-governments Act quickly in case of solvency 
problems: they try to reduce their expenses, mobilize their assets, take out 
credits and they try to get the loans rescheduled. It is important to emphasize 
that there is no possibility of liquidation of local self-governments during 
debt arrangement procedures! 
Ad9. Is the state responsible for the debt? 
I have already referred to the fact that in Hungary the local self-govern-
ments have autonomy, they are independent legal entit ies, they have their 
own properties and they have whole and exclusive responsibility in arranging 
the local public affairs. The state has no universal, nor secondary respon-
sibility for the possible debts of local self-governments, including the 
debts local self-government institutions (schools, health facilities etc. as 
budget financed institutions) too. When the tasks are carried out by not the 
local self-government 's own institutions, or the tasks are transferred to 
other organizations or the tasks are carried out in form of concessions, the 
local self-government is not exempted f rom responsibility of carrying out the 
tasks. If the contractual partner or the organization entitled to the concession 
goes bankrupt, this does not concern the local self-government's obligation to 
carry out the tasks. It is a different matter when the local self-government 
helps the contractual partner or organization entitled to the concession in 
case of solvency problems. It is possible for the local self-government to 
establish an own economic company to carry out the tasks. But this fact does 
not change what was written earlier, but if the economic company goes 
bankrupt, the resolutions of the bankruptcy law will be valid. The local 
self-government (as the owner or founder) has limited liability, as I referred 
to the fact that the local self-government, cannot be a member with unlimited 
liability of any economic company. 
AdlO. Can those creditors initiate a trial who have not been paid o f f ? 
Those creditors who have not been paid off can theoretically initiate a trial against 
any organization that is entitled to carry out the financial-economic control 
of the local self-government. (I referred to these organizations under ad5.) 
The Civil Code makes compensation possible when someone (or some 
organization) causes damage illegally. The amount of damage, the illegality 
and the relationship between the damage and the illegality should be proven 
by those who have suffered the damage. This is not an easy job. As far as I 
know, there have been no such trials so far in Hungary, but the theoretical 
possibility of such trials is not excluded! (The state initiated a similar trial 
against those world-famous auditing companies that audited Postabank 
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and the state claimed for compensation for inappropriate control. This trial is 
still going on.) I completely exclude the possibility of winning a trial 
against the state. 
Ad.ll. The question of transferring tasks to private organizations 
The state determines the mandatory tasks of local self-governments by 
law. These tasks are carried out by the own organizations of the local self-
government (schools, health and social facilit ies) or by organizations the 
tasks have been transferred to (by establishing public utility companies, 
economic companies or with concessions). As we could see, the successful 
performance of the tasks is the responsibility of the local self-government 
and it has ful l responsibility as well. 
There is a theoretical possibility that the state obliges private organi-
zations, public utility companies or economic companies to carry out given 
public tasks. In this case the state is also exempted f rom any financial res-
ponsibility, because the responsibility as owner can be limited only. However 
the state is still responsible fo r carrying out the task. It is possible that the 
state trusts neither local self-governments nor, but public boards or 
foundations to carry out publ ic tasks private organizations. I will wri te 
about this later. 
Adl2 The question of initiating criminal procedures 
The law makes it mandatory for the organizations entitled to control to 
make reports when they have a suspicion of criminal acts. The creditors do 
not have this responsibility but they have the possibility to make reports to the 
authorities. Several criminal acts can occur concerning this area, so the 
Criminal Code names several types of criminal act when someone is res-
ponsible for getting in debt. These are the following: 
a) Breach of Trust 
That person commits this crime who is trusted to handle foreign property and 
the person causes financial damage by failing to carry out their liabilities. 
b) Negligent Breach of Trust 
That person commits it w h o is trusted to handle or supervise foreign 
property based on law and the person causes financial damage by fai l ing 
to carry out or neglecting the responsibilities. 
c) Fraud 
That person commits it who deceives others to gain illegal causes. 
d) Embezzlement 
That person commits it who theft foreign property that was trusted to them 
and they treat that property as if it was their own. 
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e) Violation of credit 
That person commits it who takes away the coverage of the credit partly or 
completely or makes it impossible to pay off the creditor from the coverage 
in any other way. 
f ) Taking away the coverage of debt 
That person commits it who takes away assets that serve as coverage for 
debt that comes from economic activities and thus makes it impossible to 
pay off the debt. 
g) Unlawful preference of creditors 
That person commits it who is aware of their insolvency, gives illegal advantage 
to one of the creditors to the disadvantage of the rest of the creditors. 
h) Bankruptcy 
That person commits it who hides or destroys the assets serving as the 
coverage for insolvency that comes f rom economic activities or the person 
makes a false deal or intentionally does loss-making businesses and thus 
makes it impossible to pay off the creditors. 
6. The second type of public institutions: the public boards 
6.1. General information on public boards 
The Civil Code records the concept and most important feature of public 
boards. In this way a public board is a legal entity with self-government and 
recorded membership whose establishment is regulated by law and that carries 
out public tasks. The tasks are connected to the members or the activities 
done by the members. The public board is not established based on the free 
will of the members (as it is the case with associations), but it is established 
by law. The Parliament trusts public boards and not public administration 
organizations to carry out given public tasks. The law can order that some 
tasks can be carried out exclusively by public boards, on the other hand, 
some tasks can be carried out only as a member of a public board. The law 
can determine mandatory tasks for the public board. In this case the codifying 
organization ensures particular public licenses to the public board that is 
executed through self-administration. The codifying organization ensures 
appropriate assets to the public board. The board manages these assets 
independently, of course under state supervision. The rules valid for the 
associations are to be applied for public boards. I discussed the law on public 
finances in Section 4 and I referred to the fact that the assets trusted to 
public boards belong to public finances. These assets must be managed 
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appropriately and with responsibility. This is controlled by the State Audit 
Office. Public boards are the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the economic 
chambers (chambers of commerce and industry, agricultural chambers), 
professional chambers (medical, pharmacist 's and lawyers' chambers) and 
also mountain municipalities, the Hungarian Board of Standards, the Public 
Foundation of the Hungarian Television and the Public Foundation of the 
Hungarian Radio. As the establishment of public boards is ordered by law, 
there is law for each board. The regulation on the specific tasks, management, 
incomes, expenses and state supervision of public boards is not uniform due 
to the separate laws regulating each public board. That is why there is no 
uniform answer to the 12 questions only generalized answers can be given. I 
will try to refer to the differences. 
6.2. Answers to the raised questions 
Adl. The income of public boards, taking out credits 
The operational expenses of public boards are generally covered by the 
following resources: 
a) membership fees paid by the members and other fees , 
b) sums taken from the central budget, 
c) foundation and other contributions, 
d) sums won from competitions, 
e) sums coming from national or foreign co-operations, 
f) income from operation and utilization of assets, 
g) other income not forbidden by law. 
Taking out credits belongs to the latter category. The state ensured a 
considerable amount of goods and real estates for the Hungarian Scientific 
Academy of Sciences in Act No. XL of 1994. These assets ceased to be 
state assets, so these assets became the property of the Academy. The same 
can be told about the Hungarian Board of Standards, the Public Foundation 
of the Hungarian Television and the Public Foundation of the Hungarian 
Radio. This one-time allocation of assets f rom the state at the time of the 
establishment does not mean that these public boards cannot gain any income 
from other resources mentioned above. The exact amount and type of income 
is regulated by law in the case of each public board. 
Ad2. The procedure of taking out credits 
There is no special, mandatory procedure, the public board and the bank 
make agreements on the conditions freely. The internal rules of some public 
boards (Basic Rules) usually record the conditions of taking out credits. 
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Ad3. Deposit 
There is no mandatory law, so the deposit is a subject of free agreement. 
Giving deposits can be restricted by the internal rules of the boards. 
Ad4. The extent of indebtedness 
There is no law, nor restriction, so this is also a matter of internal regulation. 
Each board is obliged to carry out the tasks determined by law, so it is 
obvious that the public board cannot endanger the performance of these 
tasks. So the extent of indebtedness is regulated by the general principles of 
"normal management". 
Ad5. Control 
There is no specific regulation on control to prevent indebtedness. The 
state, however, tries to prevent irresponsible management through internal 
and external control. The forms are the following: 
1. The State Audit Office controls the appropriate and responsible manage-
ment of assets belonging to public finances according to the law on public 
finances. Since the assets transferred to the public boards belong to public 
finances, the State Audit Office has the right to control these. Furthermore, 
the State Audit Office can control the whole management of the Academy 
and the economic chambers (not only the management of transferred 
assets) based on legality, expedience and successfulness. 
2. The competent ministers control the respective boards legally. They 
see if the Basic Rules and other regulations of the boards are lawful , 
whether the resolutions of some organizations or off ic ia ls break the law or 
internal rules or not. The minister can go to court and the court can 
suspend the operation of the board in case of violation of the law and can 
assign a supervisor to the public board. The court cannot liquidate the 
public board. The situation is different in the case of mountain munici-
palities because the court can dissolve the mountain municipality at the 
minister 's request. In this case the municipality has to be re-established 
within 60 days. If the same thing happens within 5 years, the wine-
growing area classification automatically ends. 
3. The laws on each public board order the establishment of a mandatory 
internal control organization. This organization should control the given 
board and ensure the legal operation. 
4. Some laws order that from time to time an independent CPA must 
check the management of the public board. 
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Adó. The concepts of indebtedness and insolvency 
There is no mandatory law on this. This question has not been raised so far in 
Hungary, maybe because there has not been any situation that would have 
made it necessary. (I would note here that in the case of local self-govern-
ments the rules of debt arrangement procedures have been made only in 
1996, while the law on local self-governments was issued in 1990) In my 
opinion insolvency regarding public boards means that the board is unable 
to perform its obligation of payment within the given period of time. The 
deadline is always determined by the specific contract or the invoice written 
based on the contract. 
Ad7. The question of permanent insolvency 
There is no specific law on this, nor any legal definition of permanent 
insolvency. W h o should make what steps in case of permanent insolvency 
can be answered as follows: 
— first of all the officials and organizations of the public board must 
make the necessary steps to rehabilitate the financial balance (reducing 
expenses, sell ing mobilized assets, taking out credits etc.), 
— the creditors have the right to help (but it is not mandatory), for 
example by rescheduling the debt or reducing the claims, 
— theoretically the Parliament, which establishes public boards, is entitled 
to help by modifying the law on budget or giving budget subsidies. 
These possibilities do not exclude one another. The supervising minister 
has limited possibilities as I mentioned at question 5. The minister can only 
emphasize the importance of keeping the laws. If this is not successful, 
the minister can go to court. 
Ad8. Can the creditors ask for bankruptcy proceeding, liquidation? 
If not, what possibilities the creditors have? 
As I mentioned in the chapter on local self-governments, bankruptcy proceeding 
or liquidation can be initiated only against economic companies. It cannot be 
done in case of public boards. Debt arrangement procedures cannot be 
initiated here either. If the public board becomes insolvent, and cannot 
pay off the debts, then it is responsible with its whole assets. It can attempt to 
sell its free assets, reduce the expenses or take out credits or have the debt 
rescheduled. If they cannot pay off the debt after all these steps, the creditor 
can go to court according to the civil law and can ask the court to oblige 
the public board to pay off the debts. If this happened and the board does 
not pay, the court will execute distress. When doing this, it is not possible to 
dissolve the public board. The only exception is the mountain municipality 
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f rom the court. If they cannot pay off the debt, they operate illegally. If 
the legal operation cannot be rehabilitated, the minister can ask for the 
dissolution of the municipality. The creditors cannot enforce their claims 
against the Parliament that established the public board by law as there is 
no legal possibility to do this. 
Ad9. Is the state responsible for the debt? 
The Act does not regulate this question, but based on the regulations, it can 
be deduced that the state is not responsible. The Civil Code states that the 
rules on associations are to be applied to public boards. In case of asso-
ciations the law excludes the responsibility of the state. The association 
itself is responsible for the debts with its assets and the members are not 
responsible for the debts beyond the membership fees . The second part of 
this question mentioned in chapter 3 does not have any sense in this case, 
since the public boards are legal entities. 
AdlO. Can those creditors initiate a trial who have not been paid o f f ? 
The answer is the same that I wrote down in case of the local self-govern-
ments. Briefly: yes, theoretically the creditors can initiate a trial according to 
the Civil Code against the persons or organizations controlling the public 
board. There have been no such cases so far in Hungary. 
Adll. The question of transferring tasks to private organizations 
This question is only theoretical, since the state has established the public 
boards to carry out the public tasks recorded by law. However, it cannot be 
excluded theoretically that the state transfers the public tasks to private organi-
zations, economic companies. In this case there are different rules of respon-
sibility. These are the Civil Code rules of bankruptcy proceedings, liquidation 
and final settlement. This could happen if the Parliament trusted a minister 
who can establish an economic company or can obtain concern based on the 
law on public finances to carry out the task. This would be possible only 
with the permission of the Minister of Finances. A further restriction would 
be that the liability of the state in the established economic company could 
not exceed the extent of asset contribution. Another restriction would be 
whether the performance of the public tasks by the public board makes 
business like economic activities necessary or not. The prerequisite of estab-
lishing economic companies is the performance of businesslike economic 
activities. It must be made clear that if the state transferred the performance 
of public tasks to private organizations, the state would not be responsible 
for the debts as it is not responsible in the case of publ ic boards. 
328 ANDRÁS TORMA 
Adl2. The question of initiating criminal procedures 
The answer is the same that 1 gave in the case of local self-governments. Briefly: 
yes. Reports can be made in case of suspecting crime and the Criminal Code 
contains several crimes and punishments for those who commit such crimes. 
7. The third type of public institutions: the public foundations 
7.1. General informations about public foundations 
According to the Civil Code a public foundation is a foundation that is 
established by the Parliament, Government or local self-government to 
carry out public tasks. A public task is a state task or local self-government 
task that must be carried out by the state or the local self-governments 
based on the law. The establishment of a public foundation does not concern 
the performance of public tasks by the state and the local self-govern-
ments, so the public foundation does not replace the state, nor the local 
self-governments. On the other hand, the state (local self-governments) 
are obliged to pay attention to the operation of public foundations and if 
the foundation does not carry out the tasks properly, they must take steps 
immediately. The establishment of a public foundation happens when a 
Foundation Charter is issued. The charter must indicate the organization 
of the foundation, its headquarters, its goals, the assets attributed to the 
accomplishment of the goals and the way of utilization, the trustee and the 
organization entitled to control the trustee. The Founding Charter must be 
issued in an official gazette. 
If the law does not order differently, anyone can join the public foun-
dation. The Charter may prescribe that the trustee's approval is necessary if 
someone wants to join the foundation. Assets must be provided for the 
foundation so that it can accomplish its goals. The Foundation is established 
when it is registered by the court and it ceases to exist when it is canceled 
f rom the registry. It is the founder who hands in a request of establishment 
to the court. The Founding Charter must be attached to the request. The court 
examines if the assets necessary to accomplish the goals exist, if the 
assets are enough to start the operation and they are proportional to the 
performance of the public tasks. The trustee manages the assets of the 
foundation according to the Founding Charter. The trustee is subjected to 
inform the founder of the management every year and is subjected to 
publish other major data as well . The trustee is continuously controlled by 
the controlling organization established by the Founding Charter. The legality 
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and expedience is controlled by the State Audit Office. The legal super-
vision is carried out by the prosecutor's office. The prosecutor examines if 
the foundation operates per the law and the Founding Charter. If the legality 
of operation cannot be ensured in any other way, the prosecutor goes to court. 
The court gives a deadline to the foundation to end the illegal conditions and 
rehabilitate the legal operation. If this is not successful, the court dissolves 
the foundation and orders its cancellation from the registry. The court 
dissolves the foundation based on the prosecutor's request if the accomplish-
ment of goals has become impossible for any reasons. Finally, the court 
can dissolve the foundation at the founder ' s request if the need for the 
given public task has ended or there is a more effective way of performing 
the task. In case of dissolution the assets of the foundation—after the pay-
off of creditors—goes to the founder with the following restriction: the 
assets must be used for similar goals. The public foundation is a legal entity. 
It is responsible for the debts with its own assets. 
Since the establishment of the public foundation happens with the issue of 
a Founding Charter, the specific regulation of goals, organizational structure 
and management cannot be uniform, as in the case of the public boards. 
That is why there are no uni form answers to the 12 questions. I will try to 
refer to the differences. 
7.2. Answers to the raised questions 
Adl. The income of public foundations, taking out credits 
A public foundation is an attribution of assets for public purposes. The 
founder is obliged to provide starting assets to the public foundation, the 
assets must be enough to start the operation and must be proportional to 
the magnitude of the task to be carried out. So here there is a considerable 
attribution of assets at the beginning — opposed to the public boards. The 
resources during the operation are less important here. The public foundation 
can be open or closed. It depends on the fact whether the Founding Charter 
allows new members to join or not. If yes, one of the resources of income 
is the contribution paid by the joining members. The fur ther resources are 
usually the following: 
— the avails of the founding assets, 
— the contribution accepted in the budget, 
— donations, contributions, 
— offers f rom personal income taxes. 
(An interesting thing is that the Miklós Wesselényi Sports Foundation 
carrying out public tasks related to sports gains income f r o m the taxes of 
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drawing games (12%) and from the taxes of pools (100%) as a regular and 
normative income.) 
If the management makes it necessary, the foundation can take out 
credits, except when the founder forbids this in the Founding Charter. 
Ad2. The procedure of taking out credits 
There are no legal restrictions, but the Founding Charter can contain 
restrictions or it can contain proper procedures regarding the credits. 
Ad3. Deposit 
There is no mandatory law, so the deposit is a subject of free agreement 
between the creditors and the foundation. 
Ad4. The extent of indebtedness 
There is no law, but the Founding Charter can contain restrictions. The general 
principles of "normal management" are of course valid for the manage-
ment of public foundations as well, so the public foundation must manage 
so that it can carry out its public tasks. The Founding Charter usually expressly 
records that the public foundation manages according to a yearly budget 
(financial plan). This must keep the expected incomes and expenses in 
balance. This is the t rus tee ' s responsibility. 
Ad5. Control 
There are no regulations that expressly prevent getting in debt. The state 
tries to prevent irresponsible management through external and internal 
control. The forms of these are the following: 
a) The State Audit Of f ice controls the legality and expedience of the 
public foundations ' management. 
b) The prosecutor has a general legal supervision over the whole operation 
of the public foundations. If the legal operation is not ensured for any 
reason (including possible indebtedness), or the accomplishment of the 
goals determined in the Founding Charter has become impossible, the 
court will dissolve the public foundation at the prosecutor 's request. 
c) The founder is obliged to assign not only a trustee, but also a cont-
rolling organization of the trustee in the Founding Charter. The controlling 
organization (usually a Supervising Committee) has the job of controlling 
the whole operation and management of the public foundation. If necessary, 
the controlling organization informs the founder once a year of the manage-
ment and operation. 
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d) Every year an independent CPA examines the management of the 
public foundation and uses the results in the yearly report that is sent to the 
founder. 
Adó. The concepts of indebtedness and insolvency 
There is no law on this. In my opinion indebtedness or insolvency means 
that the public foundation is unable to pay within the given deadline. In 
this case they must try to rehabilitate the financial balance or the goals 
written down in the Founding Charter cannot be accomplished. If this 
happens, the court will dissolve the public foundation at the prosecutor 's 
request. 
Ad7. The question of permanent insolvency 
There is no specific law on this, nor any legal defini t ion of permanent 
insolvency. Who should make what steps in case of permanent insolvency 
can be answered as follows: 
— first of all the trustee of the public foundation must make the 
necessary steps to rehabilitate the financial balance (reducing expenses, 
selling mobilized assets, taking out credits etc.), 
— the founder theoretically has the right to help (but it is not manda-
tory) rehabilitate the f inancial balance, since the founder is responsible 
for the performance of public tasks, 
— the creditors have the right to help (but it is not mandatory), for 
example by rescheduling the debt or reducing the claims. 
The prosecutor 's off ice who does legal supervision does not have the 
possibility to rehabilitate the balance of management, they go to court 
when they notice that the law was broken. 
These possibilities do not exclude one another. 
Ad8. Can the creditors ask for bankruptcy proceeding, liquidation? 
If not, what possibilities the creditors have? 
The answer given in the case of public corporations can be repeated here 
with one difference: if the legal operation is not ensured, the accomplish-
ment of goals determined in the Founding Charter become impossible (even 
because of indebtedness), the prosecutor can ask the court to dissolve the 
public foundation. The creditors cannot enforce their claims against the founder 
because they do not have any legal possibility to do it. The creditors can 
go to only the prosecutor, who can state the illegal operation and can 
initiate a trial for dissolution. 
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Ad9. Is the state responsible for the debt? 
The law does not regulate this question, but based on the regulations, it 
can be deduced that the state is not responsible. Why? The Civil Code states 
in the rules on public foundations that in the case of issues not regulated, 
the rules on foundations are to be applied. In the case of foundations the 
Civil Code states that the rules on the management of associations are to 
be applied to the management of foundations. As I mentioned earlier, the 
association itself is responsible for the debts with its own assets. Again I 
need to mention the rule which states that the establishment of public 
foundations does not concern the performance of public tasks in the case 
of the state (local self-governments). If the public foundat ion is unable to 
carry out the public tasks due to insolvency or any other reason, the state 
(local self-government) as the founder must take steps immediately. It is not 
really important what they do (transfer the tasks to state administration 
organizations, establish management organizations etc.). The main point is 
that the public tasks must be carried out. The second part of this question 
mentioned in chapter 3 does not have any sense in this case, since the public 
foundations are legal entities. 
AdlO. Can those creditors initiate a trial who have not been paid off? 
The answer is the same that I wrote down in case of the local self-govern-
ments. Briefly: yes, theoretically the possibility initiating a trial exists. 
There have been no such cases so far in Hungary. 
Adll. The question of transferring tasks to private organizations 
The main point of the answer is the same I gave in the case public cor-
porations. The theoretical possibility of transfer exists and of course there are 
different rules of responsibility. Since the restrictions mentioned in the case of 
public boards exist here as well, the transfer is really theoretical. As regards 
the final responsibility of the state, the situation is the following as in the case 
of public boards. The state is not responsible for the debts of public 
foundations. It is responsible for the performance of public tasks. The way 
how the state solves this task is their business: it can trust state administration 
organizations, local self-governments, can establish public corporations etc. 
Adl2. The question of initiating criminal procedures 
The answer is the same that I gave in the case of local self-governmentss. 
Briefly: yes. Reports can be made in case of suspecting crime and the 
Criminal Code contains several crimes and punishments for those who 
commit such crimes. 
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8. Public utility companies 
In chapter 2 I wrote that public institutions are such organizations that were 
established by the state to carry out public tasks. These organizations have 
autonomy. Examples: local self-governments, public corporations and public 
foundations. 
However the Civil Code names and regulates public utility companies 
as legal entities. I think I need to mention them because of the following: 
A public utility company is a legal entity that can be established and operated 
by anyone (individuals, legal entities, the state, the local self-governments etc.) 
according to the rules of private law, based on the law on economic companies. 
The peculiarity of public utility companies is that they do so called public 
utility activities and maintain businesslike economic activities to promote 
this public utility activity and the profit cannot be divided among the 
members. The rules on limited liability companies are to be applied to the 
operation of public utility companies and they must establish a Super-
vising Committee and they have to choose a CPA. The rules on company 
law and bankruptcy law are to be applied in case of the winding-up of 
public utility companies. There is a difference: the assets remaining af ter 
paying off debts must be used for public utility purposes. 
The public utility activity carried out by a public utility company is an 
activity that satisfies the common needs of society without gaining profit 
or assets. Examples: helping families, education, protection of the nature, 
voluntary fire-fighting, protection of the environment, protection of 
human rights etc. As you can see, the public utility companies operate as 
non-profit organizations according to the rules of private law. They can be 
established either by the state or others to carry out public utility tasks. 
They do not carry out public tasks, but public utility tasks and they do not 
operate according to the rules of public law, but they are established and 
wind up according to the rules of private law. That is why I did not listed 
these organizations among the public institutions (local self-governments, 
public boards and public foundations) and I think it is not necessary to 
answer all the 12 questions in the case of public utility companies. 
9. The public utility organizations 
The Parliament passed a separate law on the so called public utility organi-
zations (Law No. CLVI of 1997) to make the operation and management 
of these non-governmental, non-profit organizations clearer and to promote 
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their public service activities. The law determines the types of public utility 
activities in 22 points. I have already referred to these in the preceding chapter. 
These organizations can ask the court to be registered in the public-utility 
registry. If this happens, these organizations will have exemption from company 
tax and also allowances regarding local taxes, duties and dues and personal 
income tax. Only the following types of legal entity organizations can apply 
for registration: 
— social organizations (except for political parties, organizations repre-
senting interests, insurance companies), 
— foundations, 
— public foundations, 
— public utility companies, 
— public corporations (if the establishing law al lows it). 
The Tax Authority controls the public utility organizations regarding 
taxes, the State Audit Of f ice controls the utilization of subsidies f r o m the 
budget. The legal control is done by the prosecutor's office. The prosecutor 
can ask the court to cancel the given legal entities f r o m the registration if 
the organization operates illegally in spite of the off ic ia l warning. If the 
yearly income of the organization exceeds five million HUF, a supervising 
board must be established even if there is no such obligation. This supervising 
board controls the operation and management of the organization. In case 
of illegal operations, they call for winding-up, f inal ly they inform the 
prosecutor. The public utility organizations must keep separate records of 
incomes and expenses that come f rom the public util i ty activities and the 
enterprises. The incomes of public utility organizations are the following: 
— contributions received from the founder or some sub-systems of public 
finances or other donations that must be used for public utility purposes, 
— the income from the public utility activities, 
— the income from the investment of means, 
— membership fees, 
— income from the enterprise, 
— other income. 
The public utility organizations cannot issue bills or bonds embodying credit 
relations and with the exception of public utility companies, they cannot 
take out credits endangering the public utility activities. They cannot use the 
contributions received f rom the different sub-systems of public finances to 
pay off credits, nor to cover credits. It is a major rule that the public utility 
organizations cannot divide the incomes coming f r o m the management 
activities, they must use it for the goals determined in the Founding Charter. 
It can be stated from the above mentioned facts that the declaration of an 
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organization as a public utility organization is not relevant regarding our 
subject. Since the activities accomplished by these organizations are peculiar, I 
think the most important rules related to these organizations need to be 
presented, avoiding the answers to the 12 questions. 
Summary 
As regards the present review concentrating on the insolvency of public 
institutions, it should be stated that the Hungarian legal system responded 
relatively quickly to the political changes in 1989-1990. The legal system 
has created the legal institutions and their conditions of operation that are 
necessary to reduce the exaggerated overtaking of tasks on the part of the 
state. I believe these legal institutions operate pretty well, however not perfectly 
and the Hungarian state administration of 2001 is considerably "smaller" than 
the state administration before 1989 and this new administration serves the 
citizens' interests much better. This must not make us self-conceited, but 
we must not be silent when talking about the results. We should con-
tinuously pay attention to the ways of performing public tasks in these of 
other countries, as we have a lot to learn and we have a lot to give as well. 
The section IV.D.l. of the 16th International Congress of Comparative Law 
that the present review was made for provides an excellent opportunity to 
do this. 
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1. Privatization of the Competition Sphere 
In developed Western countries privatization formed part of the neoliberal 
economic policy that occured f rom the 1980-s. This type of privatization 
focused on the decrease of the public sector's scope, which meant the state's 
withdrawal from the public services and at the same time the extension of 
market mechanisms in this field. Similarly to other Central and Eastern 
European countries, the first aim of Hungarian privatization was to trans-
form 90% of the state property in the sphere of competition to private 
ownership. 
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So, the privatization of the countries in transition f rom communism 
has a different function and meaning at the beginning of the privatization 
processes. In Hungary the new economic administrative law concentrated 
on refining the administrative system from its old bureaucratic charac-
teristics and elaborating market institutions which had been in existence 
before the transition. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the new functions 
and activities of administrative law that have played a role in shaping 
privatization. 
1.1. Characteristics of the Bureaucratic Economic Administrative 
System 
In Hungary the privatization process in the sphere of competition happened in 
a special way compared with other Central and Eastern European countries. 
The reason was the special fea tures of Hungarian economic administration 
system which had the greatest e f fec t on the methods of privatization. That 
is, from the 1960-s a special economic administration system had developed 
in Hungary as a result of economic reforms. The main characteristic of this so 
called "neither planned nor market economy" was that the legal regulations 
aimed to create market institutions, although in fact a high level of state 
intervention still existed. 
In order to accelerate the disintegration of the traditional planned 
economy the most essential step was the division of executive and proprietary 
administrative power which was executed in 1984. It meant that most 
proprietary rights belonged to the administrative organs before being 
handed over to the state-owned enterprises, and came to be exercised by self 
governing bodies within the state owned enterprises. The administrative 
authority that had established the state owned enterprises supervised its 
operation from the point of view of legality, and could not intervene by 
economic decisions. 
In 1968 another organization reform had already remodelled the central 
economic administration by eliminating the scope of the sectoral ministries in 
the execution of the central state plan. Instead, a special directional method— 
that of the economic regulators—typified the connection between the 
ministries and the enterprises. Economic regulators were legal norms, but 
in fact represented economic means, such as financial, price, wages, and 
employment factors in the direction of state enterprises. 
This indirect directional method represented a looser connection between 
the central public authorities and the state enterprises, than the directives 
aimed to execute the central economic plan. The so called "functional" 
APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITH REGARD TO PRIVATIZATION... 339 
ministries and central administrative authorities were entitled to pass 
economic regulators and the sectoral ministries were responsible for a sector 
of the economy, such as industry, commerce, agriculture etc. 
Nevertheless this new direction showed the limitation of the public ad-
ministration's intervention, but at the same time was capable of maintaining 
the enterprises' financial and political dependence in another form. Con-
sequently this looser economic-administrative intervention allowed market 
mechanisms and institutions to develop and most of them seemed as a 
basis for the new administrative system. 
1.2. Development of the Privatization Process 
If the privatization is implemented by the transformation of ownership, it 
has generally two forms: the securities of the company can be issued on 
the Stock Exchange, or the shares are sold by tenders. 
The money and security market being less developed in Hungary, the 
only possible means of state enterprises ' privatization in the competition 
sphere was to invite tender for selling. Partly because of this fact , and 
partly for other reasons, selling by inviting tender remained the main form 
of privatization in the competition sphere. 
The first form of privatization, the so called "spontaneous privatization" 
had already taken place during the rule of the last socialist government at 
the end of the 1980-s. By that time it was obvious, that although the self 
governing enterprises were more eff icient and better organized than the 
previous organs of the planned economy, state ownership could not be 
reformed in this way. 
Theoretical attempts to analyse this type of state ownership, could not 
answer the real nature of exercising property rights. The reason was that 
these enterprises did not operate in the form of commercial companies, 
but in public corporations. Secondly, in the lack of any real ownership the 
functions of the owner, the managers and representative organizations were 
interwoven and were exercised by the self governing body consisting of the 
employees. 
Consequently, public corporations could not represent real business 
interests in any form. Legal regulations were passed in 1989, giving the 
enterprises an opportunity to become to commercial companies, in which 
the property rights were exercised by the former self governing bodies. In 
order to obtain capital investment and decrease the companies' debts the 
self governing bodies sold some of its shares to foreign investors and 
banks. In most cases the managers themselves also bought shares. 
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One of the advantages of this form of privatization is that being based 
on the company's decision it could adapt fair ly well, increase the capital, 
decrease the debts and income was generated for development. 
The first democratic government stated that it had to defend state property 
f r o m this "wild privatization", and exherted strong administrative control 
on each step of the process of privatization. This defensive attitude displayed 
the characteristics of the old administrative culture which tried to streng-
then its power by widening its proprietary funct ions. 
But this change was also related to other political interests too: the 
government needed the income generated by privatization in order to finance 
the budget deficit and pay off state debts. Besides, the government intended 
to appoint its own supporters to the most important economic positions, so 
the populist wing accused the former élite of trying to salvage its political 
power in the f o r m of economic power. 
By that time more interest groups, such as the employees, local govern-
ments, claimants of reprivatization, etc., also declared their claims to state 
property, but these interests were not successful. 
As a result of this economic policy the total "renationalization" of the 
state owned enterprises took place. 
The State Property Agency which had merely been an advisory body earlier, 
now became an administrative organ under the government's direct control. 
The State Property Agency put the state enterprises under its administrative 
control and exercised property rights without censure and publicity. Actually, 
this organization was not based on its executive powers but on ownership. 
It meant that it was not possible to contest its decisions either by 
administrative or juridical means . 
Furthermore, the State Property Agency, as an administrative organization 
was not capable of making business decisions properly and did not have enough 
professional administration to deal with the huge number of state enterprises. 
In fact this form of privatization was an unrestricted political privatization, which 
meant, that economic points of view were subordinated to political interests. 
The process of privatization took place in two steps: the public corporations 
were obliged to become to l imited companies, and the shares were sold 
without inviting tender. After some years it increasingly became obvious, that 
the process of privatization had slowed down, had become bureaucratic, a 
"hotbed" of corruption, although there were attempts initiated by the Govern-
ments to reform the privatization system. 
So, besides selling, other legal forms of privatization, such as leasing 
contracts and utilising contracts were introduced. The reason was, that by 
that time, it was obvious, that privatization by selling contracts was not 
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realistic, because domestic capital investment was lacking. Besides, selling 
for foreign investors was not always acceptable because of the fear of the 
dominating influence of foreign capital. 
The State Property Managing Share Company as a super holding company 
in state ownership was also established in order to run those bodies which 
were intended to remain in state ownership for a long t ime. 
As a reaction to the inefficiency of the privatization process, public and 
political opinion increasingly stated the necessity of "the privatization of 
privatization" which meant the decentralization and democratization of 
privatization. In other words, the conditions must be based on legal regula-
tions, and other groups, such as the employees, claimants of reprivatization, 
public foundations, and public bodies must also have an opportunity to 
take part in privatization. 
Sharing the income of privatization between the state budget and the 
privatized companies was also among the claims. 
This new conception of privatization came into being only after the coming 
to power of the socialist-liberal government in 1994. The main aim of the 
reforms was to implement the privatization as soon as possible, because 
the companies under state ownership were making serious looses because 
of the way they were run by the State Property Agency. 
Although the Act on Privatization of 1995 regulates the opportunity for 
other groups to share in' the privatization, such as the claimants of repriva-
tization, the managers, the employees, domestic investors and social insurance 
companies, privilege is given to the foreign investors. The reason is, that only 
this group of buyers can pay in cash, which is needed to cover the state debts 
and to decrease the privatized companies ' capital for development. 
The privatization process must always be published, which means, that 
openly published tenders must be invited and the points of view of the 
decision also must be written in a memorandum. The principles of privatization 
that must be followed during the decision making are also regulated in the 
Act on Privatization of 1995. 
While in the former regulation several public authorities, such as the State 
Property Agency, the State Property Managing Company and Ministries took 
part in the privatization, the Act on Privatization of 1995 placed all the 
companies in state ownership under the State Privatization and Share 
Holding Company. 
The main aim of the State Privatization and Share Holding Company is to 
sell these companies, not to run them. If the selling by invited tender was not 
successful, or the company is intended to be maintained under state owner-
ship, the State Privatization and Share Holding Company has to make utilising 
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contracts with private companies for the treatment. Those companies which are 
intended to remain as state property, such as central utilities, must be selected 
by the Parliament and enumerated in the Act on Privatization of 1995. 
Considering the legal status of the State Privatization and Share Holding 
Company, special importance was given to the several kinds of control over 
it. The Parliament and the Audit Office have the right to supervise the 
activity of the State Privatization and Share Holding Company. Besides, the 
Parliament's approval is needed for the Government's most important privati-
zation decisions. The privatization minister appointed by the Government 
has the rights to exercise property rights. The members of the Board of 
Directors are appointed by the Government and they have legal responsibility 
for their decisions. The Directors of the Board of the Supervision are drawn 
from candidates of the six political parties represented in the Parliament. 
2. Privatization in the Field of Public Utility Services 
2.1. Public Administration's Supervision over Public Utility Services 
Before the 19th century the provision of public services by the state was 
rather unusual, and it was only after the industrial and demographic 
revolutions that it became more widespread. This period of time saw certain 
social changes notably an increasing urban population from which social 
problems, such as poverty, and poor public health arose. 
From the 1980s in Western European countries and in the USA political, 
economic and social observers were generally sceptical about intervention 
by the state. These critics encouraged most governments to rethink their 
own economic policy. The previously positive attitude towards the state 
provision of public and welfare services came under increasing criticism. 
Theories led to the conclusion that the role of the state in directing the 
economy must be queried. Neoliberal economic policy unequivocally held the 
increasing state intervention and the considerable state property responsible 
for inflation and the growing budget expenditure. Liberal economic thinking 
along these lines recommends an economic remedy for economic problems, 
promoting the extension of market mechanism, instead of etatism. 
This was expressed in several economic policy programs, such as 
liberalism, deregulation, privatization, etc. Nevertheless privatization is 
perhaps the program which has had the greatest effect. 
There are many ways to define and interpret privatization: in the most 
narrow sense privatization means the reduction of state property by selling 
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state owned enterprises. In a wider sense it is considered as a decrease in the 
scope of the public sector, the limitation of its function and generally the 
weakening of its influence, at the expense of an increase in private influence. 
The new liberal economic policy presented a system of arguments on more 
levels for the approval of privatization: privatization was accepted favorably 
because it can give individual entrepreneurs the freedom to initiate under-
takings in those areas which had hitherto belonged to monopolies, and as a 
consequence the differentiation of public services widens the customer's options. 
The economic advantage of privatization is that it is capable of dissolving 
those monopolies which are not natural monopolies and which negate 
healthy market competition. Furthermore, the elimination of state property 
and the state's bureaucratic and administrative direction of public enterprises 
would give way to private companies which are much more able to adapt 
to market conditions. 
Privatization of public utility services has special features compared 
with the enterprises of the competition sphere. The main characteristic is, 
that public administration maintains its control over the privatized enterprises 
so that continuity, general availability and quality of the services should 
be guaranteed. The main forms of public administration's control over the 
utility services are price regulation and the supervision of their operation. 
The reason of maintaining of these types of administrative control is, that 
public utility services are monopolies in two senses: state monopolies and 
natural monopolies. Public utility services are often declared as state service 
monopolies, that public authorities have to provide. Natural monopoly is con-
sidered to provide the most effective service if only one farm is in the market. 
Special contracts are made in implementing privatization of public services, 
in which there is a special relationship between the public authority and the 
private farm. Contracts, such as franchise, concession and contracting out, 
are generally applied. 
Public authorities often maintain their right of ownership in these 
contracts, and only the economic functions of the public service are assumed 
by the private firm. Public services are in the public interest, so public 
administration has to shoulder its responsibility, maintain its control , 
although these services are operated by private firms. The right of public 
authorities' supervision can be stipulated in the contract or regulated by 
legal rules. Inviting tender for the operation of public services also serves 
public interest, because that private firm will get the right for the operation of 
the service, which has offered the lowest prices and the best quality. 
If the public services are provided by state owned enterprises, utility services 
are in most cases connected with welfare, and profitability is of no significance. 
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In this case the state gives financial support to the enterprises if they are 
running of a loss. Secondly, although the utility services are maintained 
by public authorities they have an economic, not an executive character. 
If the public utility services are privatized, the confl ict of public and 
private interest emerges. If the utility is operated by the private firm, the 
public authority gives an exclusive right of the operation to the private firm, 
so that the profit should be guaranteed. Consequently, the public authority 
establishes and recognizes a private monopoly instead of state monopoly. 
Being in a monopoly position, the private firm operating the utility service 
can increase its prices, because it is not subject to competition. 
On the other hand, the interest of the customers requires a lower price 
and better quali ty of the service, which should be guaranteed by the state. 
In this case the public interest of the state and the profi t interests of the 
private f irms are always contradictory. 
For this reason, the most problematic point of these contracts is the 
way of determining the service's price. In other words, these contracts are 
long term ones, and because of the changing economic circumstances, the 
prices can not be determined in a fixed way. Instead, the prices charged by 
privatized utility service enterprises are generally determined by means of 
price regulation. 
It is generally accepted, that the role of price regulation must substitute 
for competition in those areas, where natural monopolies exist, and are 
operated by private firms. It means, that price regulation must perform the 
function of the income allocation of the competition: the service's best 
duality for the lowest price, and the guarantee of the private firm's profi t . 
The greatest problem of price regulation is that while the competition has 
perfect regulatory effects, price regulation is a legal method, which can 
not substitute competition in the same way. For example, application of 
price regulation is always based on the legislators' decision, and there has 
not been un i form agreement on prices. 
Secondly, the process of price regulation is generally long and compli-
cated, compared to the automatic effects of competition. Furthermore, the 
principles of the prices have not been elaborated in a sufficient way, 
although differentiated methods of price regulation have developed. 
The institutions of price regulation—the regulatory bodies—are always 
independent f rom the governmental and political organizations, which is 
guaranteed by legal rules. It means, that only the Parliament has the right 
to regulate the framework of the prices, appoint the heads of the regulatory 
bodies, and supervise their activities. The decisions of the regulatory bodies 
can be contested in the courts. The regulatory bodies are public authorities 
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with professional staff. Their main tasks are to pass decrees regulating prices, 
decide in legal discussions between the customers and the private firms, 
supervise the budget of the firms, etc. 
Former opinions emphasized, that price regulation is inevitable, because it 
must substitute competition. But regarding the inefficiency of the price 
regulations, more standpoints admit, that price regulation is less effective, 
than competition supervision. That is, one of the functions of competition 
supervision is to limit the abuses deriving f rom the monopoly. For this 
reason, the basic dilemma of the public service sector is whether the price 
regulation or the conditions of competition supervision must be applied. 
Recently, developing technical requirements allowed market competition 
to be created in those areas, which had previously been natural monopolies. 
As a result, there is a tendency towards putting public utility enterprises 
under competition supervision instead of price regulation. These deregu-
lation programmes intended, that the prices of the deregulated sectors must 
be determined by competition. But deregulation can not be implemented 
for every utilities, or in all the activities of the deregulated utilities. 
Consequently, the elements of competition law and the price regulation 
are interwoven, and it is not easy to decide in concrete cases, which one 
must be applied. 
2.2. Price Regulation and Competition Supervision over Public Utility 
Services in Hungary 
Privatization of public utility services was implemented in 1996 in Hungary. 
Earlier, public service enterprises were placed under direct administrative 
control, even after the economic administrative reforms of the 1960-s. At 
the beginning of the transition most of them were transformed to commercial 
companies and the property rights were exercised by the State Property 
Agency or the local self governments. 
The 1990 Act on Price Regulation declared, that in the new economic 
system prices are to be determined by market competition and the 
intervention of the government in this field can happen only in exceptional 
cases. These exceptional fields are enumerated by the Act, when the means 
of the competition supervision are insufficient to prevent abuses deriving 
f rom the position of monopoly. 
Almost all public utility services are included among these activities, 
and put under price regulation. Price regulation means, that the sectoral 
minister or the local governments are obliged to pass a decree or by-law 
to determine the maximum level of the utilities' prices to be applied. 
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Obviously, the reason for placing these utility services under price 
regulation is, that they are natural monopolies and are not subject to the 
effects of competition. In this case the legal rule determines the prices directly, 
and the provisions of competition law are not applied. The reason is, that 
price regulation instead of competition is responsible for determining the 
"right" price. Secondly, the price is regulated in legal rules which can not 
be revised either by the civil court or the Office of Competition. Certainly, if 
the utility services are not under price regulation, the price is stipulated by 
the parties of the concession contract, and the competition law can be 
applied, if the utility charges a monopoly price. 
Although the traditional means of price regulation was adjusted to the 
requirements of the market mechanisms, it was modelled to the state 
owned utility enterprises. In another words, this system of price regulation 
does not meet the profit interest of the private firms and the customers' 
interest. The reason is, that although the Act declares that the profit must 
be guaranteed, does not regulate the methods and principles of the regulated 
price. It means, that the public authority is entitled to regulate prices and 
may exercise discretion in choosing the method. 
The private company operating the utility only has the right to make 
proposals, which are not obligatory for the public authority. Being a legal rule, 
the regulated price could theoretically be contested only in the Constitutional 
Court, if it does not cover the profit for the private company. But in fact it is 
obviously not the task of the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the sectoral 
ministers are dependent from the government, and represent its interests in 
determining prices. Besides, the local governments ' staff do not have the 
necessary professional skills to regulate the prices. 
Suffice to say, this bureaucratic regulatory system does not meet the 
requirements for the regulatory bodies' independence, the procedural guaran-
tees and differentiated regulatory methods. Naturally, the privatization of 
public utility services could not have been implemented on the basis of this 
regulatory system. For this reason, other solutions were sought to ensure 
the profit interest of the private companies participating in the privatization. 
Firstly, regulatory bodies were established by the legislation in those 
areas, where privatization had been performed. These bodies represent more 
modern principles of price regulation, such as professionalism, independence, 
participation of the companies in applying prices, the representation of the 
customers, the funct ion of balancing several interests, etc. 
Secondly, the methods of price regulation are regulated in Government 
resolutions, which mean, that if the decree or the by-law contradict the 
resolution, they can be challenged in the Constitutional Court. That is, in 
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this case the decree or the by-law violates the principle of the hierarchy of 
legal rules. 
In other cases the contracting parties stipulated the methods of the prices 
to be applied in the concession contract. The minister or the local govern-
ment obliged themselves, not to pass a decree or by-law regulating the 
utility's prices which contradicts the agreement of the contract. The problem 
is, that when the minister or the local government make the concession 
contract, they represent proprietary function, and can not oblige themselves as 
the executive powers. 
On the basis of these analyses it can be proved, that the system of price 
regulation is fairly contradictory and confused. There could be two possible 
solutions. One of them is the creation of the regulatory bodies and procedures 
that represent modern principles. But many experts are unsure, whether it 
is possible without traditions and whether its costs could be financed. 
The other possibility is the extension of competition supervision. In this case 
the Office of Competition would become a "quasi" regulatory body, which 
means that public authorities would determine only the methods of prices 
and the Office would have the scope to decide in the case of abuse of prices. 
But the Office of Competition declared in its decisions many times, that it is 
not the task of the Office to determine the "right" price of the utilities. That is, 
not all utilities are under price regulation, and in these cases the Office has 
the right to decide if the abuse of prices has occured. But the practice of 
the Office shows that it tried to avoid investigating prices, and so the 
costs of the companies operating the utilities. 
2.3. Privatizing Public Utility Services in Hungary 
In Hungary before 1990 almost all the public services were state mono-
polies with a few exceptions, which were allowed to operate privately as 
individuals or companies. After 1990 the liberalization of state monopolies 
was completed. 
The Constitution makes it obligatory for monopolies to be regulated by 
acts of Parliament. Besides the Concession Act several acts contain the 
regulation of state monopolies, e.g. the Civil Code, the Post Act, the Bank 
Act. Some of these may not be operated by private persons, but are the 
exclusive monopoly and property of the state. 
The listed state monopolies in the Concession Act are transferable to 
the private sphere only by concession. The Concession Act was created as 
a framework act containing the general rules of concession, and the detailed 
conditions are regulated in clauses. 
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Among the detailed activities listed in the Concession Act only a few belong 
to the f ield of public services, (the maintenance of public roads, railways, 
rivers, ports , airports, and public utilities, public transport, telecommuni-
cations, postal services) others are regarded as policy monopolies (the 
production of nuclear energy, and the production of drugs), and a third group 
of monopolies are regarded as financial monopolies (mining, state lottery). 
Concession means those privileges, licenses, or advantages which were 
given by the state to persons or organizations for those activities which the state 
is obliged to perform. According to this interpretation concession is a license 
given by the state for executing public tasks by private persons. Concession is 
therefore often considered to be a form of privatization of public duties. 
Licensing, the practice of a state monopoly for a private party is often 
identified as concession. The main difference between concession and licence 
is derived from the two divergent positions of the administrative organ: when 
granting a licence the administrative organ acts as an administrative authority, 
but when awarding a concession it decides to enter into a contract, as an owner. 
Another difference between them is that the conditions of the license 
are determined onesidedly by the state. If the applicant suits all the legal 
requirements he or she will have the right to obtain the license. However, 
the awarding of concession is always the decision of the administrative 
organ, as well the selection of the person entitled to the concession also 
depends on it. Conditions of practice of concession are determined by the 
mutual agreement of the parties. 
The subject of concession may be the granting of a monopoly by the state, 
or the permission to uti l ize state owned property. By granting concession 
on state owned property the state intends to keep its right of control by 
maintaining the right of the ownership of its own property. 
The concession contract is faced with the contradictory elements of 
private and public law. This conflict is caused by the existence of a civil 
law contract representing entrepreneurial activity and of administrative 
control enforcing the public interest. 
This dilemma is revealed in the question, as to whether the concession 
contract can be classified as a civil law contract, or as a separate category. 
However, no explanation has been given as to whether the state can 
legitimately be regarded as an equal party in the contract, despite the state 
maintaining rights as the bearer of executive power. 
Concession contract consists of the preclusion of competition and assurance 
of monopoly for the party entitled to the concession. Obviously there are 
cases when the competition would anyway be excluded because of the 
character of the activity: e.g. the building of roads and motorways. But 
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generally the award of a monopoly is itself diametrically opposed to the 
principles of competition. The question is, what kind of solutions may be 
offered to eliminate this situation? 
The Treaty of Rome tried to outline an alternative: EEC countries have to 
ensure that enterprises should not be awarded exclusive rights which 
would contradict the law of competition as laid down by the Treaty of Rome. 
At the same time the Treaty allows for exceptions: those enterprises 
providing public service are allowed to depart from these rules if they are 
limited in performing their tasks. But any departure should not be in confl ict 
with the public interest. 
Another specific feature of the concession agreement is that in most cases 
concession occurs in areas typified by high capital intensity and low 
rentability. The public administration has to guarantee benefits for the 
contracting party to attract private capital. The measure of the benefi ts of 
concession activity depends on the concession fee and the price of the service. 
As the concession contract is a long term one, the contract may only be 
modified by mutual agreement. In the event of poor calculations or inflat ion 
the enterprise may make losses, and it would result in the bankruptcy of 
the enterprise and at the same time the public would lose its services. 
More variations are applied in determining the price of the public services. 
On one hand the enterprise should be entitled to raise its prices in the event of 
inflation, on the other hand the right to do so may justif iably be limited 
because the activities of such enterprises are not conducted under market 
conditions which would force them to reduce the prices. In most cases the 
price of the services are determined in legal rules by the authorities. 
The most specific character of the concession contract is the public element. 
The object of the concession is always connected with public property or 
public money. For this reason it has become necessary to oversee the making 
of these contracts to safeguard against corruption, and ensure equal 
opportunities. This rule makes it binding for the administrative organ to 
announce its offer of contract and to judge it by way of public tender. 
The first step towards concession is to invite public tender which is an 
obligatory condition of concession. Public tender may be initiated by the 
state, a ministry department, or the local government. The right to invite 
public tender is always determined by the bearer of property, or governed 
by the clauses within the Act. The right to select the candidate for the 
concession follows f rom the right to invite the tender. 
Concession contracts will be made with whoever submits the most favor-
able offer for the concession. According to the interpretation of this provision 
it is not obligatory for the state to enter into a concession contract if the 
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administrative organ has declared the public tender invalid. If the public 
tender is declared valid the concession contract may only be made with 
the winning candidate. 
The other reason why the administrative elements exist in concession 
contracts is the responsibility of public administration for the continuity and 
quality of public service. After the transfer of public services the public 
administration may not refuse responsibility. That is why public organs have 
the right to modify some provisions of the concession contract one sidedly. 
Another departure compared to the civil law contract is the right of the 
administrative organ to nationalize the enterprise in the event of breach of 
contract. Immediate termination of a contract as a sanction of civil law would 
not suit the demand for continuity. As a consequence of being responsible 
for the continuity of services, the public administration has wide rights in 
supervising the enterprise, which may occur in three forms: the state may 
keep the majority of shares in the enterprise, thereby maintaining the right 
of control as the owner. 
The state can also create opportunities for controlling the enterprise by 
legal rules or may entitle the ministry or government department to supervise 
it. Finally, the contracting parties may stipulate the right to control the 
enterprise by the state. 
Concession contacts are made for a definite time to avoid the indefinite 
transfer of state monopolies. The maximum period of the contract is 35 years 
although there was an exceptional contract made for 47 years. 
In the concession contract on one hand the state's obligation is the 
transfer of the right of the operation of the public service, on the other hand 
the contracting party's obligation is to pay the concession fee. During the 
existence of the contract the state is not allowed to change monopoly 
position disadvantageously for the party entitled to the concession, i.e. the 
administrative organ is not permitted to invite another tender, or to establish 
any new state owned enterprise in that field of public service. This regulation 
is necessary to guarantee benefit to the company. 
After making the concession contract it is obligatory to establish a 
business association, and to obtain the licenses which are necessary for 
the practice of the public service activity. 
3. Privatization in the Banking System 
After the aforementioned process of economic liberalization had taken 
place in the 1960s the banking system had to be adjusted to the changed 
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circumstances. Previously, all the banks performed the same functions and 
came under the state budget control. The lack of scope meant that the banks ' 
functions were limited to the execution of the central state plan and the 
financing of state investments. 
The indirect economic administrative system needed a banking system 
which could promote the development of a capital based market. In this 
case the role of the banking system would have been to influence the 
market processes by economic regulators on the basis of the central 
economic policy. 
For this reason the division of the functions of the central and credit 
banks occurred by the end of the 1980-s. The central bank (National Bank 
of Hungary) as the part of the administrative organization system performed 
only the monetary regulatory functions, but 5 state owned commercial banks 
were separated from the central bank. Although the central bank was 
empowered with monetary regulatory rights, its close dependence on the 
government was maintained. 
The government appointed the president of the central bank and it was 
empowered to set credit and monetary policy. Furthermore, legal rules set 
by the government and the finance ministry were obligatory for the activities 
of the central bank. But the budget policy had the greatest influence on the 
central bank's operations: the deficit of the budget was financed by the 
central bank's credits, and the amount was not limited by any legal rule. 
The legal regulations of the transition stated the independence of the 
central bank from the Government in 1991. That is, the Act on the National 
Bank declares, that the Government can not control the activities of the 
National Bank. The role of the Government relating to monetary policy was 
narrowed down to an advising capacity and representation by a minister 
in the Bank 's meetings. The Minister of Finance only has the right to 
reconcile the monetary policy and the finance of the budget deficit with 
the National Bank. Besides, the president and vice president of the National 
Bank are appointed by the president of the Hungarian Republic. The 
directors of the Board of Supervision are appointed by Parliament. 
The National Bank is a share holding company under state ownership, 
but it is also "quasi" public authority entitled with executive power. That is, 
the National Bank has the rights to pass decrees which are obligatory for 
the commercial banks and which provide monetary regulations. The other 
executive task of the National Bank is the supervision of the commercial 
banks as to whether they operate according to the provisions of its decrees. 
However the intervention of public administration began to prevail 
once more which adversely affected the operation of the capital market. 
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Although the Act limited the amount of credit to be given to the budget by 
the central bank, the budget can pressurize the central bank to issue 
government securities. So the budget's financial demands still affect the 
capital market and squeeze credit out of the commercial banks and increase 
inflation in the economy. 
The state monopoly of banking activity was dissolved, and as a reaction, 
new banks were established, primarily by foreign investors. 
The Office of Banking Supervision was established in 1991 under the 
Government 's direction. The main funct ion of the banking supervision is 
to guarantee the interests of the investors. The Office gives the licences 
needed for their establishment. Besides the technical, financial and personnel 
requirements, the Office has to investigate, whether the bank's business 
plan serves the interests of the investors. 
The supervision of the Office is extended to the commercial bank ' s 
activity f rom the aspects of legality and safety of investment. The Off ice 
has the right to apply several sanctions in cases of abuse, such as to 
oblige the bank to take the necessary measures, impose fines, withdraw 
licences and relieve managers from their off ice . 
Obligatory privatization was also legislated in order to decrease the 
scope of public administration in this sphere. But in reality an opposite 
tendency appears. The state owned credit banks made heavy losses partly 
because they had many unpayable claims in the state owned enterprises, 
and partly because of the old management. Therefore the state saved them 
from bankruptcy with an increase of capital subsidy and consolidation of 
credit. As a consequence, the proportion of state ownership has increased 
by 70% in the banking sphere. 
The property rights were exercised by the State property Agency, and later 
by the Ministry of Finance. Obviously, these administrative organizations 
can not have business interests in the banks ' activities which fed—among 
others—to banking scandals in many cases. 
The conclusion can be made that public administration can not assume 
many different divergent functions (supervisory, monetary and proprietary) 
at the same time. The National Bank saves the state owned credit banks f rom 
bankruptcy with refinancing credits, and the Office of Banking Supervision 
performs a lenient supervisory activity over them. Furthermore, the National 
Bank determines high reserve rates for the credit bank's in order to balance 
the budget. Consequently, the saving of state enterprises f rom bankruptcy, 
hinders the proprietary s ta te ' s monetary and supervisory functions. The 
state thus f inds itself in a contradictory position. 
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4. Privatization of the Welfare Sector 
4.1. State-Responsibility in Welfare 
The provision of welfare services as a task for the state has been strongly 
influenced by the European welfare traditions. European governments 
continue to treat welfare services as activities that cannot be adequately 
supplied by the market alone and that must receive state subsidies. In recent 
years, however, U.S. policies have increasingly been based on the idea that 
only the market can assure the quality of welfare services and that the state 
therefore should incorporate market principles in welfare policy. 
There is a persistent debate in the Continental European political literature 
on the question of whether American public administration, which is based on 
a public management approach, has established a new relationship between 
the public and private sectors and whether such approaches can be applied 
to law-governed European systems. This question is especially important in 
the field of welfare, because in Europe the welfare rights of citizens are 
specified in national constitutions and the welfare responsibilities of the 
state are detailed in public law. 
Other pressing questions include whether the law-governed character of 
European public administration can provide adequate welfare services and 
whether such services will be maintained in the manner intended by law. 
Western European theories traditionally have stressed that the public 
interest is better served when providing welfare services is accepted as a 
state responsibility. However, this has become somewhat muddy as a 
result of the neoliberal tendencies of the 1980s. 
From a comparative viewpoint, the United States has provided only a 
minimum level of welfare service. The individualist tradition stresses equal 
opportunity. It is the responsibility of individuals to improve their situation 
by their own efforts. The Constitution declares political, not social or welfare, 
rights of citizens. The provision of welfare has been a mutter of public policy, 
based on the needs and influence of different economic groups. 
However, American culture has always had an aversion to centralized 
power. This has encouraged the establishment of voluntary and charitable 
organizations. In lieu of strict regulation, public policy often encourages 
private administration of welfare services with public oversight. 
Excluding the Great Depression, U.S. social policy never intended to 
provide more than a few governmentally administered welfare programs. 
This follows the belief of many that poverty is in many ways the faul t of 
the individual, hot the result of social inequality. For this reason, social 
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welfare allocations are provided on a case-by-case basis for people in 
need. Awarding welfare is always based on discretion. It is the duty of clients 
to prove their financial condit ion warrants assistance. And provision of 
welfare allocations also depends on whether clients observe behavioral 
rules established by public authorities. Wi th unemployment in the United 
States at relatively low levels in recent years, most Americans believe 
they should no longer f inance welfare services for poor people. 
Europeans view the American welfare system as stigmatizing because 
it does hot f ocus on the social conditions that lead to poverty, but instead 
emphasizes treatment of the symptoms of those conditions. In Continental 
Europe, the publ ic interest is the reason cited for the s ta te ' s responsibility 
to shoulder welfare programs. Social rights are mandated in many national 
constitutions. 
Distinctions between the welfare services of the public and private 
sectors are reflected in the differences between applied public and private 
law. Under public law, welfare belongs to the public sector. It aims to promote 
the poor, and the state must intervene to compensate for unequal market 
mechanisms. For this reason, European approaches regard the application of 
business principles in welfare services as inconsistent with the public interest. 
4.2. Privatization of Welfare Services 
Conservative U.S. economic theory holds that because of the New Deal, 
public administration began shouldering more public tasks than it could 
effectively manage, thus interfering with economic development. In this 
view the principle of free choice is violated, because wel fare services are 
provided by the state and hot the marketplace. 
This theory of privatization often is criticized in Europe, where it is 
widely held that providing welfare is fundamental to the public interest. In 
contrast to the U.S., European theories claim that there is justice in providing 
welfare services because these services are based on fair redistribution. In the 
European way of thinking, freedom means recognition of social citizen-
ship, including the right of individuals to be protected f rom inequality 
brought about by the market. Welfare services based on market principles 
are regarded as being inconsistent with state responsibility. 
However, American style privatization may not mean transferring welfare 
services entirely to the private sector. Instead it may mean shifting to a so-
called "regulated market" where government maintains the responsibility 
but it can assign the operation of welfare services to private enterprise. 
Social policy is also expressed in the U.S. by other means, such as subsidies 
APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITH REGARD TO PRIVATIZATION... 355 
and vouchers. In American government redistribution of wealth is contrary to 
market mechanisms. Rather, individuals in society should accept respon-
sibility for their own welfare. 
Free choice and efficiency due to competition reduces costs and encourages 
partnerships between the private and public sectors. 
The European approach attempts to maintain a boundary between the 
two sectors. But once privatization emerges, the dichotomy of public-private 
law was no longer clear. The public interest that earlier determined what 
kinds of welfare services the state should provide has now become a 
vague, intractably political principle. 
Under U.S. policy, public administration's role is to maintain the quality 
of welfare services. When non-competition is unavoidable, government must 
regulate the price of services. For example, institutions for the homeless 
cannot be easily shifted to a competitive environment or performed on a 
fee basis. Government must exercise near or at least distant control over 
quality and costs. 
In the United States, some welfare services have been privatized by 
contracting out. When a fee cannot be charged for a particular welfare 
service (as is the case for services for drug addicts), the public authority of ten 
assists non-profit enterprises in providing services. While competition is 
often not possible in these fields, costs can be reduced by contracting for 
the best quality service at the lowest cost. 
U.S. privatization occurs if the enterprise providing the welfare service is 
a profit or non-profit organization operating under market conditions. 
Free-of-charge services are regarded as impractical, because only fees can 
assure reasonable consumption. Direct assistance to the needy provided by 
vouchers enable the exercise of choice and at the same time provides benefi ts 
to individuals who are in need. 
Typically, European approaches do not embrace this form of privatization. 
Vouchers are issued directly by public authorities. Privatization of welfare 
to non-profit (and for profit organizations) is rare. Moreover, this approach is 
not likely to displace centralized state systems. 
Many Americans consider nonprofit organizations to be more reliable than 
for-profit businesses, especially when customers cannot judge and choose the 
quality of service. Further, where these organizations operate in a competitive 
environment, public authorities can reduce price supervision over them. 
Consumers of nonprofit services can benefit f rom advantages such as 
flexibility, autonomy, customer-oriented services, and satisfaction of special 
needs. These public-nonprofit partnerships meet the requirements of the 
American public. But there are those in the United States who fear that 
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nonprofit organizations risk losing their identities as their quasi-state role 
expands. 
The U.S. practice of incorporating competition in providing welfare 
services could well serve as a model for Europe. The state's role in providing 
welfare services continues to be dominated by a monopolistic, centralized 
system. 
4.3. Privatizing Welfare Services in Hungary 
In Hungary s ince the demise of Communism, welfare has been provided 
by both the public and the private sector. There is a tangible movement 
toward withdrawal of the state from welfare services. But this drawback is 
occurring without benefit of either well-defined political concepts or 
elaborated theory. The "public interest" in welfare must be redefined. 
The question is as to whether change in the welfare systems in Hungary 
since the transitions are more heavily influenced by American or Western 
European traditions? Is the central challenge to welfare systems meeting 
legal requirements, or is it to provide a loose safety net? Moreover, with 
constitutional and administrative regulations emphasizing that the state 
has a high-level responsibility to support welfare, how can the withdrawal 
of political support and funding for welfare be just i f ied from a legal 
standpoint? 
During the Communist era, welfare in Hungary served as part of the 
wealth redistribution system of the state-controlled economy. The Communist 
state assured the welfare of citizens by dictating how certain goods and 
services were provided to the general population. Not only were welfare 
services provided free of charge, but below-market prices for goods such 
as flats, foods, and utility services were established and subsidized by the 
central government. 
Communist budgets served the interests of production more directly 
than the interest of welfare. For example, they often subsidize money-losing 
state-owned enterprises. Until the 1960s, the so-called "bureaucratic redistri-
bution" based on a macro-economic plan meant that markets existed only 
on the periphery of the economy. Central planning, state investments, and 
bureaucratic allocations prevailed. Starting in the 1960s, however, market 
allocations gained precedence. When that system disintegrated after the 
1990 transition, a small portion of the society became wealthy but most became 
poorer and poorer. This special market produced a new entrepreneurial 
class that have obtained great wealth and a political elite that has achieved 
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great power. The interests of these two elites are of ten able to suppress 
what remains of the bureaucratic state redistribution system. 
Recently, groups whose incomes were provided historically by the state 
bureaucracy have found themselves at tremendous economic disadvantage. 
The guarantee of low incomes and subsidized basic goods and services, 
such as food, homes, and utilities under Communism has disappeared. 
With the privatization of state-owned enterprises and creation of open 
market institutions in the post-Communist era, a "gray economy" prevails 
and the state budget is under great pressure. The percentage of the state 
budget devoted to welfare is higher in post-Communist countries than in 
developed Western nations. The political elite and "new rich" argue that 
welfare costs shouldered by the state in the former Communist regimes 
are far beyond the s ta te ' s ability to pay for them. These circumstances 
have forced the state to further withdraw from many welfare services. As 
a result, the current system can be viewed as a mechanism for maintaining 
a permanent economic underclass. Social policy continues to reflect the 
interests of the new political and entrepreneurial elite, whose members are 
economically independent from the state welfare system and are not interested 
in addressing the growing poverty which could eventually jeopardize their 
own economic success. 
In post-Communist economies there is a pronounced pattern among the 
entrepreneurial class of successfully avoiding the payment of taxes and social 
insurance. As a result, the state budget is further depressed. The reaction 
of the government is to further increase fees and taxes, which, ironically, 
further encourages people to avoid paying them. 
The consequences of fiscal duress are well illustrated in Hungary, where 
the contradiction between, on one hand, the constitutional requirements 
regarding social rights and, on the other, major reductions in welfare services 
has resulted in legal challenges in the Constitutional Court. The Court has 
been forced to interpret welfare rights within the framework of today 's 
more restrictive financial reality. As a result, it has enabled the legal reduction 
of welfare services. There was an attempt to amend the Constitution to 
eliminate some mandated welfare requirements. However, this attempt 
failed. 
Although laws in the post-Communist countries still emphasize the 
state's responsibility, this tendency by the state to withdraw from welfare 
services is increasing. The sharp difference between legal requirements 
and reality in Hungary and other post-Communist countries would be 
better served by administrative innovation and adaptation rather than 
intervention by the court. 
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Reflecting the policy of developed Western countries, former political 
elites in post-Communist countries have attempted to develop a so-called 
"premature welfare state" theory. However, the "premature welfare state" 
theory misinterprets "non-intervention." Non-intervention does not mean the 
radical withdrawal of the state from welfare. 
Hungary has attempted to decentralize and privatize social welfare 
services in order to modernize the system. But replacement of state-welfare 
services by so-called self-organizing institutions has not taken place; instead, 
serious deterioration of welfare services has occurred. 
Welfare privatization in Hungary has been fairly limited. The private 
sector is not sufficiently developed to allow the state to withdraw from 
providing welfare services. Due to a lack of state funding, few, if any, welfare 
services have been shifted to nonprofit organizations. Market conditions 
have been created, but there are relatively few private initiatives in the 
field of welfare, since the majority of citizens do not earn enough to pay 
for welfare services. In the wake of transition, social policy depending on 
privatization is not an attractive proposition for the near future. 
5. Privatizing Health Care 
5.1. Privatization Policies in Health Care 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce privatization concepts of health care 
from a comparative approach. Privatization issues of Hungarian health care 
will be examined in the post-communist political-administrative environment. 
The paper will also briefly look at some principles and trends in the 
privatization of health care in the US and Western Europe. 
Health care in Western Europe has been provided in the public sector as 
an important public service. Even in the US, where the provision of health 
care is largely based on private participation in a competitive environment, 
the government plays an important regulatory role. 
More examples can be mentioned as to how traditions of public adminis-
tration have affected reforms in health care. Reforms aimed at establishing 
general access to health care in the US failed. Such health care reform 
would require a central health authority, which is not realistic in the 
decentralized, business-oriented US public administration. Any national 
health insurance system, based on citizens' mandatory contribution, would 
limit customer choice and increase taxes in the US. The European practice 
of public f inancing of health care is inconsistent with American traditions. 
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The privatization of health care is unlikely to alter public finance systems 
in Europe. This is because authorities have to respect health services as a 
universal constitutional right when organizing health care. Instead, reduced 
subsidization and increased cost sharing, as a result of privatization, 
signals state withdrawal f rom health care. The privatization of health care 
has not always resulted in an extension of market mechanisms in Europe, 
but heavier state intervention and regulation. The aforementioned limitations 
of privatization are closely related to the nature of the centralized and 
law-governed European public administrations. 
Several variations of market mechanisms vs. state regulations have 
developed in health care. Health care is probably the area of the economy in 
which public vs. private elements in f inance, regulation and services have 
interwoven in the most complex way. Privatization in the widest sense 
means reduction of the public sector, but several forms of privatization 
can take place in practical reality. 
Health care in the US, similar to other services, is a business activity, 
and privatization policies aim to achieve even more efficient health services 
by using business principles. Health care services in the Scandinavian 
countries, as opposed to the American practice, are provided by the state 
based on social welfare principles. 
It is important to define the public purpose which privatization policy 
has to follow in health care, as privatization will determine the roles of the 
state, market and civil sectors. 
While the possibilities and limitations of privatization in health care are 
clearly seen in developed western countries, privatization is an unpredictable 
issue in post-communist Europe. The need for privatizing health care is 
evident, but it is difficult to predict exactly which kind of health care 
model may evolve in these countries. 
Hungary has created a public law system based on the continental 
European model, but bureaucratic administrative traditions from the communist 
state remain. The premise of this chapter is that these communist attitudes 
have effected health care reforms and developed a different form of practice 
for privatization than in Western Europe. For this reason, health care reforms 
in Hungary are fairly vague. 
5.2. Public Interest in Health Care 
European health care policies have followed two main areas of public interest 
since the 2nd World War, named solidarity and efficiency. 
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Solidarity means that services are available for all citizens and contri-
bution to health care should be proportional to their income. This is a main 
principle of health care everywhere in Europe. 
National governments are obliged by federal laws to provide free health 
services for poor and elderly people in the US. Medicare and Medicaid 
obviously represent welfare issues, but are exceptional, rather than a general 
commitment on the part of the government. Solidarity has not developed 
in the individualistic American society. The ideology of customer choice 
represents the interest of the American middle class which can obtain 
health services at market prices, but is unwilling to contribute to health 
care for the poor. 
Efficiency in health care in the widest sense means that funds generated 
for health care should provide the best outcome, such as quality of services, 
customer satisfaction, health conditions for the population, etc. It also 
includes the improvement of other factors outside health care, such as 
preventive programs. 
American theories, not accidentally, have established a most differentiated 
way of efficiency and effectiveness in health care. This is due to American 
administrative traditions. Not only health care, but all public adminis-
tration has always been based on business principles in the US. 
The privatization policy in Europe was expected to assure more eff icient 
health services from reduced financial resources. Privatization of health 
care did not merely mean withdrawal of the state, but an increase in the 
role of market mechanisms, such as competition, deregulation, additional 
private insurance, etc. This way of privatization is called "regulated market" 
in health care. 
Opportunities for privatization are limited in European health care. 
Solidarity has been protected by constitutional regulations as citizens' universal 
right to health services. Regulated prices or bureaucratic financial rules still 
prevail here, due to the requirement of global cost containment in public 
finance, too. 
Privatization practices in Europe cannot evidently prove that privatization 
has resulted in greater economic eff iciency in health care, or just trans-
formed financial resources by altering contributions. 
The most important difference between a regulated or free market in health 
care is the public and private character of the finance system. The percentage 
of public finance is low in American health care (only Medicare and Medicaid) 
but dominant in Europe. Only one example can be mentioned as to regulation 
limiting market mechanisms in the US: the regulated prices of Medicare 
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and Medicaid. Due to the influence of the medical business lobby, the 
requirement of global cost containment has less relevance there than in Europe. 
Privatizing health care is problematic in Hungary, because neither 
solidarity nor efficiency can be enforced. 
The Hungarian Constitution declares that everybody has the right to the 
best health care which should be guaranteed by the state through its health 
care system. This kind of regulation obviously contradicts the increased 
state withdrawal from health care: universal access to health care is still 
guaranteed by law, but provision is inadequate. The sharp difference between 
constitutional regulation and practical reality is a basic characteristic of 
the so-called "premature welfare state". 
Redistribution that has recently developed in the Hungarian health 
care system does not insure reasonable contribution from citizens to the 
health services. 
Theoretically, national health insurance is an insurance-based system, 
which means that citizens have to contribute after their incomes. National 
health insurance in fact assures the universal right of health care to citizens. 
So, the costs of the health care of the growing number of unemployed and 
pensioners should be financed by citizens' contributions. 
At the same time, the budget for national health insurance has been 
decreased by half in the last ten years, due to the lack of proportionate sharing 
in contributions. Business associations ere unwilling to pay contributions to 
health care, and can successfully avoid doing so. Wealthier people can afford 
private health-care services, or pay under-the-table money for better state 
health services. 
People with lower incomes, such as civil servants and the employed, 
contribute the most to the budget of the national health insurance. As a 
result, the percentage of private finance is increasing, but public finance 
is proportionally decreasing in the total cost of health care. 
According to general opinion, increasing contribution of citizens to health 
care is not realistic in the current system. Additional Financial resources 
could be drawn in the following way: a) Imposing tax on unhealthy products, 
such as alcohol, tobacco, etc., and transferring it to health care, b) Establishing 
additional health insurance using private insurance companies, c) Compulsory 
co-payment for health services d) Selling state/local government owned 
health institutions. 
No single government has to date made any plan for drawing financial 
resources f rom anything other than citizens' contributions. 
Greater economic efficiency of health care has not been achieved in 
Hungary, either. This is especially diff icul t because many bureaucratic 
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features of the former economic administrative system still prevail, and have 
led to a waste of the decreasing financial resources for health care. 
Health care under communism was funded from the state budget in a 
bureaucratic, centralized system. The funding of various health services was 
determined by political decisions. The provision of health services was a state 
monopoly and health care institutions were owned and closely controlled 
by the state. As in the case of state enterprises, health care institutions 
were f inanced by the state, no matter how inefficient they were. Informal 
bargains between politicians and the directors of health care institutions 
determined how financial resources were transferred to health care. 
Many think that the failures of the health care system are caused by the 
influence of bureaucratic coordination and an unregulated market. Alongside 
the existing bureaucratic coordination, there has developed an unregulated 
market, such as the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industry, private 
clinics, etc. The government controls the health system by traditional 
bureaucratic means, or lets it remain uncontrolled. 
5.3. Health Care Policies in the Politico-Administrative Environment 
Health care policy in Western Europe is determined by political consensus. In 
other words, ad hoc or regular organizations representing several groups 
of health care, such as health authorities, providers, patients, etc., are 
established to negotiate health care policy. Health care policy in Europe 
means no more than an informal consensus-based political decision that 
should be regulated by laws. Political decisions on health care reforms are 
made in a democratic way, although the public administration system 
entrusted to regulate them has been centralized. 
The Americans are adverse to any centralized power, and believe that 
only decentralized public administration and a wide civil sector can 
guarantee democracy. Health care matters are not extensively regulated by 
public laws there. Neither federal nor state laws determine accountability 
for health departments with regard to health services, with only a few 
exceptions, such as AIDS, health care for the poor, etc. Public laws deal with 
the quality of health services or other technical issues, but typically do not 
determine tasks for health authorities. 
In the absence of intense legal regulations, nonprofi t organizations in 
the US have more freedom to influence health care policy. This is also due 
to the traditions of self-governance. The lobby (pressure group), for example 
a medical association, is a kind of nonprofit organization which represents 
an interest group. Lobbies are not informal, but legally regulated and registered 
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organizations in the US. Lobbying activities are a most important guarantee 
to American democracy. 
Nonprofit organizations are in no way limited to deal with public matters 
in the US. This is because there are no public issues that only public 
authorities are entitled to deal with. Consequently, health care policy is 
primarily developed by nonprofit organizations, rather than government 
authorities. Health care policy, similar to other public policies in the US, 
is in fact an applied practice. 
The Hungarian government has not yet established a clear health care 
policy. Instead, it is left to day-to-day political goals as to how health care 
issues are regulated. Steps toward health care reforms that have been seen 
during the last ten years can be concluded only on the basis of legal rules, 
not on health care policy, because government decisions on health care are 
often kept in secret, and made behind the scenes. 
The process of legislation is governed by law in Hungary. It is the task of 
the Ministry of Health Care to elaborate a proposal for laws on health care. 
The minister who is accountable for the operation of the ministry is appointed 
by, and can be recalled by, the prime minister. Acts on health care are passed 
by the Parliament, where political parties in power have a majority. Therefore, 
both the preferences of the minister of health care and the strongest political 
party currently in power prevail, when health care issues are enacted. 
There are "checks and balances" in the legislation, with varying degrees of 
impact. The president of the Hungarian Republic has not exercised his right 
to veto when it comes to health care issues, but more acts on health care 
have been attacked before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court 
has refused to decide in those cases where health care policy was debated. 
Health care pressure groups also influence legislation. Government is 
legally obliged to withdraw representative organizations from the codification 
of health care. However, laws do not state clearly which lobbies (con-
sultative, opinionative, etc.) should be withdrawn, nor how to do so. 
Under communism, representative organizations were established by 
state order. The role of these "artificial" representative organizations was to 
demonstrate to the public that the communist state was democratic. This 
type of tradition still prevails when government authorities do not take 
pressure groups' opinions into account and consider that only the government is 
competent to make important decisions. Government authorities often violate 
acts in the process of legislation, wherein they exclude publicity and arrive 
at informal political bargains. 
Health care is declared by law to be a public issue which only govern-
ment authorities can deal with. The state is accountable for providing 
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health care. Health care policy, however, should be based on a consensus 
between both state and civil sectors, including physicians, citizens, health 
employees, etc. Only a consensus-based health care policy has any chance 
of modernizing health care. 
Lacking consensus, inadequate government decisions are implemented 
regarding health care. This is generally because government authorities cannot 
represent public interests in health care, such as solidarity and efficiency; 
rather, these authorities reflect the personal interests of their leaders. Political 
parties in power choose to share the benefits of privatization through means of 
corruption and via the acquisition of the property of health care institutions. 
The modernization of health care, on the other hand, would hurt the 
interests of certain social groups, and not result in any political benefit for 
the government. Business firms, for example, which share extra profits with 
the management of health institutions for providing diagnostic services 
and senior physicians, who receive most of the under-the-table money 
f rom patients, are interested in maintaining the status quo, but manifestly 
have no interest in modernizing. The public would most likely be against 
additional health insurance, seeing as people would see an increasingly 
narrower state health services in such a reform. 
5.4. Efficiency of Health Care in Developed Countries 
It is well-known that health care providers are interested in extending 
services in order to achieve higher income. Customers do not have enough 
information to judge if health services are really necessary. This is called 
"asymmetrical information" in the market relations of health care. Not only 
are health services typified by "asymmetrical information," but as being 
healthy is the most important value for individuals, demand for health 
services is less limited than that for other goods. 
All financial regulations in Europe which have tried to limit the costs of 
health services at the level of health care providers, while assuring the quality 
of services, have failed. All of the applied incentives have disadvantages. 
The system of "global budgeting" encourages providers to provide less 
service, but does not guarantee quality. Providers are interested in serving 
more patients in the "fee-for-service" or "day system". The most widespread 
method is the DRG (Diagnosis-related groups) system, which incites efficient 
service, but only in the case of one patient, not many. 
Insurance companies in the American private insurance system can 
transfer higher costs to customers by increasing insurance fees, although 
competition between insurance companies forces them to be prudent. The 
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price for health services and insurance is stipulated by contracting parties, 
such as health care providers, insurance companies and patients. Only the 
prices of Medicare and Medicaid are regulated in the US. 
Transferring higher costs to customers is not possible in the European 
publicly financed system, because the measure of contributions to health care 
is determined by law. Therefore, financial rules must meet the requirements 
of global cost containment. In case of loss, the state subsidizes health care 
f rom the state budget, rather than increasing contributions from citizens. 
Such a subsidy is not well received by the economic policy. 
American health insurance companies control the costs of providers 
by using differentiated means for cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness is 
enforced by competition between health providers, customers and insurance 
companies. There is a belief in the US that only market mechanisms, such as 
competition, private ownership and profit-motive, can enforce the quality 
and efficiency of services. Regulated prices and transfer of capacity are the 
rule in European publicly financed systems. 
Health providers, both for- and nonprofit, are interested in profit in the 
US, although in a different way. Communities often establish nonprofit 
hospitals. The nonprofit character of hospitals has a different meaning than in 
Europe. Nonprofit hospitals in Europe can not pursue business-like activities, 
nor make a profit . Nonprofit hospitals are normally f inanced by the state 
or the national health insurance plan so that social welfare issues in the 
provision of health services can be maintained. 
The community, as the owner of nonprofit hospitals, can not directly 
share in the profits, but can generate it for publicly beneficial investments. Non-
profit hospitals in the US are a special legal form of business associations. 
Nonprofit hospitals in the European sense are exceptional in the US, because 
they are thought to be inefficient, and a waste of taxpayers ' money. 
Scandinavian examples, on the other hand, show that state-owned health 
institutions can provide eff icient and high-quality services. 
According to American practice, health services are one of the most 
marketable services. Only the technical requirements of health services 
should be regulated by laws. According to American privatization theories, 
European governments provide services as public goods, because these 
services are thought so important for the public that the government 
guarantees them, regardless of whether consumers can pay for them or not. 
These services are directly provided by public-owned institutions or simply 
subsidized by central or local government authorities. Demand for these 
services necessarily increases due to the low price, which leads to a waste 
of financial resources. 
366 MÁRIA BORDÁS 
However, Europeans consider the American health care inefficient in 
terms of insufficient global cost containment. Americans argue that the 
reason why the US spends a higher proportion of G D P for health care is 
not the ineffective provision of health care, but a better quality of service 
based on a higher level of medical techniques and research. Higher global 
costs of health care are also a result of customer choice. In the US, the 
customer decides how much to spend on health care. 
5.5. Spontaneous and Regulated Privatization in Hungary 
Spontaneous privatization of health care happens when local governments, 
without any relevant legal regulations, initiate privatization of their health 
institutions. When privatization is regulated, legal rules, determining basic 
principles and requirements, serve as a framework for privatization. 
Health institutions were under state ownership during communism, but 
at the beginning of the 1990s they were handed over to local governments. 
Local governments, with few exceptions, such as national clinics and 
medical universities, own health institutions in Hungary. 
Constitutions declare general state-accountability for health care, but it 
is the responsibility of local governments to provide health services in their 
administrative areas. Financial resources for this task are assured by the 
state budget, but not at the necessary level. 
Health institutions operate in a dual financial system: local governments 
are obligated by law to provide the building and medical equipment for 
their health institutions, but the national health insurance finances services 
in a DRG system. Financial laws do not say in what manner local govern-
ments have to maintain the building of the clinic and assure medical 
equipment. Local government can not afford to pay much for their health 
institutions. 
Local governments are entitled by the act on local government to 
decide important issues of their health institutions. These rights of local 
governments, like the rights to autonomy and ownership, are protected by 
the Constitution, as well. Actually, it is the right of local governments to 
sell, lease, or transform their health institutions into business associations. 
Any proposal for acts on privatizing health care can not violate these 
constitutional rights. 
All physicians were public servants before 1990. Laws entitled family 
doctors to provide primary health services in the form of business associations. 
Local governments must contract with them to supervise their activity 
from the point of view of continuity and general availability of services. 
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Family doctors legally received the right to praxis in 2000. Right to 
praxis is an exclusive right to provide primary health services in a given area 
determined by the local government. The owner of the right to praxis can sell 
and inherit his or her praxis. Family doctors often buy the clinic and medical 
equipment from the local government, too. Privatization of the primary 
health system has almost been completed in Hungary. 
Spontaneous privatization has to some extent taken place in the secondary 
health care system. Private firms have invested in medical diagnostic equip-
ment and own and operate them in health institutions. Due to their lobbying 
activity, national health insurance finances diagnostic services to such a high 
level that extra profit can be achieved. Paradoxically, health institutions 
are often loss-making and close to bankruptcy, thanks to the insufficient 
finances of the national health insurance and the poor maintenance of local 
governments. 
Another way for spontaneous privatization of the secondary health system 
is when local government gives the right of operation to a private firm. 
The private firm will have the right to buy or use the property, such as the 
building and medical equipment, and to reorganize health institutions. This 
kind of privatization can theoretically be justified with better professional 
skills on the part of the private firm which can operate health institutions 
more efficiently than the bureaucratic local government authorities. 
The practical reality shows that in most cases members of the political 
elite are the beneficiaries of this kind of privatization. Local governments 
are not required by law to invite a tender open to the public. There are no 
professional or other requirements for privatization, either. 
Neither quality nor efficiency of services can be guaranteed, nor can the 
accountability of local governments be enforced in this system. The private 
firm can not be controlled if it generates financial resources of its own, but 
not for public benefit. This path to privatization can easily become the hotbed 
of corruption, as well. 
Privatization of secondary health care systems should be regulated by 
laws. Legal regulations have to define some principles of privatization, such 
as democracy and legacy, in order to guarantee incentives for better quality 
and eff iciency. 
5.6. Efficiency in Hungarian Health Care 
It is generally accepted in continental Europe that national health insurance can 
serve efficiency better than if health care is financed from the state budget. 
The reason is that it is clearer for the customers how their contributions 
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will be spent on health care, if the national health insurance is separated f rom 
the state budget and owns the funds, than if it is up to day-to-day political 
decisions as to how health care will be f inanced from the state budget. 
Continental European countries traditionally organize health care by national 
health insurance. Funding of the national health insurance is collected f rom 
the compulsory contributions of citizens. The contribution is proportional 
to income, which serves social policy. (Wealthier people pay the costs of 
the poor and the chronically ill.) Health care provision is equal in national 
health insurance, regardless of contribution. 
When national health insurance (NHI) was established in 1990 in Hungary, 
it was thought to be a step toward a more efficient health system. However, 
the government 's idea was to shake off responsibility for health care as 
the most problematic area of welfare. It could be seen at that time that the 
income of the health care budget would decrease due to the black economy. 
The recent government centralized the NHI fond under government control 
again in 1998. 
The NHI was governed by a body represented by government authorities, 
health care providers and customers, and lost its right to determine its 
financial issues in 1998. Instead, it is the right of the government to make 
important decisions about the fond of the national health insurance. The 
NHI is actually a part of the state budget in the recent system. Losses of 
the NHI can be compensated f rom the state budget, as well. 
We can see that the government has a conflict of interest when the NHI is 
formally separate from the state budget, while the government still maintains 
control by keeping the right to determine its budget. The fond of the NHI 
is decreasing and wasted, due to the insufficient finance system. It does not 
serve efficiency, either, if the state subsidizes the losses of the NHI. The 
government keeps the right in this way to make a cost/benefit trade-off, 
depending on the current political situation. 
Laws determine 20 sub-areas of the health care budget, such as operational 
costs, medicine, primary and secondary health care, etc. The Ministry of 
Health Care calculates how many hospital-beds can be financed in each 
county. Then the Office of the NHI makes an agreement on bed-capacity in 
each county. These agreements are in fact administrative decisions made 
by the Office of the NHI. The Office of the NHI is a public authority, not 
a purchaser, when it comes to distributing capacity, which circumstance 
basically determines these agreements. 
The current health finance system is still characterized by a communist-
type planned economy, wherein a central plan has been broken down into 
a number of steps to a group of state enterprises. 
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It would serve economic efficiency, if, instead of a public authority, the 
legal form of the national health insurance were either regional not-for-
profit companies, or business associations in the country. It would be 
important to transfer capacities to these insurance companies so that they as 
purchasers could buy health services in a finance system based on financial 
incentives, and sufficient quality control. Health care providers would bell 
their health services, and compete both for financial resources and patients. 
Health care providers, similarly to the former state enterprises, are still 
not entitled to make their own economic decisions, such as investments, 
making and using profit. 
Local governments, as the owners of health care institutions, can afford to 
spend much on maintaining buildings and buying medical equipment. Health 
care providers sell their health services in a market, where the Office of 
NHI is in a monopoly position and prices are regulated to be low, due to the 
pressure of the state budget. Furthermore, health care providers are purchasers 
when buying medicine at market prices. The pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment industries having been privatized and deregulated, charge monopoly 
prices. 
Health care providers are forced to broaden their services in order to avoid 
bankruptcy. The Office of NHI is not sufficiently interested in checking these 
exaggerated services. The more services are provided on global level, the 
lower prices will be determined to be by the Office of NHI. Paradoxically, 
those health institutions that provide adequate services are operating at a loss. 
This tendency does not serve efficiency on the global level but is instead a 
waste of financial resources. 
Incentives should promote the requirement for "service on an adequate 
level." It is a general tendency in the Hungarian health system that physicians 
treat patients in hospitals, even if it is not necessary, so that hospitals receive 
a higher income, and physicians more under-the-table money. The require-
ment of "service on an adequate level" can be achieved by dividing in- and 
outpatient systems. Physicians will be interested in treating patients in an out-
patient system if they get the right to praxis and f inance in a DRG system. 
Health institutions would undoubtedly be more efficient were they to 
operate in the traditional business manner. Business is regulated by corporate 
law in a refined way so that sufficient economic decisions and financial 
accountability can be assured. Health institutions are closely controlled by 
local government. Limiting the autonomy of health institutions does not 
aid in rational economic activity. Health institutions should compete for 
financial resources in a system that allows the national health insurance 
scheme to buy higher quality, more efficient services. 
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Fighting International and National Corruption by 
Means of Criminal Law 
Abstract . In Hungary there is a wide range of acts of corruption forbidden by criminal law. 
As of 1 April 2002 the measures of penal law applicable in the crackdown on corruption 
were further extended. In the Hungarian Criminal Code the system of corruption offences 
are as follows: bribery (official bribery, economic bribery, bribery in connection with 
hindering of official procedure), failure to report bribery, trading in influence, persecution 
of a conveyor of an announcement of public concern, crimes against the propriety of inter-
national affairs . Furthermore passive forms of br ibery are traditionally judged more strictly 
than active bribery patterns. As regards the comparison of official and economic bribery, 
the degree of penal law sanctioning gradually c a m e closer time to time. The criminal law 
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I. Notion of "Corruption" 
According to official criminal statistics concerning criminal corruption, Hungary 
is in a much better situation than if we regard corruption in general. The 
absolute number of registered corruption crimes fluctuated between 400-500 
and 1,000 in the last 20 years. In the background of criminal corruption there 
are such corrupt relationships in the evaluation of which as well as regarding 
the general notion of corruption hesitation can be felt in several respects. 
As regards the role of material criminal law in combating corruption, in 
our country there is a particularly wide range of acts of corruption forbidden by 
penal law. As of 1 April, 2002 the measures of penal law applicable in the 
crackdown on corruption were further extended. 
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II. Recent significant bribery cases and cases of corruption other than 
bribery and recent law reform in this field 
Regarding recent penal law reform in this area, titles VII (Crimes against 
the purity of public life) and VIII (Crimes against the propriety of international 
affairs) of Chapter XV of the Criminal Code were significantly modif ied 
from 1 April, 2002: 
— Punishments for corruption offences became more severe. 
— In cases of conviction for crimes related to organized crime, confiscation 
of the property gained by the perpetrator during the period of t ime 
when he/she was in contact with organized crime became possible. 
Perpetrators involved in the procedure have the possibility of giving 
evidence of the lawful origin of the enrichment, in order to overcome 
the above presumption. 
— Punishability was created of officials becoming informed about corruption 
cases, but not fulfilling their obligation of reporting the case to the 
competent authorities (Criminal Code Article 255/B). 
— In order to have more effective measures against bribery, new criminal law 
regulations were introduced, which ensure the termination of punis-
hability not only for the active official briber (before 1 April, 2002) but 
also for the passive official briber and also in the cases of economic 
bribery (Criminal Code Article 255/A). 
— In accordance with the contents of documents of the OECD, the Counci l 
of Europe, the European Union, especially in order to fulfil expectations 
of law harmonization, the possibility of sanctioning of legal persons was 
created by Act CIV of 2001. The entry into force of this Act is the day 
of the accession of Hungary to the European Union. 
In the light of these amendments the system of crimes against the purity of 
public life (corruption offences) from 1 April , 2002 is: 
A) Bribery (Criminal Code Articles 250-255/A) 
Bribery in connection with 
Official bribery Economic bribery hindering of official 
procedure 
— passive — passive — active 
— active — active — passive 
B) Failure to report bribery (Criminal Code Article 255/B) 
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C) Trading in influence (Criminal Code Article 256) 
— official type 
— economic type 
D) Persecution of a conveyor of an announcement of public concern 
(Criminal Code Article 257) 
E) Crimes against the propriety of international affairs (Criminal Code 
Articles 258/B-258/F) 
— Bribery in international relations 
— Profiteering with influence in international relations 
III. Bribery of public officials 
1. Protected legal interests 
The circle of legal interests to be protected by punishing bribery was con-
tinuously broadened. Hungarian penal law first put the interest of the purity 
of jurisdiction and then that of public administration under the protection of 
penal law, which was later gradually extended to the economy, too. 
Act V of 1878, the first modern Hungarian Criminal Code basically 
contained regulations to punish illegal official activities. The scope of public 
officials was gradually extended primarily due to the modifications intro-
duced in the 1940s with more and more people becoming public officials 
from the point of view of criminal responsibility and trafficking in influence 
was ordered to be a punishable offence, too. 
The first socialist Code, Act V of 1961 extended the penal law measures 
against corruption to economic life, as well, but contained the definition 
of the individual corruption offences dispersed in four different chapters. 
The presently prevailing Criminal Code, Act IV of 1978 regulates offences 
against the purity of public life consistently in one chapter. 
2. Definition of bribery 
Definition of passive official bribery in the Hungarian Criminal Code (Article 
250, Paragraph 1): Any public official who requests an undue benefit in 
connection with his actions in an official capacity, or accepts such benefit or a 
promise thereof, or agrees with the party requesting or accepting the benefit. 
Passive economic bribery (conducts identical to passive official bribery) 
and from 1 April, 2002 passive bribery in connection with the hindering 
of jurisdiction (i.e. acceptance of unlawful benefit) are also punishable. 
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Concerning the relationship between the official duties and the bribe, 
it is required that the unlawful benefi t should be connected with the duties 
of the public official . 
It is possible that such a relationship occurs in connection with the manage-
ment of a concrete case under way, or within the framework of a permanent 
official relationship arising f rom the position of the public official (e.g. 
regular monitoring by the public official), or as a result of the general work 
of the public official . 
It is important how close this relationship is when it comes to the inflic-
tion of punishment. It is closest in the case when the public official asks 
for an advantage concerning a case under way before fulfi l l ing his official 
duties. It is also a case of bribery, however, if he only asks for the advantage 
after arranging the case. A public official may ask for an advantage inde-
pendently f rom any concrete case. The point in such bribery is to win the 
"goodwill" of the public official in the hope of some future return. 
It has decisive importance that the request for and acceptance of unlawful 
advantage by the public official and his agreement with the one asking for 
or accepting unlawful advantage should take place basically in connection 
with his activities in an official capacity. The request etc. for the advantage 
related to his activities may be simultaneous with the proceedings of the 
public official (the public official gets the advantage while he is proceeding 
in the case), or this act may precede (it is expected that the public official 
will proceed in the case of the person giving the advantage) or follow that 
one. 
3. Various forms of bribery 
According to the Hungarian Criminal Code bribery (as well as trafficking in 
influence) can be of an official or economic type, and bribery in connection 
with hindering of jurisdiction is also punishable from 1 April, 2002. 
Official bribery (Criminal Code Articles 250., 253.): the perpetrator is either 
the public official , or criminal corruption is committed in connection with 
his activities. Official bribery may be related, for example, to the persons or 
activities of policemen, customs officers, borderguards, Tax Office inspectors 
or social security inspectors. 
In the case of economic bribery (Criminal Code Articles 251-252., 254.) 
the perpetrator is the employee or member of a budgetary agency, economic 
organization or non-governmental organization, or an employee or member 
who is authorised to act on behalf of a budgetary agency, economic organi-
zation or non-governmental organization, and the offence is committed in 
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connection with his activities in an official capacity. One characteristic 
field of economic bribery is the granting of credit. 
With respect to the conducts of perpetration, a distinction is made bet-
ween passive bribery (Criminal Code Articles 250-252.) and active bribery 
(Criminal Code Articles 253-254.) for both off icial and economic bribery 
offences. 
The offence of bribery committed in a judicial proceeding (Article 255., 
Paragraphs 1-2.) was introduced into the Criminal Code by Act CXXI of 
2001, which makes both an active and passive perpetrator punishable (with 
identical punishment). 
Trafficking in influence, which can be regarded as indirect bribery, was 
defined in the Criminal Code on the one hand in connection with passive 
forms of perpetration and on the other with regard to official and economic 
patterns of bribery. 
As for passive bribery, the simple definition can be found in Article 
250, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code (see point 2). 
Aggravated passive bribery 
A) if the crime is committed 
— by a public official in a high office, or by one entrusted to take measures 
in important affa i rs , 
— by another public official in an important matter of great importance. 
B) if the perpetrator breaches his official duty in exchange for unlawful 
benefit , exceeds his competence or otherwise abuses his official position, 
or if he commits the act in criminal conspiracy or in a pattern of criminal 
profiteering. 
4. Definition of a bribe 
The unlawful advantage may be of a material or personal, moral character. 
With regard to the fact that international anti-corruption agreements 
use the attribute "unlawful" to qualify the advantage in defining offences of 
bribery punishable in penal law, this attribute was entered into Hungarian 
penal law regulations of bribery offences, as well, by Act CXXI of 2001 
amending the Criminal Code. At the same time it needs to be emphasized 
that in judicial practice it is generally typical to refer to the "advantage" 
as "unlawful advantage". 
Material advantage is most commonly a money payment or any material 
benefit that can be expressed in money value, but the cancelling of debt also 
qualifies as an advantage. Besides, granting a loan or credit is likewise to be 
regarded as material advantage (if interests are to be paid, the acquisition of 
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credit constitutes the advantage, while in the case of granting interest-free 
credit or cancelling debt we are concerned with unilateral monetary 
benefit) . 
Not only the act of giving free of charge benefit or presents but the entering 
into onerous contracts (e.g. a contract of sale) may also result in unlawful 
material or probably even personal advantage as described in the state of 
affairs if it occurs in connection with the activities of the public official in 
an official capacity. 
Personal advantage is e.g. the acceptance of the opportunity to earn 
money or income, the entering into sexual intercourse or in some cases into 
onerous contracts. A career advantage of the moral type is e.g when the 
person concerned is recommended for decoration. 
With regard to the perpetration of offences of bribery it shall not be 
regarded as an advantage if the person is offered such a tiny benefit the 
acceptance of which complies with social customs in the given circumstances 
so it does not constitute misdemeanour (e.g. the acceptance of coffee, drinks 
or cigarettes during official discussions). The unlawful advantage must be 
in connection with the activities of a public official in an official capacity. 
5. Scope of public officials and related persons to be punished 
The following official persons are important f rom the point of view of 
both active and passive bribery (Criminal Code Article 137, point 1): 
a) Members of Parliament; 
b) the President of the Republic; 
c) the Prime Minister; 
d) members of the government, political state secretaries; 
e) constitutional judges, judges , prosecutors; 
f ) ombudsmen of citizens' rights and national and ethnic minority rights; 
g) members of local government bodies; 
h) notaries public and assistant notaries public; 
i) independent court bailiffs and assistant court bailiffs; 
j) persons serving at the constitutional court, the courts, prosecutors 
offices, state administration organs, local government organs, the State 
Audit Office, the Office of the President of the Republic, the Office 
of Parliament, whose activity forms part of the proper functioning 
of the organ; 
k) persons at organs or bodies entrusted with public power, public admi-
nistration duties on the basis of a legal rule, who fulfil tasks of public 
power, or state administration. 
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Other persons are the subject of passive (and active) economic bribery: on the 
one hand any (simple) employee or member, on the other hand any employee 
or member who is authorized to act in the name and on behalf of a budgetary 
agency, economic organization or non-governmental organization. 
6. Conducts to be punished 
The perpetrating conducts related to both official and economic passive 
bribery (request for unlawful advantage, acceptance of unlawful advantage 
or the promise thereof, agreement with the person who requests or accepts 
the unlawful advantage) are the same in Articles 250-252 of the Criminal 
Code. The perpetrating conducts related to active official and economic 
bribery are likewise identical (giving or promising an unlawful advantage) 
with the exception of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article 253 of the Criminal 
Code. 
The table below presents conducts of perpetration. 
Passive bribery 
request an anlawful benefit 
accepts an anlawful benefit 
accepts an anlawful benefit 
agrees with the party requesting or 
accepting the anlawful benefit 
Active bribery 
gives anlawful benefi t 
promises anlawful benef i t 
new special forms 
If the perpetrator commits the passive bribery in criminal conspiracy or in a 
pattern of criminal profiteering, he can be punished for aggravated passive 
bribery. 
7. Mental elements 
Until the recent modification, which came into force on 1 April 2002, intention 
as a mental element was necessary for punishing in all cases of bribery. From 
that time the intention is generally needed for the perpetrator to be punished 
for bribery, except in the new forms of active official bribery (Criminal Code 
Article 253, paragraph 3-4) , because in that case negligence is sufficient. 
Furthermore, active economic bribery (Criminal Code Article 254, paragraph 
1) requires the so called "purpose" (to induce a person to breach his duties) 
and it presumes direct intention. "Purpose" of the act (although different) 
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is also an element of bribery in connection with hindering of jurisdiction 
[Criminal Code Article 255, paragraph ( l ) - ( 2 ) ] . 
8. Active bribery 
According to the Hungarian Criminal Code both active official bribery 
and passive economic bribery can be punished. 
Article 253 of the Criminal Code punishes as active official bribery the 
bribery of a public official or another person with respect to him, and it is 
the supplementary state of affa i rs for passive bribery as def ined in Article 
250. 
The unlawful advantage is to be given or promised to a public official 
or to another person with respect to him. It is not a condition, however, 
that the perpetrator of active bribery should inform the public official 
about the unlawful advantage given or promised to another person with 
respect to him. The criminal offence is perpetrated even if the public official 
does not know about the unlawful advantage given or promised to another 
person with respect to him, or if he knows about it but does not agree with 
the actual or potential beneficiary of the un lawfu l advantage as acceptance 
is not a necessary condition. 
Until the modification with Act CXXI of 2001 it was a criterion of the 
active official bribery that the advantage should be such as "may influence the 
public official in his activities adversely for public interest". This statement 
was eliminated and in harmony with the definition of passive official 
bribery the unlawful advantage must be in connection with the activities of the 
public official according to the active official bribery, as well. The criminal 
offence is completed with the giving or promising of unlawful advantage 
and this is not influenced by the fact that the public official refuses to 
accept the advantage. 
Article 6 of the convention on combating corruption concerning the public 
officials of the member states of the European Union and the public officials 
of the European Communities provides for the criminal responsibility of 
company leaders if a person under their supervision or control commits 
active bribery while proceeding in the interest of the enterprise. For the 
sake of the harmonization with this convention Act CXXI of 2001 modifying 
the Criminal Code introduced paragraphs (3) and (4) into Article 253 as a 
new form of criminalization, thus creating the possibility of penal law 
punishing of the leader, the member authorized to supervise or control, or 
the employee of a corporate organization in the case of active official 
bribery. 
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As active economic bribery the legislator only punishes the giving or 
promising of unlawful advantage with the purpose of the breach of duties 
of the employee or member defined in the Criminal Code. Therefore it is 
not sufficient if the giving or promising of unlawful advantage takes place 
in connection with the activities of the employee or member concerned, in 
contrast with the basic case of active official bribery of more severe 
evaluation in accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 253, with regard to 
which the giving or promising of unlawful advantage is a criminal offence 
even when related to the activities of a public official. On condition that 
the purpose of an advantage given or promised is not the breach of duties, 
active economic bribery does not take place even if the person on the 
passive side commits a breach of duties. 
Active bribery committed in official proceedings is perpetrated with 
the purposeful acceptance of unlawful advantage. The purpose is that the 
person targeted should not exercise his lawful rights in court or other 
official proceedings or should not fulfil his duties. 
IV. Corruption other than bribery of public officials 
1. Bribery in the private sector 
As it was mentioned under point III/5, passive and active economic bribery is 
punishable in connection with the activities of the following persons: on 
the one hand a "simple" employee or member of and on the other hand an 
employee or member who is authorized to act in the name and on behalf of 
a budgetary agency, economic organization or non-governmental organization. 
Their conducts are mostly to be punished in the same way as in the case of 
official bribery, namely in connection with their duties but in the case of 
active economic bribery the so called "purpose", i.e. to induce the person 
to breach his duties is also required (see point III/8). 
2. Trading in influence 
Similarly to offences of bribery, we distinguish between trafficking in official 
influence [Article 256, paragraphs ( l ) - (2 ) ] and trafficking in economic 
influence [Article 256, paragraphs (3)-(4)]. The person trafficking in influence 
requests or accepts the unlawful advantage for himself or another person 
with reference to the fact that he influences a particular person. The person 
trafficking in influence who proceeds in the interest of another person 
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falls between the possible subjects of active and passive bribery but he has an 
independent role. 
The of fence of trafficking in influence is completed with the request for 
or acceptance of the unlawful advantage without any return. It is not necessary 
that the person trafficking in influence should get into contact with the public 
official or any other particular person or that the advantage requested should 
actually get to him. The person who gives the unlawful advantage in order 
to influence a public official commits active official bribery. The perpetrator 
of the of fence of trafficking in influence can be anyone with the exception 
of the public official in charge and the other persons listed. In connection 
with their activities, the request for and acceptance of unlawful advantage is 
passive bribery. 
3. Bribery of voters in elections 
According to the Hungarian Criminal Code (Article 211): Any person in 
the course of election, plebiscite and popular initiative held under the Act on 
Election Procedures, with the following conducts among others commits a 
crime, if 
— he obtains recommendation by virtue of financial advances in violation 
of the provisions of nomination procedures, 
— he obtains signature by virtue of financial advances in the interest 
of initiating a national referendum or popular initiative, 
— he makes any attempt to inf luence the election or plebiscite by 
of fer ing financial benefits. 
4. Corruption other than bribery 
In the Hungarian Criminal Code corruption offences other than brib-
eries—in the framework of crimes against the purity of public life—are as 
follows: 
— Failure to report bribery (Criminal Code Article 255/B) 
— Trading in influence (Criminal Code Article 256) 
> official type 
> economic type 
— Persecution of a conveyor of an announcement of public concern 
(Criminal Code Article 257). 
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V. Sanctions and related measures 
1. In Hungary passive forms of bribery are traditionally judged more 
strictly than active bribery patterns 
As regards the comparison of official and economic bribery, the patterns of 
bribery arranged in one chapter during the codification of the present Criminal 
Code made it easier to compare the penal law regulations concerning economic 
and official bribery from time to time. Bringing the former norms of penal 
law nearer to the latter is justified by the fact that the recent changes 
affecting the economic sector involved the multi-step tightening of penal 
law regulations concerning economic bribery. The degree of penal law 
sanctioning gradually came closer in the case of economic and official 
bribery. Act CXXI of 2001 further diminished the difference between the 
judgement in penal law of economic and official bribery. On the other 
hand it generally introduced a new type of termination of punishability 
because it was extended to twice as wide a circle. 
In accordance with the 1997 OECD Convention, the definition and 
sanctioning of bribery offences committed in national and international 
relationships is very similar in the Hungarian Criminal Code (almost identical 
disregarding 1 or 2 exceptions). 
Act CXXI of 2001 (from 1 April, 2002) made it possible to sanction all 
offences of bribery more rigorously as the imposable punishments were 
raised with one bracket. 
The special part of the Hungarian Criminal Code sanctions every 
offence of bribery with imprisonment. According to the regulations in the 
general part in some cases it is possible to suspend the sentence or replace 
it with a fine. In most severe cases, imprisonment can extend f rom 5 to 10 
years (for example Criminal Code Article 250, paragraph 3 and Article 252, 
paragraph 3). 
2. Corporate responsibility 
Last year in Hungary Act CIV of 2001 on the Measures Applicable against 
Legal Entities under Criminal Law was accepted by the Parliament. The 
entry into force of this act is the day of the accession of Hungary to the 
European Union. 
The main elements of the Act are the following: 
The penal measures against the legal persons are applicable only if the 
court has imposed a punishment concerning the natural person. There are 
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two exceptions to the rule: if the perpetrator is not punishable because of 
his death or mental incapacity. 
The natural person who committed the intentional o f fence could be 
a) persons having an authorization for the representation or manage-
ment of the legal person, being a member of its supervisory committee 
or being a substitute of the abovementioned persons, 
b) an employee of the legal person, but the exercise of control or super-
vision by one of the persons mentioned in point a ) could have 
prevented the commission of the offence, 
c) any person (not even an employee of the legal person), if the legal 
person has enriched because of or through the commission of the 
crime. 
The responsibility of the legal person is based on the connection 
between the legal person and the natural person, and on the fact that 
through the commission of the offence it has enriched or at least it was the 
aim of the perpetration of the offence. 
The measures applicable against the legal persons are the following: 
a) judicial order for winding up 
b) temporary restriction of the activities of the legal person 
c) fine (minimum: 500,000 HUF, maximum: 3 times the enrichment 
obtained or aimed to obta in through the commission of the crime) 
First measure is applicable only as a single sanction, while second and 
third one can be inflicted both single measures and in mixed form together. 
Act CIV of 2001 regulates—separated f rom the Criminal Code and the 
Penal Procedure Code—the penal measures applicable against legal persons, 
the conditions how they could be applied and the procedure of the application. 
The Criminal Code and the Penal Procedural Code only contain a provision 
which refers to the new Act. 
The criminal procedure shal l run parallel with the procedure against 
the legal person in front of the same court and judge. The professional legal 
representation of the legal person shall be obligatory. The rights of the 
legal representative of the legal person shall be more or less similar to the 
rights of the defender. 
3-4. Confiscation of proceeds derived from bribery and other corruption 
offences; Freezing of proceeds 
Article 77/B of the Criminal C o d e contains completely new regulations on 
the forfeiture of assets as a pena l measure f r o m 1 April, 2002. 
The following is seized subject to forfeiture: 
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a) any financial gain or advantage resulting f rom criminal activities, 
obtained by the offender in the course of or in connection with a criminal 
act, 
b) any financial gain or advantage obtained by the offender in connection 
with crimes committed in affiliation with organized crime, 
c) any financial gain or advantage that was used to replace the financial 
gain or advantage obtained by the offender in the course of or in connection 
with a criminal act, 
d) any property that was supplied or intended to be used to f inance the 
means used for the commission of a crime. Any financial gain or advantage 
resulting from criminal activities, obtained by the offender in the course 
of or in connection with a criminal act, also if it served the enrichment of 
another person, shall be seized subject to forfei ture. If such gain or 
advantage was obtained by an economic organization, it shall be subject to 
forfeiture. 
Any profits, intangible assets, claims of monetary value and any financial 
gain or advantage shall be deemed assets. 
Confiscation of an object shall not be ordered if it is included in a forfeiture 
of assets. 
Furthermore Article 77 of the Criminal Code on confiscation contains that 
an object 
a) actually used or intended to be used as an instrument for the commis-
sion of a criminal act, 
b) the possession of which constitutes an endangerment to public safety 
or is illegal, 
c) which is created by way of a criminal act, 
d) for which the criminal act was committed 
shall be confiscated. 
Confiscated objects shall become the property of the state and seized assets 
shall also become the property of the state unless prescribed by law to the 
contrary. 
The abovementioned new criminal law regulation came into force from 
1 April, 2002 concerning both forfeiture of assets and confiscation as penal 
measures. 
It is to be emphasized that Hungary joined the 1990 agreement on money 
laundering and the localization, seizure and confiscation of objects originating 
f rom criminal offences, the promulgation of which was ordered by Act CI 
of 2000. 
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5. Money laundering 
In Hungary the year 1994 was of outstanding importance in the fight against 
money laundering. On the one hand, Parliament passed Act XXIV of 1994 
on the prevention and impeding of money laundering and on the other, Act 
IX of 1994 recodifying economic crimes reintroduced money laundering 
into the Criminal Code, the regulation of which has been modified several 
times recently. 
In the meantime Parliament adopted Act LXXXIII of 2001 on combating 
terrrorism, tightening up the provisions on the impeding of money laundering 
and the ordering of restrictive measures. This Act extended the personal 
scope of the Act on prevention and impeding of money laundering to auditors, 
accountants, tax advisors, real estate agents, traders of high-value movable 
assets and the legal professions. It means that these persons are also obliged 
to report to the police the emergence of any data, fact or circumstance in-
dicating money laundering. The entry into force of this Act was December 
2001. 
The definition of money laundering as a criminal offence was altered 
by Act CXXI of 2001 (coming into force on 1 April, 2002), the essence of 
the modification being the extension of the supplementary character of 
money laundering and thus the scope of fundamental criminal offences. 
The perpetrator of money laundering can be any person who uses items 
obtained by the commission of criminal activities punishable by imprison-
ment in his business activities and/or performs any financial or bank 
transaction in connection with the item in order to conceal its origin. 
Both intentional and negligent forms of money laundering are punishable 
as well as the non-performance of the reporting obligation in connection 
with money laundering. 
VI. Laws and measures to facilitate the investigation and prosecution 
of corruption 
Concerning the conversion of burden of proof it should be emphasized that 
Act CXXI of 2001 exceptionally introduced this possibility in connection 
with forfeiture of assets as a criminal measure (see point V/3-4). According 
to the Hungarian Criminal Code any financial gain or advantage obtained 
by an offender in connection with crimes committed in affiliation with 
organized crime shall be subject to forfeiture until proven otherwise. The 
assets cannot be seized if their origin is proven legitimate. 
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The perpetrator of bribery—except in some aggravated cases—shall be 
exonerated f rom punishment on the passive side of bribery if he confesses 
the act to the authorities first hand, surrenders the obtained unlawful financial 
advantage in any form to the authorities, and reveals the circumstances of 
the criminal act. 
On the active side of bribery the perpetrator shall be exonerated from 
punishment if he confesses the act to the authorities first hand and reveals 
the circumstances of the criminal act (Criminal Code Article 255/A). 
As far as the authorities prosecuting corruption are concerned, according 
to Act XXXI of 2001 on the amendment of Act V of 1972 on the Prosecution 
Service of the Republic of Hungary, the investigation of official bribery 
shall be conducted exclusively by the public prosecutor. In the interest of a 
coordinated, more efficient action against criminal corruption, it is reasonable 
to conduct investigations on concentrated organisational bases. 
VII. Offences having international features and the question of 
international cooperation 
The criminal law regulation on bribery in international relations was intro-
duced by Act LXXXVII of 1998 with due consideration to the OECD's 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions. 
Comparing on the one hand bribery (title VII) and on the other hand 
bribery in international relations (title VIII) in the Hungarian Criminal 
Code some differences can be shown. 
Bribery in international relations can be committed in connection with 
foreign public officials and foreign economic organizations. 
Foreign public official shall mean (Criminal Code Article 137, point 3): 
a) a person serving in the legislature, law enforcement or administrative 
body of a foreign state, 
b) a person serving in an international organization created under inter-
national convention, whose activities form part of the organization's 
activities, 
c) a person elected to serve in the general assembly or body of an inter-
national organization created under international convention, 
d) a member of an international court that is vested with jurisdiction 
over the territory or the citizens of the Republic of Hungary, and any 
person serving in such international court, whose activities form 
part of the court 's activities. 
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Foreign economic organization shall mean organizations functioning as an 
artificial person according to its personal law, which is entitled to perform 
economic activities in its prevailing organizational form (Criminal Code 
Article 258/F). 
As penal law sanctions must be similar to those prescribed by the given 
state in the case of bribing its own public officials, these criminal offences 
mirror domestic criminal offences of bribery. As regards further differences, 
an important one is that in the case of official bribery patterns committed in 
international relations the order is different as active bribery is listed first. 
The other important difference is that in the Hungarian Criminal Code the 
active but not the passive form to be punished from among cases of economic 
bribery committed in international relations. 
The OECD's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions was ratified by Hungary (Act XXXVII 
of 2000). Furthermore in 2000 the Hungarian Parliament made a resolution to 
confirm the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of 
Europe and in the same year the Minister of the Interior subscribed to the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as well. 
VIII-IX. Prevention of corruption, combating against corruption 
Significant steps were taken towards the implementation of the governmental 
strategy, among which the most important one from the point of view of 
everyday practice is that the general obligation of assets declaration concern-
ing persons working in the public sphere. 
Concerning the measures of the prevention of corruption, it is also 
important to mention that the Government has significantly increased the 
salaries of public officials and law enforcement officials. 
It is reasonable that the immunity right of persons performing public power 
offices, elected for a definite period of time, should only guarantee immunity 
for the period of time of the mandate and should not mean a definite obstacle 
to the initiation of criminal procedure. 
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First of all I would like to emphasise that the Hungarian law of criminal 
procedure belongs to the so called continental "mixed" system of the law. 
The convergence of two traditional law systems in the field of criminal justice 
did not avoid our rules of criminal procedure either. The changes of the law 
connected with our joining the human rights conventions (UN International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) are the most significant. 
The extent of the discretionary power of the prosecutor is influenced 
first of all by requirements put by the given state before the criminal investi-
gation. Whether the system of law requires the compulsory investigation, 
prosecution on the basis of the principle "legality" or gives larger scope 
the "opportunity", authorises the prosecutor not to bring every case and every 
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offender to the court, bearing in mind the point of view of appropriateness 
and economic efficiency. 
Although in most part of Europe theoretically every person who commits 
a crime is brought before the court, nowadays the principle and practice of 
opportunity are more and more spreading. 
What is the reason of this phenomenon? First of all the traditional 
"continental" criminal procedure is not able to cope with the increasing 
number of cases to respond to the newly developing types of crime. So the 
legislator has to allow authorities dealing with criminal matters to select 
cases, to decide which categories of cases should be dealt with first and so 
create various exceptions to the principle of legality. The quantitative 
changes of the crime (complicated, referring to special knowledge or so-
called "monstre" cases) were not followed by the raising of the staff number 
and by the development of facilities of the organisations dealing with 
crime. 
At the same time the requirements of fair process should not be forgotten 
when a state fulf i ls the claim for the simpler and quicker arrangement of 
criminal cases. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (Rome, 4. November 1950.) requires a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time. (Article 6. Paragraph 1.) However, as the exact 
content of words "reasonable time" are not determined, every member state 
has to work out a more effective way of dealing with criminal cases without 
unnecessary delay. With regard to these two requirements the Recommen-
dation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe [No. R (87) 
18] gave guidance concerning the simplification of criminal justice 
reserving significant role to the discretionary prosecution. 
In this study I try to have this guidance in sight and compare it with the 
features of discretionary power of the Hungarian public prosecutor. 
Public prosecution and the public prosecutor play a key role in the criminal 
justice system as well as in international co-operation in criminal matters. 
Functions of the public prosecutor are multiple. As another recommendation 
of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Ree (2000) 19) 
defines: 
Functions of the public prosecutor 
1. "Public prosecutors" are public authorities who, on behalf of society and in 
the public interest, ensure the application of the law where the breach of the 
law carries a criminal sanction, taking into account both the rights of the 
individual and the necessary effectiveness of the criminal justice system. 
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2. In all criminal justice systems, public prosecutors: 
— decide whether to initiate or continue prosecutions; 
— conduct prosecutions before the courts; 
— may appeal or conduct appeals concerning all or some court decisions. 
3. In certain criminal justice systems, public prosecutors also: 
— implement national crime policy while adapting it, where appropriate, 
to regional and local circumstances; 
— conduct, direct or supervise investigations; 
— ensure that victims are effectively assisted; 
— decide on alternatives to prosecution; 
— supervise the execution of court decisions; 
— etc. 
In this list there are two (or in wider sense three) functions concerning the 
discretionary power of the public prosecutor: 
1. when he decides to initiate or continue prosecutions, 
2. when he decides on alternatives to prosecution, 
3. (in wider sense as I mentioned above) when he conducts prosecution 
before the court. 
In Hungary the prosecution service headed by the General Prosecutor is 
independent of the government. Investigations in certain cases (prescribed in 
the Act V of 1972 on the public prosecution service) are carried out by the 
prosecutor. In the overwhelming number of cases investigations of other 
authorities (mainly of police) are supervised by the prosecutor. So he/she 
should scrutinise the lawfulness of investigation and shall ensure that the 
persons taking part in investigation may enforce their rights and shall supervise 
the lawfulness of the application of coercive measures. 
The legal background' 
The legal situation in the field of criminal procedural law is very specific 
nowadays. Our Code of Criminal Procedure in its basis was socialist, however 
survived a lot of amendments. In the opposite side there is a new Code which 
hasn't enter into force yet. This new Code preserving former values puts 
the criminal process on mainly new fundament, changing, strengthening the 
1
 I ment ion the original n u m b e r of the Act and instructions, but all of them were 
modi f ied several t imes. 
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role of parties (i.e. the role of the prosecutor and on the other hand the role of 
the defence lawyer and the accuse) in examination of evidences; the relation 
between investigation and court process and the structure of court-system. 
The new Code will enter into force in 2003, but some provisions of the new 
Code have been embodied into the existing Code as amendments since 1998. 
The organisation of public prosecution service is based on the Consti-
tution. Article 52. para 2. says that the General Prosecutor shall answer to the 
Parliament and shall provide a report on his activities. The Act V of 1972 
says about the organisation of the public prosecution office. The Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Act I of 1973) contains several paragraphs concerning 
the role of the public prosecutor in the criminal procedure. Last but not least 
the instructions of the General Prosecutor determine the every day work of 
prosecutors. Among them, of outstanding significance are the instruction 
2/1999 regarding the supervision of the investigation in criminal cases, tasks 
of the public prosecutor after finishing the investigation, the instruction 
10/1995 on the investigation conducted by the prosecutor and the instruction 
6/1987 on the activity of the prosecutor before the court. 
In our country there was serious opposition against the discretionary 
prosecution until quite recently. Some experts held that the discretionary 
power of the prosecutor means that he has similar power to that of the court, 
judges of criminal cases and can impose sanctions. By now due to the 
intention of the legislator who has the requirements of our age and the 
limits of the ability of the criminal justice in sight, the discretionary power of 
the prosecutor has become wider and wider. The facts and figures of how 
often prosecutors use this power can be found in the statistics (see next pages). 
We have to admit that statistics never show how many cases go through the 
prosecutors' hands in which the possibility of discretionary prosecution 
exists. It will be very demonstrative to compare the data of French and 
Hungarian practice. We have French statistics f rom the year 1998. In that 
year 1,193,994 cases became known to the investigating authorities—in 
Hungary 140,083 offenders became known. In France in 34.9% of cases 
the investigation was refused with reference to the opportunity. In 13.7% 
of cases the prosecutor applied mediation, therapy, obliged the offender to 
do some kind of professional training or warned them. So 48.6% of cases 
were not brought before the court. In Hungary 12.48% of the cases were 
quashed.2 
2
 In: Nacsádi , P.: A z oppor tuni tés kérdése a f ranc ia j o g b a n (Problem of the 
Opportuni ty in the French Law) . Ügyészek Lapja No. 2. 2001. 17. 
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These figures show that in our country the prosecutor—if he has the 
possibility to stop the procedure—is not very keen on using his discretionary 
power, or not to such an extent that would be desirable. 
Which are the stages of the process where the discretionary power of the 
prosecutor may be exercised? 
1. Ordering of the investigation: 
The prosecutor may decide to refuse the investigation if the offence 
committed is of negligible degree of the dangerousness for society or 
its dangerousness became negligible, if the suspect collaborates with 
the authorities or in the case of covered agent. 
2. In the stage of prosecution: 
— The prosecutor may quash the process in cases mentioned in 
point 1 of this section, 
— he may postpone indictment or set aside the prosecution. 
3. In the stage of court procedure 
The prosecutor may withdraw the indictment. 
4. If the suspect pleads guilty: 
The prosecutor may propose the application of the following special 
procedure providing a simpler and quicker judgement of the case: 
— bringing to court, 
— waiver of trial, 
— omission of trial. 
The basic principle is that the offender 's consent is necessary wherever 
conditional waiver and conditional discontinuation of procedure is envisaged. 
So if the prosecutor quashes the case and applies reprimand and the suspect 
does not agree with it, he has a right to legal remedy called "complaint". The 
consequence of this complaint is that if there is no other reason to quash the 
investigation, the prosecutor has to prosecute because the consent of the 
suspect to arrange the case without court procedure is absent. 
On the next pages we look over conditions of discretionary decisions. 
1. If the offence committed has negligible degree of the dangerousness for 
society (this is a reason when punishability shall be precluded according to 
the rules of Criminal Code) or if the offence became dangerous for the 
society to a negligible degree (this is a reason in Criminal Code when the 
punishability shall be terminated) the prosecutor may refuse the investi-
gation and reprimands the offender. Reprimand is a measure similar to 
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warning. As it is written in the Criminal Code Section 71 paragraph 3 "By 
a reprimand, the authority expresses its disapproval, and invites the 
perpetrator to restrain himself in the future from the perpetration of a 
»3 
crime. 
If this reason exists, the investigating authority has no power to 
take such decision, although the decision to refuse the investigation is 
generally in their competence. But in these cases balancing is the most 
important feature of the decision-making and the legislator did not entrust 
this task to the investigating authority. So they have to refer the case to 
the prosecutor with a recommendation and the prosecutor takes the 
final decision. 
Similarly active participation of the prosecutor is necessary for the 
refusing of investigation in the case of collaborating suspect and the covered 
agent (in the first case the prosecutor 's consent is necessary, but in the 
latter case the prosecutor himself makes the decision). 
At this point we try to make clear what is meant by the collab-
orating suspect and the covered agent. Collaborating suspect is the 
person with whom the interest relating to co-operations is more 
important f r o m investigating or national security point of view than the 
interest relating to the enforcement of the criminal law claim of the 
state: i.e. in exchange for his co-operation (collaboration) authorities 
let him off . 
The covered agent supports the successfulness of the investigation 
with cover his character. His application is allowed only with the 
permission of the prosecutor, and if he commits a crime during the 
performance of his duties and the interest of the investigation (for which 
he is working) is more important than the interest relating to the enforce-
ment of the criminal law claim of the state, the investigation can be 
refused. Only the county chief prosecutor or his deputy is entrusted to 
give the consent mentioned or make such decisions. They decide on the 
basis of the proposal of the police and af ter examining the file. 
3
 Whole tex t of this section is: 
Section 71 (1) That person shall be reprimanded, who is not punishable due to the 
negligible degree of the dangerousness for society of his act (Section 28) or its becoming 
negligible (Sec t ion 36). 
(2) Rep r imand may also be g iven to a person , w h o is not pun i shab le due to the 
cessation of the dangerousness for society of his act (Section 36), or whose punishabi l i ty 
has ceased to ex i s t for another r e a s o n defined in the Act [Section 32, paragraph e)]. 
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No other investigating authorities (such as Customs Police, Investigating 
Unit of the Tax and Financial Control Office and the Border Guard) acting 
in the criminal procedure are excluded to propose to the prosecutor to 
re fuse the investigation or to quash it in the case when collaborating 
suspect or covered agent is concerned. 
2. In the stage of prosecution the prosecutor has much wider possibilities to 
make the most adequate decision—taking into consideration the seriousness 
of the offence committed, circumstances of commission of the crime and 
the personality of the offender. In this stage the procedure could be quashed 
because of the same reasons as during the investigation. A new possibility is 
the omission of prosecution, where the expansion of the principle of 
opportunity is observable. In this case the prosecutor may omit prosecution 
for a criminal offence which, compared to the criminal offence of greater 
weight made subject of the charge is of no significance for the purpose of 
liability under criminal law, and this shall accordingly be applicable also 
to petty offences connected with the criminal offence. It is to be noted that 
because of the same reason the investigation would have been omitted by 
the investigating authorities and the prosecutor deals with this question 
only when he investigates himself or in the f rame of the supervision of 
the lawfulness of the investigation. In Hungarian legal system we can 
f ind a very new institution introduced at the end of the 1990s called 
postponing of prosecution. First it was applicable only in the procedure 
against juveniles and only since 1999 it is possible to postpone the 
prosecution in the case of adult offenders. However, conditions are 
different: while juveniles have one more chance to prove that personally 
they are not dangerous for the society if they commit a crime punishable 
not more than 5 years imprisonment, this merit of punishment is 3 years 
imprisonment in cases of adult offenders. 
Prosecution may be postponed if this measure could influence the 
future conduct of offender favourably (in cases of juvenile in the interest 
of proper tendency of his development). This means a conditional discon-
tinuation of the case, its period is between 1 and 2 years and during this 
t ime the suspect is under the supervision of a probation officer . If this 
t ime passes successfully the prosecutor quashes the procedure. 
The postponing of the prosecution is "not successful" if the suspect 
was charged with an offence perpetrated intentionally during this period 
or he breaks the rules of conduct imposed seriously. In these cases the 
procedure is not closed but the prosecutor charges him. 
Which conditions preclude the possibility of postponing of the 
prosecution? 
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The first reason is the police records concerning the suspect: if he 
is habitual recidivist, the possibility of postponing the prosecution is 
excluded.4 
The second reason connected with the time of commission of the 
offence in question: if the suspect commits the intentional crime during 
the probation when imprisonment suspended for probation or after he 
was sentenced to imprisonment but the enforcement of this punishment 
is not ended. The explanation of these exclusionary rules is that post-
poning of the prosecution is planned to make possible to avoid the trial 
for offenders behind whom are not so called "criminal career", for whom 
it is enough to keep him back from committing further crime (special 
prevention): overhead of him hang the possibility of the continuation 
of the process as Democles's sword. Postponing of the prosecution is more 
frequent in cases of juveniles, the explanation of this phenomenon is not 
only the wider possibility written in the law, but the difference in the 
structure of offences committed by juveniles and adults and the intention 
of the prosecutor. 
The decision on diversion connected with two circles of crimes does not 
definitely belong to the prosecutor, but we would like to say some words 
about it. 
a) In the Criminal Code a special reason of termination of punishability for 
drug-dependant suspects is created. In this case the investigation may be 
suspended for one year conditionally if the suspect promises to undergo 
continuos treatment for drug-addiction for at least six months. 
b) The investigation may be suspended once in the case of omission of 
support if the satisfaction of o f fender ' s obligation is expected. 
4
 Habitual recidivist shall mean a person, who has been sentenced to imprisonment 
wi thout probation as a recidivist pr ior to the perpetration of a premeditated criminal act, 
and three years have not yet passed f r o m having served the last term of imprisonment or 
the termination of its executability unt i l the perpetration of another cr iminal act punish-
able by imprisonment. (Criminal C o d e of Hungary Section 137. 16) 
5
 Criminal Code, Section 282/A. (6) A drug-addicted person shall not be punishable 
a ) in respect of Paragraph a)-b) of Subsection (5), or 
b) if having commi t t ed another cr iminal act re la ted to the use of narcot ic drugs 
tha t is punishable wi th two years of impr isonment at mos t , 
provided, that he proves with a document prior to the rendering of the sentence in the 
f irs t instance, that he has received cont inuous treatment for drug-addict ion for at least 
s ix months . 
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The reason of suspension of the process in these cases is that the 
treatment of drug-dependent suspect and that the entitled party receives the 
allowance which is necessary for his/her existence are more important, 
than the enforcement of the criminal claim of the state. 
These circumstances giving basis for the suspension of the investigation 
will turn back in the stage of prosecution and before the court: if earlier it 
has not happened the process may be suspended in these stages, because it 
is a fundamental condition that these reasons—essentially the promise of 
the offender—may serve as the reason of suspension only once during the 
process, may block the process once and it is not allowed to give a ground 
to the suspect to cause delay in the criminal process. 
The decision of the prosecutor about how significant he considers the 
confession of the suspect is connected with the stage of the prosecution: 
whether he proposes the application of some quick and simplified special 
procedure or not. Pleading guilty has importance in bringing the suspect 
before the court, concerning waiver of trial and omission of trial. While 
the two previous procedures combine only the advantages of quickness and 
simplicity, in the case of the waiver of trial the suspect receives obvious 
advantages: punishment may be imposed against him in the sense of the law 
could be diminished at least by half.6 
After the prosecutor's proposal, the court, may find the defendant guilty 
(in charges which are not to be punished with more then eight years of 
imprisonment) and may also come up with a sentence with a verdict 
pronounced in an open session, if defendant waivers its right to a trial and 
pleads guilty. In case of a waiver of trial the sentence of imprisonment is 
imposed according to Article 87/C of the Criminal Code (Section 355/J. paras 
(1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). 
The prosecutor, after giving weight to all the circumstances of the case— 
especially the personality of the suspect and the nature of the offence—may 
propose the trying of the case in an open session if the suspect pleaded 
guilty during the investigation and proposes the open session-procedures 
6
 Sec t ion 87/c of the Cr imina l Code says: 
In the c a s e of waiver of r ight to trial (CP , Chapter X X V ) the term of impr i son-
ment may not exceed 
a) three years in respect of crimes punishable by more than five but less than eight 
years of impr i sonment , 
b) two years in respect of cr imes pun i shab le by more than three but less than f ive 
years of impr i sonment , 
c) six m o n t h s in respect of crimes pun i shab le by impr i sonmen t of up to three 
years. 
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(Section 355/K. para (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Even if the 
suspect did not pleaded guilty during the investigation, he/she may propose 
the open session-procedures for fifteen days after the delivery of the indict-
ment. If the prosecutor finds that there is a chance that the court will accept 
the proposal, will hear the accused and send the proposal for an open-
session procedure to the court (Section 355/K. paras (3) and (4) of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure). 
In court process the court is bound by the charge as a principle, which 
means that 
— judicial procedure can be instituted only on the ground of a lawful 
indictment, 
— judicial procedure can go on until the lawful indictment exists, 
— court can judge only the act contained by the indictment, 
— court can make decision only against the accused who was 
charged, 
— the indictment must be exhausted regarding both acts and persons. 
The right of disposal of the prosecutor manifests itself in what the pro-
secutor brings before the court , what he makes subject of the indictment. 
At this point we would like to mention that the classification of the offence by 
the prosecutor does not bind the court. 
The prosecutor can drop the charge even before the court until the court 
convenes a divisional session for passing its decision. During the preparation 
of the trial he can do this without offering any explanation, but after the 
trial was appointed, the prosecutor has to explain his decision on with-
drawing the indictment. The court is not allowed to examine whether the 
explanation is reliable or established, it is bound merely by the fact that 
the prosecutor withdrew the indictment and so the court must quash the 
procedure. Explanation of the withdrawing of the charge may be important 
only within the organisation of prosecutor office. The prosecutor can 
withdraw the charge if the act made subject of the indictment is not a 
criminal offence, or it has not been committed by the accused. Really this 
rule of criminal procedure gives the prosecutor a possibility to correct the 
lack of the former procedure—i.e. insufficiency of fact-finding, insuffi-
ciently supported indictment—because this solution is much more elegant 
than the acquittal. The reason of being the acquittal so "discreditable" for 
the prosecutor has its root in the statistical measuring of the work of 
prosecutors: so called effectiveness of indictment as measurer must 
approach 100%. 
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Statistics 
Now we try to support our statements with statistical data. 
In 2000 the number of offences supervised by the prosecutor was 220,716. 
The investigation was discontinued in 1,788 cases (9.74%) and the prosecutor 
instructed investigating authorities to quash proceeding in 19 cases (0.1%). 
This year 364,325 criminal cases were registered and the prosecutor's 
supervision concerned 80,724 cases (22.16%). (The difference between 
the offences and cases comes from the fact that most criminal cases contain 
more than one offence committed.) In 3,152 (3.9%) out of 80,724 supervised 
cases supplementary investigation was ordered, in 2,618 (3.24%) some 
addition of the investigation was necessary and in 373 cases the prosecutor 
himself executed investigating act. 
I mentioned that the effectiveness of the charge is a very important 
measure in the life of every prosecutor and in every prosecutor's office. 
This index shows in how many cases decisions of the court corresponded 
with the proposition of the prosecutor. In the last five years this index 
varied as follows: 
1996:95.07%; 1997:94.61%; 1998:94.85%; 
1999: 94.40%; 2000: 96.22%. 
From the point of view of discretionary prosecution the rate of postponing 
and omission of prosecution is more important. The number of decisions 
regarding the omission of the prosecution (because the minor offence has 
no significance beside the more serious offence) was: 
The proportion of this decision is decreasing among the so called "other 
way of closing" of the case between 2.65% and 0.55. 
As we mentioned the postponing of prosecution as a relatively new 
measure, could be taken by the prosecutor (since 1996 in juvenile cases 
and since 1999 against adults). Although the proportion of this kind of 
decision is increasing, very few suspects were concerned: 
1996: 13,502; 1997: 12,087; 1998: 11,811; 






In the last 5 years 36.98-45.02% of accomplished cases were settled 
with bringing the case before the court. 
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The investigation was refused and the suspect was reprimanded only in 
few cases: 
1996: 237; 1997: 223; 1998: 460 
1999:251; 2000: 214 cases. 
Far more cases were quashed and the reprimand applied: 
1996: 10,676; 1997: 10,987; 1998: 12,351; 
1999: 11,403; 2000: 10,856 
(1.90-2.15% regarding every closed investigation). 
The new Code of Criminal Procedure 
Rules of the new Code of Criminal Procedure strengthen the role of the 
prosecutor in the criminal process: 
— refer some decisions containing averting of the institution or continuation 
to the exclusive competence of the prosecutor, 
— widen the circle of cases when the prosecutor entrusted to waive 
prosecution. Adjoining to limitation of the prosecution and the waiver 
it because of "bagatelle" (petty) offences the prosecutor will have power 
not only to prescribe rules of conduct for the suspect (both adult and 
juvenile) against whom the prosecution postponed, but he may call the 
suspect to fulfil some duties: pay compensation for the victim, pay certain 
amount of money for the particular purpose or work for the public. But 
juveniles could not be bound to pay money for particular purpose or to 
work for the public: namely these may impose impracticable obligation 
for juveniles and so couldn't serve the aim of their proper development. 
As it is written in the reasoning of the Act XIX of 1998 regarding 
preconditions of prosecution: It follows from the principle of legality that if 
evidence gathered in the preparatory stage of the procedure gives enough 
ground for the prosecution, the indictment is well-founded in respect of 
facts and law as well, the prosecutor has to prosecute; he has discretionary 
power only if the law entrusts him to do so (postponing of prosecution, 
omission of prosecution etc.). The new Code stops the possibility of the 
prosecutor to apply reprimand if he quashes the case. The reason of this 
rule is that every kind of sanctions could be imposed according to the new 
code only by judge. 
Postponing of prosecution is compulsory if a drug-dependant suspect 
promises to submit himself to treatment for drug-addiction for at least six 
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months or the suspect charged with alleged commission of omission of 
support to satisfy his obligation. 
The consent of the suspect is necessary for imposing obligation if the 
prosecutor postpones the prosecution. The prosecutor has to hear the suspect 
for making clear conditions of postponing of the prosecution, whether the 
suspect wants and is able to fulfil his duties. The compensation of the victim 
supposes the consent of the suspect and of the victim as well. 
Conclusions 
The Recommendation R(87) 18 requires that "The principle of discretionary 
prosecution should be introduced or its application extended wherever 
historical development and the constitution of member states allow...". 
As we can see, the discretionary power of the prosecutor has become 
wider and wider during the last ten years in Hungary. But as opposed to 
the way of thinking usual in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, in Hungary the 
preference is on the side of prosecution. Even the reasoning of the new 
Code stands by the principle of legality. 
Instructions created by the General Prosecutor are very generally 
phrased regarding the discretionary power, provide hardly any help for 
prosecutors and so give wide scope for the local variations and applying 
possibilities of diverting of the offender f rom the court proceeding not 
consistently. 
The main problem of the discretionary prosecution is that this decision 
may be accompanied with some kind of sanctions: nowadays with reprimand 
and supervision by a probation officer, but after the new Code enters into 
force these possibilities will widen with obligation the suspect to pay a 
certain amount of money for a special purpose, to work for the public and 
pay compensation to the victim. Even the European Court of Human Rights 
dealt with this question, but the conclusion was that if the discretionary 
prosecution depends on the suspect's consent, the presumption of innocence 
is not injured. 
In Hungarian law discretionary prosecution requires previous consent of the 
suspect and in other cases the suspect has right to remedy and challenge 
the judicial judgement. 
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